The Imagineers of War

by Sharon Weinberger

  “Its operation, greatly complicated”: Ibid.

  Moscow Viral Study: Associated Press, “Tracking the Microwave Bombardment,” Spartanburg Herald Tribune, June 12, 1988, A20.

  At five microwatts per square centimeter: U.S. Senate, Radiation Health and Safety, 269.

  The United States wanted to figure out: Barton Reppert, “The Zapping of an Embassy: The Mystery Still Lingers,” Spartanburg Herald Tribune, June 12, 1988, A19.

  The new ARPA office: Koslov’s professional biography, including the dates of his ARPA position, are included in U.S. Senate, Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittees on Military Construction of the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Armed Services, Military Construction Appropriations for 1974 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973).

  “He did his best”: Frosch, correspondence with author.

  “a master at maneuvers”: John L. Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen as a Propulsion Fuel, 1945–1959, Scientific and Technical Information Office, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1978.

  Colleagues at ARPA: George Lawrence, interview with author.

  “Tell your nominal boss”: Lukasik, correspondence with author.

  “We were used as a cutout”: Kresa, interview with author.

  “to use for some of the space work”: Huff, interview with author.

  The only public information: Robert Cooksey and Des Ball, “Pine Gap’s Two Vital Functions,” Age, July 2, 1969, 6.

  “When I visited a foreign country”: Lukasik, interview with author.

  “is to initiate a selective portion”: R. Cesaro, “Memorandum for the director, defense research and engineering, Subject: Project BIZARRE,” Sept 26, 1967. This memo, in addition to Operational Procedures for Project Pandora Test Facility, was released as part of a Freedom of Information Act request (80-FOI-2208), filed by Michael Drosnin.

  Thus was born ARPA Program Plan 562: Ibid.

  One theory that officials floated: Lukasik, interview with author.

  In fact, ARPA-sponsored translations: Lawrence, interview with author.

  MKULTRA: According to the Church Committee report, the original MKULTRA charter did include radiation, though it is unclear if the agency ever did experiment with microwaves and behavior. U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), bk. 1, 390.

  “much as embassy employees”: Jack Anderson, “The Strange Secret of ‘Operation Pandora,’ ” Florence Times Daily, May 10, 1972, 4.

  The radiation results were so convincing: In fact, the test results appeared much more ambiguous than Cesaro made out. As declassified documents would later show, the monkey Cesaro referenced worked ten hours a day, seven days a week. When its performance degraded on the twelfth day, Cesaro concluded that this was the result of radiation (rather than exhaustion). After the monkey stopped working, the radiation continued for two more days and then was turned off. After another three days without radiation, the monkey returned to normal work. Again, Cesaro said this result was from terminating the radiation (rather than the five days of rest, irrespective of the radiation). Cesaro noted that after the monkey resumed its normal tasks, it worked for five days without radiation, at which point the radiation resumed for an additional eight days, and then the monkey’s performance again began to slip. Cesaro also attributed this work stoppage to the radiation. Simple math shows that Cesaro was making logical leaps of faith. In the first run of experiments, when the monkey was irradiated continuously, its performance degraded on the twelfth and thirteenth days. On the second run, the monkey worked for five days without radiation, and eight days with radiation, and on the thirteenth day, its performance slipped. The results, in other words, were roughly the same regardless of the radiation; the monkey’s performance got worse around the twelfth or thirteenth day. The description of these tests can be found in U.S. Senate, Radiation Health and Safety.

  “potential weapon applications”: R. Cesaro, “Memorandum for the director, defense research and engineering, Subject: Project BIZARRE.”

  “The extremely sensitive nature”: Ibid.

  In minutes from a May 12, 1969, meeting: Institute for Defense Analyses, Minutes of Pandora Meeting of May 12, 1969, in Operational Procedures for Project Pandora Test Facility.

  “gonadal protection be provided”: U.S. Senate, Radiation Health and Safety, 1199.

  One experimental protocol, called Big Boy: Ibid.

  “The answer to that was no”: McIlwain, interview with author.

  “If there is an effect”: U.S. Senate, Radiation Health and Safety, 1189.

  “He was all over the place”: Lukasik, correspondence with author.

  “In brief, I am forced to conclude”: Koslov to Lukasik, “Review of Project Pandora Experiments,” Nov. 4, 1969.

  “You can’t just hit a target”: Hearings on Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Program for Fiscal Year 1971 Before Sub-committee of Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, March 25, 1970 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), 8500.

  nuclear depth charge: Peter Papadakos, “QH-50 Evolution,” www.gyrodynehelicopters.com. That never happened, however, because the QH-50, developed at the behest of Admiral Arleigh Burke, the chief of naval operations and a rare drone enthusiast, retired. With him gone, enthusiasm for the QH-50 dissipated.

  initiated two drone projects: Nite Panther was loaded with sensors, such as day and night television cameras, radar to track moving targets, and a laser designator. Later, ARPA even experimented with tethered balloons, also developed by the Advanced Sensors Office, to relay video from the QH-50 and extend its range. In all, ARPA, either on its own or in conjunction with the military services, conducted nine different configurations of the QH-50 under names like Desjez (short for “Destroyer Jezebel”) and Blow Low, which used a classified electro-optical sensor. Michael J. Hirschber, “To Boldly Go Where No Unmanned Aircraft Has Gone Before: A Half-Century of DARPA’s Contributions to Unmanned Aircraft,” 48th AIAA Aerospace Sciences Meeting Including the New Horizons Forum and Aerospace Exposition, 4–7 January 2010, Orlando, Florida (American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2010).

  Egyptian Goose: Reed, Van Atta, and Deitchman, DARPA’s Technical Accomplishments, 1:17-1-2.

  a “checkered” history: Huff and Sharp, Advanced Research Projects Agency, VIII-53.

  “unsuccessful”: Tietzel, “Summary of ARPA-ASO, TTO Aerial Platform Programs.”

  While some of ARPA’s QH-50s: The exact fate of Nite Gazelle is unclear, but interviews with Stephen Lukasik and Peter Papadakos, among others, confirm that it crashed.

  Stephen Lukasik says he believed: Lukasik, interview with author.

  Though Nite Gazelle was never used: Tietzel, “Summary of ARPA-ASO, TTO Aerial Platform Programs.”

  Deitchman recalled clashing: Deitchman, interview with author.

  Though the six prototypes: The first was called Camp Sentinel II, and the five additional radar were Camp Sentinel III. Reed, Van Atta, and Deitchman, DARPA Technical Accomplishments, 1:15-2-5.

  Fred Wikner, a physicist who served: Wikner, interview with author. In fact, there were some half a dozen of the radar sent to Vietnam, so Wikner’s comment, though pertinent, should be taken with a grain of salt.

  Jacobson achieved infamy: Marlene Cimons, “Infertility Doctor Is Found Guilty of Fraud, Perjury,” Los Angeles Times, March 5, 1992. One might argue these later misdeeds had no connection to his earlier State Department work, but the secrecy surrounding the radiation investigation, and its lack of peer review, invited sloppy results. At the very least, Dr. Jacobson’s later work calls into question his judgment.

  “I look at it as still a major”: Associated Press, “Tracking the Microwave Bombardment.”

  Project Pandora was often cited: In his book Currents of Death (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), the New Yorker writer Paul Brodeur describes
as “mysterious” McIlwain’s determination that the Moscow Signal showed no effect. There was nothing particularly mysterious in McIlwain’s view; he just crunched the numbers.

  “The lesson learned”: Associated Press, “Tracking the Microwave Bombardment.”

  “showy stunt”: Lukasik, correspondence with author.

  “The bird tumbled out of the sky”: Papadakos, interview with author.

  “I argued very hard”: Herzfeld, interview with author.

  CHAPTER 12: BURY IT

  Cyrus Vance: Huff and Sharp, Advanced Research Projects Agency, VI-7.

  “Would it be desirable”: U.S. House, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriation for 1965, 154.

  “Congress hated AGILE”: Lukasik, interview with author.

  To protect its bureaucracy: Lukasik, e-mail correspondence with author.

  On March 23: Huff and Sharp, Advanced Research Projects Agency, IX-23.

  On its own, the new name: A commonly repeated myth was that the D in “DARPA” was added to signify the agency’s move to defense applications. This is wrong; interviews with contemporaneous officials, ARPA’s institutional history, and records from the time all indicate it was an administrative change.

  “This was not a minor point”: Lukasik says the transition to “ARPA” as an acronym did not occur until George Heilmeier became director in 1975. Lukasik, interview with author.

  The agency’s budget: Huff and Sharp, Advanced Research Projects Agency, I-1.

  “the flow of ‘Presidential assignments’ ”: Lukasik, e-mail correspondence with author.

  “It did not serve as a useful”: Ibid.

  “mechanical elephant”: Thomas O’Toole, “ ‘Walking’ Truck Is Drafted by U.S. Army,” New York Times, March 30, 1966, 22.

  “damned fool”: Huff and Sharp, Advanced Research Projects Agency, VI-42.

  “open the door”: Bell Aerosystems, Individual Mobility System, undated pamphlet, Jet Belt, RG 330, National Archives, College Park.

  ARPA eventually stopped funding: Steve Lehto, The Great American Jet Pack: The Quest for the Ultimate Individual Lift Device (Chicago: Chicago Review, 2013), 91.

  “The agency got rid of it”: James R. Chiles, “Air America’s Black Helicopter,” Air & Space Magazine, March 2008.

  “general dishonesty”: Lukasik, e-mail correspondence with author.

  “AGILE, counterinsurgency”: Lukasik, interview with author.

  In Washington, the key to killing: In 2014, the Pentagon announced it was changing the name of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, the bomb-fighting agency that was created following the invasion of Iraq. This is a classic example of a first step in eliminating the organization.

  “Look, the Nixon Doctrine”: Lukasik, interview with author.

  “bury it someplace”: Lukasik, interview with Williams/Gerard.

  “We shifted from little guys”: Lukasik, interview with author.

  On the day after Christmas: Lukasik to Secretary of Defense, memo, “Taking Stock,” Dec. 26, 1972, Gerald R. Ford Library.

  ARPA was asked to step in: ARPA Research in Iran, April 26, 1970, Project AGILE, RG 330, National Archives, College Park.

  “Iran’s military leaders neither assign”: October 1969 Summary for Ambassador MacArthur, Project AGILE, RG 330, National Archives, College Park.

  “disappointing”: Delavan P. Evans (director) to Chief, ARMISH/MAAG, memo, “Subject: Continuation of ARPA Effort with CREC,” March 16, 1970, RG 330, National Archives, College Park.

  That work pleased the shah: Abbas Milani, The Shah (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 36.

  In 1970, ARPA proposed a new approach: “Technical Program Plan Military Systems Analysis,” rev. Aug. 26, 1970.

  “The reason is simple”: Large to Tachmindji, June 10, 1972, Project AGILE, RG 330, National Archives, College Park.

  “pompous”: Ibid.

  “near-religious faith”: Tim Weiner, “Robert Komer, 78, Figure in Vietnam, Dies,” New York Times, April 12, 2000.

  “Toufanian was the top clerk”: Precht, interview with author.

  Not only did the shah: “The Iranian Deals” (pt. 3 of the BAE Files), Guardian, June 8, 2007.

  Cordesman wanted to study: Harold C. Kinne, Memorandum for the Record, Aug. 19, 1972, Project AGILE, RG 59, National Archives, College Park.

  “mask the analysis work”: John H. Rouse Jr. to Douglas Heck (minister-counselor, American embassy, Iran), Dec. 19, 1972, RG 59, National Archives, College Park.

  What other analysis was being masked: Cordesman, phone conversation with the author. He declined to comment even after being sent declassified correspondence from the archives regarding his work.

  When the navy demonstrated: Currie, interview with author.

  Iran became the only foreign country: Dario Leone, “Thirty Minutes to Choose Your Fighter Jet: How the Shah of Iran Chose the F-14 Tomcat over the F-15 Eagle,” Aviationist, Feb. 11, 2013.

  Fearful of the hijackers’ finding: Patricia Sullivan, “Robert Schwartz; Defense Official Was Hostage in Hijacking,” Washington Post, June 18, 2007.

  Both men were eventually released: Stark, interview with author.

  “This would be unfortunate”: Henry Precht, Memorandum, “Subject: ARPA,” March 7, 1974, RG 59, National Archives, College Park.

  “there are limits”: J. G. Dunleavy, J. H. Ott, S. Goddard, and R. D. Minckler, “A Status Report on Equipment and Devices for Disposal of Improvised Explosive Devices in Urban Environments,” sponsored by the Overseas Defense Research Office, Advanced Research Projects Agency, Sept. 1971, Project AGILE, RG 330, National Archives, College Park.

  After spending nearly $20 billion: Sandra Erwin, “Technology Falls Short in the War Against IEDs,” National Defense, Oct. 20, 2010.

  “was a neat idea”: Lukasik, interview with author.

  Lukasik took what was left: There was a precedent for the Tactical Technology Office. When missile defense was taken away from DARPA just a few years prior, the previous director had created the Strategic Technology Office, which the ARPA history says worked on “truly exotic weapons concepts,” like lasers and particle beams. At just under $70 million, the Strategic Technology Office was still, like Defender before it, the largest part of ARPA’s budget at the time.

  “I took a really bad dish”: Lukasik, interview with author.

  It was not until 1972: In his memoir, A Life at Full Speed, Charles Herzfeld says that ARPA’s Advanced Sensors Office was involved in developing the laser-guided bombs that took down the bridge. However, there are no other ARPA officials, or air force officials, who can confirm this, nor is there any documentation to back up this claim. Without a doubt, ARPA explored laser-guided bombs during the Vietnam War, but it does not appear, based on available sources, that it was directly involved in the bombs used in this operation.

  By the time Wikner arrived: Wikner says the number was more than 50 percent, though this is hard to confirm because the casualty statistics are typically reported by division. However, there were certainly divisions that counted mines and booby traps as contributing well over 50 percent of casualties.

  “That’s the greatest accomplishment”: Wikner, interview with author.

  Office of Net Technical Assessment: The office was eventually eliminated and its mission subsumed by the Office of Net Assessment, headed by Andrew Marshall, which was established in 1973.

  Soviet Union had increased: Lewis Sorley, ed., Press On! Selected Works of General Donn A. Starry (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009), 1:23.

  “no more than speed bumps”: Donn Starry, “Opening Remarks,” in China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese Liberation Army, ed. James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein (Alexandria, Va.: CNA, 2005), 374.

  “Nuke ’em till they glow”: Wikner, interview with author.

  “Wha
t we want”: Ibid.

  “Steve, we have to do something”: Ibid.

  “If we had called this Project Smart Kill”: Lukasik, interview with author.

  “wrote as colorlessly”: Ghamari-Tabrizi, Worlds of Herman Kahn, 354.

  An unusual figure: For a biographical portrait of Wohlstetter, see Abella, Soldiers of Reason.

  “To deter an attack”: Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1959.

  The LRRDPP was approaching: In addition to Wohlstetter, the study included Joseph Braddock and Don Hicks, two physicists who were part of a group of scientists who frequently advised the Pentagon on nuclear policy.

  “Look, we have something to accomplish”: Lukasik, interview with author.

  “near zero miss”: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense Nuclear Agency, Summary Report of the Long Range Research and Development Planning Program, DNA-75-03055, Feb. 7, 1975. Declassified Dec. 31, 1983.

  Once there, it would release: Van Atta and Lippitz, Transformation and Transition, Vol. II, IV-15.

  Assault Breaker: Even when Assault Breaker was in full swing, the army was not necessarily ready to give up its tactical nukes. In 1983, it emerged that the army was looking at putting tactical nuclear weapons on the Assault Breaker missiles, essentially undermining the very purpose of the system, which was to lessen dependence on nuclear weapons. “You can’t tie your hands behind your back,” The Washington Post quoted one army official as saying.

  “ARPA gets 60 to 70 percent”: Wikner, interview with author.

  “It all came from counterinsurgency”: Lukasik, interview with author.

  CHAPTER 13: THE BUNNY, THE WITCH, AND THE WAR ROOM

  Vietcong flag: Marshall Kilduff, “SDS to Hold Rally,” Stanford Daily, Jan. 29, 1969, 1.

  That month, Stanford’s board: For a full account of the rift, see C. Stewart Gillmor, Fred Terman at Stanford: Building a Discipline, a University, and Silicon Valley (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004).

  At 10:30 p.m.: Leonard Kleinrock, “The Day the Infant Internet Uttered Its First Words,” www.lk.cs.ucla.edu.