Dixie Victorious: An Alternate history of the Civil War

by Peter Tsouras

  To his rear, Merritt and Averell had defeated Imboden and the Confederate horse, killing Imboden in the process. As the Confederates were leaving the field in some disorder, the two Union cavalry commanders saw the jaws of the trap closing on Crook. The quick-witted Merritt ordered his troopers into a column of regiments in line, conformed to by Averell, and the two cavalrymen charged the Confederate infantry about to encircle Crook. What followed was an action of cavalry against rifle-armed infantry that had not yet been seen in the war.12

  Sabers flashing in the sunlight and trumpets blaring the charge, the two Union cavalry divisions burst out of the smoke and noise on the unsuspecting Confederate infantry, overrunning one of Cleburne’s brigades and forcing the other two to stop their converging attack on Crook. Spent by the initial attack, Merritt withdrew his command to reorganize, but Averell continued to advance, hurting Gordon badly before being stopped for good by D.H. Hill.

  In the respite, Crook gathered up his bleeding regiments and attacked “to the rear” breaking out of the impending Confederate trap and saving most of his corps, though his corps artillery was lost to the Confederate assault. What had been planned as an annihilating hammer-blow by Sheridan had been turned into a rout by Early’s careful planning and the ace he had up his sleeve—Cleburne’s division.

  There was no pursuit, an omission which left Early in a fit of fury. However, Imboden was dead and his cavalry wrecked. The remaining Confederate cavalry under Rosser were following the Union retreat, but at a respectful distance, for Wilson was alive and alert, and he had enough artillery for a Confederate division. Gordon and Hill were fought out. Breckinridge was picking up the pieces of his hard-used division, and Cleburne, for all the fury of his decisive assault, was at the end of his tether. One of his brigades had suffered heavily to Union cavalry, and the other two were disorganized somewhat by the flank assault.

  Casualties on both sides were heavy, the Federals, however, losing twice as many as the Confederates, especially in prisoners. Early’s casualties were 5,500 killed and wounded and almost none captured. Sheridan lost 11,971, including 2,500 prisoners plus horses and guns captured, two of his artillery batteries being overrun in the last stages of the fighting. The one advantage to this was that Sheridan could replace his losses, Early could not.

  Sheridan was furious. Why had they not known about the other Confederate units with Early? He was much stronger than expected, with more artillery and cavalry than had been reported. This was not over by a damned sight, and there would definitely be another day. Time before November, and the fateful national election, however, was running out.

  Plans

  Sheridan withdrew northwest to Charlestown where he set about assessing his position and reorganizing his command. His losses in officers had been especially damaging. He wrote to Grant informing him in very blunt terms what had happened (“We were whipped badly, but it was a very close thing.”). Without waiting for a reply, he set about refurbishing his command, no excuses, none tolerated, and waited for a chance to getat Early’s army just one more time.

  Grant took his subordinate’s accurate report with deep regret, yet he had not lost faith in Phil Sheridan. He ordered more troops out of the Washington garrison to the Valley, and resupplies and more artillery, to replace guns lost at Winchester, were hurriedly rushed to railheads and sent to Charlestown. Sheridan maintained his three corps organizations as well as the corps commanders. All had done well, but Wright was furious at what had happened to him and his VI Corps. The entire army was still full of fight and burning for revenge.

  Early, Hill, and Cleburne planned boldly. Mosby ranged the upper Valley, looking for signs of movement. What Early wanted to do was entice the aggressive Sheridan to attack him again, at least to move against him in force. He wanted the Union Army in his pocket, not to retreat and regroup. If he could destroy Sheridan, the election in November might go to the Democrats, giving the Confederacy a chance for a negotiated peace and perhaps independence.

  After cleaning up the battlefield, taking care of the wounded and prisoners, Early withdrew down the Valley to the vicinity of Woodstock, an unforaged area that could and would feed his army. Prisoners were sent south, the wounded to follow, and the army moved out on September 22, gingerly followed by Wilson, sent back to the Valley to keep an eye on Early. Reaching Woodstock the next day, Early put his army into a cantonment area prepared for defense and waited for Sheridan’s next move, his troops living in unaccustomed, for them, luxury while his cavalry ranged the Valley to the north, keeping contact with both the Federals and the ever-present Mosby.

  Finding out from Wilson that Early was curiously withdrawing down the Valley, Sheridan sent all of his available cavalry under Wilson, Custer, and Merritt down the Valley to find out as much as they could. As soon as the hard-used infantry was fit to move, they followed, starting at the beginning of October. Sheridan’s army had reached Middletown, on Cedar Creek, by the second week of October. With Grant’s admonishments and instructions still ringing in his ears, and no movement at all from Early’s army, Sheridan went into a cantonment area a little northwest of Middletown.

  Sheridan placed his infantry facing down the valley in their camps, the cavalry cantonments to the rear. His artillery was liberally placed throughout the area, ready for instant use. He knew numbers were about equal in infantry, artillery, and cavalry with Early, and he wanted to entice Early to attack, which might actually fool the Confederate. What he did not know was that Early was already planning to oblige him.

  On the morning of October 15, Sheridan was summoned by courier to Washington for a conference with the President, the Secretary of War, and General Grant. Reluctantly leaving his army, he and a small escort left at breakneck speed for Washington. He could not have left at a worse time.

  Cedar Creek

  The Confederate army was on the move. They were moving north to attack Sheridan in his camp at Cedar Creek. Early planned to catch the Yankees napping, and envelop and trap them before they knew what had hit them. Thanks to Mosby, he knew that Sheridan was probably absent and, without their driving, fiery commander present, Early was positive that he could catch them unawares and destroy the last Union force of any size in the Valley. The Union general election was in a little over three weeks.

  In Sheridan’s absence, the local security of the camp at Cedar Creek became somewhat lax. Early moved up undetected during the night of October 18–19, crossing Cedar Creek at 3.00 a.m. on the 19th and forming in line of battle by 4.30. Early’s army was now organized into three divisions commanded by Gordon, Cleburne, and D.H. Hill, Breckinridge had been badly wounded at Winchester, and had been sent home The cavalry was now commanded by Rosser, reorganized as a single division and reinforced with captured Federal horse artillery. It was sent deep into the battlefield on the right to be ready to take care of any intervention by the Union cavalry. Cleburne was to make a direct frontal assault on the Union encampment, which was lightly fortified. Gordon was to bypass to the right, enveloping the camp, Hill to envelop even deeper on the right flank in order to encircle and pocket the Union army against Cedar Creek. The signal for the attack was to be a three-gun salvo from the Confederate artillery positioned on the friendly side of Cedar Creek on Cleburne’s left flank.

  By 5.00 a.m. both Cleburne and Gordon were in position. Hill was not, as he had the furthest to go, but Early decided to launch the assault at 5.15 as planned anyway. He wanted to hit the Yankees at the time of the morning when they would be the least alert. Hill would just have to catch up. If he knew Harvey Hill, he would be furious that the attack had begun without him and would bust a gut to get to his assigned position and start his enveloping move.

  The attack burst like a sudden thunderstorm on the Union positions. Men were asleep and pickets were dozing. The eager Confederate infantry came out of the gloom like gray doom, hitting the Northern picket line just at that time of day when the human body is at its lowest ebb. Cleburne met Emory’s corps jus
t as it was attempting to form up and overran its artillery and lead units, Confederates streamed past surrendering and running Federals, shooting up any of Emory’s units that attempted a stand.

  Gordon went in hard, breaking through the more professionally organized picket line of Wright’s corps, overrunning Wright’s command post and almost capturing Wright. Wright’s divisions managed to form a line of battle through which Emory’s men ran, and they finally stopped Gordon 500 yards behind their encampment.

  Suddenly, the almost irresistible Southern attack slowed and nearly stopped. Famished infantrymen, who had lived on hard, scanty rations for quite some time, stopped to loot the Northern camps, eating food that was still cooking over slow fires. This respite allowed both Wright and Emory to disengage and re-form their units in a position behind both camps. The Union cavalry had hastily mounted and moved out, not allowing itself to be trapped in the mess. Their horse artillery moved with them, and most of Wright’s artillery got out, but Emory had lost his, and his corps had lost almost 50 percent of its strength. However, a line of battle had been formed by 8.00, and the attacks by Gordon and Cleburne were effectively stopped. They were not beaten, but needed to reorganize to continue the attack.

  Harvey Hill was damning and urging his men forward on their movement to get into position. Ahead of them, they were being screened by Rosser’s cavalry, and they could hear the firing slackening to their left. Behind them, a courier was pounding up the road to them, a bandage over his left eye, and a bullet hole in his kepi. He reined up next to Hill and gave him a message from Early, “For God’s sake, hurry up and attack, we’re stalled and need the support. The enemy is formed in line of battle behind their camps. We will continue our attack presently.” Nodding to the messenger, Hill ordered his subordinates to turn the command to the left and into line. By 7.45 a.m. he was ready to go.

  Sheridan’s Ride

  Sheridan, accompanied by his faithful aide, Lieutenant Colonel Forsyth, and his escort were making their way down the Valley at an easy gait. Off in the distance, they heard a growing crescendo of firing, getting louder by the minute. What they were hearing was Gordon’s men over-running the Federal camp. The time was 6.00 a.m. Knowing that he and his army were in trouble, Sheridan sunk spur and bolted down the turnpike, followed by Forsyth and his escort. Sheridan rode like a man possessed. He knew if he lost to Early, the Valley would go and probably the national election. He drove himself and his escort to the limit, finally encountering Yankee cavalry and wounded infantrymen on the road and in the fields to either side of the turnpike.

  ‘Turn around! Go the other way! We can still beat them boys! Form up! Form up!’

  Sheridan’s horse ate up the distance to Cedar Creek, and the troops were beginning to stop in ones and two, and small clumps of them were starting to form up, spurred on by his enthusiasm and the fact that he was present among them. Sheridan was a force of nature when leading troops, and it never shone more clearly than in the cluttered mess along the road to Cedar Creek. Tough clumps of veterans were gathering around their regimental colors; officers were shouting through the retreat and rout for the troops to rally, and NCOs were cuffing recalcitrant troops back into line. Then the gods stopped smiling at Phil Sheridan.

  With a whoop and a holler, and the familiar Rebel yell, Confederate cavalry burst on the little party like the hounds of hell. Sheridan’s escorts turned to fight, but were almost instantaneously overwhelmed. Sheridan drew a pistol, but was shot from the saddle by a Confederate sergeant, and he hit the ground hard on his shoulder. Sitting up, holding his side, he was instantly made a prisoner, his guards dead or captured, along with Lieutenant Colonel Forsyth.

  At the same time that Sheridan was wounded and taken, Hill’s assault broke on the left flank of the new Union line. The shock was terrific, the left flank brigade being almost instantly destroyed, and with no time to refuse its flank, an entire division of Emory’s corps was overrun. At almost the same time, Cleburne and Gordon attacked again and the entire Union line collapsed. Fugitives streamed to the rear, Wright and his staff were captured this time, and Emory was killed, being blown out of the saddle by three simultaneous wounds. He was dead before he hit the ground.

  The Yankee cavalry gallantly sacrificed itself trying to cover the retreat and rout, but over half of the infantry and all of the corps artillery was lost. It was as complete a victory as Jubal Early might have wanted, with the added bonus of taking Sheridan prisoner.

  Early’s victory was overwhelming. Wright’s veteran corps was virtually destroyed. Emory and Crook both lost over half of their commands, and all the artillery of the army was lost. The only intact units that survived were in the cavalry corps, and they, too, had been badly hurt. Total losses were over 20,000, including 5,000 taken prisoner. Early’s army had also lost heavily, with 7,500 killed and wounded, and another 1,500 missing. But he held the Valley, as well as Sheridan, and the immense booty taken from the Yankees. It was the most lopsided victory of the war, Sheridan’s army being destroyed as a cohesive fighting unit.

  Aftermath

  Lincoln’s untimely death and Sheridan’s defeat and capture did become the decisive event of 1864 and of the entire war. These two incidents entirely changed the picture both at home and abroad, canceling out the earlier, seemingly overwhelming, Northern victories of 1863: Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga. The Republicans could not field a candidate of suitable stature and prestige, though Secretary of State Seward manfully stepped up to the plate and tried. The Democrats and McClellan were the winners in the fall election, even though the military vote went overwhelmingly for Seward. The Northern soldiers did not want to give up all that they had achieved and definitely did not want the Union to be dissolved but, as soon as McClellan had been inaugurated, peace feelers went South and a cease fire was agreed to between the combatants. Britain and France, having no objection to the creation of a much-weakened United States, immediately offered to mediate between the two sides. The shooting stopped in all theaters, and the Union blockade of Southern ports was lifted. A much-disputed peace treaty was negotiated and signed in the summer of 1865, granting the South its independence, though without the provision of war indemnities from the North. The Confederacy was granted all territory that had seceded in 1861, though West Virginia was recognized as a Northern state. The so-called “border states” stayed as part of the United States and the Emancipation Proclamation was enforced in those areas still under the control of the United States.

  Slavery was maintained as an institution by the Confederacy, at least temporarily, but an immediate infusion of European investment capital quickly dried up when cotton became a glut on the market. “King Cotton” became a liability to the South, as European markets had found alternate, and cheaper, sources of cotton to substitute for the blockaded Southern product. The underpinnings of slavery were manifestly creaking when Virginia abolished the institution in1870. By the turn of the century, it was gone. The Southern economy never fully recovered from the devastation of three years of brutal warfare. The United States never recovered its political stability from the cult of the leader established by President McClellan. It sullenly refused to help its Southern neighbor, and the border between the two nations remained hostile for decades.

  The Reality

  Jubal Early’s small Confederate army did enter the Shenandoah Valley in June 1864 to support the Confederate forces there and to keep the Valley, the South’s breadbasket, as a supply center for food for the Confederacy. Initially successful, Early drove to the outskirts of Washington outside of Fort Stevens. Troops (Wright’s VI Corps) were rushed from the Army of the Potomac to protect Washington, but there was little fighting, though President Lincoln, standing on the parapet of Fort Stevens, was under fire for a little while. Lieutenant Colonel Oliver Wendell Holmes, later chief justice of the Supreme Court did, in fact, tell him “get down you damned fool!” which Lincoln reluctantly did. (Holmes did not realize who it was until after he had said
it. The much-wounded Holmes was no doubt suitably embarrassed, but the fact that the comment was obeyed says much for its common sense.) However, Lincoln was not harmed and won the national election that November. Lincoln defeated the anti-war Democrats and their somewhat reluctant candidate George McClellan, who was a twice-failed commander of the Army of the Potomac. Interestingly, the military vote went heavily for Lincoln.

  There was no council of war with Lee, Davis, and Johnston. Johnston was soon relieved by Davis, being replaced unwisely by John Bell Hood, who wrecked what was left of the Southern forces in the Deep South at Franklin and Nashville. A competent division commander for Longstreet, Hood was in over his head commanding an army.

  Lee, though admired as the “marble model,” and the epitome of an army commander, really did not grasp the strategic situation for the Confederacy. His concern was for Virginia. He defended it well, was an excellent tactician and counter-puncher, but as he doggedly held on in Northern Virginia in 1864–65, the South fell apart behind him.

  By mid-July 1864 Early and his small army did control the Valley. Union forces under the department commander David Hunter had been defeated and outmaneuvered. Sheridan arrived in late July and the situation changed. He defeated Early at Winchester and unwisely figured the Southerners were done. Early and his resilient troops did conduct a savage attack at Cedar Creek, which initially swept all before it, but Sheridan’s timely arrival from Washington reversed the situation.

  Phil Sheridan completed his famous ride on his black horse Rienzi, rallied the defeated troops of his army and counter-attacked, defeating and routing Early’s outnumbered army. Early was no longer a threat, and Sheridan’s army went on down the Valley to comply with his instructions to render it incapable of providing food and fodder for the Confederate armies, especially Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia which was then besieged at Petersburg, outside of Richmond. It was another nail in the coffin of Southern hopes for a successful conclusion to the war. The Union noose was tightening. In actuality, with Lincoln’s re-election, Grant’s dogged determination not to give Lee any breathing space, and Sherman’s ruthless march to Atlanta and then Savannah, it was all over but the shouting.