Complete Works

by Plato, Cooper, John M. , Hutchinson, D. S.

  CLINIAS: How do you mean?

  ATHENIAN: My dear Clinias, only a small part of mankind—a few highly-educated [d] men of rare natural talent—is able to steel itself to moderation when assailed by various needs and desires; given the chance to get a lot of money, it’s a rare bird that’s sober enough to prefer a modest competence to wealth. Most people’s inclinations are at the opposite pole: their demands are always violent demands, and they brush aside the opportunity of modest gain in favor of insatiable profiteering. That’s why all branches of retailing, trade and inn-keeping suffer from abuse and extreme unpopularity. [e] Now here’s something I’m determined to mention, ludicrous though it is; it’ll never happen, and Heaven help us if it did. But just picture to yourselves some eminently virtuous men forced for a time to go in for inn-keeping or retailing or some similar occupation, or some eminently virtuous women similarly forced by some stroke of fate to take up that kind of life. We’d soon realize how desirable and pleasing each of these trades really is, and if they were carried on according to honest standards we’d value them all as highly as we do our mother or our nurse. But what happens? A man goes off to some remote point on a road running through [919] the middle of nowhere and sets up his establishment to sell provisions; he receives the weary traveler with welcome lodging—peace and quiet for the victim of violent storms, cool refreshment for the sufferer from stifling heat—but then instead of greeting them as friends and offering them in addition to his hospitality some gifts as a token of goodwill, he treats them like so many enemy prisoners that have fallen into his hands, and holds them up to ransom for a monstrously steep and iniquitous sum. [b] It’s these and similar swindles, which are practiced in all branches of the trade, that have given the occupation of helping the worn-out traveler such a bad name, and in every case the legislator has to find a remedy. The old saying is quite right: it’s difficult to fight against two enemies, especially when they are fundamentally different (as with diseases, for instance, and there are a lot of other examples). Our present battle is a case in point: it is a battle against two foes, wealth and poverty—wealth that corrupts our souls by luxury, poverty that drives us by distress into [c] losing all sense of shame. So what remedy for this disease will be open to an enlightened community? First, it should keep its trading class as small as possible; second, trade should be made over to a class of people whose corruption will not harm the state unduly; third, some means must be found to prevent those engaging in such activities from slipping too easily into an utterly shameless and small-minded way of life. [d]

  After these remarks, our law on the subject should run like this, with Heaven’s blessing: God is now re-establishing and re-founding Magnesia, and no inhabitant who holds one of the 5040 hearths must ever, willingly or otherwise, become a retailer or a wholesaler, or perform any service whatever for private individuals who are not his equals in status, with the exception of those services that a free man will naturally render to his father and mother and remoter ancestors, and to all free persons older [e] than himself. Of course, it is not easy to lay down in a law precisely what is consistent with the dignity of a free man and what is not, and the point will have to be determined by those who have won distinctions for their aversion to the latter and devotion to the former. Anyone who by some trick goes in for retail trading in a way forbidden to a gentleman should be indicted by anyone who wishes before a court of judges with a high reputation for virtue, on a charge of disgracing his clan.

  71. If he is judged to be sullying his paternal hearth by following an unworthy calling,

  he must be imprisoned for a year and so be taught to refrain from such conduct.

  72. If he does not then refrain, [920]

  he must be imprisoned for two years, and the period of imprisonment must be doubled indefinitely on each subsequent conviction.

  Now for a second law: anyone who intends to go in for retail trading must be either a resident alien or a temporary visitor. Thirdly, as a third law, such people must behave with as much virtue and as little vice as possible while they share in the life of the state. To that end, the Guardians of the Laws must not simply be regarded as guardians of those whom it is easy to keep from wickedness and crime thanks to their good birth and [b] education. There are those who do not enjoy such advantages, and need more careful supervision, because they engage in pursuits which are very powerful inducements to vice. So since retail trading is an occupation of great variety and embraces many cognate activities, the Guardians of the Laws must hold a meeting about it, or at any rate about such branches of it as they have concluded are unavoidable and essential to the state, after [c] the others have been eliminated; and just as we ordered in the case of adulteration—a closely connected matter—experts in each branch should be in attendance. The meeting must see what ratio of expenditure to receipts will give the retailer a decent profit, and the ratio arrived at must be recorded in writing, put on display, and then imposed on the various traders by the Market-Wardens, City-Wardens and Country-Wardens. Perhaps thus retail trade will benefit the population at large and do minimum harm to those members of society who engage in it.

  [d] If a man fails to fulfill an agreed contract—unless he had contracted to do something forbidden by law or decree, or gave his consent under some iniquitous pressure, or was involuntarily prevented from fulfilling his contract because of some unlooked-for accident—an action for such an unfulfilled agreement should be brought in the tribal courts, if the parties have not previously been able to reconcile their differences before arbitrators (their neighbors, that is).

  The class of craftsmen who have enriched our lives by their arts and skills will have Athena and Hephaestus as its patrons, while Ares and [e] Athena will be patrons of those who protect the products of these craftsmen by skills of a different order—the techniques of defense. (The consecration of this latter class to these gods is perfectly justified, in that both classes are in the continuous service of land and people, the latter by taking the lead in the struggles of war, the former by producing tools and goods in return for pay.) So if they respect their divine ancestors, they will think it a disgrace to break their word in a professional matter.

  [921] 73. If one of the craftsmen culpably fails to complete his work within the stipulated time, out of disrespect for the god from whom he wins his bread, fondly thinking that he can count on the indulgence of the divinity with whom he has some personal relationship,

  (a) first he will pay a penalty to the god,

  (b) and secondly, under the provisions of the law applicable to his case, he must owe the price of the works of which he has cheated his employer, and perform his task all over again within the stipulated period, free of charge.

  And the law will give the contractor for a work the same advice as it gave [b] a seller, not to take advantage by setting too high a price on his services, but to name their actual value without further ado. The contractor has precisely the same duty, because as a craftsman he knows what the job is worth. In a state of gentlemen a workman must never use his craft, which is at bottom accurate and straightforward, to take ‘craft’ advantage of laymen, and anyone who is thus imposed upon shall be able to sue the culprit. But if anyone lets a contract to a workman and fails to pay him [c] the price stipulated in a valid legal agreement, and snaps his fingers at those partners in our social framework, Zeus the patron of the state, and Athena, so that his delight at being in pocket wrecks the fundamental bonds of society, then the following law, with the backing of the gods, must reinforce the cohesion of the state:

  74. (a) If a man takes delivery of a piece of work and fails to pay for it within the agreed time,

  he must be charged double;

  (b) if a whole year elapses,

  then notwithstanding the rule that loans in general do not bear interest, he must pay an obol per drachma9 for every month in arrear. [d]

  Actions in these cases should be brought before the tribal courts.

  Now that we hav
e broached the subject of craftsmen in general, we ought in all fairness to glance at those whose job it is to keep us safe in war, such as generals and other experts in military techniques. These persons are just as much craftsmen as ordinary workmen, though of a different kind, so when one of them undertakes some public task, voluntarily or under orders, and performs it well, the law will never tire of praising anyone who pays him the honor he deserves—honor being in effect a [e] military man’s pay. But if anyone receives the benefit of some splendid military action and fails to pay that price, the law will censure him. For the benefit of the military, then, let us enact following regulation-cum-commendation, by way of advising rather than compelling the people at large. Those fine men who safeguard the whole state either by exploits of [922] valor or by military expertise must be accorded honor—but honor of the second rank, because the highest honor should be given first and foremost to those who have proved conspicuously conscientious in respecting the written regulations of the good legislator.

  ATHENIAN: We’ve now pretty well completed our provisions for the most important agreements that men make with each other, with the exception of those relating to orphans and the care and attention due to them from their guardians. So now we’ve more or less provided for the first topic, here’s the next thing on which we are obliged to impose some sort of [b] order. All our regulations must start from two basic facts: (a) people at the point of death like to settle their affairs by a will, (b) sometimes, by chance, they die intestate. What a difficult and contentious business it is, Clinias! That’s what I had in mind when I said we were ‘obliged’ to deal with it: to leave it unregulated is quite out of the question. If you allow a will unchallengeable validity whatever condition a man near the end of [c] his life may have been in when he drew it up, he might make any number of mutually inconsistent provisions that contradicted not only the spirit of the laws but also the inclinations of those who survive him, and indeed his own earlier intentions before he set out to make his will. After all, most of us, when we think death is at hand, just go to pieces and can’t think straight.

  CLINIAS: How do you mean, sir?

  ATHENIAN: When a man is about to die, Clinias, he becomes refractory, and keeps harping on a principle that spreads alarm and despondency among legislators.

  CLINIAS: How’s that?

  ATHENIAN: In his anxiety for complete authority he’s apt to express [d] himself with some warmth.

  CLINIAS: To what effect?

  ATHENIAN: ‘Ye gods!’ says he, ‘it’s a fine thing if I’m not going to be allowed to give—or not give—my own property to anyone I please! Why shouldn’t I give more to one man and less to another depending on whether they have shown themselves good or bad friends to me? My illnesses, my old age and all my other various misfortunes have sorted them out well enough.’

  CLINIAS: Well, sir, don’t you think that’s well said?

  [e] ATHENIAN: Clinias, my view is that the ancient lawgivers were too easy-going, and legislated on the basis of a superficial and inadequate appreciation of the human condition.

  CLINIAS: How do you mean?

  ATHENIAN: My dear fellow, because they feared the line of argument I have mentioned, they passed the law allowing a man to dispose of his [923] own property in his will exactly as he pleases. But when people have come to death’s door in your state, you and I will make a rather more appropriate response:

  ‘Friends, you “creatures of a day” in more senses than one, it’s difficult for you in your present circumstances to know the truth about your own property and also “know yourselves,” as the Delphic inscription puts it. Therefore, I, as legislator, rule that neither you nor this property of yours [b] belongs to yourselves, but to your whole clan, ancestors and descendants alike; and your clan and its property in turn belong, even more absolutely, to the state. That being so, I should be reluctant to tolerate someone worming himself into your good graces when you are smitten with illness or old age, and wheedling you into making a will that is not for the best. I shall legislate with a view to nothing except the interest of your clan and the entire state, relegating (as is only right) that of the individual to second place. So as you go on your journey, which is the way of all flesh, show restraint and goodwill towards us: we will look after your affairs for the future and guard your interests with the utmost care, down to the [c] smallest detail.’

  Let that stand by way of preamble and consolation for both the living and the dying, Clinias. Here’s the actual law:

  Anyone who settles his property by writing a will should first, if he has had children, write down the name of that son who in his opinion deserves to be his heir, and he should also record precisely which, if any, of his other children he offers for adoption by someone else. If, however, he is still [d] left with one of his sons not adopted into an estate, who will presumably be dispatched by law to a colony,10 the father should be permitted to present him with as much of his property as he likes, apart from the family estate and all its associated equipment; and if there is more than one son in that position, his father is to distribute his property among them—excluding the estate—in whatever proportion he pleases. But he should not distribute any part of his property to any son who has a home. He should treat a daughter analogously: if she is promised in marriage, he should not let [e] her share his goods, but only if she is not promised. If subsequent to the will one of the sons or daughters is discovered to have come into possession of an estate in Magnesia, he or she should abandon his or her legacy to the testator’s heir. If the testator is leaving no male offspring but only female, he should select whichever of his daughters he pleases and in his will provide someone to be a husband for her and a son for himself, and record this person as his heir. And here’s another disaster a man should allow for when drawing up his will: if his son (his own or adopted) dies in infancy before he can reach man’s estate, the will should specify in writing a child who is to take his place—and who, one hopes, will have [924] better luck. When a man who has no children at all writes a will, he may reserve one tenth of his acquired property and give it to anyone he wishes; all the rest he should leave to his adopted heir, so that in making him his son with the blessing of the law he gains his goodwill by treating him fairly. When a man’s children need guardians, and the deceased has made a will and stated in writing the number of guardians he wants his children to have and who they should be (provided they are ready and willing to undertake the office), the choice of guardians put on record in this way [b] should be binding. But if a man dies absolutely intestate or without selecting guardians, then the two nearest relatives on the father’s side and the two nearest on the mother’s, together with one of the deceased’s friends, must be authorized to act as guardians; and the Guardians of the Laws should appoint them for any orphan who stands in such need. Everything to do with guardianship and orphans should be the concern of the fifteen eldest Guardians of the Laws, who should divide themselves by seniority [c] into groups of three, one group to act one year and another the next, until the five terms of office have been completed in rotation; and so far as possible there should be no gaps in the sequence.

  When a man dies absolutely intestate and leaves children in need of guardians, these same laws must be brought into operation to relieve their distress. But if he meets with some unforeseen accident and leaves just daughters, he must forgive the lawgiver if he arranges the giving of them [d] in marriage with an eye on only two out of three possible considerations: close kinship, and the security of the estate. The third point, which a father would have taken into account—namely to select from among the entire citizen body someone whose character and habits qualify him to be his own son and his daughter’s bridegroom—these considerations, I say, will have to be passed over, because it’s impracticable to weigh them. So here’s [e] how the best law we can manage in such a field should run. If a man fails to make a will, and leaves only daughters, then on his death (a) a brother on his father’s side (or, if witho
ut an estate of his own, a brother on his mother’s side) should take the daughter and the estate of the deceased. (b) If there is a brother’s son available, but no brother, then if the parties are of a similar age the same procedure is to apply. In the absence of all these, (c) a sister’s son is to benefit under the same regulations. (d) Next in line is to be the brother of the deceased’s father, next (e) that brother’s son, and finally (f) the son of the sister of the deceased’s father. And in all cases where a man leaves only female offspring, the succession is to [925] pass through the family according to the same rules of kinship, through brothers and brothers’ and sisters’ sons, the males in any one generation always taking precedence over the females. As for age, the assessor must determine the propriety or otherwise of the marriage by inspection, viewing the males naked and the females stripped down to the navel. If the family suffers from such a dearth of relatives that not even a grandson either of the deceased’s brother or of the son of the deceased’s grandfather exists, then in consultation with her guardians the girl may single out of her own free choice any other citizen, provided he does not object, who [b] should then become the deceased’s heir and the daughter’s bridegroom. However, ‘flexibility above all’: sometimes suitable candidates from within the state itself may be in unusually short supply, so if a girl is hard put to it to find a husband among her compatriots, and has in view someone who has been dispatched to a colony whom she would like to inherit her father’s property, then if the man is related to her, he should enter into the estate under the provisions of the law; if he is not of her clan, then provided there are no near kin living in the state, he shall be entitled by [c] virtue of the choice of the daughter of the deceased and that of her guardians to marry her and return to his homeland to take over the establishment of the intestate father.