Complete Works
Page 96
D.S.H.
[225] SOCRATES: What is greed? What can it be, and who are greedy people?
FRIEND: In my opinion, they’re the ones who think it’s a good idea to profit from things of no value.
SOCRATES: Do you think they know these things are of no value, or do they not know? For if they don’t know, you mean that greedy people are stupid.
FRIEND: No, I don’t mean they’re stupid. What I mean is this: they’re [b] unscrupulous and wicked people who are overcome by profit, knowing that the things from which they dare to profit are of no value; yet their shamelessness makes them dare to be greedy.
SOCRATES: So, then, do you mean that the greedy person is, for example, like a farmer who plants, knowing his plant is of no value, and thinks it’s a good idea to profit from the plant when fully grown? Is this the sort of person you mean?
FRIEND: The greedy person, at any rate, Socrates, thinks he ought to profit from everything.
SOCRATES: Don’t let me make you give in like that, as if you had somehow [c] been tricked by something; pay attention and answer as if I were asking again from the beginning. Don’t you agree that the greedy person knows about the value of the thing from which he thinks it is a good idea to profit?
FRIEND: I do.
SOCRATES: So who knows about the value of plants, in what seasons and soils it’s a good idea to plant them—if we may throw in one of those clever phrases with which legal experts beautify their speeches?1
[d] FRIEND: The farmer, I think.
SOCRATES: By “thinking it’s a good idea to profit” do you mean anything but thinking one ought to profit?
FRIEND: That’s what I mean.
[226] SOCRATES: Well then, don’t try to deceive me—I’m already an old man and you’re so very young—by answering as you did just now, saying what you yourself don’t think; tell the truth. Do you think there is any man who takes up farming, and expects to profit from planting crops that he knows to be of no value?
FRIEND: By Zeus, I don’t!
SOCRATES: Well then, do you think that a horseman who knowingly gives his horse food that is of no value is unaware that he is harming his horse?
FRIEND: I don’t.
SOCRATES: So he doesn’t expect to profit from food that is of no value. [b]
FRIEND: No.
SOCRATES: Well then, do you think that a ship’s captain who has rigged his ship with sails and rudders that are of no value is unaware that he will suffer loss, and risks being lost himself and losing the ship and all it carries?
FRIEND: No, I don’t.
SOCRATES: So he doesn’t expect to profit from equipment that is of no [c] value.
FRIEND: Not at all.
SOCRATES: Or does a general who knows that his army has arms that are of no value expect to profit, or think it’s a good idea to profit from them?
FRIEND: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: Or does a flute-player who has flutes that are of no value, or a lyre-player with a lyre, or an archer with a bow, or, in short, does any other craftsman, or any other sensible man who has worthless tools, or any other sort of equipment, expect to profit from them?
FRIEND: Obviously not. [d]
SOCRATES: Then who do you say the greedy people are? For surely the ones just mentioned are not the ones who expect to profit from what they know has no value.2 But in that case, my wonderful friend, there aren’t any greedy people at all, according to what you say.
FRIEND: What I mean, Socrates, is this: greedy people are those whose greed gives them an insatiable desire to profit even from things that are actually quite petty, and of little or no value. [e]
SOCRATES: Not, of course, knowing that they are of no value, my very good friend; for we have just proved to ourselves in our argument that this is impossible.
FRIEND: I believe so.
SOCRATES: And if they don’t know this, plainly they’re ignorant of it, thinking instead that the things of no value are very valuable.
FRIEND: Apparently.
SOCRATES: Now, of course, greedy people love to make a profit.
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: And by profit, you mean the opposite of loss?
FRIEND: I do. [227]
SOCRATES: Is there anyone for whom it is a good thing to suffer loss?
FRIEND: No one.
SOCRATES: It’s a bad thing?
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: So people are harmed by loss?
FRIEND: Yes, harmed.
SOCRATES: So loss is bad?
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: And profit is the opposite of loss?
FRIEND: Yes, the opposite.
SOCRATES: So profit is good?
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: So it is those who love the good whom you call greedy.
FRIEND: So it seems.
[b] SOCRATES: Well, my friend, at least you don’t call greedy people lunatics. But you yourself, do you or don’t you love what’s good?
FRIEND: I do.
SOCRATES: Is there something good that you don’t love? Or something bad that you do?
FRIEND: By Zeus, no!
SOCRATES: So presumably you love all good things?
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: And you can ask me, too, if I’m not the same; for I will also agree with you that I love good things. But besides you and me, don’t [c] you believe that all other people love what’s good and hate what’s bad?
FRIEND: So it appears to me.
SOCRATES: And we agreed that profit is good?
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: Well, then, in this way of looking at it, everyone appears to be greedy; whereas, according to what we said earlier, no one was greedy. So which of these approaches would it be safe to rely on?
FRIEND: I think, Socrates, we have to get the right conception of the greedy person. The right conception is that the greedy person is the one [d] who is concerned with and thinks it’s a good idea to profit from things which virtuous people would never dare to profit from.
SOCRATES: But you see, my dear sweet fellow, that we have already agreed that to profit is to be benefited.
FRIEND: Well, what of it?
SOCRATES: We also agreed that everyone always wants good things.
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: Therefore, even good people want every kind of profit, at least if they’re good.
[e] FRIEND: But not profits from which they’re going to suffer harm, Socrates.
SOCRATES: By “suffer harm,” do you mean “suffer loss,” or something else?
FRIEND: No; I mean “suffer loss.”
SOCRATES: Do people suffer loss from profit, or from loss?
FRIEND: From both; for they suffer loss from loss and from wicked profit.
SOCRATES: Well, do you believe that anything virtuous and good is wicked?
FRIEND: I don’t.
SOCRATES: And we agreed a little while ago that profit is the opposite [228] of loss, which is bad?
FRIEND: I would say so.
SOCRATES: And being the opposite of bad, it’s good?
FRIEND: We agreed to that.
SOCRATES: So you see, you’re trying to deceive me, deliberately saying the opposite of what we just agreed to.
FRIEND: No, by Zeus, Socrates! Quite the opposite: it’s you who’s deceiving me, and turning me upside down in these arguments—I don’t know how you do it!
SOCRATES: Be careful what you say; it wouldn’t be right for me not to [b] obey a good and wise man.
FRIEND: Who is that? What are you talking about?
SOCRATES: I mean my and your fellow citizen: Pisistratus’ son, Hipparchus, of Philaedae, who was the eldest and wisest of Pisistratus’ children. In addition to the many other fine deeds in which he displayed his wisdom, it was he who first brought the works of Homer to this land, and compelled the rhapsodes at the Panathenaea to recite them in relays—one following another—as they still do now. He also sent a fifty-oared ship [c] for Anacreon
of Teos, and brought him to the city. He also entreated Simonides of Ceos always to be around, with large fees and gifts.3 He did these things with a view to educating the citizens, so that he could govern the best possible people; like the gentleman he was, he didn’t think it right to begrudge wisdom to anyone.
And when the citizens from the city had been educated by him and were impressed by his wisdom, he decided to educate the country-people, as well, setting up Herms4 for them along the roads between the middle [d] of the city and each deme.5 And then, selecting from his store of wisdom—both what he had learned and what he had found out by himself—what he thought were the wisest he put into elegaic verse and inscribed them (his own poetry and examples of his wisdom) on the Herms. He did this in order that, first, his citizens would not be impressed by those wise Delphic inscriptions, “Know Thyself,” and “Nothing in Excess,” and other [e] things of this sort, but would instead regard the words of Hipparchus as wiser. And, second, he did this so that when they travelled back and forth they would read and acquire a taste for his wisdom and would come in from the country to complete their education. There are two sides to the inscriptions: on the left side of each Herm, it is inscribed that the Herm [229] stands in the middle of the city or the deme, whereas on the right it says: “This is a monument of Hipparchus: walk with justice in mind.” There are many other fine inscriptions of his poetry on other Herms. There is one in particular—on the Stiria road—on which it says: “This is a monument of [b] Hipparchus: do not deceive a friend.” So, since I am your friend, I would never dare to deceive you and disobey so great a man.
After his death the Athenians were ruled under tyranny by his brother, Hippias, for three years, and you would have heard from all of those of earlier days that there was tyranny in Athens only for those three years, and that during the other times the Athenians lived almost as when Cronus was King.6 In fact, the more sophisticated people claim that his death did [c] not come about in the way that the common people think—that it was because his sister was dishonored in the carrying of the basket,7 for that’s silly—but because Harmodius had become the boyfriend of Aristogiton and was educated by him. Aristogiton also prided himself on educating this fellow, and regarded himself as a rival of Hipparchus. At that time, [d] Harmodius himself happened to be a lover of one of the handsome and noble youths of that era. (They say what his name was, but I don’t remember it.) In any case, this youth was for a while impresssed by Harmodius and Aristogiton as wise men, but later—after associating with Hipparchus—he disdained them, and they were so hurt by this dishonor that they killed Hipparchus for it.
FRIEND: Well now, Socrates, it seems likely that either you don’t regard me as your friend, or if you do, you don’t obey Hipparchus. For you [e] will never be able to persuade me that you aren’t deceiving me in these arguments, though I don’t know how you do it.
SOCRATES: Very well, just like in a friendly game of checkers, I’m willing to let you take back anything you want of what’s been said in the discussion, so you won’t think you’re being deceived. So should I take this back for you, that all men desire good things?
FRIEND: No, not that.
SOCRATES: Well, how about that suffering loss, or loss, is bad?
FRIEND: No, not that.
SOCRATES: Well, how about that profit and profiting are opposite to loss and suffering loss?
[230] FRIEND: Not that, either.
SOCRATES: Well, how about that profiting, as the opposite of bad, is good?
FRIEND: It’s not always good; take that back for me.
SOCRATES: So you believe, it seems, that some profit is good, and some is bad.
FRIEND: I do.
SOCRATES: All right, I’ll take this back for you; let’s say that some profit is good and some other profit is bad. And neither one is more profit, the good or the bad. Right?
FRIEND: What are you asking me?
SOCRATES: I’ll explain. Is some food good and some bad?
FRIEND: Yes. [b]
SOCRATES: Then is one of them more food than the other, or are they both the same thing, food, and in this respect, at least, the one is no different from the other in so far as being food, but only in so far as one is good, and one is bad?
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: And so with drink and everything else; when some things of the same sort come to be good and others bad, the one does not differ from the other in that respect by which they are the same? For example with people, I suppose: one is virtuous, and one is wicked. [c]
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: But neither of them is more or less a person than the other, I think—neither the virtuous person more than the wicked, nor vice versa.
FRIEND: That’s true.
SOCRATES: Then are we to think this way about profit, too, that both the wicked and the virtuous sort alike are profit?
FRIEND: They have to be.
SOCRATES: So, then, one who makes virtuous profit doesn’t profit more than one who makes the wicked sort—it appears that neither one is more [d] profit than the other, as we agree.
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: For neither “more” nor “less” is added to either of them.
FRIEND: Not at all.
SOCRATES: And how could one ever do or suffer anything more or less with this sort of thing, to which neither of these things is added?
FRIEND: Impossible.
SOCRATES: Therefore, because both alike are profits and profitable, we must now investigate what it is in virtue of which you call both of them profit—what do you see that’s the same in both of them? For example, if [e] you were to ask me, about the examples I just gave, “what is it, in virtue of which you call both good and bad food alike, ‘food’,” I would tell you that both are solid nourishment for the body—this is why. For surely you would agree that this is what food is, wouldn’t you?
FRIEND: I would.
SOCRATES: And with regard to drink, the answer would be the same, that the liquid nourishment of the body, whether virtuous or wicked, has this name: “drink,” and similarly in other cases. Try, therefore, to imitate [231] me by answering in this way. When you say that virtuous profit and wicked profit are both profit, what do you see in both that’s the same—that which is actually profit? If you yourself are again unable to answer, consider what I say: do you call a profit every possession that one has acquired either by spending nothing, or by spending less and receiving more?
FRIEND: Yes, I believe I’d call that profit. [b]
SOCRATES: Do you mean cases like this—when you are given a feast, spending nothing but eating your fill, and getting sick?
FRIEND: By Zeus, I do not!
SOCRATES: If you became healthy from the feast, would you be profiting or losing?
FRIEND: Profiting.
SOCRATES: So this, at least, is not profit: acquiring just any possession at all.
FRIEND: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: Not if it’s bad, right? But if one acquires anything good at all, doesn’t one acquire a profit?
FRIEND: Apparently, if it’s good.
[c] SOCRATES: And if it’s bad, won’t one suffer a loss?
FRIEND: I believe so.
SOCRATES: Don’t you see that you are coming around back again to the same place? Profit appears to be good, and loss bad.
FRIEND: I’m at a loss for what to say.
SOCRATES: At least you’re not at an unfair loss. But answer this: when one acquires more than one has spent, do you say it’s profit?
FRIEND: At least I don’t mean when it’s bad, but if one acquires more gold or silver than one has spent.
SOCRATES: I’m just about to ask you that: if someone spends half a measure [d] of gold and gets double that in silver, has he profited or lost?
FRIEND: Lost, surely, Socrates, for then his gold is worth only double, instead of twelve times as much as silver.
SOCRATES: But still he’s acquired more; or isn’t double more than half?
FRIEND: Not in value, at least, with silver and gold.
SOCRATES: So it looks like we must add the notion of value to profit. At least, now you say that silver, though there is more of it than gold, is not as valuable, and that gold, although there’s less, is of equal value.
[e] FRIEND: Of course, for that is indeed the case.
SOCRATES: Value, then, is what brings profit, whether it’s small or large, and what has no value brings no profit.
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: And by “value,” do you mean anything other than “valuable to possess”?
FRIEND: Yes, “valuable to possess.”
SOCRATES: Moreover, by “valuable to possess,” do you mean the unbeneficial or the beneficial?
FRIEND: The beneficial, surely.
SOCRATES: Well, isn’t the beneficial good?
FRIEND: Yes.
[232] SOCRATES: And so, my valiant warrior, haven’t we once again, for the third or fourth time, come to the agreement that what’s profitable is good?
FRIEND: So it seems.
SOCRATES: Do you remember the point from which this discussion of ours arose?
FRIEND: I think so.
SOCRATES: If not, I’ll remind you. You disagreed with me, claiming that good people do not want to make just any sort of profit, but only those that are good ones, and not the wicked ones.
FRIEND: Yes indeed.
SOCRATES: And doesn’t the argument now force us to agree that all gains, [b] small and large, are good?
FRIEND: It forces me, Socrates, rather than persuades me.
SOCRATES: Well, perhaps later it will also persuade you. But for now, whatever condition you’re in—persuaded or not—you do at least agree with us that all profits are good, both small and large.