Call Sign Chaos

by Jim Mattis

  leaving the terrorists to die inside the caves: Yaniv Barzilai, 102 Days of War (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2013), p. 317.

  we were not called forward: In the public press, the last mention of bin Laden was by a Delta Force commander who referenced a December 12 radio intercept that he was still hiding in Tora Bora. Pete Blaber, The Mission, the Men and Me (New York: Penguin, 2008), p. 195.

  “a hell of a Christmas present”: Mary Anne Weaver, “Lost at Tora Bora,” New York Times, September 11, 2005.

  “armor battalions chasing a lightly armed enemy”: Franks, American Soldier, p. 324. The CENTCOM deputy commander, Lieutenant General DeLong, later explained, “If we put our troops in there, we would inevitably end up fighting Afghan villagers—creating bad will at a sensitive time—which was the last thing we wanted to do.” Lieutenant General Michael DeLong, A General Speaks Out (New York: Zenith Press, 2007), p. 56.

  fast-moving light infantry: Henry A. Crumpton, The Art of Intelligence (New York: Penguin, 2012), p. 259.

  “Bush had missed the best opportunity”: Peter Baker, Days of Fire: Bush and Cheney in the White House (New York: Random House, 2013), p. 322.

  “the gravest error of the war”: Weaver, “Lost at Tora Bora.”

  CHAPTER 6

  I commanded the 1st Marine Division: Lieutenant Colonel Michael Groen, With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 2003 (Washington, DC: History Division, Marine Corps University, 2006), p. 98.

  “one tent will be allowed each company”: Ulysses S. Grant, The Complete Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant (Berkeley, Calif.: Ulysses Press, 2011), p. 153.

  “destroy as many military installations as they could”: Richard Miller, In Words and Deeds (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 2008), p. 133.

  “survive only through surrender”: Ibid., p. 236.

  “No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy”: This expression, “Nullus melior amicus, nullus peior inimicus,” is attributed to Roman General Lucius Cornelius Sulla, allegedly a fiercely loyal friend, but cruel, merciless toward his enemies. He supposedly composed the quote to be inscribed on his own tomb in the Campus Martius, Rome, around 78 B.C.

  “you have to push through”: General John Kelly, interviewed by Bing West, August 16, 2014.

  “follow you to the end of the world”: “William Joseph Slim,” YourDictionary, updated April 12, 2019, biography.yourdictionary.com/​william-joseph-slim. See also Vicki Croke, Elephant Company (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2015), p. 223.

  “aren’t catching up to the maneuver units”: Franks, American Soldier, p. 511.

  “I understood the reason for the pause”: Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Penguin, 2011), p. 465.

  “ready for the push to Baghdad”: Rick Atkinson, Peter Baker, and Thomas E. Ricks, “Confused Start, Decisive End,” Washington Post, April 13, 2003.

  CHAPTER 7

  88,000 gallons of fuel: Groen, With the 1st Marine Division, p. 97.

  youngest Marine to die: Nashua Telegraph, April 15, 2003, newspaperarchive.com/​nashua-telegraph-apr-15-2003-p-6/.

  “better state of peace”: B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (1954), cited at Classics of Strategy and Diplomacy (website), posted by Roger Beckett, January 19, 2016, www.classicsofstrategy.com/​2016/​01/​liddell-hart-strategy-1954.html.

  CHAPTER 8

  “beyond the war on terror”: “Text of Bush’s Speech at West Point,” New York Times, June 1, 2002, www.nytimes.com/​2002/​06/​01/​international/​text-of-bushs-speech-at-west-point.html.

  More than a million Sunnis: “Anbar Province Plagued by Violence,” New Humanitarian, January 15, 2007, www.irinnews.org/​report/​64374/​iraq-anbar-province-plagued-violence.

  “classical guerrilla-type campaign”: Brian Knowlton, “Top U.S. General in Iraq Sees ‘Classical Guerrilla-Type’ War,” International Herald Tribune, July 16, 2003.

  fair laws and orderly practices: J. R. Fears, “Afghanistan: The Lessons of History,” Big Think, October 13, 2011, bigthink.com/​learning-from-the-past/​afghanistan-the-lessons-of-history. “Alexander, from 330 until 327 B.C., systematically conquered the country by the most ruthless exercise of military force. Then having conquered the Afghans, he won their hearts. Alexander married, as his first wife, Roxanne, the daughter of the Afghan warlord, Oxyartes. Alexander then conciliated all the other warlords of Afghanistan. His firstborn son and heir to his great empire would be an Afghan and Alexander made the Afghans full partners in his great new world. What Alexander did not try to do was to force Greek customs and Greek values, like democracy, upon the Afghans. He not only allowed them to keep their customs, he adopted the customs of the Afghans and the Persians. Alexander became a national hero to the Afghans, who still invoke with awe the name of Skander (Alexander).”

  oath taken by all doctors: MerriamWebster.com, s.v. “primum non nocere,” www.merriamwebster.com/​dictionary/​primum%20non%20nocere.

  Marines would “be bloodied”: Bing West, No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah (New York: Bantam, 2005), p. 52.

  strong military action must be taken: L. Paul Bremer, My Year in Iraq (New York: Threshold Editions, 2006), p. 332.

  “tougher than hell”: Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, Wiser in Battle (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), p. 350.

  “the might of the U.S. military”: Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, p. 332. See also p. 532: “All of us on the National Security Council recognized that we could not allow an Iraqi city to become a sanctuary for murderers and terrorists. My impulse was not only to find the enemies who had committed the atrocity, but also to send a message across the country that anyone who engaged in acts of terror would face the might of the U.S. military.”

  300,000 increasingly resentful residents: “Battle for Falluja Under Way,” CNN, November 9, 2004, www.cnn.com/​2004/​WORLD/​meast/​11/​08/​iraq.main/.

  “a source of shock”: Dan Glaister, “US Gunships Pound Falluja,” Guardian, April 27, 2004, www.theguardian.com/​world/​2004/​apr/​28/​iraq.danglaister.

  they would resign: Bremer, My Year in Iraq, p. 333.

  Bremer called Generals Abizaid and Sanchez: Ibid., p. 334.

  before the end of the Friday services: Ibid., p. 335.

  lost the information war: General Jim Conway, interviewed by Bing West, Fallujah, Iraq, May 29, 2004.

  “I’ll have the Hidra mosque”: West, No True Glory, p. 143.

  “Our orders changed”: I MEF press conference, May 1, 2004.

  Bremer objected strongly to the White House: Bremer, My Year in Iraq, p. 345.

  was a hooded Zarqawi: Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama (New York: Pantheon, 2012), p. 113. “The CIA believed that the execution took place in a safe house in the Jolan neighborhood, Tawhid wal-Jihad’s base, and that Zarqawi himself slit Berg’s throat.”

  Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi: Richard DesLauriers, former FBI agent, and Kevin Carroll, Army intelligence officer, Fox News, September 19, 2014.

  CHAPTER 9

  “find their own way”: George W. Bush, “5 Step Plan for Democracy in Iraq,” speech, Carlisle, PA, May 24, 2004, American Rhetoric Online Speech Bank, www.americanrhetoric.com/​speeches/​wariniraq/​gwbushiraq52404.htm.

  “a path to a better future”: Bremer, My Year in Iraq, p. 393.

  “in the manner of industrial war”: General Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force (New York: Vintage, 2005), p. 399.

  “generals refuse to apologise”: Rory McCarthy, “US Soldiers Started to Shoot Us, One by One,” Guardian, May 20, 2004, www.theguardian.com/​world/​2004/​may/​21/​iraq.rorymccarthy.

  “Let’s not be naive”: Ibid.

  “acces
s the Marine brass gave me to the enlisted troops”: Tony Perry to Bing West, July 23, 2016.

  “confrontation with the enemy”: Edward Cody, “Officers Say Target Was Safe House,” Washington Post, June 20, 2004, p. A01.

  “I want insecurity, strife”: Wikipedia, s.v. “The Paratrooper’s Prayer,” last modified May 1, 2019, en.wikipedia.org/​wiki/​The_Paratrooper%27s_Prayer.

  CHAPTER 10

  “nothing less than recognition”: Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013), p. 11.

  assimilation of knowledge: Jon Clegg, “How Urban Meyer Took the Buckeyes to School,” Wall Street Journal, Dec 6, 2014.

  “I like brawling”: David Hancock, “General: It’s Fun to Shoot People,” CBS News, February 3, 2005, www.cbsnews.com/​news/​general-its-fun-to-shoot-people/.

  “the urge to get something done”: S. L. A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command (1947; repr., Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith Publications, 1973), p. 138.

  “speaks with a great deal of candor”: Esther Schrader, “General Draws Fire for Saying ‘It’s Fun to Shoot’ the Enemy,” February 4, 2005, www.latimes.com/​archives/​la-xpm-2005-feb-04-fg-mattis4-story.html.

  second battle to seize Fallujah: West, No True Glory, p. 316.

  troops to follow: Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, www.dtic.mil/​doctrine/​new_pubs/​jp1.pdf.

  a guide for small-unit leaders: “Small-Unit Leaders’ Guide to Counterinsurgency,” United States Marine Corps, June 20, 2006, www.slideshare.net/​marinecorpsbooks/​marine-corps-small-unit-leaders-guide-to-counterinsurgency.

  “That does away with the Marine Corps”: Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps (Annapolis, Md., Naval Institute Press, 1999), p. 243.

  “no captain can do very wrong”: Admiral Horatio Nelson, quoted in “Trafalgar—21st of October, 1805,” Naval Review XLIII, no. 4 (1955), p. 388, available at docplayer.net/​51746379-The-issued-quarterly-for-private-circulation-november-1955.html.

  “the elemental passions”: James Currie, The Complete Poetical Works of Robert Burns: With Explanatory and Glossarial Notes; and a Life of the Author (New York: D. Appleton, 1859), available at quod.lib.umich.edu/​cgi/​t/text/​text-idx?c=moa&cc=moa&sid=95e3f6e828e116b80d4cccd93c806bc1&view=text&rgn=main&idno=ABE9038.0001.001.

  CHAPTER 11

  “I think it will take five years”: Mark Walker, “Mattis: Winning in Iraq Will Take Five More Years,” San Diego Union-Tribune, December 21, 2006, www.sandiegouniontribune.com/​news/​2006/​dec/​21/​mattis-winning-in-iraq-will-take-five-more-years/.

  “This war is lost”: Joel Roberts, “Senator Reid on Iraq: ‘This War Is Lost,’ ” CBS News, April 20, 2007, www.cbsnews.com/​news/​senator-reid-on-iraq-this-war-is-lost/.

  “their own My Lai”: John MacArthur, “Semper Why? One More Illusion Down the Drain,” Providence Journal, June 20, 2006.

  “27,000 civilian deaths”: “Large Bombings Claim Ever More Lives,” Iraq Body Count, October 4, 2007, www.iraqbodycount.org/​analysis/​numbers/​biggest-bombs/.

  “in terms their audience can understand”: Walker, “Mattis: Winning in Iraq.”

  “Men who take up arms”: Frank Freidel, “General Orders 100 and Military Government,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 32, no. 4, March 1946, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/​stable/​1895240?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

  “lack of due diligence”: Paul von Zielbauer, “Marines Punish 3 Officers in Haditha Case,” New York Times, September 6, 2007, www.nytimes.com/​2007/​09/​06/​world/​middleeast/​06haditha.html.

  CHAPTER 12

  twelve nations to twenty-six: “NATO Decisions on Open-Door Policy,” NATO, April 3, 2008, www.nato.int/​docu/​update/​2008/​04-april/​e0403h.html.

  CHAPTER 13

  “little or no land forces would be required”: Matt M. Matthews, We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War, Long War Series Occasional Paper 26 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), p. 26.

  “terminology used was too complicated”: Avi Kober, “The Israel Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the Poor Performance?” Journal of Strategic Studies 31, no. 1 (June 5, 2008), p. 62.

  “Adaptation is smarter than you are”: Friedrich Hayek, Wikiquote, s.v. “Friedrich Hayek,” last modified January 14, 2019, en.wikiquote.org/​wiki/​Friedrich_Hayek.

  “will result in humiliation and disaster”: Mike Santacroce, Planning for Planners: Joint Operation Planning Process (Bloomington, Ind.: iUniverse, 2013), Google Books.

  “clear, logical thinking”: George C. Marshall, Infantry in Battle, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1939), pp. 1–14.

  “empower their subordinates to act decisively”: James N. Mattis, “USJFCOM Commander’s Guidance for Effects-based Operations,” Joint Force Quarterly (Autumn 2008), p. 25.

  “The trinity of chance, uncertainty, and friction”: www.clausewitz.com/​readings/​Bassford/​Trinity/​TRININTR.htm.

  CHAPTER 14

  twenty countries: See “The Joint Organization and Staff Functions,” The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide (2000), www.au.af.mil/​au/​awc/​awcgate/​pub1/. Note: CENTCOM is a combatant command. “Combatant command (COCOM) is fully defined in Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). COCOM is the command authority over assigned forces vested only in the commanders of combatant commands by title 10, U.S. Code, Section 164, or as directed by the President in Command Plan (UCP), and cannot be delegated or transferred. The Congress has given the combatant commander as the authority to give direction to subordinate commands, including all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics; organize commands and forces to carry out assigned missions; employ forces necessary to carry out assigned missions; assign command functions to subordinate commanders; coordinate and approve administration, support, and discipline; and exercise authority to select subordinate commanders and combatant command staff.”

  deployed across the region: “Combatant Commands,” U.S. Department of Defense, www.defense.gov/​know-your-military/​combatant-commands/.

  CIA station chiefs: “U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM),” Global Security, www.globalsecurity.org/​military/​agency/​dod/​centcom.htm.

  CHAPTER 15

  “advise and assist”: Ali Khedery, “Why We Stuck with Maliki—and Lost Iraq,” Washington Post, July 3, 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/​opinions/​why-we-stuck-with-maliki—and-lost-iraq/2014/07/03/0dd6a8a4-f7ec-11e3-a606-946fd632f9f1_story.html?utm_term=.5f43adfd99c8i. See also Emma Sky, 336-42.

  “I’ll bet you my vice presidency”: Gordon and Trainor, Endgame, p. 643: “ ‘Maliki wants us to stick around because he does not see a future in Iraq otherwise,’ Biden said, according to the account. ‘I’ll bet you my vice presidency Maliki will extend the SOFA.’ ” See also Khedery, “Why We Stuck with Maliki”: “Maliki would not surrender power easily. General Austin made clear that he was more comfortable with the status quo. Jim Mattis, the CENTCOM commander, was not. The Egyptians, the Saudis, the Jordanians, and the Qataris have all told him that they did not want Maliki to stay on. If Maliki triumphed, it would send shockwaves across the region, and any extension of Iranian influence on his government would work against the United States in the long term. Mattis was reminding the group that government formation in Iraq would affect relations across the Middle East….James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence agreed with Mattis that the regional impact would be significant.”

  recommending that we retain eighteen thousand troops: Howard LaFranchi, “Iraq Withdrawal: How Many U.S. Troops Will Remain?” Christian Science Monitor, September 7, 2011, www.csmonitor.com/​USA/​Foreign-Policy/​2011/​0907/​Iraq-withdrawal-H
ow-many-US-troops-will-remain.

  offered a token presence of 3,500: Lauren Carroll, “McCain: Obama Never Said He Wanted to Leave Troops in Iraq,” PolitiFact, September 12, 2014, www.politifact.com/​truth-o-meter/​statements/​2014/​sep/​12/​john-mccain/​mccain-obama-never-said-he-wanted-leave-troops-ira/.

  Iraqi parliament could never unite: While the lack of an Iraqi-legislated SOFA was given as the administration’s reason for leaving not even 3,500 troops in Iraq, following the 2014 return of Al Qaeda in Iraq (known as ISIS), the administration reintroduced more than five thousand troops under the same legal guarantee and protections the Iraqi government had offered before we pulled out all our troops in 2011—an executive order that granted U.S. military jurisdiction over its men simply by affirming our soldier was on duty at the time of any alleged misdeed. None of our troops would wind up in an Iraqi courtroom. Why this was sufficient in 2014–16 but insufficient when offered in 2011 I’ve never understood.

  “sovereign, stable, and self-reliant”: Mark Landler, “U.S. Troops to Leave Iraq by Year’s End,” New York Times, October 21, 2011, www.nytimes.com/​2011/​10/​22/​world/​middleeast/​president-obama-announces-end-of-war-in-iraq.html?searchResultPosition=27.

  “I ended it”: President Barack Obama, “Barack Obama’s Victory Speech—Full Text,” Guardian, November 7, 2012, www.theguardian.com/​world/​2012/​nov/​07/​barack-obama-speech-full-text.

  “The tide of war is receding”: Mark Landler and Helene Cooper, “Obama Will Speed Pullout from War in Afghanistan,” New York Times, June 22, 2011, www.nytimes.com/​2011/​06/​23/​world/​asia/​23prexy.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=BF3E31C9DD88A65880999B1C0248021E&gwt=pay.