Abraham Lincoln: A Life, Volume 1
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Vandalia was also notorious for its lawlessness. In 1837, residents deplored the “frequent recurrence of brawls and drunken frays in our streets” and lamented that “our town has come to the pass, that it is almost dangerous for one to walk the streets, unless he is armed with dirks, pistols, &c.”178
Many towns aspired to become the new state capital, including Springfield, Alton, Decatur, Peoria, and Jacksonville. In an 1834 statewide referendum on relocating the seat of government, Alton had received 7,511 votes, Vandalia 7,148, and Springfield 7,044. Three years later Lincoln led the Springfield forces in the legislature, even though he was the youngest of the nine members from Sangamon County. That delegation, consisting of men whose average height was slightly over 6 feet, was contemptuously labeled by the Springfield Republican “the Long Nine,” after a type of cheap cigar.179
To win support for Springfield, Lincoln and his colleagues did what legislators usually do: they cut deals. As the representative from Morgan County, John J. Hardin, observed in 1836, “members support measures that they would not otherwise vote for, to obtain another member’s vote for a friend.”180 To his wife, Hardin described the legislature as a “Den of legislative trading” and renounced politics, saying that a “man has no business here [in Vandalia] unless he will debase himself to bargain & trade for his rights.”181 In 1839, David Davis described to his father-in-law the legislature’s “barter, trade & intrigue—‘You vote for my measure, & I will vote for yours.’ ”182 In the first session of the General Assembly held in the new capital, a journalist reported: “Log rolling is now in most successful operation; and that party which understands the art of buying and selling votes the best will succeed. In every sense of the word, ‘the longest pole will knock off the persimmon.’ ”183
In 1836–1837, the most coveted “persimmons” were roads, canals, railroads, and river improvements, which were universally desired and which the legislature was eager to provide. Illinoisans were, as Governor John Reynolds put it, “perfectly insane” and “crazed considerably with the mania” for canals and railroads.184 That mania was the key to Lincoln’s strategy to make Springfield the new capital.
Under Lincoln’s direction, the Long Nine promised to support various internal improvements throughout the state in return for endorsement of Springfield’s aspirations. Helping Lincoln was his mentor, John Todd Stuart, who lobbied behind the scenes. Since Sangamon County’s delegation was the largest in the General Assembly, it had significant leverage when its members voted as a bloc. Governor Thomas Ford noted that the Sangamon delegation was not only large, but also included “some dexterous jugglers and managers in politics,” and thus Sangamon County had “a decided preponderance in the log-rolling system of those days.”185
As legislative business was grinding along in December and January, the Long Nine relentlessly accumulated friends by promising support for internal improvement projects tailored to the needs of each county. It was difficult work, and progress came hard. As Lincoln remarked later, the subject of internal improvements was fraught with difficulty because it was impossible to please everyone: “One man is offended because a road passes over his land, and another is offended because it does not pass over his; one is dissatisfied because the bridge, for which he is taxed, crosses the river on a different road from that which leads from his house to town; another can not bear that the county should be got in debt for these same roads and bridges; while not a few struggle hard to have roads located over their lands, and then stoutly refuse to let them be opened until they are first paid the damages. Even between the different wards, and streets, of towns and cities, we find this same wrangling, and difficulty.”186
Strong resistance to the internal improvement scheme also came from fiscal conservatives who believed that private funds, not tax dollars, should underwrite river and harbor improvements, railroads, canals, and turnpikes. In addition, some “old fogies were opposed to railroads for the reason that they would be too destructive of timber, believing that the roads were made of split wooden rails laid closely together ‘corduroy’ fashion!”187
On December 13, 1836, a serious threat confronted the Long Nine when John Taylor of Springfield submitted a petition to divide Sangamon County. Taylor and his lieutenant, John Calhoun, had speculated in land that they hoped would become county seats and thus appreciate in value. In addition, Taylor and others had bought up acreage at the geographical center of the state, a locale that they named Illiopolis and hoped to make the capital. Lincoln, not wanting to see the delegation reduced in size while it was seeking votes for Springfield, adopted delaying tactics, urging that the question be postponed until Springfield had achieved its goal. When signatures on a petition favoring division of the county proved fraudulent, the measure failed. In late January 1837, another attempt to divide the county was made, which was condemned at a mass meeting in Springfield. Soon thereafter Springfield’s champions submitted a remonstrance bearing more signatures than the original petition, thus killing the proposal.
At one point in the long, tedious process Lincoln succumbed to despair. Jesse K. Dubois, a fellow legislator who became Lincoln’s good friend, recalled that “Lincoln came to my room one evening and told me that he was whipped—that his career was ended—that he had traded off everything he could dispose of, and still had not got strength enough to locate the seat of government at Springfield.” Yet, he said, “I can[’]t go home without passing that bill. My folks expect that of me, and that I can[’]t do—and I am finished forever.”188 Robert L. Wilson of the Long Nine also remembered discouraging moments: “The contest on this Bill was long, and severe; its enemies laid it on the table twice, once on the table till the fourth day of July and once indefinitely postponed it.” Removing bills from the table “is always attended with difficulty; but when laid on the table to a day beyond the Session, or when indefinitely postponed, [it] requires a vote of reconsideration, which always is an intense Struggle.” But the once-discouraged Lincoln rallied his troops. “In these dark hours, when our Bill to all appearance was beyond recussitation and all our opponents were jubilant over our defeat, and when friends could see no hope, Mr Lincoln never for one moment despaired, but collect[ed] his Colleagues to his room for consultation.” His “practical common Sense, his thorough knowledge of human nature then, made him an overmatch for his compeers and for any man that I have ever known.”189
On February 17, a motion to table the internal improvements bill passed 39 to 38; four days later it was taken off the table. A key swing vote was cast by Edward Smith of Wabash County, an engineer who championed the internal improvements scheme, which passed the legislature on February 23. Two days later, the council of revision (consisting of the governor and the state supreme court) refused to approve that bill; Smith’s decision to change his vote may have been influenced by his fear that the House of Representatives would not override the council’s action. He probably struck a deal with the Long Nine to support the removal of the capital to Springfield in return for the Long Nine’s votes to secure final passage of the internal improvements measure. Opponents of the internal improvements system claimed that its supporters “found out the price of certain members” and “bought up” enough votes to pass it.190 The council’s veto was overridden, and the bill to move the capital to Springfield passed on February 28.
Lincoln provided much of the backbone for the victorious Long Nine. Robert L. Wilson and another legislator, Henry L. Webb of Alexander County, reported that on “several occasions their opponents deemed that they had circumvented the movement, and incautious ones crowed lustily over the supposed defeat and discomfiture of Lincoln and his colleagues.” Some pessimists “supposed that the measure was lost, but Lincoln was tenacious and resolute.” His unexpected flanking movements “would revive their chances.” Thus “under his adroit leadership, the bill was carried, although the only political strength in its favor at the start was seven votes in one house and two in the other, with no natural allies,
and several delegations of active enemies.” The passage of the bill “was felt to be one of the greatest of political triumphs, and its credit was freely ascribed to Lincoln.” Wilson said flatly, “had Lincoln not been there, it would have failed.”191
Lincoln’s most important maneuver may have been an amendment he offered on February 24, stipulating that the legislature “reserves the right to repeal this act at any time hereafter.”192 This tautological measure won over the support of four legislators who had previously been in opposition. As amended, the bill was adopted that same day, facilitating Springfield’s victory. Helping expedite that choice was another amendment suggested by Lincoln and formally introduced by Alexander P. Dunbar, requiring the town selected as the capital to donate 2 acres of land and pay $50,000 to help cover the cost of a new statehouse. This measure, which virtually eliminated the smaller towns from competition, passed 53–26.
By the time balloting for the removal of the capital took place, Lincoln and his colleagues had cobbled together an alliance of twenty-three legislators who lived in or near Sangamon County; nine who represented counties that would benefit substantially from the internal improvements bill that had just passed; and three who fit neither category. Two of those three unclassifiable representatives were Jesse K. Dubois and Henry L. Webb, friends of Lincoln who wanted to accommodate him. Dubois and Webb were from the southern part of the state, where proposals to shift the capital northward enjoyed little popularity. Dubois explained that he and Webb “defended our vote before our constituents by saying that necessity would ultimately force the seat of government to a central position. But in reality we gave the vote to Lincoln because we liked him and because we wanted to oblige our friend, and because we recognized his authority as our leader.”193 Webb called the legislative triumph of the Long Nine “the master stroke of diplomacy of the Western Hemi sphere” and deemed Lincoln “a Napoleon of astuteness and political finesse.” According to Henry C. Whitney, Webb “voted for the measure because of his admiration of Lincoln and the inability to resist his importunities. His [original] policy was to leave the capital at Vandalia but [he] yielded to Lincoln.”194
These thirty-five votes made Springfield the clear front-runner. On the first ballot, Vandalia and Peoria each received only sixteen votes, Alton fifteen, Jacksonville fourteen, and Decatur four. On the second ballot, Springfield picked up nine more votes. On the third, its total again swelled by nine. On the fourth and final ballot, twenty more legislators sided with Springfield, putting it over the top.
The internal improvements bill and the move of the capital to Springfield had lasting implications, not all of them salutary. The strenuous maneuvering to trade votes for each bill earned both praise and blame for years to come.
The improvements bill funded many more projects than the committee drafting it had recommended. It directly benefited forty-four of the state’s sixty counties; the other sixteen received cash grants. Representative Richard S. Walker from Morgan County complained “of the bargain and sale that was brought about to make Springfield the successful candidate.”195 In 1838, the leading Whig paper in that county declared that the internal improvement legislation “was carried through the Legislature by bargain and trade. It was a perfect log-rolling affair, and was avowed to be such by many of its supporters.”196 In 1844, an editor of that paper, John J. Hardin, told the U.S. House of Representatives during a debate on an internal improvements bill, “I do not wish to enter into a system of log-rolling to carry through this measure. I have seen the evils of that system carried to the extreme in the legislation of my own State; and we are now suffering too severely from its unfortunate results, for me to be willing to see it adopted here.”197 Vandalia’s champion, William L. D. Ewing, decried “the foul corruption by which the seat of Government, contrary to justice and the constitution, was removed to Springfield.”198 He contended that the Long Nine “had sold out to the internal improvement men, and had promised their support to every measure that would gain them a vote to the law removing the seat of government.”199
In July 1838, State Representative Christian B. Blockburger reported witnessing the Long Nine “acting in firm and united phalanx throughout the whole session on this subject. I saw the dangerous influence their numbers enabled them to exert. I saw how votes were swapped off and exchanged, and how quickly the local measures of other members were voted for, when Springfield could receive a vote in return.”200 That same month, a dozen others joined Ewing and Blockberger in deploring the machinations of the Long Nine: “Having staked their all upon this one measure, and having so strong a delegation to act upon the system of log rolling, it was not difficult for them to secure the votes of members who felt but little interested in the subject. Every art, device, and argument that could possibly be used to gain votes were resorted to.”201
In 1843, a shrewd observer of Sangamon County politics declared that the internal improvements law “and all its sad consequences, are more justly attributed to the ‘log rolling’ of the ‘LONG NINE,’ than any other men or set of men.”202 Lincoln’s friend and political ally George T. M. Davis, editor of the Alton Telegraph, alleged that Springfield was chosen as the capital by the use of “the basest stratagem and intrigue.”203
The internal improvements scheme generated patronage opportunities galore. One observer noted that the statute “would never have passed had it not been for the multitude of new offices which it created, and the confident expectation that the friends of the measure [in the legislature] would fill those offices.” Soon after the bill’s passage, the chairman of the committee which reported it to the legislature received an office under the law worth $3,000 a year. Most of the men appointed to the board of public works were “party leaders who had never been conspicuous for any thing but their blind devotion to the dominant party.” None “had the least experience in the important duties assigned them,” but because “they had done something for ‘the party,’” they “had to be provided for, and if they knew nothing else, they knew that they got good salaries, and that was of course satisfactory.”204 A case in point was Democrat John A. McClernand, who broke with his party to support the measure and as a reward was named treasurer of the Illinois and Michigan Canal.
Lincoln openly acknowledged that he had engaged in log rolling, and his sense of honor demanded that the commitments he and others had made be kept. In 1839, the Vandalia Free Press, a Whig newspaper, said: “Lincoln admitted that Sangamon county had received great and important benefits, at the last session of the Legislature, in return for giving support, thro’ her delegation to the system of Internal Improvement; and that though not legally bound, she is morally bound, to adhere to that system, through all time to come!”205 Another Vandalia journal, perhaps describing the same remarks, alleged that one night during the 1838–1839 legislative session, Lincoln and Edward D. Baker clashed over the internal improvements system. After Baker “pronounced himself against the system,” Lincoln “replied tartly to his colleague that he for himself and every other Representative of Sangamon county, present and future, should forever support the system of internal improvements because the Sangamon delegation had obtained the seat of Government at Springfield by an understanding with the friends of the system. Mr. L. said he considered the pledges then made as forever binding, not only on him but on Sangamon county itself.”206
In the joyful celebration following this victory, Lincoln was toasted as “one of Nature[’]s Noblemen.”207 Robert L. Wilson “thought that if any man was entitled to that compliment it was he.”208 Orville H. Browning praised the Long Nine: “It was to their judicious management, their ability, their gentlemanly deportment, their un assuming manners, their constant and untiring labor” that Springfield owed its success.209 Echoing Browning, William Pickering commended Lincoln for his “continuously moral and self-reliant conduct,” saying his avoidance of strong language and strong drink, along with his good nature, “formed a striking contrast with the general manners of nea
rly all by whom he was surrounded.”210 Nor did Lincoln distribute money to win votes. He was given $200 to dispense while promoting the internal improvements project, but only used 75¢, explaining afterwards, “I didn[’]t Know how to Spend it.”211
Helping Lincoln and the other members of the Long Nine in their efforts to round up votes was William Butler, who later told an interviewer: “I was sent down to Vandalia to work in the interest of Springfield. [Peter] Van Bergen was also sent down there with me—though he did no good—but to hear him tell it he did it all. Lincoln and [Usher F.] Linder were the two principal men we relied on in the Legislature to make speeches for us. John T. Stuart was the man we depended upon in caucus. Lincoln was not worth a cent in caucus.”212
Not all of Lincoln’s friends praised him for his work in the legislative session. Several of them foresaw that the internal improvements scheme was far too ambitious for the meager resources of the new state and was therefore doomed to fail. Stephen T. Logan recalled that “I was in Vandalia that winter and had a talk with Lincoln there. I remember that I took him to task for voting for the Internal Improvement scheme. He seemed to acquiesce in the correctness of my views as I presented them to him. But he said he couldn’t help himself—he had to vote for it in order to secure the removal here [Springfield] of the seat of government.”213 Usher F. Linder, who later regretted his support for the system, apologetically explained many years later that at the time he, Lincoln, and other enthusiasts “were all young and inexperienced men.”214
No such misgivings were voiced when the internal improvement bill passed. A dispatch from the capital, probably by Lincoln, described the jubilation: “the huzzas and acclamations of the people were unprecedented.—All Vandalia was illuminated. Bonfires were built, and fire balls were thrown, in every direction.”215 Paying for the system would be simple, according to Representative John Hogan, who predicted that the bonds “would go like hot cakes, and be sought for by the Rothschilds and Baring Brothers,” and “that the premium which we would obtain upon them would range from fifty to one hundred per cent.,” which by itself “would be sufficient to construct most of the important works, leaving the principal sum to go into our treasury, and leave the people free from taxation for years to come.”216