Complete Works
Page 54
YOUNG SOCRATES: We must certainly not let this slip.
VISITOR: Certainly not, if you ask my view. So tell me this.
YOUNG SOCRATES: What?
VISITOR: We recognize monarchy, don’t we, as one of the varieties of [d] rule in cities?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
VISITOR: After monarchy one would, I think, list the holding of power by the few.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course.
VISITOR: And isn’t a third type of constitution rule by the mass of the people, called by the name of ‘democracy’?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Most certainly.
VISITOR: So there are three of them—but don’t they in a certain way become five, giving birth from among them to two other names in addition to themselves?
YOUNG SOCRATES: What are these?
VISITOR: I think that as things are people refer to the aspects of force [e] and consent, poverty and wealth, and law and lawlessness as they occur in them, and use these to divide each of the first two types into two. So they call monarchy by two names, on the grounds that it exhibits two forms, the one ‘tyrannical’, the other ‘kingly’ monarchy.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course.
VISITOR: And any city which has come to be controlled by a few people they call by the names of ‘aristocracy’ and ‘oligarchy’.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Most certainly.
VISITOR: With democracy, on the other hand, whether in fact it’s by force or with their consent that the mass rules over those who possess the wealth, [292] and whether by accurately preserving the laws or not, in all these cases no one is in the habit of changing its name.
YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
VISITOR: What then? Do we suppose that any of these constitutions is correct, when it is defined by these criteria—one, few and many, wealth and poverty, force and consent, and whether it turns out to be accompanied by written laws or without laws?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Why, what actually prevents it?
VISITOR: Look at it more clearly, following this way. [b]
YOUNG SOCRATES: Which?
VISITOR: Shall we abide by what we said when we first began, or shall we be in discord with it?
YOUNG SOCRATES: What was that?
VISITOR: We said, I think, that kingly rule was one of the sorts of expert knowledge.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
VISITOR: And not just one of them all, but we chose out from the rest particularly one that was concerned in a sense with making judgments and controlling.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
[c] VISITOR: And then from the controlling sort, we took one that was set over inanimate products, and one set over living creatures; and it’s by splitting things up in just this way that we have been progressing all the time to the point where we are now. We haven’t forgotten that it’s knowledge, but as for what sort of knowledge it is, we’re not yet able to give a sufficiently accurate answer.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Your account is correct.
VISITOR: Then do we see just this very point, that the criterion in the things in question must not be few, nor many, nor consent nor the lack of it, nor poverty nor wealth, but some sort of knowledge, if indeed we are going to be consistent with what we said before?
[d] YOUNG SOCRATES: But that we can’t possibly fail to do.
VISITOR: Necessarily, then, we must now consider in which, if any, of these types of rule expert knowledge about ruling human beings turns out to occur—practically the most difficult and the most important thing of which to acquire knowledge. For we must catch sight of it, in order to consider which people we must remove from the wise king’s company, who pretend to possess of the art of statesmanship, and persuade many people that they do, but in fact do not have it at all.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, we must indeed do this, as our argument has already told us.
[e] VISITOR: Well, does it seem that a mass of people in the city are capable of acquiring this expertise?
YOUNG SOCRATES: How could they?
VISITOR: But in a city of a thousand men, is it possible for a hundred or so, or again fifty, to acquire it adequately?
YOUNG SOCRATES: In that case, it would be quite the easiest of all the sorts of expertise there are; for we know that among a thousand men there would never be so many top petteia-players54 in relation to those among the rest of the Greeks, let alone kings. For it is that man who actually possesses the expert knowledge of kingship, whether he rules or not, who [293] must in any case be called an expert in kingship, according to what we said before.55
VISITOR: You’ve remembered well. As a consequence of this, I think, we must look for correct rule in relation to some one person, or two, or altogether few—when it is correct.
YOUNG SOCRATES: We certainly must.
VISITOR: Yes, but these people, whether they rule over willing or unwilling subjects, whether according to written laws or without them, and whether they rule as rich men or poor, we must suppose—as is now our view—to be carrying out whatever sort of rule they do on the basis of [b] expertise. Doctors provide the clearest parallel. We believe in them whether they cure us with our consent or without it, by cutting or burning or applying some other painful treatment, and whether they do so according to written rules or apart from written rules, and whether as poor men or rich. In all these cases we are no less inclined at all to say they are doctors, so long as they are in charge of us on the basis of expertise, purging or otherwise reducing us, or else building us up—it is no matter, if only each and every one of those who care for our bodies acts for our bodies’ good, making them better than they were, and so preserves what is in their care. [c] It’s in this way, as I think, and in no other that we’ll lay down the criterion of medicine and of any other sort of rule whatsoever; it is the only correct criterion.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, just so.
VISITOR: It must then be the case, it seems, that of constitutions too the one that is correct in comparison with the rest, and alone a constitution, is the one in which the rulers would be found truly possessing expert knowledge, and not merely seeming to do so, whether they rule according to laws or without laws, over willing or unwilling subjects, and whether the [d] rulers are poor or wealthy—there is no principle of correctness according to which any of these must be taken into any account at all.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Right.
VISITOR: And whether they purge the city for its benefit by putting some people to death or else by exiling them, or whether again they make it smaller by sending out colonies somewhere like swarms of bees, or build it up by introducing people from somewhere outside and making them citizens—so long as they act to preserve it on the basis of expert knowledge and what is just, making it better than it was so far as they can, this is the [e] constitution which alone we must say is correct, under these conditions and in accordance with criteria of this sort. All the others that we generally say are constitutions we must say are not genuine, and not really constitutions at all, but imitations of this one; those we say are ‘law-abiding’ have imitated56 it for the better, the others for the worse.
YOUNG SOCRATES: The rest of it, visitor, seems to have been said in due measure; but that ideal rule may exist even without laws was something harder for a hearer to accept.
VISITOR: You got in just a little before me with your question, Socrates. [294] For I was about to ask you whether you accept all of this, or whether in fact you find any of the things we have said difficult to take. But as it is it’s already apparent that we’ll want a discussion of this matter of the correctness of those who rule without laws.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite.
VISITOR: Now in a certain sense57 it is clear that the art of the legislator belongs to that of the king; but the best thing is not that the laws should prevail, but rather the kingly man who possesses wisdom. Do you know why?
YOUNG SOCRATES: What then is the reason?
[b] VISITOR: That law could never accurately embrace what is best and most just for all at the same time, an
d so prescribe what is best. For the dissimilarities between human beings and their actions, and the fact that practically nothing in human affairs ever remains stable, prevent any sort of expertise whatsoever from making any simple decision in any sphere that covers all cases and will last for all time. I suppose this is something we agree about?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
[c] VISITOR: But we see law bending itself more or less towards this very thing; it resembles some self-willed and ignorant person, who allows no one to do anything contrary to what he orders, nor to ask any questions about it, not even if, after all, something new turns out for someone which is better, contrary to the prescription which he himself has laid down.
YOUNG SOCRATES: True; the law does absolutely as you have just said with regard to each and every one of us.
VISITOR: Then it is impossible for what is perpetually simple to be useful in relation to what is never simple?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Very likely.
[d] VISITOR: Why then is it ever necessary to make laws, given that law is not something completely correct? We must find out the cause of this.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
VISITOR: Now with you, too, people train in groups in the way they do in other cities, whether for running or for anything else, for competitive purposes?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, very frequently.
VISITOR: Well, now let’s recall to mind the instructions that expert trainers give when they’re in charge of people in such circumstances.
YOUNG SOCRATES: What are you thinking of?
VISITOR: That they don’t suppose there is room for them to make their prescriptions piece by piece to suit each individual, giving the instruction [e] appropriate to the physical condition of each; they regard it as necessary to make rougher prescriptions about what will bring physical benefit, as suits the majority of cases and a large number of people.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Right.
VISITOR: And it’s just for this reason that, as it is, they give equally heavy exercises to the group as a whole, starting them off together and stopping them together in their running, wrestling, and the rest of their physical exercises.
YOUNG SOCRATES: That’s so.
VISITOR: Then let’s suppose the same about the legislator too, the person who will direct his herds in relation to justice and their contracts with one [295] another: he will never be capable, in prescribing for everyone together, of assigning accurately to each individual what is appropriate for him.
YOUNG SOCRATES: What you say certainly sounds reasonable.
VISITOR: Instead he will, I think, set down the law for each and every one according to the principle of ‘for the majority of people, for the majority of cases, and roughly, somehow, like this’, whether expressing it in writing or in unwritten form, legislating by means of ancestral customs.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Correct.
VISITOR: Yes, it certainly is. For how would anyone ever be capable, Socrates, of sitting beside each individual perpetually throughout his life [b] and accurately prescribing what is appropriate to him? Since in my view, if he were capable of this, any one of those who had really acquired the expert knowledge of kingship would hardly put obstacles in his own way by writing down these laws we talked about.
YOUNG SOCRATES: It certainly follows from what we have now said, visitor.
VISITOR: Yes, but more, my good friend, from the things that are going to be said.
YOUNG SOCRATES: And what are they?
VISITOR: Things like the following. Are we to say—that is, between us—that if a doctor, or else some gymnastic trainer, were going to be out of [c] the country and away from his charges for what he thought would be a long time, and thought that the people being trained, or his patients, would not remember the instructions he had given them, he would want to write down reminders for them—or what are we to say?
YOUNG SOCRATES: As you suggested.
VISITOR: But what if he came back unexpectedly, having been away for less time than he thought he would be? Do you think he wouldn’t propose other prescriptions, contrary to the ones he had written down, when things [d] turned out to be different, and better, for his patients because of winds or else some other of the things that come from Zeus which had come about contrary to expectation, in some way differently from the usual pattern? Would he obstinately think that neither he nor the patient should step outside those ancient laws that had once been laid down—he himself by giving other instructions, the patient by daring to do different things contrary to what was written down—on the grounds that these were the rules of the art of medicine and of health, and that things that happened differently were unhealthy and not part of his expertise? Or would all such things, if they happened in the context of truly expert knowledge, [e] cause altogether the greatest ridicule, in all spheres, for acts of legislation of this sort?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Absolutely right.
VISITOR: And as for the person who has written down what is just and unjust, fine and shameful, good and bad, or has laid down unwritten laws on these subjects, for all those herds of human beings that graze, city by city, according to the laws of those who wrote them down in each case—if the person who wrote them on the basis of expertise, or someone else [296] resembling him, arrives, is it really not to be permitted to him to give different instructions contrary to these? Or wouldn’t this prohibition appear in truth no less ridiculous than the other one?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course.
VISITOR: Well then, do you know what the majority of people say in such a case?
YOUNG SOCRATES: It doesn’t come to mind for the moment, just like that.
VISITOR: Well, it sounds fine enough. What they say is that if someone recognizes laws that are better, contrary to those established by people before him, then he must introduce them by persuading his city to accept them in each case, but not otherwise.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Well then? Is that not a correct view?
[b] VISITOR: Perhaps. But first things first: if someone forces through what is better without the use of persuasion, tell me, what will be the name to give to the use of force in this case? No—not yet; answer me first in relation to the previous cases.
YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
VISITOR: If then—to continue with our example—someone does not persuade his patient, but has a correct grasp of the relevant expertise, and forces child, or man, or woman, to do what is better, contrary to what has been written down, what will be the name to give to this use of force? Surely anything rather than what we called an unhealthy mistake contrary [c] to the expertise in question? And the last thing the person who was the object of such force can correctly say about such a thing is that he had unhealthy things done to him by the doctors who used force on him, things that did not belong to their expertise?
YOUNG SOCRATES: What you say is very true.
VISITOR: And what do we really suppose to be the sort of mistake we’re talking about, the one in contravention of the expertise of the statesman? Isn’t it what is shameful, what is bad,58 and unjust?
YOUNG SOCRATES: I agree, absolutely.
VISITOR: Then those who have been forced, contrary to what has been written down and to ancestral custom, to do different things that are more [d] just, better and finer than the things they did before—tell me, if people in this kind of situation for their part censure this kind of use of force, isn’t it true that, if their censure isn’t to be the most laughable of all, they must say anything on each occasion rather than that those who have been forced have had shameful, unjust and bad things done to them by those who did the forcing?
YOUNG SOCRATES: What you say is very true.
VISITOR: But are the things forced on them just, if the person who did the forcing is rich, and unjust if he happens to be poor? Or if, whether by using persuasion or not, whether as a rich or a poor man, or according to written law or contrary to it, he does what is not to the benefit of the [e] citizens59 or what is to their benefit, mu
st that be the criterion, and must it have to do with these things—the truest criterion of correct government of a city, the one according to which the wise and good man will govern the interests of the ruled? Just as a steersman, always watching out for what is to the benefit of the ship and the sailors, preserves his fellow sailors [297] not by putting things down in writing but offering his expertise as law, so too in this same manner a constitution would be correct, would it not, if it issued from those who are able to rule in this way, offering the strength of their expertise as more powerful than the laws? And there is no mistake, is there, for wise rulers, whatever they do, provided that they watch for [b] one great thing, that by always distributing to those in the city what is most just, as judged by the intelligent application of their expertise, they are able both to preserve them and so far as they can to bring it about that they are better than they were?
YOUNG SOCRATES: It is certainly not possible to contradict what has just been said.
VISITOR: And neither should one contradict those other things we said.
YOUNG SOCRATES: What are you referring to?
VISITOR: That a mass of any people whatsoever would never be able to acquire this sort of expert knowledge and so govern a city with intelligence; and that we must look for that one constitution, the correct one, in relation [c] to a small element in the population, few in number, or even a single individual, putting down the other constitutions as imitations, as was said a little earlier, some of them imitating this one for the better, the others for the worse.
YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean by this? What are you saying? For I did not understand the point about imitations when it was made just now60 either.
VISITOR: And it’s no small matter, if one stirs up this subject and then proceeds to leave it where it is instead of going through it and showing the mistake that now occurs in relation to it. [d]