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44 In August 2007 he was suddenly freed without a trial and without being charged by the ISI, which had held him in a secret prison in Pakistan. U.S. officials were angry that he had been freed. There were also strong suspicions that he was released as part of a deal with the ISI and may have been working for them at some stage. See Craig Whitlock and Griff Witte, “Al Qaeda Suspect Released by Pakistan,” The Washington Post, August 22, 2007.
45 The Islambouli Brigades of al Qaeda claimed to have carried out the attack. The group had been responsible for the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in 1981 and the bombing of the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad in 1995. However, subsequent arrests proved that Pakistani militants working with a faction of Jaish-e-Mohammed and under Amjad Farooqi’s leadership were involved.
46 According to Western diplomats who spoke to Marcus Mabry, Aziz claimed to be able to conquer any woman in two minutes with his “Savile Row suited gigolo kind of charm.” Mabry wrote that when Rice sat down with Aziz, “Aziz puffed himself up and held forth in what he obviously thought was his seductive baritone.” See Marcus Mabry, Twice as Good: Condoleezza Rice and Her Path to Power, New York: Modern Times, 2007.
47 Interview with Sherry Rehman, Islamabad, October 15, 2004.
48 After the second suicide attack on Musharraf, General Kayani suggested that soldiers search the roofs of shops near the attack site for possible evidence. It was there that soldiers found the all-important chip from a cell phone that led to the disclosures about the identities of the suicide bombers. There are usually 115 major-generals in the Pakistani army.
Chapter Twelve. Taliban Resurgent: The Taliban Return Home
1 The former foreign minister Mullah Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil surrendered to U.S. forces in Kandahar on February 8, 2002. Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, the former Taliban ambassador to Islamabad, was handed over by Pakistan at the same time; while Mullah Fazel Mazloom, the former army chief of staff, was captured by U.S. forces.
2 Gul Agha met with Mullah Obaidullah Ahmed, the former defense minister, and Mullah Noorudin Turabi, the former justice minister. Bradley Graham, “Two al Qaeda Fighters Caught,” The Washington Post, January 9, 2002.
3 Agence France-Presse, “Osama May Be Alive: Afghan FM,” Washington, D.C., January 25, 2002.
4 Reuters, “Islamabad, Kabul Vow to Curb Terror,” Kabul, April 4, 2002.
5 BBC, “Interview with Mullah Omar,” May 17, 2002.
6 My earlier book gives a full history of the origins of the Taliban and their links with the JUI and the Deobandi tradition. See Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2001.
7 Ahmed Rashid, “Taliban Mounted Militia Prepares for Border Strike,” The Daily Telegraph, October 8, 2003. See also Ahmed Rashid, “Safe Haven for the Taliban,” Far Eastern Economic Review, October 16, 2003.
8 James Dao, “Afghans Raise Concern That Taliban Forces Are Reorganizing in Pakistan,” The New York Times, November 3, 2002.
9 Elizabeth Rubin, “In the Land of the Taliban,” The New York Times Magazine, October 22, 2006.
10 Ahmed Rashid, “US Bombers and Fighters Attack Afghan Rebels,” The Daily Telegraph, January 29, 2003.
11 Text of Osama bin Laden’s message “Fight the Invaders,” International Herald Tribune, February 15, 2003.
12 Associated Press, “Afghan Rebels Urge Attack,” Islamabad, February 23, 2003. “I ask the Muslims of the world to wage a guerrilla war by using suicide attacks—now is not the time for large-scale group assaults but rather for individual attacks,” said Hikmetyar.
13 Sarah Chayes explains the situation in the south in great detail in her The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan After the Taliban, New York: Penguin Books, 2006.
14 Ahmed Rashid, “Afghans Urge Pakistan to Help Rein in Taliban,” The Daily Telegraph, April 23, 2003.
15 Ahmed Rashid, “Taliban Are Back, Says US General,” The Daily Telegraph, July 21, 2002.
16 The ten were former corps commanders Dadullah, Barader, Razzaq; the former chief of the Kandahar air base Akhtar Mansoor; former army chief Akhtar Usmani; former defense minister Obaidullah; former Nimroz governor Mohammed Rasul; and Kandahar’s ex-security chief Hafiz Abdul Majeed. The only two Pashtuns who did not belong to the south were Jalaluddin Haqqani and Saifur Rehman Mansur. Of these, Razzaq was killed in a NATO air strike in Zabul province in 2006, Usmani was killed in a NATO air strike in Helmand province in January 2007, and Obaidullah was captured in Quetta in March 2007. See Asif Farooqi, “Taliban’s New Hierarchy,” IslamOnline.net, June 25, 2003.
17 In a major speech on April 30, 2003, Karzai announced that “those who did not oppose the peace process and who were committed to non-violent means must be provided with the political space and equal opportunities . . . to help the peace process.” John Heller, “Political Space Is Opening for Taliban Moderates,” Radio Free Liberty, July 4, 2003.
18 Lakhdar Brahimi, “Address to the UN Security Council,” New York, UN briefing paper, December 8, 2003.
19 Reuters, “Iraq Won’t Weaken US Effort,” Bagram, July 30, 2003.
20 The scene was reminiscent of the burning down of the Pakistani embassy in Kabul in 1995 by a crowd led by NA leaders after the Taliban had captured Herat.
21 Ahmed Rashid, “Karzai Pledges Good Relations but Demands Pakistan Stop Extremists, ” The Nation, July 22, 2003.
22 “I have spent 3 million rupees [$50,000] on tickets sending back Mujahedin to their homes—if I am a terrorist, the court should hang me,” said Piracha. “If I Am a Terrorist, the Court Should Hang Me—Piracha,” Herald, September 2004.
23 Ahmed Rashid, “The Betrayal of the Afghans,” New York Review of Books, January 29, 2004.
24 My story was for the Far Eastern Economic Review: “Afghanistan and Pakistan: Safe Haven for the Taliban,” October 9, 2003. The editorial was “Haven for the Taliban,” The Washington Post, November 2, 2003.
25 Al Qaeda leaders made constant references to the Muslim kingdoms in the province of Andalusia in southern Spain in the Middle Ages as a period of greatness in the Muslim world that should be emulated. Lawrence Wright, “The Terror Web,” The New Yorker, August 2, 2004.
26 A total of twenty-three U.S. soldiers were killed in 2003, and twelve were killed in the first six months of 2004.
27 Ahmed Rashid, “Karzai Expects to Discuss Critical Issues with Musharraf,” The Nation, July 25, 2004.
28 Interview with Paul Wolfowitz, deputy defense secretary, Washington, D.C., February 19, 2004.
29 Interview with John McLaughlin, Washington, D.C., November 19, 2005.
30 See Robin Wright, “Untested Islamic Militants Emerging, US Official Says,” The Washington Post, April 2, 2004.
31 Associated Press, “US Wants to Build Network of Friendly Militias to Combat Terrorism, ” Washington, D.C., August 11, 2004.
32 Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, “Afghan Elections: The Great Gamble, ” Kabul, November 2003. Of the warlords, the report said, “It will be a cruel irony for Afghans if their first experience of voting is being to vote for those who have been responsible for so much of the misery of the last two decades.”
33 Ahmed Rashid, “Afghan Elections to Be Delayed,” The Wall Street Journal, January 8, 2004.
34 Ibid.
35 I saw several private cables sent by the UN and European embassies that outlined the deal, even though Karzai publicly continued to deny it. Karzai had agreed to give the warlords 50 percent of the ministries in return for their support to his candidacy. He promised that Fahim and Karim Khalili, the Hazara leader, would be on his slate as vice presidents, and Rabbani would become the speaker of the future parliament.
36 Carlotta Gall, “Karzai Casts Lot with Warlords,” The New York Times, June 8, 2004.
37 A confidential UN discussion paper circulated among Western embassies stated: “The reformers have looked up to the transitional government and the international commu
nity to spearhead the transition. The jihadis have relied on their position in the security apparatus—and their military/political control over large parts of the territory—to achieve their own agenda.” UNAMA discussion paper, “Debate on the 2004 Electoral Process,” Kabul, March 2004.
38 Rashid, “Afghan Elections to Be Delayed.”
39 Interview with Karzai, Kabul, July 20, 2004. See Ahmed Rashid, “A Vote Is Cast Against Warlords,” Far Eastern Economic Review, July 28, 2004.
40 Ahmed Rashid, “No Going Back,” Far Eastern Economic Review, September 24, 2004.
41 Due to the security situation, the UN felt that it could not protect hundreds of foreign election monitors, so thirteen Afghan and Western NGOs pooled their resources to set up the Free and Fair Elections Foundation of Afghanistan, which trained Afghan men and women as election monitors.
42 Private document, letter from Munir Akram to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, New York, October 4, 2004.
43 Private document, letter from UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to President Pervez Musharraf, August 18, 2004. I was shown various UN letters and Pakistani replies to them by diplomatic sources in Islamabad and Kabul in September 2004.
44 All the quotes above were made to me personally. See Ahmed Rashid, “Afghanistan Hopes for Neighborly Goodwill,” Far Eastern Economic Review, October 14, 2004.
45 Musharraf also appointed a new ISI chief, Lt.-Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani, the general who had uncovered the plot to blow up Musharraf a year earlier. The Afghans knew him because for the past year he had led the Pakistani delegation in regular meetings with the United States and Afghan militaries. In June 2003 a tripartite commission had been established among senior military commanders from the United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to discuss border violations.
46 Ahmed Rashid, “Karzai Looks to Rebuild a Nation,” Far Eastern Economic Review, October 14, 2004.
47 There were other Panjsheri Tajiks and NA leaders in the hierarchy. Apart from Abdullah Abdullah, Ismael Khan remained minister of power and water, Amrullah Saleh headed the intelligence service, Gen. Bismallah Khan was army chief of staff, and the head of Counter-Narcotics was Gen. Mohammed Daud.
Chapter Thirteen. Al Qaeda’s Bolt-Hole: Pakistan’s Tribal Areas
1 For more information on FATA and the Durand Line issue, see Barnett Rubin and Abubakar Siddique, “Resolving the Afghanistan-Pakistan Stalemate,” United States Institute of Peace, October 2006; International Crisis Group, “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants,” Islamabad, December 11, 2006; Hassan Abbas, “Profiles of Pakistan’s Seven Tribal Agencies,” Jamestown Foundation, Jamestown Terrorism Monitor 20 (October 2006).
2 Interview with Afrasiab Khattak, February 12, 2007.
3 The United States abandoned the Lawara firebase in December 2002, after phosphorous rockets fired on the base burned several U.S. SOF vehicles. The Taliban claimed the U.S. retreat as a major victory.
4 Reuters, “Pakistan Could Do More, Says US General,” Bagram, December 27, 2002. Agence France-Presse, “US Says Attackers May Be Pursued in Pakistan,” Bagram, January 3, 2003.
5 Marc Kaufman, “On Afghan Border, War Drags On,” The Washington Post, January 25, 2003.
6 On October 2, 2003, Pakistani security forces, aided by gunship helicopters, attacked an al Qaeda camp in Baghar village, in South Waziristan, killing eight and arresting eighteen suspects. Ahmed Said Khadr, alias Abu Abdur Rehman Khadr al-Canadi, an Egyptian-born Canadian and a key al Qaeda financer, was believed to be among the dead.
7 Zulfiqar Ali, “Musharraf Warns Against Failure of Wana Operation,” Dawn, March 16, 2004.
8 Major Qudoos, an officer of the Signal Battalion, who was arrested on March 1, 2003, for allegedly helping al Qaeda’s Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, was sentenced to ten years in jail. Col. Khalid Abbasi, also a Signal officer, was arrested on May 30, 2003, and sentenced to six months in jail. Col. Abdul Ghaffar, serving at the Army Aviation Headquarters, was arrested on March 4, 2004, and sentenced to three years in jail. The cases of two majors and a captain were dismissed.
9 For more economic details, see International Crisis Group, “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas.” An interesting book on education in FATA by a Mahsud female school inspector is Zaiba Mahsud, Touchstone, Islamabad: self-published, 2006.
10 “FATA Sustainable Development Plan, 2006-15,” Peshawar: Government of Pakistan, June 2006.
11 Interview (in July 2007) with Christine Fair, formerly of the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C., and presently working with UNAMA in Kabul.
12 See Sohail Nasir, “Baitullah Mahsud,” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Focus, July 5, 2006.
13 Owais Tohid, “Cash Weans Tribes from al Qaeda,” Christian Science Monitor, February 16, 2005.
14 Carlotta Gall and Mohammed Khan, “Pakistan’s Push in Border Areas Is Said to Falter,” The New York Times, January 22, 2006. Those killed in the strike included Egyptians Midhat Mursi al-Sayid Umar, alias Abu Khahab al-Masri alias Abu Ubayda alias Mustafa Osman; the Moroccan Abdel Rehman al-Maghrebi; and Khalid Habib. Al-Maghrebi was believed to be the son-in-law of al-Zawahiri. Carlotta Gall and Douglas Jehl, "U.S. Raid Killed Qaida Leaders, Pakistanis Say,” The New York Times, January 19, 2006.
15 The madrassa was run by Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi, or the Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law, the same extremist group that had persuaded thousands of tribesmen to cross into Afghanistan to fight U.S. forces during the war in 2001. The organization was banned in 2002 and its leader, Sufi Mohammed, jailed, but the ISI allowed it to reestablish its influence in FATA. Sufi Mohammad’s son-in-law, Maulana Fazlullah, revived the movement. Nicknamed “Maulana Radio” due to his expertise in launching illegal FM radio stations, he had close ties with al Qaeda and the Taliban.
16 General Orakzai had been corps commander in Peshawar from October 9, 2001, to March 12, 2004.
17 Reuters, “Bush Says US Watching Pakistan Deal with Militants,” Washington, D.C., September 7, 2006.
18 Ahmed Rashid, “Nato’s Top Brass Accuse Pakistan over Taliban Aid,” The Daily Telegraph, October 6, 2006.
19 Anwar Iqbal, “Taliban Command Structure in FATA Alarms US,” Dawn, December 28, 2006. Boucher made the comments while on a visit to Canada.
20 The first agreement was the Shakai deal in South Waziristan in 2004; the second and third took place in North Waziristan, in 2005 and 2006.
21 Zahid Hussain, “Terror in Miramshah,” Newsline, April 2006. “In Tank, the Taliban have ordered barbers not to shave beards, people are prohibited to play music, even at weddings, and the traditional fairs, which provided some form of entertainment to the public, have been banned. In Dera Ismail Khan, the Taliban have forcibly stopped people from organizing their spring fair and instead asked them to hold a religious conference. In Swat district, some pro-Taliban clerics set television sets on fire. In Peshawar, clerics have threatened to take action against those cable operators who show western television channels.”
22 Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, The New York Times, October 20, 2005.
23 Peter Bergen, “The Return of al Qaeda: Where You Bin?” The New Republic, January 29, 2007.
24 Nasir Jamal, “Musharraf Rules Out Pakistan Link to Blasts Abroad,” Dawn, July 25, 2005.
25 The ringleader, Omar Khyam, testified in his trial that “they taught me everything I needed for guerrilla warfare in Kashmir, AK47s, pistols, RPGs, sniper rifles, climbing and crawling techniques, reconnaissance and light machine guns.” See ibid.
26 Text of speech delivered by Eliza Manningham-Buller, director-general of MI5. “The Internationalist Terrorist Threat to the UK,” The Daily Telegraph, November 9, 2006.
27 Jim Hoagland, “Message to Musharraf,” The Washington Post, January 22, 2006.
28 Khalid Hasan, “US Paid Pakistan Billions of Dollars to Counter Terror,” Daily Times, October 29, 2006. The figures are based on a report by the U.S. Congressional Research Servic
e. In 2002 Pakistan charged the U.S. Defense Department $420 million for logistical facilities given to U.S. forces as they waged the war in Afghanistan. The charges were for the rental of air bases and the supply of fuel, water, and ammunition transported from Karachi port to U.S. forces in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
29 Tim Burger, “Ten Questions for Porter Goss,” Time, June 27, 2005.
30 “Report on the Congressional Research Service of the US Congress,” Dawn, February 25, 2005.
31 Haitham al-Yamani and Abu Hamza Rabia were killed in a missile strike in North Waziristan in 2005. In 2006, Muhsin Matwalli Atwah, an Egyptian bomb maker, was killed in an air attack in Miran Shah, while Abu Marwan al-Suri, a Saudi national, was killed at a checkpoint in Bajaur.
32 Dana Priest and Ann Scott Tyson, “Bin Laden Trail Stone Cold,” The Washington Post, September 10, 2006. U.S. intelligence still referred to bin Laden and al-Zawahiri as High-Value Targets, or HVT 1 and HVT 2.
33 Agence France-Presse, “Al Qaeda Funding the Taliban, Says Top US Commander,” Kabul, March 29, 2005.
34 Ron Moreau and Sami Yousfzai, “Unholy Allies,” Newsweek, September 22, 2005.
35 Dafna Linzer and Walter Pincus, “Taliban, al Qaeda Resurge in Afghanistan, CIA Says,” The Washington Post, November 16, 2005. Hayden and Gen. Michael Maples, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, both spoke to the Congressional Intelligence Committee.
36 Sebastian Rotella, “War on West Shifts Back to Afghanistan,” Los Angeles Times, October 26, 2006.
37 Text of John Negroponte speech to the Senate Intelligence Committee, Washington, D.C., January 11, 2007.
38 The initial cost of the port, which was opened in 2006, was $250 million, out of which China contributed $198 million.
39 Ahmed Rashid, “Explosive Mix in Pakistan’s Gas Province,” BBC News Online, January 24, 2005.
40 Carlotta Gall, “In Remote Pakistan Province, a Civil War Festers,” The New York Times, April 2, 2006.
41 Hussain Haqqani, “Talking Without Thinking,” The Nation, December 13, 2006.