MI5 in the Great War

by Nigel West

In summing up the Gould case we may distinguish points that concern the case alone and points that arise in relating it with other cases. The investigation was of enormous length and involved an extraordinary number of officials, inclucing the police at Rochester, Chatham, Portsmouth, Harwich, Dover and London, and post office officials at Rochester, Dover and presumably London. Such an investigation gave opportunities for disagreement on the part of the several authorities involved and for leakage.

  MO5 were scrupulously courteous and conciliatory; they made every effort to ensure harmonious co-operation with every department, and also between the several branches of the constabulary engaged in the enquiry. Yet there are traces of a difference of opinion between MO5 and the central police authorities on the question of arrest on suspicion, such a difference perhaps, as arises naturally from the different training and outlook of the military and the police. The military background of MO5 may constitute a difficulty in dealing with the spy cases: such a possibility should at least be kept in view. On the other hand, there seems to have been some friction between the police of Rochester and of Portsmouth Dockyard, the latter being under the Metropolitan Police.

  There may have been no leakage, and probably was none, but the case illustrates the extraordinary difficulty of police observation. In a big town the prey escapes, in a small town the hunt is seen and guarded against. Moreover, with such a network of spying as the Germans had organised, any special measures taken at any danger-spot, such as a dockyard or port, would be noted and reported. Consequently a long investigation is to be avoided both on the score of expense and difficulty. MO5 tried to close on Gould many times; he evaded them easily showing an expert knowledge of his trade. In conclusion, several points arose from grouping the cases. It seemed the spies knew each other and each other’s work, in their own centre and in different centres.

  The case is the last in a long series. The evidence collected in the study of the series seems to prove that, contrary to what was supposed, the spy was not isolated; he did not act in ignorance of what others of his own grade were doing; he knew not only spies working in his own neighbourhood but those in distant fields. How else should Parrott have recognised Klare at Ostend and what was the meaning of Gould, who was a failure at Rochester, being repeatedly told to go to Portsmouth and Devonport? Besides, we have, in various assertions of the spies, evidence that seems to prove they pooled their experiences. This, of course, might not take place directly but indirectly through the German spy-master.

  As evidence of direct communication between spies we have a link connecting Lozel with Karl Hentschel and Hentschel with the Rileys and Parrott with Wittstruck and with Gould in the Chatham district and with Klare in the Portsmouth district; Gould with Klockenbusch at Chatham and with Kronauer in London (and possibly also Kent); Wittstruck with Kronauer and Ernst; Grosse seems to have had some connection with Kronauer and a question that needs answering is why did Patricia Hentschel assume the name of Howarth? That was the name of a firm at Singapore which had employed Grosse on his discharge from prison; this form of the name sometimes also is used by mistake for Horvarth and Howard.

  The evidence seems to prove that the business of spying like any other business becomes a family affair; the action of the Germans in supporting the families of their victims who came to grief tends to make it hereditary, while normal pressure tends to make it spread collaterally.

  MO5 laid great stress on obtaining information as to a suspect’s friends and associates. The police were not always able to supply this and it may be asked whether it might not have paid to act on the assumption that a suspect in a district was a friend of and working with, a known spy in that district and to give the police a hint to work on the lines of such an assumption. Possibly, too, the Home Office Warrants might have been extended in that direction. Mrs Riley, for instance, had been definitely asked to send her letters through the intermediary of some friend and while the Gould correspondence is on the whole admirably complete, that of Parrott and the Rileys is not. Wittstruck’s correspondence might possibly have supplied some valuable information with regard to the Chatham and Sheerness group.

  After Frederick Gould’s arrest his true name was established by a London County Council Inspector who had discovered it on one of the Gould children’s birth certificates. He brought the fact to the notice of the police and called their attention to another case of the same kind that had occurred in his district. The children of a foreigner named Horvath attended school under the name Howard. In years gone by the Horvaths had lived in the district and had frequently visited the Continent. They had then left Southfields and gone to Golder’s Green. They were supposed to be friendly with the Goulds and had returned to the district and gone to live at 297 Wimbledon Park Road, at about the time the Goulds went to Merton Road. Horvath was reserved and resentful of official interference; at the time of Gould’s arrest he was harassed by business worries. No enquiry seems to have been made but Horvath’s name was put on check. He was found to be corresponding with Berlin, to be receiving by parcel post, very small quantities of a special sort of wire, and to be expecting the visit of a certain Herr Sannig, head of the firm and at that time engaged on a business tour.

  He was also expecting the arrival of Fritz Kramm from Berlin. Taut seemed to avoid answering Kramm’s letters. Herr Sannig fell ill suddenly at Amsterdam and returned to Berlin. The writer of most of the letters subsequently announced that Sannig’s visit to England was given up but he himself might come later.

  The suspicious circumstances were Horvath’s apparent unwillingness to write to Fritz Kramm in Berlin; the fact that his breakdown in health and postponed journey of Herr Sannig coincided with the apparent breakdown of Walter Reimann’s journey in March 1914; but the correspondence might be genuine. The Home Office Warrants which had been taken out for Horvath and Fritz Kramm were cancelled on 30 April, having produced nothing after 25 March. War broke out and on 15 October 1914 MO5G reported Stephen Horvath, a mantle manufacturer at Kentish Town and Highgate, to the CID as a suspicious character who should be watched. The police replied that Horvath had registered as a Hungarian subject, that he had five children all born in England; he was an electrical engineer, and had lived in this country fifteen years. He was then the principal of the Corona Lamp Works Company of Asham Street, Kentish Town. Casual observation had been kept upon him, and there was nothing suspicious to report.

  In July 1915, the Home Office referred to MO5 Horvath’s application for exemption from internment which was favourably considered. Two years later, however, Horvath’s neighbours were insistent for his internment, and 45,000 residents of Wandsworth signed a petition in that sense. Enquiry made by the local police failed to produce anything substantial but the police reported that Horvath had never expressed good sentiments towards this country. Enquiry was made at Horvath’s place of business, where he was found to be doing work of national importance in producing tungsten under the supervision of the Ministry of Munitions. There was nothing on which MO5 could act and Horvath was known to have an enemy, Mrs Clutterbuck-Barnett. Then William Jones, a neighbour of Horvath’s, wrote explaining Horvath’s position; he was loyal, was a denationalised Hungarian, all his children were British except the eldest son, who for special reasons had been born in Hungary. The case was brought up again in September 1918, as that of an unnaturalised Austrian, with a son of military age not serving, and a daughter engaged to an officer of the British Army. Horvath behaved insolently to the Special Constable who was sent to inquire but his papers were in order and no further action was taken. The ambiguity of the position of Stephen Horvath and still more of his son was obviously the cause of great offence to the public. The police were to blame in that they had given incorrect information to MO5 as to the nationality of all the children. The point seems to be that a more prolonged enquiry in 1914 might have given more certain results.

  The LCC Inspector considered the man’s actions suspicious and there was sufficient in the corr
espondence to raise some doubt. The connection with the Gould family seems never to have been verified and it is obvious that if there had ever been any guilty association, Horvath would have been particularly careful while Gould’s case hung in the balance and for some time after Gould was sentenced on 3 April. The records of this early part of the case are almost certainly incomplete; if there was any police enquiry at all, the probability is that Horvath would have known of it and have been extra cautious. With the expiry of the Home Office Warrant all chance of clearing up doubts vanished.

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  The third group of enemy agents to be investigated after August 1914 proved to be of rather less significance and consisted of a dozen men. They were Friedrich von Diederichs, a 65-year-old pensioned German naval commander; George Beatty; Private Harry Sampson; Carl Meyer; Robert Blackburn; Frederic Sukowski; Carl Hemlar; Karl Stubenwoll; Edward Durkin; Antonius Rummenie; Thomas Hegnauer and August Reichwald.

  Von Diederichs was the son of a German admiral. He came to England shortly before the outbreak of war and wrote letters to Captain von Prieger, head of the German Secret Service, at 38 Konigin Augustastrasse, Berlin. This was already known to be the headquarters of the German Admiralty’s intelligence branch and had been the subject of a HOW that had been taken out for the name ‘Streckel’ at this address on about 22 July 1914.

  In these letters he gave details connected with British naval mobilisation, asked for certain addresses at A (Amsterdam) and R (Rotterdam) to be sent him, suggested that a simple code for urgent telegraphic communication be supplied, and that arrangements should be made to remit money in case of war.

  He wrote to his brother Hermann von Diederichs KK at the same address and Hermann replied that his wishes would be carried out. The day before a letter had come through from Berlin rebuking von Diederichs for his long screed, the contents of which could be read in the newspapers, and warning him to be careful not to show himself so much in public. The HOW for von Diederichs was taken out on the 27 July and he was placed on the SWL on 29 July.

  Enquiries showed that he had been some days in London before taking up quarters at the Kenilworth Hotel on 24 July, and that he had left the Kenilworth on 29 July, as it was supposed en route for the Continent.

  When arrested in town on the 4 August there were found in his possession a pass issued by Korvettenkapitan von Muller, of the German embassy, stating that von Diederichs was going to his unit and requesting facilities, and also the return half of a ticket to Flushing issued 1 August 1914. The other half had been used, said von Diederichs, to visit his brother. He was detained under ARC and all requests for release or mitigation of his sentence were refused on the grounds that it was fairly clearly established that von Diederichs was a naval officer sent on a special mission of espionage just before war broke out.

  He was repatriated in March 1919. In Brixton Prison he came in contact with Grosse who befriended him as von Diederichs could speak very little English. Afterwards both men were transferred to Reading and there eventually von Diederichs learned what Grosse’s past had been. In consequence, when Grosse was being repatriated, von Diederichs, with the consent of the governor of the prison, cut out of a bible which he had given to Grosse an inscription of warm friendship. Grosse was furious and reported the matter to von Muller at The Hague. The only thing that calls for comment in this case is the really shocking translation of von Diederichs’s letters.

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  An American aviator named George Beatty came to England in June 1913 and had introductions to officials at the Royal Aircraft Factory, Farnborough, to Graham White and others; obtained possession of eleven sheets of drawings of the British experimental aeroplane; he tried to sell them first to the US War Department and then to private firms. The drawings were signed Crouch. The military attaché at Washington had been told these facts by a Canadian, unknown to him. The report reached MO5 in due course, after MI-1 had communicated with the Superintendent of the Royal Aircraft Factory.

  The Superintendent had already been told by Rogers, one of his inspectors, that certain BE drawings had been sold to a private firm in America and the inspector had been offered £10 a week to go and make BE aeroplanes in America. The Inspector had accepted the offer and asked for it to be put in writing. The Inspector was of the opinion that the drawings had originated in Handley Page’s office as Beatty shared lodgings with Handley Page; was frequently in his office and had been surprised with Handley Page under circumstances which embarrassed both these men. A further report embodied the following details and inferences. In August 1913, two BE drawings were at Handley Page’s. Beatty was having his aeroplanes repaired there. Early in December he went to America, and returned thence on 15 January 1914, and on 20 January he told Inspector Rogers that a company in Connecticut had a complete set of copies of drawings and that a company had been formed for the purpose of building BEs. The company had a promise that all future improvements of BE aeroplanes would be sent them. On 9 February Rogers had found Beatty sitting familiarly with Handley Page although previous to that Beatty had given no sign of knowing Handley Page.

  The enquiry was narrowed down to four possible firms who were in possession of the latest BE drawings, e.g. British & Colonial Aeroplane Co. Bristol; Hewlett & Blondeau, Clapham; Graham White, Hendon; Handley Page, Cricklewood and Hendon.

  MO5 had recourse to two Metropolitan Police detectives and GPO warrants were taken out for the addresses of Beatty at London Aerodrome, Hendon and 1 Park Drive, Golder’s Green. A check had been put on for the address of the Handley Page factory at Cricklewood for letters from the United States to Beatty and Handley Page. The name of the draughtsman at Hewlett & Blondeau’s was obtained: it was Halberg. An attempt was made to buy back one of the original drawings – through Colonel M.

  Letters to Mr William H. Workman, of 1 Park Drive, Golder’s Green, which may have been an alias used by Beatty, were intercepted. Beatty started a flying school at Hendon on Monday 16 February. Melville, in conversation with Beatty, found that Beatty knew that the confidential drawings given out to contractors were called ‘blueprints’. Mr O’German was to prepare an identifiable drawing of a tail-plane but whether this was done does not appear. Beatty was to be proposed as member of the Aeronautical Society and Mr O’German warned the chairman who had already received a warning letter from the Canadian or American society. Mr O’German suggested that Major Kell should tell the chairman about the case and get to see this letter.

  Some action was taken but the result is unknown. In this file is a copy of Flight for 18 October 1913 which contains some drawings and an account of certain details of a BE aeroplane. These had been supplied it was said by the Superintendent of the Factory and it may be that these drawings were the source of the whole trouble.

  Beatty’s financial position seems to have been unsound; he had interests in various commercial undertakings of which Scotland Yard took note in August 1914. Up until 2 July 1914 Beatty had financed the Aeronautic Journal, of which Ledeboer was editor, and at some time not specified, Beatty had been made chairman of the Pneumatic Tube Company, London Wall Buildings.

  During the war Beatty’s name was repeatedly brought up in connection with accusations of treacherous conduct. In September Bjorklund, a Swede and former pupil of Beatty’s at Hendon, returned to Sweden with his aeroplane. MO5 ascertained that the aeroplane had been inspected at Hendon on mobilisation and reported useless and was moreover considered dangerous.

  Beatty’s Flying School continued its work during the war and Beatty trained officers for the Allied armies. He did not always give satisfaction. Two pupils (Scholart, a Belgian, and Branford) complained. The accusation was that Beatty deliberately held back the pupils; restricted flying; used unsafe machines; sent men up with engines set at half power. Moreover, the enemy knew about the de Haviland machines and where they were being built. Beatty, it was rumoured at the Royal Aero Club, had been offered a large sum to cross to Germany. MI-1c forwarded this report to MI5. Whe
ther any action was taken does not appear.

  In October 1918, in consequence of a report that G. W. Beatty (American Air Service), Manager of the Handley Page Works, was giving information to the Germans, wholesale enquiry was made about him. The informant seemed to know nothing of Beatty’s first visit to England but he supplied certain details and gave information which led to an interview with a man who knew Beatty intimately. From the informant and this friend the following was ascertained:

  Beatty was born in New Jersey on 28 August 1987. He came to England in January 1914 and occupied various addresses. He quarrelled with his wife and separated from her and hid his address so that she should not find him. He was governor and sole director of Beatty’s School of Flying Ltd, Cricklewood, and a contractor for Handley Page Co., Ltd and for the Aircraft Manufacturing Co. His private character was bad and he was a bad payer, but he had an account with the London & Provincial Bank and his income was derived from the two firms mentioned above. He had done good work for the company and would certainly not betray secrets.

  The enquirer was careful to suppress the names of his informants but internal evidence shows that Beatty’s intimate friend was very probably Handley Page himself and if this is so the enquiry had gone round in a circle. MO5, it is to be presumed, had satisfied themselves as to Handley Page’s integrity in the course of their enquiry in 1914, but as it stands incompletely recorded in the file it is a singularly unsatisfying case from the point of view of G work.

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  Formerly an Engineer Lieutenant in the German Navy, which he joined in 1899, Carl Meyer was appointed Marine Engineer in October 1910 and placed on the Retired List on 14 December 1912. The reason for this order was the adverse finding of a court martial to which Meyer had been subjected for having improperly communicated with a matrimonial agency.

  Meyer came to England in July 1912 and travelled in the west, visiting Bristol, Newport and Exeter. He wrote letters to Herr Fagel, Hotel Stadt, Konigsberg, in which he referred to some vague business saying that he would face risks if he were well paid. Intercepted communications showed that, for the month of January, he received allowances amounting to 401 marks 67, that his pension was 180 marks a month, and that, for February and March, he received allowances amounting to 206.67.