If we regard as one part of this change the fact that from this time on, proceedings in the public sector had to be recorded in writing to a much greater extent than previously, and as another aspect of it the reorganization of administrative practices in large households that is apparent in the annual formula for the twenty-first year of Shulgi’s reign—“year, in which . . . , and Shulgi set to rights the field accounts in the temple of Enlil and Ninlil,” i.e., the main temple in Nippur—then we can perhaps, in a very general way, call these changes, taken all in all, an administrative reform.
Figure 75. Brick with a stamped inscription by Ur-Nammu of Ur. Reproduced by courtesy of the trustees of the British Museum.
We cannot assess the scope of these administrative measures, but it does appear that here an important step had been taken in relating administrative procedures to politically desirable structures. In spite of all the gaps in our knowledge and all the parts that do not seem to fit in with the rest of the puzzle, the state of the Third Dynasty of Ur turns out to have been an extremely complicated entity, which created forms of organization that were more than just answers to the specific problems of Babylonia. This becomes clear when we consider things like the transferability of civil servants, for which we have evidence in several cases, as well as the beginnings of the creation of a cursus honorum—that is, a more or less fixed sequence of posts that candidates for the highest state offices had to have held. However, it would be a mistake to assume that Babylonia’s fundamental problems had ceased to exist, since at least two observations to the contrary can be found.
If research into hydrological changes had not already pointed to the fact that in the period around 2000 B.C., that is, roughly in the period of the Third Dynasty of Ur, the water supply had reached its lowest point, we would have been able to draw this conclusion from the written evidence of this period. It is true that this is not direct evidence, but the numerous references to the building of canal systems in areas that were already settled provide us with very significant information. These canal systems were most probably not merely built in order to expand the existing area of settlement, but to ensure the supply of water to existing agricultural areas. However, it was not only new canals that served to improve exploitation of the available water supply. There was also a whole series of additional facilities, such as weirs, locks, and water-retaining basins, that were meant to ensure that water was available for a longer time. We can tell that these were innovations from the fact that the relevant technical terms for these additional facilities first appear in the texts of this period. At the same time, these texts allow us to see the great importance attached to the personnel responsible for the distribution and allocation of water. The irrigation system had now become so complicated, both from the organizational and from the technical point of view, that at this point in time at the latest there was an obvious need for central institutions for the building and maintenance of irrigation facilities.
We learn closely enough from the events that led to the end of the Third Dynasty of Ur that, in spite of the innumerable assurances given by the rulers that they would concern themselves with the well-being of the gods and their temples, in spite of the enormous amount of temple building undertaken not only by Ur-Nammu but also by his successors, in spite of the inclusion of the gods and their priesthoods in the coronation and confirmation rituals, the conflict between the central authority and the local priests had in no way been resolved. It is quite true that here again our sources give the impression that a single event brought about the end of the dynasty—an invasion by the Elamites, who conquered the capital city, Ur, and abducted the last ruler. However, if we take all our information into account, we see that a multiplicity of reasons must have been responsible, just as in the case of the end of the Akkad Dynasty.
For example, long before the end came, one local governor after another appointed by the last ruler of Ur changed sides and went over to a pretender to the throne who was advancing from northern Babylonia. A reciprocal sequence of letters between the central ruler and the local governors gives one reason for this changing of sides: the supreme god of the pantheon, Enlil of Nippur, had withdrawn his mercy from the central ruler. This can only mean that the highest god, who had to defend the interests of the gods and thus appeared as their spokesman, once more interfered decisively in a political disagreement against a representative of the idea of the central state.
We may assume that here, at the end of the period of the Third Dynasty of Ur, visible conflicts had already been in the offing, though we have very little evidence to support such an assumption. If we return again to earlier events, we might consider the fact that Shulgi was the first to demand the rank of a god again after Sharkalisharri, on the assumption that his reasons for doing so were similar to those that prompted the first introduction of self-deification under Naram-Sin of Akkad, a point already dealt with at length. Possibly the new order for the administration of the Enlil temple in Nippur mentioned in the year formula quoted for the twenty-first year of Shulgi’s reign was imposed by the king in the interests of the central state. This must have been experienced as unnecessary interference in the affairs of the temple, a parallel with the procedure postulated above for the period of Naram-Sin of Akkad.
Thus the form taken by the state under the Third Dynasty of Ur is also still connected with the specific problems of Babylonia, with the basic conflict between centralism and particularism. However, it does seem, especially in the administrative sphere, as if a general applicability had been arrived at that went beyond this. We take this as our justification for concluding here with the reign of Shulgi after a short sketch of Babylonia’s relations with its neighbors and detailed presentation of the sequence of events that should show the route taken by forms of political organization in attaining a certain degree of abstraction and general applicability. The final chapter will give a short view of further developments.
There is both much and very little that can be said about the relationships of the state of the Third Dynasty of Ur with neighboring countries. There is a lot to be said because, according to their inscriptions, the rulers of this period penetrated into the surrounding countries at least as far as the rulers of the Akkad Dynasty had done. There is little we can say because we have practically no evidence from these neighboring countries, and thus there are hardly any cases in which we can scrutinize the evidence obtained from Babylonian sources.
According to royal inscriptions, the rulers of the Third Dynasty of Ur for the most part followed the same routes, or used the same points of support, as the earlier rulers. This is, for example, the case with the great “palace” built by Naram-Sin at Tell Brak, in which an inscription of the time of the Third Dynasty of Ur was also found. A more calculated “foreign policy,” directed toward more than ephemeral campaigns in the neighboring regions, can perhaps be seen in the fact that the areas that border Babylonia directly to the east, as well as the areas along the Tigris to the north, were clearly more strongly drawn toward the central government. For this reason, they achieved a special status compared with the other regions by being placed under the local rule of Irnanna, the second man in the state from the time of Shulgi’s successors on. In this, we can probably recognize the intention of protecting the eastern flank of the state from the inhabitants of the mountain regions by means of a continuous strip of areas in close association with it. It is highly probable that the living memory of the Guti contributed to this measure.
For the first time, we also hear of a threat from the northwest, from groups characterized in a similar way to the previously mentioned inhabitants of the mountains. These new groups are described as not being settled and are subsumed under the name “Martu.” This similarity of characterization is understandable. For the inhabitant of Babylonia, everyone who did not have precisely the same way of life as he did was a barbarian. But we must make a distinction here nonetheless. This is shown by the mere fact that all the rulers who took possess
ion of the heritage of the Third Dynasty of Ur came from these groups, and they clearly had no difficulty in acquiring the skills of civilization and fitting in with the Babylonian lifestyle. Though definitely closer to the Babylonian inhabitants than the Guti, the “Martu” were politically no less dangerous. We take our evidence for this judgment from information about the structure supposed to prevent them from entering the land. The year name of the fourth year of the reign of Shusin, Shulgi’s successor, reports on the erection of a “Martu wall”: “Year in which Shusin, king of Ur, built the Martu wall [named] ‘that which keeps the Tidnum away.,” The Tidnum must have been a particular grouping among the Martu. This example also shows that walls were not in the long run impregnable, since, as already mentioned, only a short time later precisely the group that was supposed to have been excluded held the reins of political power in the whole country.
We have already mentioned the supposition that the expeditions the rulers of the Akkad and Ur III Dynasties sent to neighboring countries cannot be understood as only stemming from a position of strength. At the same time they must also be seen as a preventative measure against the irreversible decline in Babylonia’s leading position among the lands of the Near East. Unfortunately, as already noted, there are practically no written sources of evidence from the neighboring countries for this period. This can, however, most definitely be traced back to gaps in research that—given the rapid progress being made in archaeological research, at least in the area of what is today Syria—will soon be closed up.
The form of cuneiform writing later used by the Hittites derives, both in its technical details and in the form of the written signs and syllables, from Babylonian script under the Third Dynasty of Ur and must have reached Anatolia by way of Syria at that period. This is a piece of indirect evidence for the existence in this area of strong cultural centers, which were also definitely important political centers. This history of Babylonia’s relationship with its neighboring countries will, therefore, have to be completely rewritten and will definitely look completely different compared to what the sources available at present lead us to expect.
SEVEN
Prospects
How far can we speak of unity among, or of differentiation between, the regions of the ancient Near East? In chapter 1, we saw how what had originally been a cultural entity—that is, with all the regions at a similar level of cultural, technical, and economic development—gave way more and more to differentiation between the individual regions that was directly related to the degree to which specific solutions had to be found to the specific problems of individual areas.
Babylonia, the most specialized region in the Near East, whose few natural resources were even more restricted by the slow, but continuous, worsening of the climate, demanded solutions that had to be consistent in coping with these changes. They were challenges that could only be posed, and answers that could only be found, in this countryside. In the course of time, as a result of improvements and the substitution of more efficient processes for ones that had become impracticable, what had at first been formulated as answers to urgent problems produced forms of organization that were more and more divorced from their original character of specific solutions to specific problems. In chapter 6, especially in the period of the Third Dynasty of Ur, we saw how, according to the indications, such abstraction—the development of more generally valid political and administrative forms—increased.
The situation as a whole is considerably easier to grasp for the so-called Old Babylonian period that followed, especially since there is a good supply of written finds from the neighboring regions. The mere fact that cuneiform writing was used as a matter of course shows that the other areas were catching up. The way in which cuneiform was used also points to a preliminary phase of its usage that is not yet known to us. In addition, we see that far more must have been taken over than just the Babylonian way of writing.
The extent of this appropriation becomes much more evident in one specific example, the takeover and use of the so-called “forms.” These had been developed in Babylonia to simplify the transaction of specific economic or legal processes that had to be continually repeated. Because of the fixed outline of these forms, only the facts relating to each specific procedure had to be filled in. Possibly this development has to be seen in connection with the considerable increase in the demand for scribes as a direct consequence of Shulgi’s administrative reforms.
This is not the place to report on the extremely varied and well-documented relationships between Babylonia and the various political entities that constituted considerable power complexes in Elam and in the Syrian area. That will be the task of a more coherent presentation of the later history of Babylonia. The reason for this short, chronological overview is merely to draw attention to the turning point that can be connected with the Old Babylonian period at the latest, and that can briefly be referred to by the name of the famous Hammurapi of Babylon.
At one time Babylonia, which had only just become suitable for settlement and was thus far behind the neighboring lands in its development, had obtained its ideas and forms of organization from its neighbors—above all those to the east. Because Babylonia managed to use these ideas successfully in the solution of its own problems, it was able to develop them further, so that it soon left the original donor lands far behind in the speed of its development. Babylonia itself then became the victim of a similar development. In both cases, forms of organization had developed to such heights in the donor lands (in this case, Babylonia) precisely at that point in time when they could be, and were, exploited to their greatest extent by other regions to solve their own problems. In both cases, this led to a total reorganization of the political landscape of the Near East.
In the period we are now dealing with, the first half of the second millennium B.C., larger regional coalitions became possible on the broader plains of northern Mesopotamia and Syria thanks to the models of organization devised, but in no way brought to maturity, in Babylonia. It goes without saying that the much greater reserves in land, raw material, and people in states such as those of Hurri-Mitanni and Assyria, for example, which were consolidated during the following period, endowed them with such political weight that Babylonia could no longer hold its own as far as political power went. If Babylonia did in fact still have a role to play from this time on, it was because of its accumulated cultural goods and experience, which also ensured Babylonia a significant place among the concert of regions in the Near East during the following period. The role of political instigator was, however, withheld from Babylonia for a long time.
This attempt to present the different threads of development woven into the early period of the Near East must, of necessity, remain unsatisfactory. Too many questions remain unanswered. Gaps in our knowledge that are too large can often only be bridged in a makeshift way, and with the help of theses that are considered rather daring. In spite of this, it may be hoped that the fascination of the history of the early period of the Near East has become evident: the consistency built on divergent sources, the historical momentum checked by arrest, the variety in unity.
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