MI5 in the Great War

by Nigel West

  The next period of the correspondence is from October 1912 to September 1913 when Schmidt broke off relations with Gould. During the autumn and winter of 1915 the letters reflect the turmoil caused by the Balkan War and the nervousness which resulted from the arrest of Parrott on 15 November 1912, and his trial on 11 January 1913. A new factor appears in the correspondence; Gould obtains an aide who supplies him with reports. This involves additional work in the conduct of the investigation as these reports have to be traced to their source.

  On 28 October, Gould who had scoffed at the cover address used by the German Secret Service, now asked to be written to via London. After his journey abroad in December, Schmidt wrote to him through August Klunder, and, as an additional precaution, the letters were addressed to Gould under an alias which was frequently changed. Besides this, the opening sentence of the letter would imply that the recipient was only temporarily at Rochester. The aliases used were: John Steffenson, George Allen, Stuart Moore, George Parker, Charles Graham and Charles Schattock.

  C. F. Schmidt also changed his own cover address and directed Gould to write via the bankers, Broker & Wirth, 46 rue du Congres, Brussels. But Gould had a rooted objection to any address in Brussels; he took no notice, at first, then he was told to go on writing to the old address; then he adopted the new address, under protest presumably, for Schmidt wrote in some annoyance to say that the address given was quite unremarkable and the only other at his disposal in Brussels was the one (Muller, rue du Theatre) which Gould had refused.

  Moreover, in December Schmidt prepared an improved code and invented a scheme to enable Gould to draw money if war broke out. Both of these were to be communicated at a meeting at Rotterdam, but eventually the code was sent by post. From 28 October onwards, the report are full of rumours connected with hasty mobilisation and, on 15 December Schmidt asked definitely whether there were no signs in the dockyard of special preparation for war. But throughout the eleven months of the period in question Schmidt’s chief objective was the Torpedo Manual and his insistence upon getting it shows the importance the German Staff attached to it.

  On 15 November Gould enclosed with his own letter a report, signed ‘T’, written in a strange handwriting and giving information about certain nucleus crew ships, the equipment of certain vessels with rapid mine-sweeping gear, and the arrival at Sheerness of two 9.2 guns for land defence. Schmidt had been on the point of terminating the contract, but the effect of this letter was immediate; mine-sweeping gear was about as interesting to the Germans as torpedoes. He wrote thanking Gould for the most interesting reports just received, and suggested he should spend more time and trouble on procuring information; a permanent appointment depended upon this. A few days later he begged his ‘Dear Brother-in-law’ to meet him at Rotterdam but Gould, hoping to get samples from Portsmouth, put off the meeting till Friday 6 December. Schmidt accepted that date and asked Gould to wire if he were bringing samples so that arrangements could be made for photographing them.

  Though unrecorded in the file, it is clear from Schmidt’s next letter that Gould did wire to put off the photographer and consequently went abroad unhindered. After his return from Rotterdam, Schmidt wrote that it was to be regretted that Gould had had to put off ‘Herr P’ on account of his friends having been unable to come but ‘Herr P’ had given ‘good hopes for this month’, and three times in succession did Schmidt write urgently demanding completion of this business, but in vain. Gould ascribed his failure to the paralysing nervousness caused by the ‘Gunner’s’ (George Parrott’s) trial. Then Schmidt offered £400 for the 1911 edition of the Report of Torpedo School. This was double the price he had offered in October 1912 (to Klare whose letters about obtaining this report were at that moment being delayed in Germany). Meanwhile, though unsuccessful in obtaining information about torpedoes, Gould had pursued minor objects. His informant had supplied him with details and diagrams of mine-sweeping gear and methods in use in the navy, details and diagrams of the defences of the Medway and particulars of the structure and place of storage of the Sheerness boom defence. And on 25 January came details and diagrams of the Dover defences with especial reference to the boom defence. All this information was allowed to go through as it was not of sufficient importance to require confiscation and MO5 wished to keep their hands free to deal with Gould.

  Besides this he held out hopes of getting details of the Percy Scott Fire-Director. The importance attached to obtaining this information is shown by reports received at Scotland Yard and at the Admiralty. A journalist told the police that on some date previous to 10 January 1913, a German journalist, Fred Manasse, had asked him to procure details of the fire-director, and had read a list of points concerning which he required highly confidential information which had not appeared in the press. On the 15 January 1913 the Admiralty was informed that a lady had been approached by a German of her acquaintance, who asked her to help him procure one of the sights connected with the Percy Scott Range-Finder; three other men were working for him with the same object in view and success might bring in a sum of £800. Finally in the same letter in which Schmidt offered £400 for the Torpedo School Report, he asked for a sketch and precise details of the new fire director and for details of the fire control fitted on the Thunderer.

  The record of the investigation during November and early December shows that MO5, being satisfied that Frederick Gould was not obtaining valuable information, now tried to put in practice a policy which had been successful in the case of George Parrott, but, owing to the cleverness of the professional spy, they failed.

  During November Gould was reported to have changed his habits and to be attending closely to his business; he seldom left the house which was less resorted to by naval men than formerly. When Regan was sent to relieve Melville he found that Gould was inventing another pretext for a trip abroad; moreover conversation at the public-house showed that the Goulds knew George Parrott, their friend Jack Shepherd had said he knew Parrott had been shadowed abroad three times, and Gould was silent and anxious.

  Then the correspondence showed that Gould might be going abroad, hence on 28 November, four ports were warned and two officers were sent from Scotland Yard to shadow him on his trip but they were recalled the following day. On 3 December Regan reported that a dinner and smoking concert which was to have taken place on Friday 6 December, had been postponed till 20 December, and he thought Gould would cross on 5 December; subsequently he noted that the daughter had just posted a letter.

  On 4 December as the journey seemed imminent, the police at the ports were informed that Gould might be going abroad in a few days, but, as he would not be carrying incriminating documents, he must not be stopped, nor must the two police officers who would probably be shadowing him, be recognised. These two officers were again sent to Rochester and together with MO5’s two agents, Regan and Fitzgerald, they kept close watch on Gould until 11.30 p.m. on Wednesday 4 December. On 6 December Regan missed him at the bar, and ascertained from the wife that Gould was ‘upstairs sleeping off the effects of a rough night’. This being reported to MO5, the two officers were recalled to Scotland Yard. Then, on the 7th, a report was received from Sergeant Sandercock of Harwich that Gould had crossed to Rotterdam on the 8th and had returned that day. When Regan called at the Queen Charlotte on the 7th and 8th, there were signs that the family suspected the house was being watched. He had cleverly eluded the police for the third time.

  The leakage continued. Schmidt had sent a fresh cipher code on 24 January, this was followed up by a long questionnaire, covering a immense field of naval armaments which was completed, at Gould’s special request, by questions on tactics, to which Schmidt added one question, supplementary to the long list, on the Percy Scott Fire-Control. Besides this, as a connection to Gould’s nervousness perhaps, Schmidt asked him to submit the name of some person who would procure books of fleet signals and fighting instructions. Schmidt would approach him cautiously and Gould would incur no risk. Subsequently Sch
midt offered £25 for the name of any deck officer who would be willing to work for him.

  On 25 February Gould sent answers to questions 1, 4, 6, 11, 11a, 12b, 26, 28, 34a of the questionnaire; on 7 March answers to questions 34 (n) 34 (o) and 35 with some information about mine-sweeping on 18 March he stated that the fire director was not quite satisfactory, but was to be submitted to severe tests after Easter. On 28 March he sent answers to Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6; on 7 April he sent answers supplied by his informant to questions Nos. 3, 7, 8, 9, 10 of the questionnaire. In this letter too reference is made to a particular book dealing with torpedoes which has ‘a couple of items about fire control’.

  In spite of all this work Schmidt was dissatisfied and again threatened to break off relations with Gould, who had spoken of a special secret surveillance exercised by the authorities in England. But Gould mollified him somewhat by offering for sale a torpedo drill book, edition of 1913. This was not a confidential book but it was issued to officers and instructors only. Gould offered to convey it abroad together with the Admiralty chart of the Medway. Schmidt wished to see the book at Rotterdam or Ostend, which seems to imply that facilities for photographing documents had been set up there. Then he wrote that the book and the chart were of little use but he would like them to be sent by post. But Gould’s man had to account for the things – or the loss of them – on Monday, and the only way was for him to obtain week-end leave from Devonport, and bring them to Rochester. Gould pressed the purchase saying ‘the Thing is full of useful information’, and Schmidt at length agreed to a meeting at Rotterdam, Hotel de France, on 3 May. Gould went and returned via Folkestone on the 5th. At that meeting a quarrel must have taken place, for on 16 May Gould writes that he is leaving for London on 24 May; he is being blackmailed at Rochester; he has a good offer of work in London but he could act as postbox for the German Secret Service. At the same time he has hopes of getting a sample. After consultation with ‘Herr P’, Schmidt agreed to prolong the contract for three months, but he insisted that Gould must go to Devonport. Whereupon Gould postponed the transfer of his business, promised to go to Devonport and on 5 June offered a sample for the following week. Schmidt hoped it would prove of more value than the last and told Gould to travel direct via Harwich. But Gould never went, he had not even seen the book although he declared he had been twice to Devonport, and he sent misleading information about torpedoes. On 6 September Schmidt wrote finally to break the contract, but he told Gould that should he ever obtain anything of value, he was to write to the address in Potsdam as the Brussels address was no longer available. Gould replied that he was leaving Rochester as soon as possible.

  During this period the chief objects of MO5 were to identify Gould’s informants and to protect Admiralty secrets from being tampered with. This involved correspondence with the Admiralty and naval officers, which must now be dealt with, together with certain facts in the correspondence, which it was more convenient to reserve for this special chapter than to mention in their chronological order.

  Since early October of 1912, efforts had been made to find out the names and occupations of Gould’s naval friends and one of the first names submitted was that of ‘Billy’ Knight, a carpenter’s mate. He was a Chief Petty Officer attached to HMS Actaeon, at Sheerness Dockyard. At first suspicion fell on this man and an effort was made to identify him as the writer of the letters. Specimens of the handwriting were sent through the Commander-in-Chief at the Nore to the captain of the Actaeon, who returned them saying he had been unable to connect them with anyone on the ship. Regan however had previously reported ‘Billy’ Knight’s recent retirement from the service, and that it was said he intended to settle at Devonport, his birthplace. The inquiry was therefore not pursued.

  A better clue was afforded by the letter which contained a sketch of Dover defences. Inquiry elicited the fact that, on 19 December 1912, a party of six riggers had been sent from Sheerness to help in fitting the nets of the Dover boom defence and Captain Kell guessed that the culprit would be one of those employed on this work. But specimens of handwriting obtained from this group of men were insufficient to prove identity and further specimens could not be procured without causing remark. For a long time suspicion rested on George William Shepherd (the Admiralty form), Gunner, known as ‘Jock or Jack Sheppard’, an intimate friend of Gould, and a First Class Petty Officer attached to HMS Pembroke, the stores department of Chatham Dockyard. However, there was some doubt as to the man’s name. The police at Chatham identified the photo as that of George William Shepherd, Gunner, and the ‘trace’ from the Royal Navy Barracks, at Chatham, gives the name, George William Shepherd, adding the private address used by Jock or Jack Sheppard. Regan also identified the photo as that of Jack Sheppard but Commander Booth Allen of HMS Pembroke wrote of him as Petty Officer Sheppard. There was also a petty officer named George Howard Sheppars who may have been identical with George W. Shepherd, as the trace of the two men were strikingly alike.

  In answer to Schmidt’s request, Gould had submitted this man’s name and photograph stating that he would do anything for money if he were cautiously approached. When employed in the Stores Department he had embezzled to the extent of £2 a week and now he was moved to other work he was very poor. Schmidt at once wrote to George Sheppard (the form of the name used by Gould) but he concealed his connection with Gould, signing under the name Alexandropf, and giving the address as the Palace Hotel in Lucerne. He said he could offer him a means of earning money easily and suggested that Sheppard should send an address to which particulars could be forwarded without risk. Sheppard, fearing a trap (his remarks about Parrott have been quoted already), did not answer but showed the letter to Gould, who wrote rebuking Schmidt for his bad English and want of caution. Then Schmidt wrote again and enclosed £1 as earnest of his intentions. Sheppard showed this letter to Commander Booth Allen of HMS Pembroke, and so somewhat tardily cleared his character.

  Up to the end of April, however, Captain Drake thought that Sheppard was the purveyor of news and documents to Gould, and made the usual inquiries at the office of the Commander-in-Chief, the Nore.

  Schmidt’s acceptance of the torpedo drill book led to the identification of the writer of Gould’s reports, for when Schmidt’s telegram had come through, Gould immediately wired to Thomas James Mott to meet him that night. Now Mott’s name was on the list of men who had been sent to Sheerness to rig the boom at Dover.

  On 30 April Captain Kell informed Mr Pullen of the discovery made and asked whether Mott was a position to disclose anything of importance. Mott, a former Torpedo Coxswain had been employed for about a year in the dockyard. The question of how to handle the case was discussed with the Superintendent of the dockyard. It was agreed to keep him on without any remark but to take steps that he should not be employed on any confidential work. Later on he seems to have been kept so busily at work that he had no time to meet Gould – if we may believe Gould’s statement – and in any case the precautions taken were successful for Mott wrote on 25 August confessing to Gould that he had failed miserably. It has been shown already that the information he supplied to Gould was not valuable, nor could certain definite references made to the contents of the book offered for sale in April be traced to any torpedo book known to Captain Villiers, HMS Actaeon.

  Mott’s name was put on the SWL for Kent, the police kept some watch upon his movements, and the naval authorities were specially warned when Gould was proposing to put special pressure on Mott in order to save his own reputation. In February 1914, Sir Graham Greene was warned that in view of Mott’s connection with Gould it would be wise to move him from his station and after Gould’s conviction the question of the man’s discharge from the dockyard was again mooted, and the further question arose as to whether in that case he should be told the grounds of his discharge. But because intercepted correspondence could not be produced as evidence and Mott might deny the charge and get his case taken up publicly, it was agreed not to interrogate him but to frigh
ten him thoroughly. A semi-official letter drafted by MO5 and initialed by the Secretary of the Admiralty was sent to the Commander-in-Chief at the Nore, requesting him to instruct the Superintendent of Sheerness Dockyard to send for Mott and tell him that in the course of investigations it had been discovered that he had been in touch with a foreign agent under gravely suspicious circumstances, and that to communicate information to a foreign power was a felony punishable with seven years’ imprisonment. He was to be invited to make a signed statement after being duly cautioned that the authorities might use it against him. This policy was successfully carried out and on 30 April Mott signed a statement denying everything.

  Another man in touch with Gould was J. M. Pinkard of HMS Cyclops, a repair ship. From the ‘trace’ of his services by the Admiralty it appeared that his conduct was very good; he was intelligent and might be very useful to the enemy if he were not trustworthy. MO5 wrote asking that he should be kept under observation by the police of Chatham Dockyard and he was placed on the SWL for the army and navy. On 19 February 1914 his name was submitted to Sir Graham Greene with the suggestion that he should be removed from his station on account of his connection with Gould. As regards preventive action concerning the care of official documents, it will suffice to note once and for all the principle followed by MO5: as soon as they had particulars of the photos or maps offered to Schmidt, inquiry was made of the naval authorities as to the value of these objects and a warning was given as to Gould’s intentions. During this period the police reported Gould’s various items of interest connected with Gould’s children; Maud, for a short time, was a barmaid in a small public-house at Folkestone; Adolphus was at work in the Haymarket and living with an elder brother Henry, at Clapham. Gould, changing his habits, was going out at night, in the direction of Chatham and coming home the worse for drink.