Some Day the Sun Will Shine and Have Not Will Be No More

by Brian Peckford

  Anyway, before that day’s campaigning was over I got to meet the man himself. He was a short, bald man with thick glasses halfway down his nose. He was wearing a plaid shirt, an old pair of trousers, and braces. He was about seventy-seven then, possessed of a lively mind and impish grin. He seemed a little reserved at first and I was soon to find out why. See, Skipper Wes was independent, all right, but he had a beer licence. In those days (the Liberal Smallwood era was just coming to a close), to get a beer licence you had to be “on the right side politically,” and of course that meant Skipper Wes was a Liberal. Here he was talking it up with a young Tory candidate—and he knew I was aware of the situation.

  Later, in my many visits to see him as his representative in the legislature, he maintained that he pulled one over on Smallwood and the Liberals because he really was a closet Tory the whole time. I sort of took that with a grain of salt and never pressed the matter again; I just enjoyed his many yarns, watching him savour his scotch, and seeing his genuine delight when I would turn up to see him.

  It was on one of these visits that he up and told me that he was in the First World War, Royal Navy: “I got no records to show for it and the Canadian Legion knows it is true, but they are a no good lot ’cause they can’t get my papers for me.” This was a serious matter for him and he cursed at those around him who thought that it was just another one of his tall tales like his many exaggerated Labrador cod fishing yarns. I could see that of all the things we yarned about, this matter stuck in his craw. And I had found out that he was aware of the rumours of the insurance jobs but took that as a joke, that the boys didn’t know any better. But his war papers, now that was another matter.

  Well, I knew I had better try and do something about that! Of course, when I told him that I was going to check on it, he displayed his impish grin and exclaimed, “No young Tory could ever do something about such a complicated thing as that!” On reflection, there may just have been a bit of intrigue in this comment. He likely said it to urge me on.

  So, together with my political assistant, we went to work on contacting the Admiralty in London. Between the jigs and the reels, many months later we were successful in getting, let’s call it a certificate, verifying that Wesley Pittman of Pilley’s Island, Newfoundland, was indeed in the Royal Navy and served overseas during the First World War.

  On a sunny fall day I entered the porch of Wes’s house and peered across the kitchen. There he was in the corner, sitting in his favourite old chair, pipe in hand, scotch bottle on the side table. He was partly leaning over trying to read from an old, dusty book, undeterred by his failing sight in the dimly lit room. He heard someone in the porch and growled a hello.

  As I moved from the porch to the kitchen he growled again. Standing now in the middle of the kitchen, still unrecognized by Wes, I loudly announced: “Seaman Wesley J. Pittman, number 067541, His Majesty’s Royal Navy, 1915–1917. Attention!”

  At first confused, it slowly dawned on him that something special was happening. He rose to his feet, marched a few paces to stand in front of me, stood to attention, and saluted. He was now close enough to recognize me.

  In as good an official military voice as I could muster, I declared, “Seaman Pittman, it gives me great pleasure to present to you your certificate of service in the Royal Navy!” I passed the certificate to him and, with a tear edging down his aged face, he exclaimed, “I never thought this would ever happen!”

  My assistant, who had been waiting outside, entered and we took pictures of the event and had it displayed the next week in the local newspaper.

  Skipper Wes died a few years later, a happy man, and was buried at Head’s Harbour, the settlement of his youth, with the Canadian Legion proudly present.

  CHANGE ISSUE #2—CHURCHILL RIVER

  “Labrador—‘the land God gave to Cain’”

  — Jacques Cartier

  THE CHURCHILL RIVER OF Labrador consists of three major hydro-development sites: the so-called Upper Churchill, by far the largest at 5,280 megawatts, and two others on the lower part of the river, Gull Island and Muskrat Falls.

  Every Newfoundlander and Labradorian knows of the Upper Churchill Falls development and most particularly of the Upper Churchill contract with Quebec. This was Smallwood’s greatest failure of all. I remember being in Churchill Falls when this project was officially “opened,” July 16, 1972, having been inaugurated five years earlier by Smallwood and Edmund de Rothschild. Premier Moores, Prime Minister Trudeau, and Premier Bourassa were all there. Funny how we all could be there (I was the newly minted first Conservative Member for the district of Green Bay) to celebrate the official sellout of Newfoundland water to Quebec!

  This is one singular development that could have given the province historic and economic viability, to be a “have” province, if only we were getting our fair share of the revenues from current prices for electricity. This haunts all Newfoundlanders to this day and remains a bitter lesson in how not to develop a resource. People unfamiliar with the project are amazed and dumbfounded when they are informed of the details. In 1980, my administration published a booklet regarding Labrador Hydro Power entitled “The Energy Priority of Newfoundland and Labrador: Fairness and Equity in the Utilization of the Churchill Falls Hydro Resource.” In it the Upper Churchill contract details are provided. Let me quote:

  Under the Power Contract, the price to be paid by Hydro Quebec for energy declines from a high of just under 3.0 mills per kwh in 1977 to a low of just over 2.5 mills per kwh in 2001, which price is maintained until 2016. The price is reduced thereafter to 2.0 mills pkh for the final twenty-five years.

  A total of sixty-five years in which the price that the power is sold for actually goes down over time, the equivalent of selling a barrel of oil for an average of $1.80 for 40 years, and then reducing the price to $1.20 per barrel for the final twenty-five years.

  It is any wonder Newfoundlanders and Labradorians don’t forget?

  Several think tanks have concluded that Newfoundland’s loss of economic rent on this project is somewhere between $500 million to $1 billion per year. In a 1978 briefing note from Newfoundland Hydro to Premier Moores, the economic rent loss to Newfoundland was estimated at $810 million for the year 1979. The Economic Council of Canada’s report of 1980, entitled “From Dependency to Self-Reliance,” although a timid and disappointing analysis in many ways, was forced to say in its Summary and Recommendations, “The contract with Hydro Quebec to develop Churchill Falls hydroelectric power has failed to return proportional revenues to Newfoundland.”

  This inequitable, unconscionable contract has been left to stand by successive federal governments with but mild attempts by some of them to help, such attempts being mainly a commitment by the prime minister to talk to the premier of Quebec. Sometimes it was insulting, as when I was approached at a constitutional meeting of first ministers by an envoy of Prime Minister Trudeau to indicate that if I was a little more compromising on the offshore, the PM would talk to Quebec about the hydro situation. The messenger could see by the look on my face that I was furious. I don’t remember my exact response, but it would have been something along the lines of, “You must be joking—this is insulting: for a verbal promise through an envoy I am to relent on the last real chance for my province.” Later, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney at least put in writing that he had tried. In a letter to me dated February 16, 1988, Mr. Mulroney addressed our recent conversation on the matter:

  I have recently raised this issue with Mr. Bourassa, urging him to consider options for resolving the problems associated with the Upper Churchill contract and the development of hydro potential in Labrador and for a process that would encourage both parties to move forward on these issues. Mr. Bourassa has undertaken, without prejudice, to explore the matter further and I anticipate that he will be in a position to make his views known shortly. You should also know that the premier has rejected the idea of a federal intervener for the time being. I hope that my intervention wil
l lead to a constructive dialogue on the issues at hand.

  Other than this attempt, which, of course, went nowhere, there was little real sympathy by the federal government or for that matter by Canadians to assist in having the transmission of electrical energy handled on a national basis as the transmission of oil and gas was being treated. I travelled the country on the issue and most people were polite and that was about it. Hence, Quebec would remain holding Newfoundland hostage. I wonder if a similar situation would have been allowed to happen anywhere else in Canada. I remember that the well-known Newfoundland artist and designer of the Newfoundland Flag Christopher Pratt once suggested to me that there was one way to break this different treatment being used by Ottawa in the transmission of oil versus electricity, and that was to put the transmission lines in a pipeline!

  After I became minister of Mines and Energy in 1976, I went to Quebec City to meet with the fairly new Parti Québécois Energy minister, Guy Joron. He was very friendly and expressed optimism that we could make progress on this file involving the Upper and Lower Churchill as a package. The meeting was in his office. Suddenly, who should enter but René Lévesque himself, jovial and of course smoking a cigarette. We all had a very upbeat conversation on the Labrador energy situation, and they would be following up with Hydro-Québec. Of course, Hydro-Québec saw that nothing materialized.

  A very bizarre thing happened in 1978 when one evening I was made aware that Premier Moores was entertaining the premier of Quebec concerning energy. I was flabbergasted. I knew nothing of it. I immediately went to the premier’s office to discover a flurry of activity. Vic Young was the premier’s chief of staff at the time, and I was quickly ushered into his office and made aware that a framework agreement was pending with Quebec concerning the Upper and Lower Churchill River.

  I demanded to see the premier, and after some shuffling about and my anger visibly rising, I was in the premier’s office. He proceeded to give me a broad outline of what was going on and I listened with incredulity. There was to be a press conference that very evening to announce the arrangement. I asked a few questions and found the whole thing to be rushed, and just not enough elements there to make the deal worthwhile. I told the premier that I would not be able to support it and would have to make that known publicly. After being rushed from his office I was once more back in Vic Young’s office with Vic (and I think a couple of Cabinet ministers), where I furiously, with tears in my eyes, denounced the deal and said this would not stand. I would resign and fight it. No amount of talk would appease me and I stood firm.

  Lo and behold, the press conference was cancelled and the whole thing fizzled. Lévesque had to return to Quebec empty-handed!

  Many years later, Janice Wells of St. John’s, formerly of Corner Brook and a close friend of Frank Moores, wrote a book on the life of Frank. In it she recounted how Frank had told her how I had scuttled this wonderful deal he had worked out with René Lévesque. CBC interviewed her on the matter and later contacted me. I explained to the CBC that this was not at all the way the matter unfolded and that what was being offered was Quebec once again getting more of our power to use and sell, now from the Lower Churchill, with no change to the infamous Upper Churchill contract. If the deal was so good, why didn’t Frank proceed with it, seeing he had the majority of ministers with him on the deal? Or, if the deal was so good, it should be able to take a few more days of scrutiny. It was a rush job and not in the best interests of the province. Funny, too, that for the many years after Frank left politics, I am unaware that he ever uttered a word that in any way corroborated Janice Wells’s story. It seems like an attempt by an admirer to try and shed a positive light on her hero. Additionally, I had met Janice when she was writing the book (initiated by me when I heard she was writing such a book and I had not been contacted by her), and at no time during that “interview” did she mention this Churchill matter—odd, given her revelations in the book. I wrote Janice an email after that encounter on June 21, 2006:

  It was great seeing you again and having a few moments to talk about Mr. Moores.

  I was a little taken aback to learn that he considered me a socialist. I have some difficulty understanding how he could come to such a conclusion given my record. Did he ever share with you the reasons for such a view?

  You also mentioned some materials that his administration had prepared to distribute to the schools and which my administration cancelled. Apparently, he was upset with this decision. As I mentioned, I vaguely remember the materials and I cannot remember precisely why the distribution was cancelled. As I said to you I suspect the decision was made as a result of advice/recommendation from the Department of Education. I could perhaps find out for you if you wish.

  Any other matters just shoot an email.

  Regards,

  Brian Peckford

  Ms. Wells never replied to this communication.

  Without any breakthrough in talks with Quebec, the province embarked on legal action as well as being open to additional talks with Quebec. The legal action centred on the lease, a piece of Newfoundland legislation that provided a lease to Hamilton Falls Corporation, a forerunner of the Churchill Falls Labrador Corporation, the present owners and operators of the Upper Churchill Falls development. This lease transferred to Hamilton Falls Corporation the rights to the waters of the Upper Hamilton (Churchill) River. In Part 1, Section 2 (e) the leasee had

  the right to transmit throughout the province any electric power generated as the result of the harnessing of the whole or any part of the Upper Hamilton and to export from the province such power; provided that upon the request of the Government consumers of electricity in the province shall be given priority where it is feasible and economic to do so ...

  Newfoundland had earlier requested 800 megawatts from the development. With no adequate response on the request, Newfoundland exercised its legal rights under the lease to the courts. However, this was to be a long and arduous process with little chance of immediate to mid-term resolution.

  Therefore, once I assumed the premiership in 1979, I assembled a number of legal experts to see what other options might be available. This legal team included Cabot Martin, Noel Clarke, Tom Kendell, Keith Mercer, and Edward Hearne. Our actual presentation to the courts (Newfoundland Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada) was handled by Leonard Martin with assistance from Edward Hearne, Noel Clarke, and David Osborne. We also consulted with legal experts around the world, including Dr. Geoffrey Marston of Cambridge University and Dr. William C. Gilmore of the University of Edinburgh. Through the work of that legal team, a number of options were presented to government; the one that the team thought had the best chance of success was a new piece of legislation entitled the Water Reversion Act. The government accepted this recommendation and action ensued in the courts. In other words, we decided after passage of the Act in the legislature that we would refer it directly to the courts to test its validity, rather than try to implement it with all the uncertainty this would engender.

  The Newfoundland Court of Appeal agreed that the province was within its legislative competence to pass the Act.

  However, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled on May 3, 1984:

  In conclusion, having found that the pith and substance of the Reversion Act is to interfere with the rights of Hydro-Québec outside the territorial jurisdiction of Newfoundland, it is my opinion that the Act, taken as a whole, is ultra vires of the Legislature of Newfoundland. Question 9 of the Reference must be answered accordingly. It therefore becomes unnecessary to answer the other eight questions.

  Our hopes were dashed again.

  And in 1988 the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the earlier decisions of the Newfoundland courts that our recall case was also invalid.

  Of course, over time there are always those who question whether you have done all you can on a given public policy issue. And such was the case on my involvement with the Churchill Falls issues. In 2005, I appeared on a local CBC radio show and
was questioned by Mr. Burf Ploughman, who implied that I had not done enough to get the Lower Churchill going and that there were buyers in New York State for the power. This led me to check my sources later and respond more fully to Mr. Ploughman.

  Feb. 21, 2005

  Mr. B. F. Ploughman

  17 Pinebud Avenue

  St. John’s, NL

  Dear Mr. Ploughman:

  A few weeks ago you called the CBC radio afternoon show and indicated to the audience that when I was premier I failed to follow through on an opportunity to develop the Lower Churchill Falls. You quoted a press release that talked about the Power Authority of the State of New York and how they and other investors had the money to build the project and buy the power. I said to you and the audience at the time that I remembered the matter and that I had travelled to New York and that, notwithstanding the press release, no deal was able to be made. I then said that I did not remember any other details. You expressed amazement that I did not remember more details. Well, I did remember some, but I was not sure that I was completely correct. For example, I was pretty sure that a group of investors led by Franklin Roosevelt Jr. was involved and that there was a return visit to Newfoundland. I did not want to mention names and return visits unless I was completely sure that I was right.

  I have had a chance to check the whole thing. There are no documents with the Government or Newfoundland Hydro on the matter, at least not now. This is so because there was no deal and no negotiations were held. I have talked to people who were in government with me at the time and to hydro people. All confirm that there was a meeting in New York and a visit to Newfoundland and that was it because of the impasse with Quebec. And on Friday, February 18, I have talked directly with Mr. Dyson, the then chairman of the Power Authority of the State of New York.