December 1941

by Craig Shirley

  The citizenry begged MacArthur to return with the American army in tow to defend the city. But the notion was taking hold that America was going along with Churchill’s plan to put the main emphasis of the Allies in Europe. “Despite the Manila news and a steady Japanese advance northward and southward through Luzon, it was reported in Washington that Britain and the United States had agreed, in the interests of a wider strategy, to concentrate on Germany.”47 The Japanese broadcast a message over Tokyo radio which was tantamount to an ultimatum to the Filipino people: lay down your arms and we will stop bombing Manila. A CBS listening post picked up the broadcast. The Japanese demand “was greeted with scorn and derision.”48 A town only 55 miles from Manila, Lucena, now flew the Japanese flag of the rising sun and up to 15,000 ground troops were estimated just in this one area.49 Despite the threat, the Filipino people refused, in part because they believed, as did MacArthur, that American aid was forthcoming. There was no aid coming.

  Fortunately, the monument to Ferdinand Magellan, who brought Christianity and western civilization after he discovered the islands in 1521, was untouched amid the destruction.50 A small victory. Meanwhile the streets were strewn with bodies, body parts, blood, and “tattered school books and examination papers from the bombed Intramuros Catholic elementary school. . . .”51

  The Japanese attack of the day before was enraging to all. They bombed at almost a leisurely pace, wave after wave after wave of planes, doing so in almost three hours, knowing there was no danger from anti-aircraft guns. They also bombed Kuala Lumpur on Saturday and destroyed an ancient mosque, described as one of Malaya’s “oldest and finest.”52 The bombing had taken place when many Muslims there were praying.

  Washington politicians were lamenting how America had been “twice burnt” and many thundered for direct retaliation against Japan’s cities. Senator Alben Barkley was practically offering to carry the bombs to Tokyo on his back. He accused the Japanese of “sadistic cruelty.”53 Problem was, those cities were too far off for American land bombers to make the round trip from any airfields controlled by the Allies. And America had no available planes in the area at the time and no secret airfields.

  CHAPTER 29

  THE TWENTY-NINTH OF DECEMBER

  Our Fleet “Is Not Idle,” the Navy Declares

  New York Times

  Russia, England Agree on Method of War Conduct

  Birmingham News

  Positive Aid Pledged by Roosevelt and Navy in Philippine Fighting

  The Sun

  The Japanese bombed Manila again around noon, on the twenty-ninth. The city had done everything possible to make it clear it was open for peace, short of taking out ads in the Tokyo newspapers. Any remaining ships in Manila Harbor were towed out—so not to be confused by the Japanese with naval warships—and blown up and sunk.1

  “The second day of savage, unopposed air-raids left Manila an inferno of burning churches and office buildings. Many persons lay dead among the debris.”2 The second attack of the day also involved repeated strafing of Ft. Murphy, which General MacArthur had already evacuated. The most famous Catholic statue in Manila, “Our Lady of the Rosary,” was fortunately saved from the bombing campaign “by priests and church servants who braved the flames and entered the church shortly after bombs had wrecked the bell tower and roof” of the Santo Domingo cathedral, first built in 1588.3 But tragically, a priceless library at the church went up in smoke, destroying 200,000 folios and books. In that library was a complete record of every Filipino dialect spoken over the past 300 years in the islands. “Ironically, the library also contained original manuscripts from Dominican missions in China and Indo-China. They were brought to Manila a few months ago to save them from the ravages of war on the Asiatic mainland.”4

  The Japanese state media, Domei, announced that the government intended to have the Philippines conquered and catalogued by New Year’s Day, which was a big holiday in Japan.5

  President Roosevelt, under pressure to do something, pledged aid to the beleaguered country, and to one of his favorite generals, MacArthur. Late the day before, he went on short wave radio and proclaimed his “solemn pledge that their freedom will be redeemed and their independence established and protected. The entire resources of the United States, in men and materiel, stand behind that pledge, the President’s message assured.”6 Almost immediately, the navy issued a statement claiming, “The Fleet is not idle. The United States Navy is following an intensive and well-planned campaign against the Japanese forces which will result in positive assistance to the defense of the Philippine Islands.”7 It was bluster. Or disinformation. Other than submarines, there was no attempt or planned attempt involving American surface ships to come to the defense of the Philippines.8

  Even if Washington had the ability to send anything, a Japanese blockade of the Philippines was forming up to keep anything from getting in. Some wondered about the whereabouts of the American Pacific fleet, such as it was, and a knowledgeable source said, “Be patient.” Strategic reasons necessitated silence, but the nation was reassured that the navy would strike when the time was right.9

  The navy as much as admitted that there had been no military contact between U.S. ships and the Japanese since the beginning of the war. “Naval strategists believe that major contact between the Japanese and United States navies will not occur for some time, maybe months—perhaps a year or more.”10 Of course, without naval “contact,” there would be no re-provisioning of the Philippines. The Japanese had complete air superiority over Luzon so that option was out for the American forces. The Japanese saturation bombing of Clark Field and Nichols Field had obliterated hundreds of planes on the ground, and those that escaped were eventually shot down or were grounded for a lack of replacement parts.

  Navy Secretary Frank Knox claimed the fleet was at sea and that “the main body of the fleet with its battleships, cruisers, aircraft carriers and submarines was ‘. . . seeking contact with the enemy.’”11 The contradictory information coming from naval sources—other than announcing their submarines successes—was the first real information of any kind since the week after Pearl Harbor. The navy may have been engaged in a disinformation campaign so as to not reveal to the Japanese the true location of the fleet. “The Japanese government is circulating rumors for the obvious purpose of persuading the United States to disclose the location and intentions of the American Pacific fleet. It is obvious that these rumors are intended for and directed at the Philippine Islands.”12

  Among all the services, the navy was in the worst shape when it came to men and materiel. The Air Corps had lost hundreds of planes at Hickam but airplanes were easier to replace than destroyed or damaged warships, which tended to take longer to refloat.

  Despite the rush at recruitment offices, large ads continued to run looking for “College Men . . . to be Naval Officers.” No sugar-coating, the ads practically begged that “the Navy needs 7000 Seniors now in college or college graduates as prospective officers. In addition, the Navy needs 5000 men now in their Junior year in college as prospective officers.” Upon completion of training, “you will be commissioned as an Ensign, U.S.N.R., at $125 a month and allowances.” However, the Navy also needed “15,000 men now in their Senior, Junior or Sophomore years . . . as prospective Naval aviators. As full-fledged Naval Aviators their pay will be $205 per month plus allowances.”13

  But as far as the final word on the disposition of the Pacific Fleet, columnist Paul Mallon who wrote the “News Behind the News” syndicated column said, “The truth probably is that our naval command has decided not to risk heavy ships in waters where the enemy has air superiority, especially after what happened to the Prince of Wales and the Repulse. It is also probable a third of the fleet was in the Atlantic when the blow fell. A redistribution of naval forces is obviously necessary. The British should have enough of their own capital ships to take care of the Atlantic. . . .”14 Mallon was an unusually trenchant columnist.

  Japanese parachutists
were spotted floating down over Manila, a prelude to invasion and occupation. “Filipino police, sole-remaining defenders of Manila, rushed through the bomb-ravaged and burning city early this morning hunting Japanese parachutists who were said to have been seen swooping down during the night, apparently attempting to prepare the way for invading armies.”15 The Japanese War Office broadcast a statement in which they refused to recognize Manila as an open city. “The Japanese will not consider their action at all limited by such ‘arbitrary and unilateral announcements’ and will proceed to carry out their war objectives,” they said.16

  American anti-aircraft guns—what few there were outside the city—scored a couple of hits and brought down three Japanese planes, but the bombings and the invasion continued. The Japanese advised the remaining civilians in the city to evacuate, via air dropped pamphlets. They were told to go to two refugee centers, Antipolo and Montalban. It wasn’t that the Filipino and American troops weren’t up to the challenge. They were; they fought bravely and tirelessly and by all accounts their equipment was better, but they were now facing overwhelming numbers of Japanese troops. “Outnumbered American and Philippine troops dug in among the coconut groves fringing the Tiaong River . . . for a stand against 10,000 to 15,000 Japanese invaders pushing up the Tabayas Isthmus. Their stand was costing the Japanese ten men for every fallen defender.”17

  MacArthur had been training these troops for several years, and it had paid off in a superior fighting soldier but as a substitution for victory, he would have gladly accepted more tanks, planes, and men, had they been forthcoming from Washington. One American anti-tank gun was, on average, taking out three Japanese tanks along with field guns.18 “This question of reinforcement is difficult because the Philippines lie 7,000 miles from the United States and are amid Japanese island positions that hold a constant threat to reinforcement by air or sea.” The best Washington could realistically offer MacArthur was “Hopeful.”19

  The Japanese storm continued to rage across the entire Pacific. They had finally gained a toe-hold in the mineral rich Dutch East Indies. The move was a strategic one, aimed at possessing bases near Singapore to stop re-supply and aid from getting to the battered British garrison there.20 Inhabitants of the East Indies were warned not to run out of their homes when the Japanese dropped leaflets, as it was a ploy.

  In Penang, on the Malaya Peninsula, leaflets had been dropped and then Japanese planes strafed the individuals who came out to read the paper which said the Japanese wanted peace.21

  The Japanese were also dropping paratroopers onto the Malaya Peninsula and claimed they now controlled one third of the isthmus. Singapore announced it had received assurance from both London and Washington that help was on the way, and the Australian Expeditionary Force was mounting a resilient and valiant effort against the Japanese invaders.22 British leaders were already vowing to take back Hong Kong, but that was so much blue sky over the Pacific as they didn’t have the manpower to stop the Japanese advance, much less actually defeat them in open battle. That very day, the Japanese held a triumphal troop review in Hong Kong while announcing they had captured six thousand British troops and fifteen thousand Indian troops.23

  The final chapter of the American presence in China was written when the Japanese seized the consul there and with it, some sixty noncombatants were taken into custody including Kenneth Yearns, the U.S. Consul.24 It was an open question whether it would also be the final chapter in the American presence in the Western Pacific if the Philippines fell. At this point, Japanese troops had closed to within forty miles of Manila.

  A mound of paper crossed President Roosevelt’s desk that day but none of it apparently dealing with the Philippines. FDR’s inbox was especially heavy, the twenty-ninth. Memos from Secretary of State Cordell Hull on Borneo,25 copies of British diplomatic memoranda, to the State Department including a memo defining “Security,” and another on the organizational problems in localities where various agencies were crowding and stepping on each other’s toes.26

  As often the case, there was a confidential memorandum from John Franklin Carter, a writer (and covert White House operative) who worked out of the National Press Club building in Washington. His memos went directly to FDR, and no one else, and it seemed as if he was a free agent on the outside, outside any chain of command, working exclusively and directly for the president. His memos littered Roosevelt’s desk.

  A new one, dated the twenty-seventh, dealt with “Intelligence Problems in the New York Area.”27 “After discussions with F.B.I., O.N.I. [Office of Naval Intelligence] . . . I am convinced . . . Civil Service should be asked to waive or modify some of its rules on recruiting civilian personal for intelligence services.” In so many words, Carter was advocating the creation of a network of private individuals, including Mafiosi and wise guys, to act as covert operatives in behalf of the U.S. government. “There is a need for greater pooling of intelligence reports and services on the New York Area at least.”28 Roosevelt wrote back and advised Carter to take the matter up with William H. McReynolds and Vincent Astor.29 McReynolds was a White House aide who carried a portfolio with a wide latitude and extensive contacts in the agencies, and Astor was a New York socialite who, because of his connections to horse racing, presumably had contacts in Gotham’s underworld.

  He also received a copy of a classified British memo on how Great Britain was dealing with their Alien problem. “The initial policy was to impose on enemy aliens restrictions graduated according to their estimated potential danger. . . . the Executive advised a policy of general internment . . . “30 Roosevelt also sent a note on White House stationary to “H.H.” saying, “Will you read this over and I will talk with you about it later? F.D.R.”31 The H.H. was Harry Hopkins, and widespread internment of Japanese was for once on the horizon.

  The survivors of yet another previous Japanese attack on a civilian American ship in the Pacific washed ashore at Hawaii. But there were only thirteen men out of a compliment of thirty-four aboard the Prusa, a 7,000-ton freighter.32 Life magazine published the most comprehensive set of photos of the carnage of Pearl Harbor, but the bulk dealt with the damage done to civilian targets and not the military in the Harbor or at Hickam Field. “First pictures of Jap onslaught show death & destruction at American base.”33 Still, few military targets were shown and no images of torpedoed ships were printed. Only the photo of a blasted out hangar and a B-17 that had been forced to belly land were published along with those of some destroyed P-40s that never got off the ground. One surprisingly gruesome photo was of seven dead civilians in the morgue: “[S]even corpses—three men, three women and one child—lie sheeted in an emergency morgue.” The publication claimed, “Now for the first time they [readers] may look on the bodies of their own dead.”34

  To end on a happier note, this being the Christmas season, Life ran a montage of boys in uniforms saying good bye to loved ones. At an undisclosed location, up to four troop trains stopped daily.

  “As each arrives, volunteer agents of the local Red Cross, the Knights of Columbus or the U.S.O. quickly appears with baskets of books, magazines and jig-saw puzzles which they give away, cartons of cigarets [sic] which they sell at any cost.” Because of the short stay, the young men were not allowed to get off. “As trains vanish into the night the soldiers shout goodbye to the girls on the platform ‘See you again,’ they cry ‘We’ll bring you a necklace of Jap ears.’”35

  Henry Luce’s Life magazine seemed to have a direct pipeline into the War Department. In this pre-television era, government publicists saw the splashy, picture-intensive magazine as an important tool in telling the story of the American military and to boost civilian and military morale. Features ran the gamut, from the “Anatomy of Bombs”36 and the personal story of “Buzz” Wagoner and how he bagged two Japanese Zeros in the Philippines,37 to the story of the marines and “parachutists,”38 to “How Nazi Planes May Bomb New York.”39 The thick, visually compelling weekly was filled with the stories and tales of t
he American fighting man, including full-sized photos of handsome young G.I.s in uniform.

  One feature profiled Ensign George T. Weems, a handsome, six-foot tall specimen of American manhood with everything going for him. Humorously, Life also mentioned his one weak spot. The young navy man whose career goal was to become an admiral suffered from “seasickness.”40

  That same week, Luce’s Time magazine sported a flattering profile of MacArthur in the Pacific with a quote from the general saying, “When George Dewey sailed into Manila Bay on May 1, 1898, it was Manifest Destiny working itself out. By God, it was Destiny that brought me here. It was Destiny.” MacArthur smoked a cigarette as he watched Japanese bombs drop from the sky.41 The lengthy and gushy two-page profile reviewed his career, that of his father’s, his devotion to the Philippines, and his physical courage, as proved in Europe beginning in 1917.

  Interestingly, the magazine opened by opining, “For the first time in nearly 10 years of publication, Time finds itself unable to tell its readers freely and frankly of all the things it [knows].”42 While this may have been true, the Luce publishing empire found itself in a position to tell Americans a lot more than what they were getting from other publications and broadsheets, even down to Admiral Chester Nimitz’s nickname, “Cottonhead.”43 Indeed, the periodical had dozens of stories about the war and the men conducting the war in great detail, practically swimming in facts.

  The magazine that week also had the complete insider dope on how poorly Fiorello La Guardia was running the Office of Civil Defense. The story and the extensive details could have only come from sources close to a White House very down on the mayor’s stewardship. “Indications were that Mr. Roosevelt . . . was getting ready to pluck the Little Flower from OCD.”44