The Israel-Arab Reader

by Walter Laqueur

  The proposal for a binational state, as advocated by Matzpen, is not sufficiently progressive for Hawatmeh. In his view, Jewish nationhood implies only cultural autonomy for a religious community. But this is no innovation; Mr. Shukeiry was prepared to grant the same.

  2. Bafflements and Contradictions

  In Arab journalism, particularly in periodicals, interesting articles and symposia are often published concerning social problems, self-criticism and the Arab-Israel conflict. Israeli newspaper reporting usually skips over these articles because it is by its nature more concerned with political events, more with Arabs’ actions and less with their ideas. Such journalistic portrayal of the Arab world becomes pallid because of the absence of the human-ideological dimension of events. Human beings not only operate, they also think about their actions. Furthermore, our concern for the opponent’s reflections tends to humanize him by viewing him along with all his human problems. The Six-Day War and its aftermath raised questions for the Arabs and stimulated them to reassess their procedure in the conflict. They began to grapple with the question of their objective in the conflict. This wrestling is primarily concerned now with the slogan “Democratic Palestinian State.”

  In the weekly supplement of the Beirut newspaper al-Anwar (March 8, 1970), a long symposium was published concerning the meaning of the slogan “The Democratic State,” in which the views of most of the prominent fedayeen organizations were represented. A translation of extracts (italicized text) from this symposium is here presented, along with comments by the author and a summary concerning its significance.

  Representative of the Democratic Front: . . . The adoption of a particular slogan, in our estimation, does not stem from a subjective position or a subjective desire but from a study and analysis of the evolution of the objective situation, the objective possibilities present in society and within history—moving forces, as well as the nature of the potential evolution of these forces in the future. . . . Coexistence (ta’a-yush) with this entity (Israel) is impossible, not becauseof a national aim or national aspiration of the Arabs, but because the presence of this entity will determine this region’s development in connection with world imperialism, which follows from the objective link between it and Zionism. Thus, eradicating imperialist influence in the Middle East means eradicating the Israeli entity. This is something indispensable, not only from the aspect of the Palestinian people’s right of self-determination, and in its homeland, but also from the aspect of protecting the Arab national liberation movement, and this objective also can only be achieved by means of armed struggle. . . .

  The representative of the Arab Liberation Front (a fedayeen organization under Iraqi influence): There is no special [separate] solution for the Palestine issue. The solutionmust be within the framework of the Arab revolution, because the Palestine issue is not merely the paramount Arab issue but the substance and basic motivation of the Arab struggle. If the Arab nation suffers from backwardness, exploitation and disunity, these afflictions are much more severe in Palestine. That is, the Arab cause in the present historical stage is epitomized in the Palestine issue. . . .

  The liberation of Palestine will be the way for the Arabs to realize unity, not to set up regional State No. 15, which will only deepen disunity.The unified State will be the alternative to the Zionist entity, and it will be of necessity democratic, as long as we understand beforehand the dialectical connection between unity and Socialism. In the united Arab State all the minorities—denominational and others—will have equal rights . . .

  The intention is not to set up a Palestinian State as an independent unit, but to incorporate it within a unified Arab State which will be democratic because it is progressive, and which will grant the Israeli Jews minority rights.

  Shafiq al-Hut (a leader of the PLO and head of its Beirut office): . . . The Palestinian problem is that of a Zionist-colonialist invasion at the expense of a land and a people known for thirteen centuries as the Palestinian Arab people. . . . I side with Farid al-Khatib in holding that there is no benefit in expatiating upon the slogan “Democratic Palestinian State.” I hope the fedayeen organizations will not do so, although I would encourage discussion of it by those who are not in responsible positions. Whatever discussion of it there is on the part of the fighting groups may cause a sense of helplessness, despair or weakness. . . .

  As far as it concerns the human situation of the Jews, which Farid al-Khatibmentioned, we should expose the Zionist movement and say to the Jew: The Zionist movement which brought you to Palestine did not supply a solution to your problem as a Jew; therefore you must return whence you came to seek another way of striving for a solution for what is called “the problem of the persecuted Jew in the world.” As Marx has said, he (the Jew) has no alternative but to be assimilated into his society. . . .

  Even if we wished, by force of circumstances, a Democratic PalestinianState “period,” this would mean its being non-Arab. Let us face mattershonestly. When we speak simply of a Democratic Palestinian State, this means we discard its Arab identity. I say that on this subject we cannotnegotiate, even if we possess the political power to authorize this kind of decision, because we thereby disregard an historical truth, namely, that this land and those who dwell upon it belong to a certain environment and a certain region, to which we are linked as one nation, one heritage and one hope—Unity, Freedom and Socialism. . . .

  The implication that the Israeli Jews would be allowed to stay in the Democratic State raises difficulties concerning its Arab character. If the slogan of the Democratic State was intended only to counter the claim that we wish to throw the Jews into the sea, this is indeed an apt slogan and an effective political and propaganda blow. But if we wish to regard it as the ultimate strategy of the Palestinian and Arab liberation movement, then I believe it requires a long pause for reflection, for it bears upon our history, just as our present and certainly our future.

  Representative of as-Sa’iqa (a Syrian fedayeen organization): I was among those who thought five years ago that we must slaughter the Jews. But now I cannot imagine that, if we win one night, it will be possiblefor us to slaughter them, or even one tenth of them. I cannot conceiveof it, neither as a man, nor as an Arab.

  If so, what do we wish to do with these Jews? This is a problem for which I do not claim to have a ready answer. It is a problem which every Arab and Palestinian citizen has an obligation to express his opinion about, because it is yet early for a final, ripe formulation to offer the world and those living in Palestine.

  Thus, I think that among many Jews, those living in Palestine, especiallythe Arab Jews, there is a great desire to return to their countries of origin, since the Zionist efforts to transform them into a homogeneous, cohesive nation have failed. There is a well-known human feeling— yearning for one’s homeland, one’s birthplace. There are a number of known facts concerning the Jews living in Palestine today which clearly point to this feeling among them. They desire to return to their countries of origin, especially Jews from the Arab region. . . .

  Moderator: . . . Can we consider the Kurdish problem and the mannerof its solution as similar to the Jewish problem and its solution underthe heading of the slogan of one Democratic State? . . .

  Representative of the Liberation Front: Our view of the subject of Kurdish national rights follows from objective and historical considerationswhich substantially contradict the nature and objectives of the Zionist movement. The Kurds comprise a nationality having a distinct, well-known historical, geographical and human dimension. . . .

  Farid al-Khatib: As far as the Arab character of the Democratic State is concerned, the Jews in Palestine have the right to express their view concerning the Arab character of the Democratic State in a democratic manner. And although it is possible to say that the Democratic State is Arab, and to say furthermore that it is a union, it is advisable to hold back additional information until the appropriate stages in the evolution of the resistance are reached. When the Zionis
t movement came to Palestine,it first sought a refuge, afterward a homeland, and then a State; and now it is striving to build an empire within and outside Palestine.

  Zionism also disclosed its objectives in stages. There is nothing to be gained by summoning the Jews in the Zionist State to join the national liberation movement, as Shafiq al-Hut proposed,when he advocated convening the unified State at once. This will not convince the Jews of the world and world public opinion.

  As far as it concerns the number of Palestinians, all those who emigratedto Latin America in the nineteenth century, and those who live in the desert, in exile, under conquest, or in prison, all are citizens in the State. For example: the number of Bethlehemite residents living in South America exceeds the number of those Bethlehemites living in occupied Palestine, and the combined total [of all Palestinians] is not less than that of the Jews now living in the Zionist State. . . .

  The Palestinians are more numerous than the Israeli Jews and will determine the character of the State.

  Shafiq al-Hut: First, how can Farid (al-Khatib) think that the Jews and Zionists who came to set up an empire in our country have the privilege to express their democratic right in the Palestinian State? Second, how can he claim that it is difficult to convince Jewish citizens to join the liberationmovement?

  Farid al-Khatib: I think that most of the Jews living in Palestine are groups of people who were deceived by the Zionist movement and the world imperialist movement. And the Jew, as a man, has the right to expresshis opinion in a democratic manner regarding his future life after the collapse of the Zionist State, which is opposed to the Democratic State insofar as it discriminates between the Eastern Jew and the WesternJew and the Circassian Jew.

  The second point: The greatest ambition of the revolution is to draw the Jews of the Zionist State into the ranks of the resistance movement . . . . But what I wanted to say is that it is difficult to persuade the Jews to join the resistance movement because its immediate objective is to dissolve the Zionist contradiction within the Zionist State. . . .

  Representative of the Democratic Front: It seems to me that many of the disagreements that exist concerning this idea can be traced to some manner of misunderstanding or lack of communication. . . . This State is not bi-national in the sense that there would be two national States joined together in one form or another. This solution must be rejected, not only because it is inconsistent with our own desire, but also because it is not a true democratic solution. It is rather a solution that will representthe continuation of the national conflict which exists between the Jews and Arabs, not a solution of this conflict. It is impossible to speak of a democratic solution if it is powerless to eliminate the conflict betweenthe different denominations and peoples within the Democratic State. When we speak of democracy it must be clear that we do not mean liberal democracy in the manner of “one man, one vote.”

  OLD ILLUSIONS AND NEW AWARENESS

  If the number of Jews living in Israel is not reduced, then, on a national level their quantitative and qualitative weight will dilute the Arab character of the liberated state, and on a personal level there will not be sufficient room for these Jews as well as for the Palestinians who supposedly all desire to return. In order to evade these difficulties, the spokesmen in the symposium try to breathe life into old ideas: that the Jews brought to the country were misguided by Zionist deceit (Zionism therefore not being a vital need), and that they remain by coercion (criticism by Israelis of themselves and their state, in a manner unknown in Arab countries, is interpreted as a sign of hatred for the state and a desire to emigrate). On these grounds it is believed that the Jews would rejoice at the opportunity to leave. An interesting element of self-deception is added, that the Jews from Arab countries wish to return to their countries of origin. One may suspect that this illusion contains the psychological dimension of amour-propre and self-adulation: the Arabs are so good and were so kind to the Jews that it is inconceivable for the Jews not to desire ardently to return to live under their protection. However, along with these notions, there are signs of recognition that this is a false hope, and that the Jews have nowhere to return to, especially those born in the country, who will soon become the majority of the Jewish community. An attempt to grapple with these contradictory notions is most evident in the words of the as-Sa’iqa representative, who maintains at one and the same time that most Israeli Jews have nowhere to go, and yet that many will emigrate.

  The spokesmen also try to evade this problem by claiming that the Israeli Jews are not a people. Their attachment to the country is therefore weak, and the hope that they will emigrate is reinforced. Moreover, in the clash between the Jewish group, whose cohesion is supposedly religious and not national, and the group whose cohesion is national, the latter will prevail, thereby determining the character of the country. Therefore, even if a considerable Jewish community remains there will be no such thing as a partnership between two homogeneous groups, creating a bi-national state. The Democratic Front, which stresses the Palestinianism of the Democratic State more than its Arab character, also regards membership in an Arab unity as inherent in the very idea of the Democratic State, while the Iraqi organization rejects the notion of the Palestinian State and regards it at best as a district within a unified state. (For this organization, the struggle in Palestine has the value of a catalyst for the rest of the changes in Arab countries, or a spark that will ignite a revolution that will spread to all of them.) Along with these hopes of reducing the number of Jews in the Democratic State there is the notion of tipping the population scales in the Arabs’ favor by considering all Palestine Arabs, wherever they may live, as prospective citizens of the state according to an Arab Law of Return of sorts.

  All the participants in the symposium agree that the Jews do not presently constitute a people. However, the recognition gnaws at some of them that nationalism is not something static but an evolution, and as time goes on, the Jews in Israel will become consolidated into a people and a nation. Hence the conclusion that this process must be forestalled by the founding of a Palestinian State. The temporal factor thus works against the idea that the Israelis are not a people, and against the possibility of founding a Palestinian State. It is no accident that Shafiq al-Hut vigorously maintains the essential and permanent nature of the Jewish status as non-people and non-nation. According to the view presented by Arabs, only a people has the right of political self-determination and deserves a state of its own. If the Jews are indeed becoming a people, this means that they are in the process of acquiring these rights.

  AN ARAB PANDORA’S BOX

  For most of the participants, the slogan “Democratic State” is merely tactical, the aim being to give the outside world a positive impression and to enchant the Israelis who, as the speaker who describes Fatah’s views says, will only eventually discover its full meaning. For the Democratic Front this is presumably not merely a slogan, but a principle they sincerely hold as an implication of the progressivism they profess. However, even they wrestle with the slogan; they safeguard themselves by various qualifications or hedges: the state will be a member within an Arab federation, and the democracy will not be formal, nor expressed in a numerical representation, but a “true” democracy of “the contents”—that is, its policy will represent progressiveness as expressed by “the Palestinian revolution.” The final qualification is their insistence upon the precondition for establishing the Democratic State, that Israel be destroyed.

  For those who regard the slogan “Democratic State” as merely a tactic, the problem arises that it is impossible to lead the public only by tactical slogans; one must present the objectives of a national vision. While the slogan “Democratic State” may be helpful externally, it is quite destructive internally, impairs the state’s Arabism and undermines confidence in the feasibility of “returning” to the country, if it would not be evacuated. Shafiq al-Hut states bluntly that acceptance of this slogan means abandoning the idea of Arabism. From the Ar
ab viewpoint another two-fold question arises: 1) if the Jews are a people, it is doubtful whether they will consent to live in a non-Jewish state, and hence the expressed hope that they will emigrate; 2) since the Palestinians are a people, they will certainly be opposed to returning to a state which is not Arab.

  It appears that the Palestinians and Arabs are beginning to sense the difficulty of their ideological position. In the past they could be content with the formulations “restoration of rights” and “restoration of the homeland,” which were restricted to the meaning of the objective as bearing upon what would be given to the Arabs, and the implication concerning what would be taken away from the Jews was overlooked. Arab spokesmen in foreign countries are still striving to focus on the need to rectify the injustice inflicted on the Palestinians, while evading the implication of this rectification for the Jews. The necessity of defining the position in all its aspects and the debate concerning the Democratic Palestinian State undermine the Arab position. The slogan of a “Democratic State” seemed to be an escape from a genocidal position, but it was revealed as the first step of retreat, and the source of problems and bewilderment. I think it is no exaggeration to say that this slogan opened a Pandora’s box for the Arab position in the conflict. Hence the deep apprehensions of all the participants in the discussion concerning this slogan, and the dramatic agreement of everyone at the end of it that the slogan “Democratic State” is premature, even though this contradicted the previous insistence by some on the need for a clear definition of the objective.