Sleeping With The Devil

by Robert Baer

  Whether there’s anyone in the Al Sa’ud willing to impose the rule of law in the kingdom, I don’t know. Whether anyone has the guts or determination to even try, I’m not sure. From what I know, Crown Prince ‘Abdallah might. He’s related to Asad through marriage; maybe something of Syria’s determination has rubbed off on him. But ‘Abdallah will be eighty years old soon, and he has enough enemies in the family to block anything he might dream up. In case he or someone else wants to try, Syria is a model, much as the bloodless policy wonks in Washington might blanch at the suggestion.

  At the end of the day, what we need in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East is rule of law. I’m not talking about a Bill of Rights, the Magna Carta, a free press, freedom to worship, or the right to bear arms. I’m talking about something more basic - outlawing righteous murder, jihad, the Muslim Brotherhood. That would be a start; then you could move on to outlawing grotesque commissions, theft, and bribery. Only when you address those problems can you think about other rights or true democracy.

  It would also help if we imposed a rule of law on ourselves, like enforcing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, stopping bribery, and putting an end to officials retiring from the U.S. government on Friday and going to work for a foreign government on Monday. A little decency in Washington - and in Europe and the rest of the world that has lived off the oil bonanza - would go a long way toward cleaning up the mess in Saudi Arabia and beginning the process of telling the truth about what’s going on in that country.

  Failing that, there’s always the 82nd Airborne.

  IT’S NOT LIKE the United States has never thought about seizing Arab oil fields. On August 21, 1975, the Congressional Research Service presented to the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on International Relations a document entitled “Oil Fields as Military Objectives: A Feasibility Study.” By the time the document was entered into the record, the OPEC oil embargo had been over for almost a year and a half, but the memory lingered on.

  Gerald Ford, who ascended to the presidency on Nixon’s resignation, and the holdover secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, had talked publicly about the possibility of seizing Persian Gulf facilities should the embargo escalate into a strangulation of American industrial capacity. Doing so, the Research Service estimated, would be no cakewalk, even in the best of circumstances:

  If nonmilitary facets were entirely favorable, successful operations would be assured only if this country could satisfy all aspects of a five-part mission:

  • Seize required oil installations intact.

  • Secure them for weeks, months, or years.

  • Restore wrecked assets rapidly.

  • Operate all installations without the owner’s assistance.

  • Guarantee safe overseas passage for supplies and petroleum products.

  Achieving American objectives, the Research Service summarized, would require two to four military divisions, maybe sixty thousand troops, “tied down for a protracted period of time.” To keep the oil fields running, “drafting U.S. civilian workers to supplant foreign counterparts might be mandatory.” Because “U.S. parachute assault forces are too few to cover all objectives quickly [and] amphibious forces are too slow,” skilled localized sabotage teams could be expected to “wreak havoc” before invasion forces were in place. “In short, success would largely depend on two prerequisites: slight damage to key installations [and] Soviet abstinence from armed intervention.”

  Even if we confine a takeover to Saudi Arabia, we couldn’t count on it going smoothly. Whether the House of Sa’ud were still in power or had been supplanted by some sort of Wahhabi putsch, we would still have to contend with all those weapons Washington sold the Saudis, and all those fighter pilots and infantry officers trained by American military personnel and private contractors to use the planes and other weapons. Happily, the U.S. has an adequate base of operations in Qatar. Additionally, U.S.-trained Saudi forces would realize the futility of resisting, in part because they know that however many planes and missile launchers they have, the U.S. has the next generation in far greater numbers. Also, corruption in the kingdom is so thorough that spare parts for its planes and tanks would quickly be truly spare and sparse.

  Sure, terrorism would likely increase, locally and globally. Al Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, you name it - none is going down without a fight. Even if the Saudis aren’t widely loved in the Middle East, the enemy of my enemy is still my friend. Vilified for the invasion of Iraq, the U.S. would take an even worse beating in international public-opinion polls. We would have to run roughshod over international organizations and our own long-standing principles, although the newly promulgated “doctrine of preemptive warfare” would certainly provide cover. But would all that be worse than standing idly by as the House of Sa’ud collapsed and the world’s largest known oil reserves fell into the hands of Muslim Brotherhood-inspired fundamentalists dedicated to jihad against Israel and the West? I don’t think so. Some things are more calamitous than others, and if the Bush-Cheney administration knows anything well, it ought to be how to rebuild and run an oil field.

  THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE feasibility study on seizing Arab oil fields has mostly disappeared from history, in part because it’s embarrassing for Congress to be identified with such schemes and in part because the study is almost embarrassingly naive at times. (“The resultant survey covers the immediate future only, through the 1970s,” the authors write. “Thereafter, new United States and allied sources of energy could make armed intervention against petroleum producers an irrelevant act.” Right.) But the magazine article on which the CRS study builds - Robert W. Tucker’s “Oil: The Issue of American Intervention,” from the January 1975 issue of Commentary - has been nibbling at the dreams of out-of-the-box Washington thinkers for more than a quarter century. Unlike the CRS bureaucrats, Tucker doesn’t beat around the bush. He wants to seize the Saudi oil fields, straight and simple:

  Since it is impossible to intervene everywhere, the feasibility of intervention depends upon whether there is a relatively restricted area which, if effectively controlled, contains a sufficient portion of present world oil production and proven reserves to provide reasonable assurance that its control may be used to break the present price structure by breaking the core of the cartel politically and economically. [Remember: This was 1975.]

  The one area that would appear to satisfy these requirements extends from Kuwait down along the coastal region of Saudi Arabia to Qatar. It is this mostly shallow coastal strip less than 400 miles in length that provides 40 per cent of present OPEC production and that has by far the world’s largest proven reserves (over 50 per cent of total OPEC reserves and 40 per cent of world reserves). Since it has no substantial centers of population and is without trees, its effective control does not bear even remote comparison with the experience of Vietnam.

  There is a second factor to consider: the Shi’a-Sunni split in Islam. The Saudi Shi’a in the Eastern Province, the majority of workers in Aramco, are ripe for a revolution. They are a poor, oppressed minority, not allowed to express their faith, forbidden from holding any important government position or serving in the military. From time to time, they’re subject to Wahhabi pogroms. If they’re lucky enough to own any property, it’s liable to be seized by the Al Sa’ud. Until U.S. and British forces started rolling into Iraq in March 2003, I would have bet that if we had offered the Shi’a a deal to rule the Eastern Province - the heart of Saudi Arabia’s oil industry - they would have instantly agreed. Now, I’ve got plenty of doubts. Iraq’s Shi’a didn’t exactly welcome their “liberators” with open arms as the script called for. But the war still goes on as I write. Maybe by the time it ends, America won’t seem so arrogant to the Arab world, so intolerant of any world view but its own. That’s a steep learning curve, but winning over the Shi’a would be worth the effort.

  The idea is not as far-fetched as it seems. Already the Pentagon has made an alliance with Ahmad
Chalabi, head of the Iraqi National Congress and a Shi’a, to set up a government in a post-Saddam Baghdad. Even if he were to take power, Chalabi isn’t likely to last long. He left Iraq in 1958, still a child, and has spent his adulthood in the West. He has no political base in Iraq. Few Iraqis know his name. Also, in 1989 he was convicted in Jordan of defrauding his own bank. If we’re ready to consider a Shi’a with all that baggage, couldn’t we consider a Saudi Shi’a for the same role?

  If you carry the logic forward, it would be possible to extend an arc of moderate Shi’a governments from Tehran to Kuwait to Bahrain to the Eastern Provinces, all countries with a substantial Shi’a population. Before September 11, any talk about nation building on this scale would get you ejected from any serious policy discussion in Washington. Now we’re faced with the House of Sa’ud’s dissolution, and we may have no other choice. An invasion and a revolution might be the only things that can save the industrial West from a prolonged, wrenching depression.

  Was it all inevitable? No, which brings me to the final thing I want to say in this book. Washington made us lie down with the devil. It made the bed, pulled back the covers, and invited the devil in. We whispered in his ear and told him we loved him. When things went a little wrong, Washington held his hand and said it was all right. And all that time we had our eye on his bulging wallet, lit by the moonlight on the dresser.

  Index

  The following items may be used as a guide to search for information in this eBook.

  Note: Arabic names with the prefix al- or bin are alphabetized by their main element.

  ‘Abassi, Hashim

  ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz (Saudi prince). See Azouzi

  ‘Abd-al-Salam, Mansur

  ‘Abd-al-Wahhab, Muhammad ibn

  ‘Abdallah (Saudi crown prince)

  reform potential and

  U.S. presidents and

  ‘Abdallah ibn Ibrahim ibn Saif

  Abqaiq oil complex

  Acheson, Dean

  Aerospace Engineering Design

  Afghanistan

  CIA and

  bin Laden bases

  Muslim Brothers in

  Saudi Arabia and

  Soviet invasion of

  See also Taliban

  Ahmar, ‘Abdallah al-

  Airbus

  Air Cess

  Alaskan oil, xxiv

  Alawites

  Aleppo attack (1979)

  Algeria

  Aliyev, Heydar

  Al Sa’ud. See House of Sa’ud

  Amerada Hess

  American University (Beirut)

  American University (D.C.)

  Amnesty International

  Amoco

  Amoudi, Muhammad Husayn al-

  Angola

  anthrax, weaponized

  Arab-Israeli wars

  Arafat, Yasir

  Aramco

  Armacost, Michael

  arms dealing

  Khashoggi and

  Lebanese and

  Russians and

  Saudi purchases

  See also defense industry, U.S.

  Arms Export Control Act, U.S.

  Asad, Bashar al-

  Asad, Hafiz al-

  Ashcroft, John

  Asad, Rifa’t al-

  Atlantic Richfield/ARCO

  Atta, Muhammad

  Autumn Leaves arrests (1988)

  Azerbaijan

  Azhar, al- (Cairo university)

  Azouzi (Saudi prince)

  greed/bid for power by

  militant Islam and

  ‘Azzam, ‘Abdallah (“Amir of Jihad”)

  Bahrain

  Baker, James

  Bandar bin Sultan (Saudi prince; U.S. ambassador)

  background/personality of

  Saudi money flow and

  Washington connections

  wife’s Islamic charity gifts

  Banna, Hassan al-

  Barger, Thomas C.

  Basmachi revolt

  Basra

  Bawazir, Tahir

  Bayyumi, Omar

  BCCI scandal

  BDM International

  Bedouin

  Begin, Menachem

  Beirut

  Bell, J. Bowyer

  Bentsen, Lloyd

  Beschloss, Afsaneh

  Beschloss, Michael

  Bill (CIA officer)

  bin Laden. See Laden, Osama bin

  Boeing McDonnell Douglas

  Bojinka plot

  Bosnia

  Bout, Victor

  BP Amoco

  Brady, Nicholas

  Bridas

  British Aerospace

  Brown, Ron

  Brzezinski, Zbigniew

  Buckley, Bill

  budget deficit, U.S.

  Burayk, Sa’d al-

  Burma

  Bush, Barbara

  Bush, George H. W.

  Bandar friendship

  Carlyle Group and

  Bush, George W.

  ‘Abdallah and

  oil interests and

  Cambridge Energy Research

  Capitol Trust Bank

  Carlucci, Frank

  Carlyle Group

  Carlyle Partners II fund

  Carter, Jimmy

  Casey, William

  Caspian Sea oil

  Caterair

  Central Asia

  militant Islamics

  oil resources

  See also specific countries

  Centre Islamique (Geneva)

  Chalabi, Ahmad

  Chechnya

  Cheney, Dick

  Cheney, Lynne

  Chevron

  Chowan College (Murfreesboro, N.C.)

  Christopher, Warren

  Churchill, Winston

  CIA

  Afghanistan and

  arms dealers and

  Central Eurasian Division

  cold war focus

  Counter-Terrorism Center

  lack of Middle East sources

  Lebanon and

  militant Islam and

  Muslim Brotherhood and

  Saudi policy

  Syria and

  Citicorp

  Clinton, Bill

  Bandar and

  Boeing-Saudia deal and

  Bosnia policy

  Iraq policy

  Qatar and

  cold war

  Muslim Brothers and

  Saudia Araia and

  Syria and

  Cole, U.S.S., bombing

  Congressional Research Service

  Cordesman, Anthony

  Cutler, Walter

  Dalkimoni, Muhammad Hafiz

  Darkazanli, Mamoun

  Darman, Richard

  Defense Department, U.S.

  defense industry, U.S.

  Defense Policy Board

  Delta Oil

  democratization

  rule of law as prior need

  Deutch, John

  Dodge, David

  Dome of the Rock

  Drake, Edwin

  drug dealing

  Dulles, Allen

  Dulles, John Foster

  Eagleburger, Lawrence

  East-West pipeline

  Economic Offset Program

  economy, global

  Eddy, William

  Egypt

  Muslim Brothers

  Eisenhower, Dwight

  Enron

  Ericsson

  Export-Import Bank

  F-15 aircraft

  Fahd, king of Saudi Arabia

  stroke of

  Fares, Issam

  Fasi, Muhammad al-

  Faysal, king of Saudi Arabia

  FBI

  Qatar and

  Saudi Arabia and

  Fergana Valley

  Feurth, Leon

  Florida

  Fluor Daniel

  Foley, Tom

  Ford, Gerald

  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

  Forrestal, James
r />   Forstmann, Teddy

  Fowler, Wyche, Jr.

  France

  Freeh, Louis

  Freeman, Chas W.

  French Riviera

  Frontera Resources Corporation

  fundamentalists. See Islamic militants

  gas reserves

  Gates, Robert

  General Electric

  Georgetown University

  Germany

  Gerstner, Lou

  Gerth, Jeff

  Ghawar

  Giuliani, Rudy

  global economy. See economy, global

  Golan Heights

  Gore, Al

  graymailing

  Great Britain

  Central Asia and

  Saudi arms deals

  Green Line (Beirut)

  Gromyko, Andrei

  Guantanamo Naval Base

  Gulf Oil Corporation

  Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation

  Gulf War (1990-91)

  Bush (G. H.W.) and

  Saudi Arabia and

  Haifa, Princess (wife of Bandar)

  Islamic charity gifts by

  Washington ties

  Halliburton

  Hama, destruction of (1982)

  Hamad bin Jasim bin Hamad Al Thani (Qatari black prince)

  Hamad bin Jasim bin Jabir Al Thani (Qatari foreign minister)

  Hamas

  Hamburg terrorist cells

  Hamdan, Jamal

  Hamdi, Tarik

  Hariri, Rafiq

  Hasa (mother of Sudayri Seven)

  Hashemites

  Hassan, king of Morocco

  Hawali, Safar al-

  Hawsawi, Mustafa Ahmed

  Heikel, Mohamed

  Hersh, Seymour

  hijackings

  Hills, Carla

  Holiday, Edith

  hostages

  House of Sa’ud

  corruption of

  enemies of

  family tree

  future of

  impact of Fahd’s stroke on

  Israel’s 1967 victory and

  militant Islamist funding by