Codebreakers Victory

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by Hervie Haufler


  The admiral who in Prange's interview scanted the Japanese destruction at Pearl Harbor was Claude C. Bloch.

  Admiral Morison's quote about Pearl Harbor being a "strategic imbecility" is from his The Rising Sun in the Pacific.

  Layton and Prados expressed sharp criticism of MacArthur for the follow-up losses on Luzon.

  In the use of Japanese names, I've followed the Western practice of putting the surname after the given name. In Japanese style, it's the reverse.

  The section on Baron Oshima relies mostly, as mentioned, on Carl Boyd's Hitler's Japanese Confidant. Also, Bruce Lee documents in his book Marching Orders the incredibly diverse flow of information provided by the Magic summaries placed daily on the desks of General Marshall and Secretary of War Stimson.

  Chapter 9. North Africa: A Pendulum Swung by Codebreakers

  The terrible story of Bonner Frank Fellers was not to be overlooked by writers. Kahn tells it in a couple of his books. Welchman dwells on it. So does Cave Brown. They all gave me aid in forming my own account.

  Both Welchman and Kahn tell of Seebohm's field intercept unit and its fate.

  A prime source for coverage of the North African battles is Barnett's The Desert Generals, despite his obvious animus toward Bernard Montgomery.

  Rommel quotes are from The Rommel Papers, edited by Hart with the aid of Rommel's family. Kesselring's quote is from his A Soldier's Record.

  The Edgar Williams and William Mather quotes are from Nigel Hamilton's Monty: The Making of a General.

  Hinsley is, as ever, indispensable in pinning down specific decrypts that were of great benefit to British generals. His quote about the number of submarines and recon aircraft based on Malta is from his answer to a question following his 1993 lecture at a Security Group Seminar.

  The section on Operation Torch is compiled from Keegan, Gilbert and Lewin, with Ultra information from Hinsley and from Omar Bradley's autobiography.

  Chapter 10. Turnaround in the Pacific War

  Details of the Japanese double delay in changing JN-25 come from Lewin's The American Magic and Edward Van Der Rhoer's Deadly Magic.

  Layton's memoir sets forth clearly the effects of Doolittle's raid, as does Frederick Parker's A Priceless Advantage, from the United States Cryptologic History available on the Web. Yamamoto's quote about the "disgrace" of the raid is from Layton.

  As cited, Prados's Combined Fleet Decoded proved a valuable resource for understanding all the Decisive Battles of the Pacific war.

  Sources for the treatment of the Battle of Midway include Rochefort's own Reminiscences, Layton, Holmes, Kahn and particularly Prange's Miracle at Midway.

  The David Kennedy quote is from his essay "Victory at Sea," in the March 1999 issue of The Atlantic Monthly.

  Admiral Nimitz's postbattle praise of Rochefort is from Winton's Ultra in the Pacific.

  In addition to the sources cited, the section on MacArthur's Port Moresby operations includes details from Edward Drea's MacArthur's Ultra and William Manchester's American Caesar.

  Chapter 11. USSR: Intelligence Guides the Major Victories

  Most of the sources here are cited in the text. Otherwise, Jozef Garlin-ski's The Enigma War supplied information on the Red Three as well as the Red Orchestra.

  Alexander Foote's quote is from his Handbook for Spies.

  Material on the Cambridge ring came from Phillip Knightley's The Master Spy, among other sources.

  My main source on Richard Sorge is Robert Whymant's Stalin's Spy.

  The David Glantz quote is from his The Role of Intelligence in Soviet Military Strategy in World War II.

  Keegan supplied Hitler's quote about kicking down the Russian door, while Gilbert contributed the Hitler lines about flouting the Hague Convention rules and the führer's plans for Operation Typhoon.

  Rundstedt's quote is from Hart's The German Generals Talk, as is that of Kleist.

  Churchill's exchanges with Menzies are from Gilbert. Hitler's Directive 41 is drawn from V. E. Tarrant's The Red Orchestra. For my brief summary of the battle for Stalingrad I've relied mostly on Glantz.

  The Cairncross quote about Moscow's acceptance of his information is from Michael Smith's Station X.

  Zhukov's counsel to Stalin is from Keegan.

  Tarrant is the source for the account of the breakup of the Red Orchestra, seconded by Shareen Brysac's Resisting Hitler. The postwar treatment of Rado, Foote and Roessler is also from Tarrant.

  John Taylor at NARA helped me dig far enough into the files on Martin Bormann to discount Louis Kilzer's claim that Bormann was the main source of anti-Nazi information.

  Chapter 12. Smiting the Axis's Soft Underbelly

  Again, most references are identified in the text. In addition to the works by Keegan, Gilbert and Hinsley, Robert Wallace's Time-Life book, The Italian Campaign was a useful source.

  At the Public Record Office, copies of the most significant decrypts, such as those warning of Kesselring's planned attacks at Anzio, were efficiently delivered for review.

  Kesselring quotes are, once more, from his memoir.

  Churchill's quip about Anzio turning into a stranded whale is from his Triumph and Tragedy.

  As noted, details about Mark Clark's megalomaniacal decisions in Italy are from Eric Sevareid's Not So Wild a Dream.

  Chapter 13. The Coming of the Ultra Americans

  Supplementing my own memories, I've interviewed or corresponded with a number of other Americans who participated in the Ultra program. The unpublished memoirs of Walter Sharp, Jim Nielson and George Vergine were especially helpful.

  Joan Nicholls's book is England Needs You: The Story of Beaumanor Station. Diana Payne's comments are from her chapter in Hinsley and Stripp's Codebreakers.

  Thomas Parrish's The Ultra Americans was a useful, if disjointed, source.

  Chapter 14. Up the Island Ladder Toward Tokyo

  The historical narrative here follows Keegan, while coverage of the cryptologic developments synthesizes Layton, Drea, Holmes, Prados and Winton, plus personal research at the National Archives.

  The quote about Nimitz's staff being unable to read the enemy mail is from Edwin Hoyt's How They Won the War in the Pacific.

  Firsthand observations of cryptologic work on Guadalcanal have been supplied by Philip Jacobsen's Web history, The Codebreakers. An associate of Joe Rochefort at Hypo, Jacobsen was transferred to Guadalcanal and helped operate a field intelligence station there.

  The main sources on MacArthur are Manchester and Drea. The Juro quote, as an example, is cited by Manchester, as is The General's order to Eichelberger.

  To John Kennedy's own account of PT-109, Kahn, in The Codebreakers, adds details about coast watcher codes and the Japanese failure to break them.

  The story of Yamamoto's fall has been written up repeatedly. Kahn's version in The Codebreakers is a good one.

  Rochefort's downfall is taken from his own oral history as well as from the memoirs of Holmes and Layton.

  Vice Admiral Lockwood's quote is from Winton.

  Chapter 15. France: Invasions from North and South

  The account here of the Allies' Normandy landings and of the deceptions accompanying them has been compiled from many sources, including my own readings of relevant decrypts at the PRO. For additional coverage of the Sigint side I'm indebted, of course, to Hinsley, but also to Cave Brown, Kahn, Welchman and Lewin.

  Oshima's involuntary spy role is from Boyd.

  General Blumentritt's quote is from Hart. Jodl's estimate of divisions held in the Pas de Calais is from Masterman.

  William Stephenson's Magic Group is described by Stevenson, while Jones's Most Secret War tells of the air traffic simulator. The Ronald Wingate quote is also from Jones.

  The Don Bussey quote: Smith's Station X. That of Omar Bradley is from his A General's Life.

  The part played by Britain's double agents is, again, mainly from Masterman.

  Churchill's proposals for Russia-countering alte
rnatives to the Riviera landings are in his Triumph and Tragedy.

  Rundstedt's brash words about making peace are quoted from Winterbotham's The Ultra Secret.

  The incident involving Melvin Helfers's meeting with George Patton is related in Robert Miller's August 1944. So is Bradley's meeting with Morgenthau. Miller is the source for Hitler's order for a new offensive and for Kluge's end.

  Principal source for the section on the Riviera invasion: William Breuer's Operation Dragoon.

  Chapter 16. CBI: Winning the "Forgotten War"

  In his massive book Burma: The Longest War, Louis Allen, a British veteran of that war, tells more than anyone other than a specialist or a fellow vet would be interested in absorbing. But Allen, fluent in Japanese, does give a rounded history by recording both sides of the conflict.

  General William Slim's memoir, Defeat into Victory, presents a much more readable account from his perspective. Philip Ziegler's Mountbatten devotes chapters to Lord Louis's part in the campaign. Joseph Stilwell's The Stilwell Papers offers a vinegary account from his vantage point.

  The China-Burma-India volume from Time-Life Books' World War II history is a useful source. The editor is Don Moser.

  Eric Sevareid's Not So Wild a Dream gives penetrating glimpses of the war from his visits to India and China.

  Sigint information has been culled from Michael Smith's The Emperor's Codes, Alan Stripp's Codebreaker in the Far East, Hugh Den-ham's essay "Bedford-Bletchley-Kilindini-Colombo," in Codebreakers, and Winterbotham's The Ultra Secret.

  Churchill quotes are from his Triumph and Tragedy.

  Chapter 17. Europe: The Bitter Fruits of Complacency

  Hinsley's chapter "The Check in the West" is a compendium of the troubles Allied generals brought upon themselves, often by not heeding their intelligence providers. Montgomery's rueful quote about not clearing the Schelde estuary is from his Memoirs and is also cited by Hinsley.

  Other sources are noted: Cave Brown, Miller, and Peter Harclerode's Arnhem. The brief account of the Hürtgen Forest struggle borrows from Miller and from General James Gavin's 1979 article in American Heritage magazine. Oshima references are from Boyd.

  Some details such as Eisenhower's attendance at his valet's wedding on the day of the Ardennes attack come from Charles Whiting's Ardennes: The Secret War.

  The Churchill quote is, once again, from Triumph and Tragedy, and that of Rundstedt is from Hart's The German Generals Talk.

  Chapter 18. Closing In on the Empire

  For sources here, a familiar cast reassembles. Holmes tells of the captures of intelligence materials, Layton of Fukudome's briefcase, Van Der Rhoer of the ships for Saipan, Prados of Japanese hopes for the Decisive Battle, Winton of the Marianas turkey shoot and Drea of Koiso's replacement of Tojo. To these add Thomas Cutler's The Battle of Leyte Gulf A navy career officer, Cutler capably dramatizes the battle but shows a fighting man's disdain for secret intelligence by never acknowledging the contributions of the codebreakers.

  Cutler, however, can't pass up the story of Halsey's wrath aroused by the Task Force 34 query and tells it well.

  The references to MacArthur's leaving two hundred thousand Japanese soldiers useless and details of his Leyte landing are from Manchester's American Caesar.

  The Churchill quote about Kurita is from Triumph and Tragedy.

  As noted, Drea's description of The General's Luzon maneuverings was most helpful.

  Of the several tellings of the story of Ohnishi and the formalization of the kamikaze tactics, Cutler's is best.

  Chapter 19. Europe: High-grade Decrypts Abet Allied Victory

  In addition to a final surfeit of decrypt information from Hinsley, this chapter gains from Keegan's lend-lease facts and from Stephen Ambrose's account in his Citizen Soldiers of the seizure of the Remagen bridge.

  The section on the air war technologies obviously owes much to R. V. Jones, with the final bit about oxen-towed Luftwaffe aircraft contributed by Hyland and Gill's Last Talons of the Eagle.

  Ambrose's Eisenhower and Berlin is the chosen source for Ike's Churchill-annoying decision. The Allies' warning to the Soviets about Hitler's southwest offensive is from Hinsley.

  The report on Hitler's V-weapons is, mostly, a briefer retelling of the relevant passages in R. V. Jones's memoir. The summary of Bohr's letter refuting Heisenberg is the New York Times article by James Glanz. Cave Brown is the source for the narrative on Norway's heavy-water production. Montagu's Beyond Top Secret Ultra contributes the detail of the warning from Tricycle's spymaster.

  For information about the Nazis' jet plane developments I have relied on Hyland and Gill as well as Jones and Hinsley. The latter pair are also the chief sources for the account of the struggle against the V-weapons.

  For the finale on the "Final Solution," the key source is, as noted, Richard Breitman's Official Secrets.

  Chapter 20. In the Pacific: Last Battles, Final Decisions

  I looked to Prados for facts about the Superfort benefits from the taking of Iwo Jima and to Winton for codebreaking details.

  The code talkers' story: Singh's The Code Book.

  The Superfort pilot's expression of gratitude: Winton.

  Japanese plans for the defense of Okinawa: Van Der Rhoer.

  Prados contributes the information on Colonel Holcomb and Admiral Spruance as well as the sacrificial mission of Japanese warships.

  Drea is one source for the debate over potential casualties from a Kyushu landing, for MacArthur's opposition to changes in plans for the Olympic operation and for details of what awaited the invaders.

  Douglas MacEachan's The Final Months of the War with Japan, available on the Internet, also details the awesome Japanese preparations to withstand the invasion.

  Churchill's quotes about the costs of an invasion and the decision to drop the atomic bomb: Triumph and Tragedy.

  As cited, McCullough's Truman provides a thorough treatment of the president's decision to drop the bomb.

  The MacArthur reaction to news of the Hiroshima bombing is recalled in Horace A. Thompson Jr.'s interview with MacArthur's pilot, W.E. Rhoades. The interview transcript is in the MacArthur Memorial Archives.

  Magic decrypts revealing the divide in Japanese attitudes toward peace: Van Der Rhoer, among others. As mentioned in the text, Robert Butow's Japan's Decision to Surrender is a key source.

  Effects of the "Fat Boy" bomb on Nagasaki: Gilbert.

  Bull Halsey's line about handling an ex-enemy aircraft attack: Winton.

  My brief section on the Venona project summarizes the fuller account in Budiansky's Battle of Wits.

  Conclusion

  Hinsley's quote is from his introduction to Codebreakers. The Ameringer quote is from his U.S. Foreign Intelligence: The Secret Side of American History.

  Kahn on Admiral Anderson is from The Codebreakers.

  Eisenhower's opinion that "Ultra was decisive" is cited by Winterbotham, while Churchill's assessment is from Harold Deutsch's essay "The Historical Impact of Revealing the Ultra Secret," in the journal Parameters.

  Diana Payne's comment is from her essay "The Bombes," in Hinsley and Stripp's Codebreakers.

  Bibliography

  Books

  Accoce, Pierre, and Pierre Quet. A Man Called Lucy. Translated by A. M.

  Sheridan Smith. New York: Coward-McCann, 1967.

  Allen, Louis. Burma: The Longest War, 1941-45. London: Phoenix Press, 1984.

  Ambrose, Stephen A. Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the Bulge to the Surrender of Germany. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997.

  ———. Eisenhower and Berlin, 1945: The Decision to Halt at the Elbe. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1967.

  ———. The Victors: Eisenhower and His Boys: The Men of World War II. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999.

  Ameringer, Charles D. U.S. Foreign Intelligence: The Secret Side of American History. Lexington, VA: D. C. Heath, 1990.

  Andrew, Christopher, ed. Codebreaking a
nd Signals Intelligence. London: Frank Cass, 1986.

  Barnett, Correlli. The Desert Generals. Rev. ed. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982.

  Beesly, Patrick. Very Special Intelligence: The Story of the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre 1939-1945. New York: Doubleday, 1978.

  Bennett, Ralph. Behind the Battle: Intelligence in the War with Germany, 1939-1945. Rev. ed. London: Pimlico, 1999.

  ———. Intelligence Investigations: How Ultra Changed History. London: Frank Cass, 1996.

  Bertrand, Gustave. Enigma, ou la plus grande enigme de la guerre 1939-1945. Paris: Plon, 1973.

  Bethel, Nicholas, and the Editors of Time-Life Books. Russia Besieged. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1977.

  Boyd, Carl. Hitler's Japanese Confidant: General Oshima Hiroshi andMagic Intelligence, 1941-1945. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1993.

  Bradley, Omar N., and Clay Blair. A General's Life. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983.

  Breitman, Richard. Official Secrets: What the Nazis Planned, What the British and Americans Knew. New York: Hill and Wang, 1998.

  Breuer, William B. Operation Dragoon: The Allied Invasion of the South of France. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1987.

  Brysac, Shareen Blair. Resisting Hitler: Mildred Harnack and the Red Orchestra. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

  Budiansky, Stephen. Battle of Wits: The Complete Story of Codebreaking in World War II. New York: The Free Press, 2000.

  Butow, Robert J.C. Japan's Decision to Surrender. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954.

  Calvocoressi, Peter. Top Secret Ultra. New York: Pantheon, 1980.

  Cave Brown, Anthony. Bodyguard of Lies. New York: Harper & Row, 1975.

  Churchill, Winston S. The Second World War. 6 vols.: The Gathering Storm, Their Finest Hour, The Grand Alliance, The Hinge of Fate, Closing the Ring, Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1948-53.

  Clark, Mark. Calculated Risk. New York: Harper, 1950.

 

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