Dixie Victorious: An Alternate history of the Civil War

by Peter Tsouras

  The Southerners’ desire to put a halt to the depredations spurred their pursuit. Several times they roughly handled the Northern rearguard and many Yankee “foraging parties” fell captive. In one case, an enraged captain of cavalry, a certain Robert Martin, gave a half a dozen Federal marauders a drumhead court martial and an equally summary execution as an example for others. Whether word of this incident spread or the Rebel pursuit simply proved too energetic, looting and pillaging dropped off as the Federals neared Alexandria. By far the most successful intervention on the part of the Southerners occurred at Natchitoches. It was here that Bee’s brigade of horse thundered down the main avenue and caught several hundred Union cavalry in the process of firing the town. While the numbers were about equal, Bee’s troopers, flushed with victory, drawn up in a strike column and mad with rage scoured the streets of Natchitoches. The disorganized Yankees either scattered or were captured, and any caught with incendiary materials were shot on the spot.

  From Natchitoches, Banks’s army force-marched down the river road towards Alexandria. Men fell out, animals collapsed and more and more wagons, caissons, equipment and even a few spiked artillery pieces added to the detritus of war. As Taylor compared Green to Marshal Joachim Murat, William B. Franklin, now commander of the amalgamated XVI and XIX Corps, likened the retreat to Napoleon’s disastrous rout from Russia in the winter of 1812–13. He wondered if he would throw the last of the muskets into the Mississippi River. However, Banks enjoyed two advantages over Napoleon: the sunny weather and the protective guns of the Mississippi Squadron. The warships generally kept the Rebels away from the main body of the army.

  In this way the Federals reached Alexandria five days after leaving Natchitoches, as the Confederates continued to torment their movements. At Alexandria the Yankees found security within a series of fieldworks thrown up on the outskirts of the town. The relief proved temporary. The steadily dropping river demanded another anguished war council. Banks wanted to rest his men and await a new delivery of supplies via steamer. Porter, deeply concerned for the fate of his squadron, insisted on a hasty departure. At Alexandria a series of underwater sandstone obstacles and the dangerous channels they created threatened the Navy’s ships. By this time, itwas not known if the larger ships could still navigate the falls in the river. At the council, Franklin introduced Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Bailey of Wisconsin. Bailey proposed building a temporary dam to raise the river’s water level and float the squadron over the falls. Bailey had originally proffered the idea to Porter, who ignored it, and it took Franklin, another engineer by training, to appreciate and sponsor the plan.

  As the Confederates began to collect in the vicinity of Alexandria, Banks ordered the construction to begin on April 22. The Union soldiers took to the task with a will, while the navy slipped into lethargy. There were no efforts made to lighten the ships by removing armor, guns or stores, and especially not the precious bales of cotton. After eight days, the water level rose and only then did work to divest the ships of armor and guns begin. Porter would not allow any cotton to be unloaded and, in addition, he decided to send his largest warship, the Eastport, through the passage first even though it had already suffered grounding problems on the river. Perhaps with cannon and armor off-loaded and shipped down-river by wagon, the Eastport might have successfully made its way over the falls. Unfortunately for the United States Navy, Porter seemed to believe his own boasts concerning his ability to navigate across damp sand.

  Still loaded down with cotton, on April 30 the Eastport headed for the passage between two stone crib dams that extended from each bank of the river. The ship drew too much water and her keel caught on an underwater obstacle. Efforts to free the Eastport added more stress and strain until the hull buckled and the ship took on water. The pilot could not keep the Eastport under control and the massive ironclad swung to starboard in the current, smashed into the right-hand crib dam and partially dislocated it. Lodged on the crib dam, the vessel quickly settled upright in the river, the decks awash and the hold packed with sodden cotton. Even worse, the broken dam allowed too much water to escape, so not only did the Eastport’s bulk block the middle passage, the water level immediately began to drop. Bailey watched in horror as all of his endeavors came to naught. Porter looked out on the death knell of his squadron.

  By the following day, a dolorous scene greeted the ill-starred Banks. The Mississippi Squadron, partially unarmored and unarmed, had collected in knots of three or four ships in a long column that stretched down the center of the river. This was the only way to take advantage of the deepest part of the Red. The problem lay in the fact that this pushed some of the ships so far upriver they were beyond the support of the army in Alexandria. As dawn broke, sections of newly captured 3-inch rifles and Parrott guns started to pepper the hapless ships. Holed by roundshot and gutted by shells, three transports, a tug and most damaging of all, the tinclad Cricket, all succumbed to the cannonade and sank at various points along the river during the course of the day.

  That night Banks called for one more council of war. While a few advised surrender, most of the officers supported Banks in his decision to break out of the Confederate cordon and fight their way to the Mississippi River. The last communiqué Banks had received spoke of a relief force headed upriver. The great unanswered question was how far upriver could this group proceed in the face of mounting Rebel resistance? Whatever the distance, Banks’s army, now reduced to the size of a weak corps, must fight its way free. Supplies were dwindling and no more were expected. During all of the discussion, Porter drew within himself and found deep and abiding solicitude in a bottle of looted cognac. He understood that, when the army left, it would leave with a brigade of bluejackets shouldering arms and manning a few field pieces. To prevent capture, his whole squadron would have to be burned.

  As the noose tightened around the Federals, Taylor moved heaven and earth to finish off the hated Yankee invaders. Although Kirby Smith possessed no further reinforcements to send from Shreveport, the lull had allowed Taylor to collect stragglers, reclaim the lightly wounded, organize his artillery park and raise approximately 2,000 state militia and equip them with captured small arms. Rebel cavalry freely roamed the east bank of the Red and long range guns sniped at the trapped ships. The bulk of the infantry and artillery encircled the town of Alexandria, and in the intervening days, the Southerners built their own rudimentary fieldworks, especially along the river road southeast of the town. Downriver, a number of blockships rested on the bottom and the cavalry brigades of Major and Maxey watched for any relief efforts while felling trees and burning bridges to delay any there might be. Taylor understood full well that the supply situation put time on his side. With preparations complete and troops in place, he merely waited.

  For a fourth and final time, Banks summoned his council of war. Meeting in the home of Brian Camp, a local impresario, a grimly resolute Banks explained to his subordinates his plan. He announced to all in the room that the army would form up in an assault column and break through the part of the Confederate defenses that secured the river road. Porter began to interrupt with a pointed inquiry concerning his stranded squadron, but Banks, at the end of his patience with the greedy, sodden braggart, cut Porter off. “Spike your guns, burn your ships and add your men to the assault or wait for the next patch of damp sand and steam for New Orleans,” Banks curtly told Porter and thus closed the matter.7

  Throughout the night, the Federals prepared for the attack and the ships were readied to be fired. With the first light of morning on May 4, two divisional columns under Emory and Brigadier General Thomas E.G. Ransom emerged from the defenses of Alexandria. Emory’s left flank hugged the river bank and Ransom’s right was secured by Lee’s cavalry. An ad hoc brigade of bluejackets remained in reserve. A short, sharp bombardment by Banks’s remaining guns preceded the attack. Initially, the Rebel defenders displayed no small amount of confusion, but Polignac’s Louisianans held that portion of the line and, althou
gh outnumbered, they hunkered down behind breastworks and abatis. Taylor had also placed the lion’s share of hisartillery along this section of the Confederate position. Although displaying desperate courage, the Federal infantry could not pierce the defenses. The attack foundered against the resolve of Polignac’s men and the storm of shot and shell from the Rebel guns.

  As the assault fell apart, Banks sent an order for Lee to disengage from a skirmish with Green’s Texans and ride for freedom. Lee did not ask for a confirmation, but sent his command, led by the troopers of Brigadier General N.A.M. “Gold Lace” Dudley, from the current combat towards the more open country directly west of the town. Since the region due west of Alexandria was far removed from the river or any road net, Taylor had only covered this area with a cavalry screen. By hard riding, some hard fighting and foraging off the land, Lee and his men rode into Simmesport on May 7, where they met forces organizing for the relief of Banks. It fell to Lee to inform those present that the opportunity had passed.

  Back at Alexandria, Banks met his men as they straggled back to the environs of the town. He understood full well his worsening supply situation and, while a citizen-soldier and an amateur who had learned his profession on the job, Banks clearly saw that his army was played out. Turning to his chief of staff, he directed Brigadier General Charles P. Stone to ride out under a flag of truce and discuss terms. Taylor, upon meeting with Stone, immediately gave his answer: unconditional surrender. Taylor relished the thought of Grant in northern Virginia receiving the news of the surrender and the appropriation of his defining phrase. Banks delayed responding for a full day, but an impatient Taylor threatened a bombardment and Banks promised an answer on the next morning. On May 6, the remnants of Banks’s army left Alexandria and entered into captivity. As the last of the soldiers and sailors cleared the town, picked crews set torches to the ships of the Mississippi Squadron. As the tinclad Fort Hindman went up in a towering explosion, soldiers and civilians alike made for cover. Few, if any, windows survived the concussive waves and the explosions were heard and felt miles away. Far from the scene, Major Arnondin understood that the smoke and the noise “signalled the end of the Yankee invasion and all of their cotton-stealing schemes.”8

  Thus the Red River expedition ended in ignominy and failure. Two corps, more than 25,000 men, and all 90 guns were captured. Only Lee’s horsemen, slightly fewer than 4,000, escaped the net. All of the major warships, many more auxiliary craft and their whole complements, were lost, too. Banks, his staff and his officers went into captivity with their men to do their utmost to ameliorate the worst aspects of the surrender. Porter slipped downriver via a packet boat the night before and arrived in New Orleans well ahead of news of the debacle.

  Taylor revelled in his victory, but he was not one to rest upon his laurels. With the destruction of Banks’s army and Porter’s squadron, Taylor envisioned a grand march through the sugar parishes, redeeming his state and eventually appearing in Algiers, a town across the river from New Orleans. From there, the city would fall to him and thus close the Mississippi River to the detested Yankees. The problem for Taylor’s grandiose scheme lay in the fact that he possessed no means for crossing the mightiest river in North America. Even as he put forth his idea to Kirby Smith, the departmental commander faced another threat, and in consequence, another opportunity.

  Steele’s March into Oblivion

  Some 120 miles to the northeast of Shreveport, at the town of Camden, Arkansas, Major General Frederick Steele sat with 11,000 men. Back on March 23, Steele had moved out of Little Rock with his corps. He had delayed his departure to oversee local elections and in part because his heart was not really committed to the enterprise. His complaints to Grant concerning poor roads, little fodder, strained logistics and Rebel partisan rangers made no impression on the commanding general. Steele was to threaten Shreveport from the north and divert men and material away from Banks. In this, Steele conspicuously failed. His progress proved glacial, although this was more from the difficult going he predicted to Grant rather than from his own incapabilities. His men marched on half-rations and the road to Camden turned out to be a bottomless track of mud that often required a corduroy carpet of logs. Steele informed Grant that, “our supplies are nearly exhausted and so is the country. We are obliged to forage from five to fifteen miles on either side of the road to keep our stock alive.” Perhaps the only source of comfort for Steele came from his men maintaining their march discipline and generally refraining from looting.

  In response to this Union move, Kirby Smith mobilized five small brigades of cavalry and put them under the command of Brigadier General John Sappington Marmaduke. With some 3,000 troopers, Marmaduke set about the task of harassing and delaying Steele’s advance. In this endeavor he succeeded admirably. The mobility of his force and his soldiers’ intimate knowledge of the terrain gave the Confederates a nearly insuperable advantage. Steele’s two brigades of horse could neither outride nor outfight Marmaduke’s division and Steele moved southward with only the vaguest notion of what to expect. Kirby Smith counted on the habitual caution of Steele and calculated that cavalry alone would suffice to slow, if not halt, the Federal commander. A cavalryman himself, Kirby Smith fully appreciated his mounted arm’s potential. While the infantry of the department converged against Banks, Kirby Smith contented himself with sending only the cavalry of Colonels Richard M. Gano and Tandy Walker to Marmaduke. Gano’s Texans and Walker’s Choctaws would soon add to Steele’s discomfiture.

  It was on the evening of April 13 that the first Yankee horsemen rode into Camden, three weeks after the opening of the campaign. Camden put Steele’s corps halfway betwixt Little Rock and Shreveport, and here Steele hesitated about his next move. His supply situation grew more precarious with each mile marched southward, and Shreveport still lay many miles away. At one point, he even began to contemplate a retreat but, whatever discouragements or difficulties troubled Steele, a rising urgency pressed him hard. Word began to filter in at his headquarters of the battles southeast of Shreveport and the perilous state of Banks’s army. Grant and others implored Steele to do all in his power to succor Banks. Trapped between the Scylla and Charybdis of advance or retreat, Steele did neither.

  As these events unfolded in Arkansas, the denouement in Louisiana played itself out. With Banks’s surrender, Kirby Smith immediately turned his attention towards Steele. He directed Taylor to detach the infantry divisions of Walker, Churchill and Parsons and the large artillery park and send them posthaste to Shreveport for service in Arkansas. Polignac’s Louisianans would remain with Taylor, as would the Texan horse that had fought so well. At first, Taylor became absolutely apoplectic over Kirby Smith’s order. He wanted to redeem New Orleans, but Kirby Smith seemed intent on denying Taylor his ultimate glory: a triumphal entry into the Crescent City. At first, Taylor refused, but eventually the impasse broke when Kirby Smith dispatched Colonel Michael F. Labranche, a most capable and trusted staff officer, to reiterate the order. A scion from an old south Louisiana family, Labranche, a native of New Orleans, explained the futility of the proposed river crossing to Taylor. Early the next morning, the infantry and artillery headed for Shreveport.9

  With Churchill serving in the role of a corps commander, the Rebel force made swift progress and, upon reaching the capital of Confederate Louisiana, they found plenty of supplies stockpiled for their use. While he showed himself a most competent battlefield general, Edmund Kirby Smith also possessed a positive genius for military administration. His effective and efficient governance resulted in the Trans-Mississippi Department being labelled “Kirbysmithdom.” At Shreveport Kirby Smith assumed command and sent his more than 6,000 infantry and 66 guns north, to a rendezvous with Marmaduke’s cavalry. While Steele pondered his next move, Kirby Smith hurried to tighten the noose he had extended around Camden. His instructions to Marmaduke called for the Rebel horse to fix Steele in Camden with raids, probes and feints. This they did with great success, especially as Steele
’s cavalry began to suffer from a want of fodder. When the Yankees did ride, it was usually as guards to supply trains that found it harder and harder to reach Camden from Little Rock. Even as Kirby Smith maneuvered his infantry into blocking positions around Camden, the Confederate cavalry struck the telling blows of the campaign.

  On April 28, 3,000 troopers under Marmaduke set upon a Union supply train of 200 wagons some 14 miles northwest of Camden at the ominously named Poison Spring. The Rebels quickly overcame the guard of 800 foot, 300 horse and a 4-gun battery. The fight was short and brutal with incidents of atrocities perpetrated against the black troops present. That little quarter was shown surprised no one, as Tandy Walker’s Choctaws faced the men of Brigadier General John M. Thayer, whom in earlier actions had despoiled the Choctaw lands and inflicted unspeakable horrors on the civilian populace. In addition, many of the captured wagons revealed much in the way of goods looted from Arkansas farmsteads. Only after a portion of the defeated Federal cavalry made it into Camden, did Steele learn of the setback. The infantry, the battery, and worst of all, the supplies, were totally lost. With the news, Steele prepared for an evacuation and retreat to Little Rock. A very large supply train of over 300 wagons was on its way, and Steele needed to bring it in safely to Camden before he left. His animals desperately required the fodder, and in consequence he sent out 1,200 infantry, 250 cavalry and five cannon to escort the train to Camden.