Descent Into Chaos

by Ahmed Rashid

  After four U.S. SOF troops were killed in Zabul on May 29—the single biggest loss for U.S. forces since 9/11—American soldiers fought a large force of five hundred to eight hundred Taliban led by Mullah Dadullah. Once again the Taliban stood and fought, and then made good their escape back to Pakistan. The extent of the Taliban’s reorganization was evident with the capture in July of a minor Taliban commander, Mullah Sakhi Dad Mujahid. He had with him a satellite phone, telephone numbers including that of Mullah Omar, and a notebook of expenses showing that he had distributed $1.8 million in June for salaries and the purchase of supplies. An attempt to call Omar failed, but the number was for a Pakistani mobile phone.27

  As the Afghan elections approached, the UN tried to persuade the Pakistanis to restrain the Taliban. In April the French diplomat Jean Arnault, who had replaced Brahimi as head of UNAMA, shared with Pakistani officials a dossier of hundreds of Taliban commanders who were regularly crossing into Pakistan, but Islamabad denied everything. On a visit to Washington in mid-June, Karzai again complained to Bush about Musharraf’s refusal to clamp down on the Taliban. However, the Americans were more concerned with the crisis generated by Dr. A. Q. Khan involving the sale of nuclear technology to several countries. The administration decided it could not pressure Islamabad on the Taliban issue while it was trying to extract information about Khan. There was slow realization in Washington of the double game Musharraf was playing with the Americans. Paul Wolfowitz told me, “One of the ways they [Pakistan] slice it is to cooperate regarding al Qaeda. . . . Some of them say that we have to hedge our bets with the Taliban because we don’t know about the future of Afghanistan. We have a government [Pakistan] which can’t deliver everything we would like to see and . . . we don’t have the ability to simply say, If you don’t do it, we’ll cut off our whole relationship with you and let you go under.”28

  The United States remained complacent about the Taliban as long as Pakistan continued to appear to chase al Qaeda. “The Taliban were always considered a lower priority by the United States,” said a senior CIA official. “They had been defeated and only needed cleaning up, which was considered to be Pakistan’s job. Al Qaeda was the main priority for the U.S.”29 The CIA said that 70 percent of the al Qaeda leadership had been captured or killed since 9/11, while ignoring the fact that al Qaeda replaced every captured individual with someone new. “To take the two-thirds number as a yardstick is a fantasy—to say that they have only one third of their leadership left is a misunderstanding,” explained Michael Scheuer, former head of the CIA’s Bin Laden Unit. Islamabad invariably declared every captured al Qaeda leader as the “number three” man in the movement, confusing the public even further. Over the years dozens of “number three” figures were captured or killed.30

  In the midst of the Taliban summer offensive, the Afghan government also had to contend with fighting between warlords in the west and the north. Yet in August 2004 Wolfowitz asked Congress to authorize $500 million “for training and equipping local security forces—not just armies— to counter terrorism and insurgencies.”31 The Pentagon wanted to hire warlords in Yemen, Pakistan, and Somalia to combat al Qaeda because it considered that its warlord strategy had worked so well in Afghanistan. It was an insult to the Afghans who had suffered so much under the warlords. In 2006, Somali warlords supported by the CIA were defeated and driven out of Mogadishu by radical Islamists who then established a Taliban-like regime. It took another CIA-backed invasion—this time by Ethiopian troops—to dislodge the Islamists.

  Afghanistan’s first presidential elections were fast approaching. There was an intense debate in Kabul among the international community and the Afghan government about whether to hold the presidential and parliamentary elections together, as had been promised at Bonn, or separately. The Americans desperately wanted presidential elections to take place before the U.S. elections in November 2004 and were happy to see parliamentary elections delayed. European governments were divided, although several wanted to hold the elections together, to keep the momentum of the Bonn process going. Almost all NGOs and experts advised delaying both elections until the security situation improved, reforms were implemented, and DDR completed, so that Afghans could see tangible benefits. A report called “The Great Gamble,” by a Western-Afghan think tank in Kabul, warned that premature elections “could do more to promote instability and conflict rather than lasting peace.” One third of the country was unsafe for holding elections, and warlords posed a threat to free voting.32 The cost of the elections would be better spent on improving state capacity, while holding them early would divert the international community’s attention from reconstruction.

  The diametrically opposed intellectual perspective on the value of elections was the European and UN approach, which asserted that a post-conflict country should be readied for elections slowly. The Americans wanted elections in a hurry, so they could show that the job had been done and move out. “Elections should come at the end of the stabilization process and not at the beginning like the Americans want them,” said Lakhdar Brahimi.33 Karzai wanted both elections on time. “I do not want to be like Rabbani and hang on to power without legitimacy,” he told me. In 1992, Birhanuddin Rabbani had hung on to his presidency for four years, when the presidency was supposed to rotate among the Mujahedin leaders every six months.34 However, Karzai’s office was slow and disorganized in issuing the decrees needed to hold both elections. UNAMA drew up an electoral law to allow for the existence of political parties, but it took eight months for Karzai to sign the decree. The government also failed to resolve disputed district and provincial boundaries in time. Despite all the Western funds spent on improving the president’s office, Karzai was becoming more disorganized and unfocused.

  Afghan leaders were deeply divided. Former “jihadi” leaders such as Birhanuddin Rabbani, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Fahim, and other warlords wanted both elections at the same time and were willing to support Karzai as the presidential candidate as long as they were returned to power in parliament and DDR was not forced upon them. In June, under pressure from Khalilzad, the jihadis agreed to support Karzai’s candidacy without conditions.35 When reports of the agreement became public, many Afghans were furious because once again the warlords were dictating terms. “The jihadis will never allow reconstruction to take place or the collection of weapons—we will keep on having instability and anarchy,” said Masuda Jalal, the only woman candidate in the presidential elections.36 Meanwhile, the “reformers” in the cabinet, led by Ashraf Ghani, urged Karzai to hold the presidential elections first so that he could carry out reforms quickly and sideline the warlords. The reformers looked to the international community for support.

  Much depended on Karzai’s attitude. In the two Loya Jirgas he had appeased the warlords—who had then held back reform. “In the end— some would argue—the President has served the consolidation of jihadi hegemony rather than reform,” said a UNAMA discussion paper on the election issue.37 The reformers feared that simultaneous parliamentary elections would result in a warlord-dominated parliament. There was also a deep ethnic divide. The Pashtun tribal leaders wanted a strong Pashtun president elected quickly. The non-Pashtuns wanted a strong parliament that could protect them against any return to Pashtun hegemony.

  The burden of organizing the elections fell on UNAMA. In a country that had not held a census since 1979, there were only “guesstimates” as to the total population or number of voters. However, UNAMA estimated that it needed to register some 10.5 million voters over the age of eighteen out of a total population of 27.0 million. Registration would involve issuing photo identity cards to all men and women voters. The UN made an urgent appeal for the $78 million required for registration and $100 million for the elections, but the money was slow to come in.

  UN-trained teams of Afghans prepared to start registration in eight cities on December 1, 2003. Members of the public responded enthusiastically and were pleased to receive the first personal document issued to
them by the state in twenty-five years. The laminated plastic ID card had a Polaroid shot of the voter and personal information that was fed into a massive database by three hundred data-entry clerks based in Kabul. The cards became the talk of the entire country, and many people had multiple cards made. At registration stations there was palpable excitement as crowds of relatives arrived to witness the registration of a single adult. Yet the procedure was slow, and at the end of January 2004 UN adviser Reginald Austin said he was “operating at only 18 percent capacity registering only 50,000 people compared to the 500,000 we should have done.”38 Registration in the south was especially poor due to the lack of security, with only one registration station open in Kandahar. Another 4,200 registration stations would open in small towns in May.

  Every week Afghans, foreign diplomats, and journalists watched the figures issued by Reginald Austin’s office slowly climb upward. By the end of March, when a conference in Berlin on aid for Afghanistan took place, 1.57 million people had been registered. However, the numbers registering in the Pashtun belt were still far lower, raising fears that the Pashtuns would cry foul if insufficient numbers did not register. Meanwhile, only 28 percent of those registered were women. Full female participation was essential to showcase progress in Afghanistan. The Taliban attacked six voter registration teams and issued death threats to others. Yet by July half the voters, or around 5.6 million, had registered, 38 percent of them women, and Pashtuns were registering in increasing numbers. The Afghans were demonstrating that despite the risks, they wanted the chance to vote.

  Meanwhile, Fahim and his warlord allies continued to refuse to carry out DDR. In July, with the elections just eight weeks away, only 30 percent of the heavy weapons had been collected and just 12 percent of soldiers had been decommissioned. The election commission had decided that presidential elections would be held on October 9, and parliamentary elections would follow later in 2005. The reformers in the cabinet insisted that now was the moment for Karzai to dump Fahim as his vice presidential running mate. Those supporting the move included fellow Panjsheris, including the two brothers of Ahmad Shah Masud—Ahmad Wali Masud and Ahmad Zia Masud—who told Karzai, “You are tired of your warlords and we are tired with our warlords—let’s get together and get rid of them.”

  Karzai agonized for weeks about whether to dump Fahim. I watched the process from close up, as we would meet regularly at the end of his busy day and walk in his small garden in the palace. European ambassadors told Karzai their governments supported the move, but the Americans continued to procrastinate. European heads of state got involved, telephoning Karzai and urging him to fire Fahim. Lakhdar Brahimi, now at the UN in New York, invited the U.S. ambassador Khalilzad to Cairo along with Jean Arnault. “Now is the time,” Brahimi told them. “It’s all about timing. Ismael Khan was taken out at the right time; now it’s Fahim’s time.” Khalilzad finally accepted the verdict and threw his weight behind getting rid of Fahim. In two long telephone conversations, Brahimi and Tony Blair persuaded Karzai. On July 26, the last date for presidential nominations, Kabul was on a knife-edge. ISAF troops patrolled the near-empty streets and Western diplomats went into lockdown in their embassies, fearing unrest. Nobody knew how Fahim would react.

  In the late afternoon, Karzai declared that his vice presidential running mates would be Ahmad Zia Masud and Karim Khalili. Kabulis erupted with joy as Fahim went into a sulk, stunned by the reversal. It was a defining moment, signaling hope for the end of open warlordism. Ahmad Zia Masud was an unassuming figure who had been a businessman in India and helped supply his brother, Ahmad Shah Masud, with weapons from abroad. He was married to Rabbani’s daughter, so his nomination precluded any opposition from the jihadis. Khalili, from the minority Shia Hazara ethnic group, was chosen to win the support of other Afghan minorities. With Fahim gone, the Northern Alliance disintegrated. They could not agree on a common candidate to oppose Karzai in the presidential elections, and instead each ethnic group put up its own candidate.

  The most serious contender was Younus Qanuni, who had broad support among Tajiks and other non-Pashtuns. Ultimately twenty-three candidates filed nomination papers, including Masuda Jalal. When voter registration finally closed on August 15, 10.3 million people had registered, 41 percent of them women. The candidates had just four weeks to campaign. Karzai did little campaigning owing to security threats. On his first trip to Gardez, on September 16, rockets were fired at the helicopter landing pad moments before he was due to arrive, and he returned to Kabul.

  Karzai spelled out his agenda: “To move Afghanistan from two hundred dollars per capita to seven hundred dollars in the next seven to ten years; to make Afghanistan a trade and business land bridge between Central and South Asia and build on good relations with our neighbors; to carry out fundamental institutional reforms and to especially institutionalize democracy; to create respect for the rule of law, build an army and police force, and create a performance-orientated administration.”39

  However, Karzai’s supporters were dismayed at his refusal to set up a political party. Many Afghans argued that without one he could not promote democracy and parliamentary politics, which depended on parties, not tribal alliances. While the Pashtuns would clearly vote for him, his support among the non-Pashtuns would remain scattered and disunited. Karzai insisted that political parties reminded Afghans of the past, when the Communist and Mujahedin parties wreaked havoc in the country. I constantly berated Karzai for his failure to understand the usefulness of political parties and that a parliament without parties was not democracy, and was ultimately dangerous—but he remained adamant. It was his biggest mistake, and ultimately he would suffer because of his failure to build a political organization.

  U.S. officials predicted that the Taliban would mount large attacks to disrupt the elections. Khalilzad said he feared a “Tet-like offensive,” referring to the watershed offensive of the Vietcong during the Vietnam War. Security services arrested one hundred militants in Kabul and found containers full of explosives, as a massive security ring was thrown around the country.40 Some 19,000 U.S.-led Coalition troops, 9,000 NATO-ISAF forces, 14,000 ANA troops, 50,000 police and local militia hired by Pashtun elders would guard 22,000 polling stations where 115,000 Afghan election officials would be deployed.41

  Kept secret until now, a major diplomatic incident erupted when ISI officers attempted to sow panic in the south just before the elections. On August 9, ISI officials in Kandahar told the UNAMA office that the Taliban were about to launch a major offensive and the ISI was ready to evacuate UN staff to Quetta. The ISI officers vividly described how the Taliban planned to enter Kandahar “clean-shaven and without weapons, which could be provided from the numerous weapons caches inside Afghanistan.” UNAMA reported back to Kabul and New York that there was no sign of a Taliban offensive and that the ISI had wanted “to create panic and lead the UN to leave Afghanistan in order to disgrace the elections.” Munir Akram, Pakistan’s ambassador to the UN, wrote to Kofi Annan harshly criticizing UNAMA.42 Major tensions developed between Pakistan and the UN.

  In fact, the ISI was furious because it had retrieved copies of reports from Western embassies in Kabul describing how senior Pakistani officers were meeting with Taliban leaders in the army’s Command and Staff College in Quetta and that Taliban training camps were being emptied of fighters. On August 18, Kofi Annan wrote to Musharraf insisting that Pakistan do more to secure the elections. “I would be grateful for future measures you could take during the coming weeks to assist the Afghan authorities and the international community in protecting the presidential election from extremist groups bent on disrupting it,” Annan wrote.43

  Khalilzad knew that the key to stopping Taliban infiltration was to put the heat on Musharraf directly. He enlisted President Bush to do so. On September 22, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, Bush met with Musharraf and Karzai in the first three-way meeting the leaders had held since 9/11. Senior U.S. officials told me tha
t Bush was uncharacteristically blunt with Musharraf about the presence of Taliban leaders in Pakistan. “Where are Mullah Omar, Mullah Usmani and Gulbuddin Hikmetyar?” Bush asked a flustered Musharraf. “It was the first time that Bush totally focused on the Taliban threat rather than al Qaeda with the Pakistanis,” a senior U.S. diplomat admitted.44 Bush told Musharraf that he needed a successful election in Afghanistan, and Musharraf complied. For the first time Pakistan deployed troops on the Balochistan border to prevent Taliban infiltration and closed all border-crossing points.45

  The UN and ISAF forces initiated a massive logistics campaign using helicopters and cargo planes and camels and donkeys to carry the polling materials and voting boxes to each location. Five thousand satellite phones were distributed to remote polling stations. Nobody could predict what would happen on the day, whether Afghans would turn out to vote despite the Taliban’s threats and warlords’ pressure. The evening before the elections, Kabulis rushed home early and the streets were eerily deserted except for armored cars and soldiers patrolling them. There was a sense of expectation but also enormous foreboding.

  Even before dawn broke on October 9, it was clear what would happen as tens of thousands of Afghans began to line up at polling stations around the country. Along with Lyse Doucet, the BBC anchor, we rushed from polling station to polling station in Kabul and nearby villages and were so amazed at the huge turnout, the orderly queues, the patience of the women holding little children, the good humor and joking as people waited, the stories they told of their loss and hardship, that we burst into tears. After twenty-five years of covering the bloodshed and chaos of Afghanistan’s wars, it was the most moving and memorable day of my life. I felt as if a vast black blanket of despair that had covered the country and the people had suddenly been lifted and sunlight was pouring through. For most Afghans it was the first time they had ever seen a ballot box, and polling was extended by two hours in the evening to allow everyone to experience voting.46