Complete Works

by Plato, Cooper, John M. , Hutchinson, D. S.

  (Some have contended that this letter is not Plato’s.)2

  XIII

  PLATO TO DIONYSIUS, TYRANT OF SYRACUSE, WELFARE.

  [360] Let this beginning of my letter be likewise a sign to you that it comes from me.3 Once when you were feasting the young men from Locri you arose and came over to me (your couch being at some distance from mine) and greeted me with a phrase that was both friendly and neatly turned, as it seemed to me. The man lying next to me (and a fair youth he was) thought so too, for he said: “I suppose, Dionysius, that you have got much [b] wisdom from Plato?” “And much else besides,” you said; “for from the very minute I sent for him, and by the very fact that I had sent for him, I was the gainer.” So let us preserve this opinion and endeavor always to increase our usefulness to one another. It is for this very purpose that I am sending you some Pythagorean writings and some Divisions, and also a man whom we thought, you remember, that both you and Archytas, if Archytas comes to you, could use to advantage. His name is Helicon, his [c] family is of Cyzicus, and he is a disciple of Eudoxus4 and well versed in all that eminent man’s doctrines. Moreover he has been associated with one of the pupils of Isocrates and with Polyxenus, one of the followers of Bryson. But, what is rarer with such men, he is pleasant to meet, seemingly [d] not difficult, but easy and mild mannered. I put it thus cautiously, for it is a man I am giving my opinion of; and though man has his good qualities, he is, with rare exceptions and in the greater part of his actions, quite changeable. I had my fears and doubts even about this man, so I not only conversed with him myself but also made inquiry among his fellow citizens, and nobody had anything to say against him. But look him over yourself and be on your guard. Above all, if you can in any way find leisure for it, take lessons from him as part of your studies in philosophy. [e] If not, have him instruct someone else so that when you do have leisure you can learn and thereby add to your character and your good name. In this way I shall continue to be of help to you. But enough of this.

  As for the things you wrote me to send you, I have had the Apollo [361] executed and Leptines is bringing it to you, the work of a good young sculptor whose name is Leochares. There was another piece in his shop that I thought very charming, and I therefore bought it to give to your wife, for she looked after me, both in health and in sickness, in a manner that did honor both to me and to you. Give it to her, then, if you think it fitting. I am also sending twelve jars of sweet wine and two jars of honey [b] for the children. I arrived too late for the fig harvest, and the myrtle berries that were laid by have spoiled. We shall look after them better next time. Leptines will tell you about the plants.

  The money for these purchases and for certain payments to the city I procured from Leptines, telling him (what I thought was quite proper as well as true) that the money we spent in fitting out the Leucadian ship, about sixteen minae, came from my funds. So I got this sum from him, [c] have made use of it, and have sent these objects to you. Now hear how it stands with respect to your funds here at Athens, and mine. I will make use of your money, as I told you, just as I do that of my other friends; but I am using it as sparingly as I can, and only so much as seems necessary or just or proper, not to me only, but to your agent. My own situation is this. Four daughters were left by my nieces (who died at the time when [d] you bade me wear a crown, you remember, but I refused), one of marriageable age, another eight years old, another a little over three, and the other not yet one. My friends and I must provide dowries for them, at least for those who are married during my lifetime; the others we may leave out of account. Nor need I provide for those whose fathers may become richer than I am; but at present I am the wealthiest, and it was I who, with the [e] help of Dion and other friends, provided dowries for their mothers. The oldest of these girls is to marry Speusippus, whose sister’s daughter she is. For her I will require at most thirty minae; that is a reasonable wedding portion for us to give. Moreover, if my mother should die I should need almost ten minae for building her tomb. These are about all my obligations at present. If any other private or public expense comes up because of my visit to you, I will endeavor to make the expenditure as little as possible; but what I cannot avoid will have to be at your charge, as I told you must [362] be the case.

  Now a word regarding your funds at Athens and their expenditure. In the first place, if it should ever be necessary for me to fit out a chorus or anything of the sort, you have no guest-friend here who would advance the money, as we thought. Furthermore, if some matter of great importance to you should arise such that you would be benefited immediately if an expenditure were made but injured if it were not made or were delayed until word had come from you, the situation would be not only damaging but humiliating for you. I found this out myself when, wishing to send [b] you some other and more costly articles that you had written for, I sent Erastus to Andromedes the Aeginetan, upon whom, as your guest-friend, you told me to draw if I needed money. He replied, as was only human and natural, that he had formerly advanced money for your father but had had difficulty in collecting it; so now he would give a small sum, but no more. And so I got it from Leptines, who deserves to be praised, not because he gave, but because he gave willingly; and in all else that he has done and said about you he has shown the quality of his friendship. I [c] ought to report such things, as well as matters of an opposite sort, to show how I think this or that man is disposed towards you. And so I shall be frank with you about your money; since it is only right, and since moreover I can speak from experience of the men who surround you. Whenever your men bring in their reports, they hesitate to mention any matter that they think involves expense, for fear of your displeasure. You must therefore [d] compel them to form the habit of speaking about these things as well as other matters; for it is your duty to know everything, so far as possible, and pass judgment and not shrink from any facts. This will be the best of all ways of enhancing your authority. To make expenditures rightly and to repay debts properly is a good thing in many ways, and even furthers the acquisition of money, as you yourself will see more and more. Then do not allow those who profess to be looking out for your interests to give you a bad name; for there is no advantage nor honor in being known as difficult in money matters. [e]

  And now I would say something about Dion. About the other matters at issue I can say nothing as yet, until the letters come which you say you are sending me; but on the subject which you forbade me to mention to him, though I have not mentioned nor spoken about it, I have tried to find out how he would take it if you carried out your design, and it seemed to me he would be not a little indignant. In every other respect Dion’s attitude toward you, as shown in his words and actions, is quite temperate.

  To Cratinus, the brother of Timotheus and my friend, let us give a hoplite [363] breastplate, one of the light kind for foot soldiers; and to the daughters of Cebes three full-length chitons, not the expensive Amorgian ones, but linen ones of Sicilian make. You are probably familiar with the name of Cebes, for he figures in the Socratic writings as taking part with Simmias in a discussion with Socrates about the soul. He is an intimate friend and well disposed towards us all.

  [363b] You no doubt recall the sign that distinguishes the letters I write that are seriously intended from those that are not. Still I would have you attend carefully and keep it in mind; for there are many who ask me to write whom it is not easy to refuse openly. Those that are seriously meant begin with “God”; those less seriously with “gods.”

  The ambassadors also asked me to write you, and quite properly; for they have everywhere been sounding your praises and mine, not least of [c] all Philagrus, the one who had a sore hand, you remember. Philaedes, who has just returned from the Great King, also spoke of you. If it had not required too long a letter I should have written you what he said; but as it is you must ask Leptines.

  If you send the breastplate or anything else that I have mentioned, and have no one you wish to send it by, give it to Tyrillus; for he is always tra
veling back and forth, and is a friend of mine, accomplished in philosophy and other matters. He is the son-in-law of Tison, who was civic magistrate at the time when I set sail.

  Farewell, study your philosophy, and try to interest the other young [d] men in it. Give my greetings to your fellow students of the spheres. Instruct Aristocritus and the rest that if any book or letter comes from me, they are to have it brought at once to your attention and to remind you to pay heed to its contents. And now do not neglect to repay Leptines the money he advanced, but do it promptly so that others, seeing your treatment of him, may be more willing to oblige you.

  [e] Iatrocles, whom I set free at the same time as Myronides, is traveling with the things I am now sending you. Put him in your pay, since he bears you good will, and use him for any service you wish. Preserve this letter, or an abstract of it, and take it to heart.5

  1. See note to 357d above.

  2. This notation is found in our best manuscripts, and may go back to Thrasyllus.

  3. Because of its salutation “Welfare,” for the usual “Greetings”: see Letter III, 315a.

  4. Eudoxus of Cnidus, one of the foremost mathematicians of the fourth century, had moved his school from Cyzicus to Athens and merged it with the Academy.

  5. Accepting the deletion of ho in e5.

  DEFINITIONS

  Translated by D. S. Hutchinson.

  Definitions is a dictionary of about 185 philosophically significant terms. Many intellectuals in ancient Greece developed definitions: mathematicians, natural philosophers, educators such as Prodicus, and also Socrates, who believed that knowing correct definitions of ethical ideas would make people morally better. But it was Plato who urged a systematic approach to definition by collection and division in his Phaedrus and practiced it in his Sophist and Statesman. The Academic enterprise of definition by division was satirized in a comedy of about 350 B.C., in which members of Plato’s Academy cogitated over the definition of ‘pumpkin’ (Epicrates, frg. 11 Edmonds). Diogenes the Cynic ridiculed the Academic definition of ‘man’ as ‘featherless, two-footed animal’ by plucking a chicken and saying, “Here’s Plato’s man!”

  Many philosophers after Plato were also interested in definitions: his nephew and successor as head of the Academy, Speusippus, was credited with a work called Definitions, and in a list of Aristotle’s works we find “Definitions (in thirteen books)” and “Definitions prefixed to the Topics (in seven books).” Theophrastus wrote three books of Definitions, and Chrysippus the Stoic wrote many large books of and about definitions. Certain similarities between definitions in the present collection and Aristotelian and Stoic definitions have inclined some scholars to regard Definitions as a late and eclectic work, but these similarities are perhaps better explained by the fact that Aristotle and the Stoics both made use of fourth-century Academic ideas in working out their own philosophical positions.

  What we find in Definitions is probably a tiny selection of all the definitions formulated and discussed in Plato’s Academy in the middle years of the fourth century. These definitions were used in dialectical discussions, of the kind familiar to us from Aristotle’s Topics and Sophistical Refutations. The definition of ‘man’ at 415a as ‘featherless, two-footed, flat-fingernailed animal’ could be a response to Diogenes’ chicken, and other definitions are probably dialectical as well. Some are drawn directly from Plato’s dialogues, such as the definition of ‘sophist’ at 415c, from Sophist 231d.

  The individual definitions were probably coined by members of the Academy in the fourth century B.C., but we cannot know who edited them into the present collection. Indeed, Definitions seems to consist of two separate collections. The first collection is organized into the three branches of philosophy recognized by Plato’s Academy and by the Stoics: philosophy of nature (411 a–c), ethics (411d–414a), philosophy of knowledge and language (414a–e). The second collection (from ‘utility’ at 414e onward) has no such internal organization and contains independent definitions of many of the terms defined in the first collection. Certainly Plato is not to be regarded as the editor of all or part of Definitions, and the ascription to “Plato” probably signifies nothing more than “school of Plato.” Some ancient scholars guessed at Speusippus as their author, probably incorrectly.

  Since reference works and collections such as Definitions are not written in ordinary prose, they are especially liable to corruption in the course of transmission. That is why this translation involves a particularly high degree of guesswork, both about the text itself and about its proper construal. Some definitions have probably fallen out accidentally, and some may possibly have been interpolated by later ancient scribes and scholars.

  D.S.H.

  [411] (aïdion), eternal: existent at all times, including past and present, without being destroyed.

  (theos), god: immortal living being, self-sufficient for happiness; eternal being, the cause of the nature of goodness.

  (genesis), becoming: change into being; coming to participate in being; passing into existence.

  (hēlios), sun: the only celestial fire which is visible to the same people from dawn to [b] dusk; the daylight star; the largest eternal living creature.

  (chronos), time: the motion of the sun, the measure of its course.

  (hēmera), day: the journey of the sun, from rising to setting; the light opposed to the night.

  (heōs), dawn: the beginning of the day; first light of the sun.

  (mesēmbria), midday: the time at which the shadows of bodies are all at their shortest.

  (deilē), sunset: the end of the day.

  (nux), night: the darkness opposed to day; the absence of the sun.

  (tuchē), luck: passage from the unclear to the unclear; spontaneous cause of a supernatural event. [c]

  (gēras), old age: deterioration of a living thing due to the passage of time.

  (pneuma), wind: movement of air in the region of the earth.

  (aēr), air: the element to which every spatial motion is natural.

  (ouranos), sky: the body which surrounds all perceptible things except the uppermost air itself.

  (psuchē), soul: that which moves itself; the cause of vital processes in living creatures.

  (dunamis), ability: that which produces results on account of itself.

  (opsis), vision: the state of being able to discern bodies.

  (ostoun), bone: marrow hardened by heat.

  (stoicheion), element: that which complex things are composed of and resolved into.

  [d] (aretē), virtue: the best disposition; the state of a mortal creature which is in itself praise-worthy; the state on account of which its possessor is said to be good; the just observance of the laws; the disposition on account of which he who is so disposed1 is said to be perfectly excellent; the state which produces faithfulness to law.

  (phronēsis), practical wisdom: the ability which by itself is productive of human happiness; the knowledge of what is good and bad; the knowledge that produces happiness;2 the disposition by which we judge what is to be done and what is to be done.

  (dikaiosunē), justice: the unanimity of the soul with itself, [e] and the good discipline of the parts of the soul with respect to each other and concerning each other; the state that distributes to each person according to what is deserved; the state on account of which its possessor chooses what appears to him to be just; the state underlying a law-abiding way of life; social equality; the state of obedience to the laws.

  (sōphrosunē), self-control: moderation of the soul concerning the desires and pleasures that normally occur in it; harmony and good discipline in the soul in respect of normal pleasures and pains; concord of the soul in respect of ruling and being ruled; normal personal independence; good discipline in the soul; rational agreement within the soul about what is [412] admirable and contemptible; the state by which its possessor chooses and is cautious about what he should.

  (andreia), courage: the state of the soul which is unmoved by fear; mili
tary confidence; knowledge of the facts of warfare; self-restraint in the soul about what is fearful and terrible; boldness in obedience to wisdom; being intrepid in the face of death; the state which stands on guard over correct thinking in dangerous situations; force which counterbalances danger; force of fortitude in respect of virtue; calm in the soul about what correct thinking takes to be frightening or encouraging things; the preservation of fearless3 [b] beliefs about the terrors and experience of warfare; the state which cleaves to the law.

  (enkrateia), self-restraint: the ability to endure pain; obedience to correct thinking; the unbeatable ability of the conceptions of correct thinking.

  (autarkeia), self-sufficiency: perfect possession of good things; the state in respect of which those who have it are masters of themselves.

  (epieikeia), fairness: ceding one’s rights and advantages; moderation in agreements; the good discipline of a rational soul in respect of what is [c] admirable and contemptible.

  (karteria), fortitude: endurance of pain for the sake of what is admirable; endurance of labor for the sake of what is admirable.

  (tharsos), confidence: not foreseeing anything bad; being undisturbed by the presence of something bad.

  (alupia), painlessness: the state in respect of which we are not subject to suffering pain.

  (philoponia), industriousness: the state which accomplishes what one has proposed; voluntary fortitude; irreproachable state in respect of labor.