Brother Tariq: The Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan

by Caroline Fourest

  Finally, one must understand what Tariq Ramadan means by "moratorium." He speaks of a consultation (choura) that is supposed to take place not between citizens, but between scholars. But Tariq Ramadan only recognizes as scholars those theologians close to the Muslim Brotherhood-that is to say, political fundamentalists. That is really why his view is in the minority. But is he in the minority among European Muslims? No. He is in the minority among Islamist scholars. So what does it mean to propose a moratorium to be discussed among Islamist scholars, who are generally in favor of stoning, other than to propose a moratorium that can open the way to maintaining the practice? This is exactly what happened in Iran ... But that will not distress Ramadan. In the revised and corrected edition of a book published in 2004, he explained that, even if it was not applicable, corporal punish ment was there to recall "by way of teaching" that "fornication and adultery are most serious matters in the eyes of God." 35

  An all-encompassing Islam

  If he were simply a fundamentalist, Tariq Ramadan would hardly be more than an archaic religious figure, a bit sectarian and reactionary. Unfortunately, he is the product of a movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, that has always put politics ahead of religion. Obsessed as he is by the idea of influencing politics and society in the name of Islam, there is nothing that exasperates him more than believers who practice their religion only in the private sphere. His dawa, the mission that he considers his priority, propagates a political Islam intent on becoming a model for society. In France and certain other European countries, this proselytizing is immediately perceived as integrist (politically fundamentalist). Ramadan is well aware of the fact, and encourages his followers not to state point-blank that Islam makes no distinction between religion and politics. Not that he considers such an approach to be wrong; it is just that he finds it inept, which is not the same thing. In order not to shock people, he advises practicing "communication strategy": "You must know how to speak to those who don't come from the same background as we do."36 He explains that the subject is "sensitive," that Christians might take it badly as submission to a dogma, whereas the fusion of politics and religion should appear as something positive. He himself has recourse to an ingenious approach.

  He never speaks of political Islam, but always of an "all-encompassing" Islam, the only way to be faithful to one's religion: "The Muslims of the West cannot avoid this task; if they want to follow the "Way of the Faithful," if they want to trace out their "path to the source," they must commit themselves, inspired by the all-encompassing character of Islarris message."37 Once again, the liberal Muslims who want to keep their faith within the sphere of the spiritual and the private are singled out as unfaithful. But as always, in order to avoid being identified as a fundamentalist, Tariq Ramadan makes a point of presenting his proposal as if it were the middle ground. In a cassette on "Islam and politics, between confusion and separation,"38 he begins by setting up a framework that will allow him to situate his position as a median between confounding religion with politics and separating one from the other. Which is a way of saying, implicitly, that separating religion and politics is an extremist view. "When you say such a thing, your public is at a loss," he explained, referring to his favorite technique that has protected him over the years from accusations of fundamentalism: invoking the distinctive nature of Islam in order to justify the claim that his way of merging religion and politics is in no way similar to the negative manner in which Christians do so.39

  The virtues of cultural differentiation

  What would people think of a fundamentalist leader who defended an "allencompassing" Christianity that forbids mixed marriages, considers men superior to women, and argues that corporal punishment is a good way of teaching that "fornication and adultery are most serious matters in the eyes of God?" Certainly not that he belonged to the Christian Left ... The political views that Ramadan espouses are close to those of another fundamentalist, Jerry Falwell, one of the moving spirits behind the American Christian Right. The comparison is obviously not welcome. Which is why Tariq Ramadan tries at all costs to insulate his school of thought from such criticism by invoking a "specific history" that renders the comparison inapplicable.4°

  Ramadan refuses to accept the terms "integrist" or "fundamentalist" being applied to Islam: "The term `integrist' cannot be used because it refers to Catholicism, just as `fundamentalism refers to the Protestant religion," he explains in his interviews.4' A flagrant case of doublespeak. He himself uses the term "fundamentalist" as the equivalent of "Salafist" when there is no danger of being taken for a literalist. And he also brands as "integrist" the Islamist movements that are not in full agreement with the Muslim Brotherhood. Yet he rejects these same terms when not used inside the movement, but voiced by people outside. Adopting a pseudo-scholarly stance, he contends that fundamentalism and integrism are concepts applicable only to Christianity: "Fundamentalism, which has often been criticized in the Christian tradition, has nothing to do with our way of going back to found ing texts."42 Invoking this cultural difference has an enormous advantage: it avoids criticism that treats the two traditions (Christian and Muslim) in the same terms, convincing those who are not familiar with Salafist reformism and Christian fundamentalism not to compare the two for fear of committing a cultural blunder, or even being taken for a racist-even at the risk of forgiving Muslim integrism what we don't forgive the Christian sort.

  There are, to be sure, cultural differences stemming from the history of each religion. In Judaism, the radicals call themselves "orthodox" or "ultraorthodox," since they believe in strict application of their religion. In the Catholic tradition, the radicals are called "traditionalists," since they believe in returning to pre-Vatican II interpretations. In the case of the Protestants, the term "fundamentalist" is used. But this term applies as well to movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, because they, too, want to return to the fundamentals of their religion. Ramadan is well aware of this, since he uses the terminology himself. He has nothing against the word "fundamentalist" when he uses it to define his approach and that of the Muslim Brothers. It is just that he takes offense when the term is used by way of criticism, lumping him in with fundamentalist Christians. It is true that the two fundamentalisms, Christian and Muslim, arose in very different historical conditions. The former was born in the West in reaction to the theory of evolution; the latter, in the East, was born in reaction to the decline of Muslim expansion due to colonialism. But the former is engaged in a battle with liberal Christians, just as the latter is engaged in a battle with liberal Muslims. Despite his much-advertised enthusiasm for dialogue and clarification ofter- minology, Tariq Ramadan does little to clear up the misunderstanding when he addresses his allies on the Left.

  In the same way as he refuses to be criticized for his fundamentalism, he never uses the word "integrism' when speaking of Islam. "What is meant today by integrism is when people do not distinguish between the religious sphere and the public sphere. And they enter the public sphere armed with dogmas that they want to impose without resort to reason," he explained.43 In reality, integrism is a political term that refers to the aim of prescribing an "integralist," all-encompassing vision in the name of a religion, whatever it might be. It is thus a political approach that is applicable to all religions. But Ramadan obviously wants at all costs to preserve his "all-encompassing Islam' from such slander. So he redefines the term "integrisrri' as a feature that can only concern dogmatic religions and non-rational religious practices, before explaining to us that this temptation could never exist in his own religion, since it has recourse to individual reasoning (~tihad).

  To hear him speak, one would think that, in Islam, there was no conflict between faith and reason because, I quote, "the Koran forces us to think."44 Which is one way of implying that this is not the case for the Bible. Christians, and Jews will welcome the news! Similarly, he will tell you that "it is normal for a Muslim to read the Koran in a state of adoration," since the Koran is "a fountain
head that vivifies the intelligence" and not one that "shackles the mind. "45 For him, "all the difference is there." A splendid way of getting across the idea that fanaticism is no threat in Islam. Undoubtedly, if the Koran "vivifies the intelligence," then placing this text above the law and above all human concerns should not be interpreted as fanaticism, but as the sign of intense faith.

  In the same vein, he argues that Muslim fundamentalism can never result in integrism, simply because it is not literalist. But, as we have seen, the literalism of fundamentalist Protestantism and the non-literalist Muslim fundamentalism amount to roughly the same thing: both of them consider the principles proclaimed in their founding texts to be revealed truths that are eternal, and not open to question just because we live in modern times. The faithful are obliged to apply these principles, even though they were determined by a different context. Thus, the Protestant fundamentalists are persuaded that all the stories recounted in the Bible are untouchable truths, beginning with the story of Adam and Eve. But that doesn't mean they practice their religion naked in a Garden of Eden, refusing any and every modern development not anticipated by the Bible! They, of necessity, make use of their reason in order to implement, in the twenty-first century, the Biblical principles dating from the first century. They are even at the forefront of evangelical technology, thanks to the Internet and television. Tariq Ramadan would have us believe that Christianity is so dogmatic that fundamentalist Christians are incapable of adapting to the times or of reasoning. His efforts to protect Islam from criticism by invoking differentiation lead him to be contemptuous of the two other monotheistic religions.

  When reason equals faith

  Tariq Ramadan often reassures the journalists who interview him that he is a preacher who has "no problem whatsoever with reason." As a result, they are convinced that Ramadan stands for a sort of Islam of the Enlightenment. "The particularity of Islam," he is fond of saying, "is that faith is the light and reason the guide."46 These terms, obviously borrowed from the vocabulary of Enlightenment philosophy, were not chosen by accident. As a teacher of philosophy, the preacher is aware of the historical significance of the word "reason," and he deliberately uses it in order to reassure those who would be foolish enough to consider him a fanatic. But we should not be too hasty to interpret what he says as an invitation to take a rational, and thus critical, look at his religion. It is not at all in these terms that this mystic philosopher defines the word "reason." Encouraging "reason," in the sense of the Salafist reformers, is ferociously opposed to all Muslim reasoning. It is a rhetorical ploy to present individual reasoning, or ijtihad (searching with one's own intellect for answers to questions that are not already answered in the Koran or the Surma), as a safeguard to protect Islam from fanatical heresies-and it results in his public being duped. They come away convinced that Tariq Ramadan stands for a rational Islam, in harmony with Enlightenment philosophy; whereas, in his cassettes, he condemns Kant and Pascal categorically as counter-models. Reason, as represented by a critical spirit, is abhorrent to him-a conception that he describes as an extremism typical of the Occident. He is distressed to see that, in the West, everything is subject to critical scrutiny, to the extent that people come to consider that "everything is relative." He wants at all costs to protect Islam from this critical spirit, thanks again to the virtue of cultural differentiation, by explaining, with a straight face, that "doubt is linked to historical circumstances." In a cassette entitled "Islam, modernity and modernism' he went so far as to declare: "We do not doubt everything in the same way."47

  This is a terrifying confession for a professor of philosophy. Descartes' "I think therefore I am' is jettisoned, and then it's the turn of Dostoevsky, whose aphorism "Everything is permitted" he caricatures in order the better to refute it: "You are familiar with Dostoevsky's expression `if God does not exist, then everything is permitted'; we say, and it's just the point, `God exists, therefore everything is not permitted. -48 He contrasts the reason that ends in the permissiveness characteristic of the moral decadence of the West, with the "reason guided by the divine," designed to have us discover that all has been foreseen by God. A conception of reason that he presents as the true grandeur of Islam: "In Islam," he explains, "the whole conception of man is different .... In fact, what is asked of reason is to show us the way of faith in our hearts, not to explore its limits so as to extend our faith."49 In particular, he takes up the Koranic metaphor that makes of faith a veiled treasure until the day "reason' comes to break the seal and save our sick hearts. A pleasing prospect, which explains why Ramadan says that, as a Muslim, "he has no problem with reason"-because, for him, reason equals faith.

  Chapter4

  An "Islamic feminist"

  - but puritanical and patriarchal

  I n July 2003, the French-language magazine Yasmina published an interview with Tariq Ramadan, introducing him in these terms: "He owes his success to the radically innovative way he speaks of Islam: not as a religion of coercion, interdiction and repression, but as a religion of free choice, freedom of will, and liberation, particularly for women. Meet a thinker who is promoting an "Islamic feminism' and who challenges those for whom the return to religion means regression."1 Tariq Ramadan does, indeed, defend an "Islamic feminism," which he defines as a "women's liberation movement in and by Islam." In theory, this feminism is supposed to counter the "overrated" idea that the more restrictive something is, especially in regard to women, the more "Islamic" it is. In practice, it means combating feminism in the name of Islam.

  "No compulsion in religion" but the veil is obligatory

  The veil is one of those typical patriarchal traditions that a "feminist" such as Tariq, who intends to reform Islam without giving in to anti-Westernism, should be eager to combat. This custom, which dates back to the Mesopotamian era, has successively been adopted by Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, but only the fundamentalists of the three religions are in favor of maintaining it, the better to mark the distinction between men and women. The Torah speaks of Rebecca, who covers herselfwith a veil when a stranger approaches, but only a limited number of orthodox Jewish women wear a veil or a wig to set themselves off from men. In the case of Christianity, St. Paul strongly advises women to wear the veil rather than cutting off their hair or shaving her head, for "every wife who prays or prophesies with her head uncovered dishonors her head. ,2 In practice, only certain nuns, some traditional activists, and a few orthodox women continue to wear a veil or a cornet as a sign of"submission." 3 In the same epistle, St. Paul also reminds us that it is unfitting for a woman to "address an assembly."4

  The Koran is less explicit and markedly less sexist. For the first fifteen years after the Prophet's coming, Muslim women did not wear the veil. The custom first appeared in Medina in very particular circumstances.5 In retaliation for having been robbed of their influence in the city, certain leading figures of Medina-whom the Koran qualifies as "hypocrites"-decided that one way of dishonoring the Muslims was to take sexual possession of the Prophet's wives. In the face of this danger, and urged on, in particular, by the future caliph Omar, Mohammed finally agreed to heed the Koran's injunction: "Prophet, tell thy wives and daughters, and the believing women that they should cast their outer garments over their persons when abroad: that is most convenient that they should be known as such and not molested."' A second verse specifies the parts ofthe body concerned: "0 Prophet! Say to the believing women that they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty; that they should not display their beauty and ornaments except what must ordinarily appear thereof; that they should draw their veils over their bosoms and not display their beauty except to their husbands, their fathers, their husbands' fathers, their brothers, their brothers' sons, their women, their slaves, and their eunuchs, or the prepubescent. ,7 That is what it says in the Koran. Nothing more, nothing less. The Koran simply advises the wearing of a veil, intended to cover a womans bust; a veil that, in many circumstances, can be dispensed with. As in the case
of all religious texts, many different translations exist for each verse. Every translator uses a different word to indicate the part ofthe body to be veiled-sometimes it is called the "bosom," at other times the "cleavage"; but all interpretations agree: the area concerned is none other than ... the bust. How is it that a unique recommendation, adopted in very particular circumstances, concerning the covering up of a woman's bust and her arms, became the imposition of an ever more intrusive veil?

  It is a question to ask of the fundamentalists. Even though they say their only intention is to conform scrupulously to the Prophet's precepts, they do everything they can to make things more confining for women. The headto-toe veil that its advocates call the niqab-a veil that covers the whole body, with the exception of two little slits for the eyes-is never mentioned in the Koran. Insisting that it be worn is a way for radical Muslims to prove that, unlike Western husbands, they are masters over their wives. Similarly, it is not because of Islam, but because of Islamism, that some Muslim women, in defiance of Western values, began once again wearing the hijab towards the end of the twentieth century, even though this tradition had almost disappeared. Even if a woman wanted to respect the Prophet's advice, why could she not wear a hat or a wig? Why is she obliged to wear a burqa or a chador, dark clothes that cover the body from head to toe even when it is 4o degrees centigrade in the shade? Qaradawi, the scholar most frequently cited by Tariq Ramadan, has an explanation: "This garment must not resemble what is worn by infidels, Jewesses, Christian women, and idolaters. The attempt to imitate these women is forbidden in Islam, which requires that Muslims be different and independent in both their appearance and being. That is why the Prophet decreed doing the opposite of what infidels do."'