The Old Contemptibles

by Robin Neillands

  'They showed me papers and maps,' he writes, 'copies of which they are giving me, showing in detail the area of concentration for all our Expeditionary Force. Intensely interesting. We had a long discussion. Afterwards we went through many other matters. (27)

  Quite what the French staff were doing, blithely drawing up detailed plans for the concentration of the British Army in France, is neither questioned nor examined.

  Wilson's diary contains no indication that on his return to London he passed on the details of these 'intensely interesting' discussions to his superiors in Whitehall or Downing Street. Indeed, after a few days he is off to France again, this time to make a cycle tour of the roads along and behind the eastern frontier, from the Belgian border to Verdun and Mars-la-Tour, where a most curious incident took place.

  Mars-la-Tour had been one of the battlefields of 1870 and was now dominated by a statue of 'France', 'looking as beautiful as ever,' says Wilson, 'so I laid at her feet a small bit of map I have been carrying, showing the areas of concentration of the British forces on her territory'. As John Terraine remarks, 'This was an odd procedure on many counts- not least that of security ... but its significance lay in the fact that when war came Wilson's plan for the British Army was the only one in existence.' (28)

  By the time he returned to London in October, Wilson's plans had received a most welcome boost. The obstructive Reginald McKenna had gone from the Admiralty and Winston Churchill was now First Lord. This was wonderful news; up to now the Admiralty had been less than helpful in supplying Wilson with the shipping schedules and the transport ships necessary to get the BEF to the French ports. With the dynamic Churchill- a man who shared Wilson's vision - now in the post, this part of the plan would surely forge ahead.

  There was then a small problem in Cabinet- actually a 'serious difference', according to Wilson, because those Cabinet ministers not present at the CID meeting, the 'non-interventionists', those opposed to any formal alliance with France, had now been told - probably by McKenna- of what had transpired at the August meeting and of the five-year course of the secret Franco-British conversations. The Cabinet outsiders were naturally furious and, again according to Wilson, were 'opposed to all idea of war and especially angry with me'. (29) Wilson survived the non-interventionists' displeasure and from January 1912 to August 1914 continued to work on plans to ship the BEF to France. The threat of war had faded after Agadir, but no one doubted that fresh causes would arise and there was a lot to do before the BEF could actually move - again, always supposing it was ordered to move by 'the Government of the day'.

  Meanwhile, there were some changes in the British Establishment. General Sir William Nicholson left the War Office in March 1912 and was replaced as CIGS by Field Marshal Sir John French, and Richard Haldane, the Secretary of State for War, went to the Woolsack as Lord Chancellor and was replaced at the War Office by Colonel Jack Seeley- a member of parliament as well as an army officer. Neither Colonel Seeley nor Sir John French was any match for Wilson, who had no difficulty convincing them of the validity of his plans.

  One political step taken at this time was the completion of the Anglo-French Naval Agreement of 1912, by which the Royal Navy undertook to protect the Channel coast- and therefore any troop convoys to France - while the French fleet took over the main burden of defending the Mediterranean. This agreement came about because the Kaiser, yet again, had overplayed his hand. In February 1912 Asquith sent Haldane to Berlin to urge the Germans not to proceed with further warship construction; if the Kaiser would desist from building more dreadnoughts it would greatly ease British fears and lead to a general relaxation of tension. The Kaiser would agree to this only if Britain in turn agreed to remain neutral in the event of war between Germany and France. Britain refused to accept this bargain and Haldane returned from Berlin convinced that war was only a matter of time.

  By the end of 1912 Wilson's plans for the BEF had reached the point where Joffre could tell the French Cabinet that 'L'Armée W'- so called after their stoutest ally- would consist of 145,000 men and be ready for action in France on M15; no mention was made of the necessary approval from the British Cabinet. During 1913 the process of consultation continued. Wilson was in Paris every month, 'tightening and perfecting his arrangements with the French', (30) and by the spring of 1914 these arrangements were all in place. Then came a sudden distraction.

  Ireland had been a thorn in the side of Britain's body politic for most of the nineteenth century. For the last few years it had been moving towards Home Rule, which the majority Catholic population wanted but to which the Ulster Protestants in the North, led by Sir Edward Carson, were totally opposed. Declaring that 'Home Rule meant Rome Rule', Carson had imported rifles and ammunition into Ulster and made ready to contest the Catholic majority's claim to a united Ireland, if need be by force. The British Government were determined to get the Home Rule bill through and be shot of the Irish for ever, and had no intention of letting Carson and his Orangemen get in the way.

  Therefore, in March 1914, Brigadier General Hubert Gough, commanding the 3rd Cavalry Brigade at the Curragh camp near Dublin, was ordered to issue live ammunition to his troops and prepare to march on Belfast to suppress any Loyalist attempts to resist Home Rule. Naval units were ordered into Belfast Lough, and it was hoped that this display of force and firmness would nip any trouble in the bud.

  The soldiers and sailors did not like this order. On 21 March an Army conference in Dublin discussed this order, noted the officers' objections and stated that any officer from the North could go on leave until the crisis was over. This was a limited concession; officers from any other part of the UK who opposed this act of coercion would be obliged to comply or resign their commission. The Army liked this suggestion even less, and most of the officers in the 3rd Cavalry Brigade promptly sent in their papers; they would neither take up arms against the Protestants nor support any government attempt to bully Ulster into a united Ireland. In taking this action the cavalry officers were quite right; soldiers must obey all lawful orders but no order can oblige a British soldier to deliver his fellow citizens by force into the power and jurisdiction of another country.

  The 'Curragh Incident' rumbled on for months and caused considerable dissension in Parliament and the Army until Field Marshal French, Colonel Seeley and the Adjutant General of the Army, Sir John Ewart, were obliged to resign. Prime Minister Asquith took over the War Office portfolio, but the incident led to a complete if temporary breakdown in relations between the Cabinet and the War Office.

  The incident was still at the top of Britain's political agenda on 28 June 1914, when a Serbian student shot the Archduke Franz­ Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian thrones. From that moment Europe slid inexorably towards war - and the British Government was dragged ever closer to that dreaded moment of commitment with France.

  Churchill recalls that on Friday, 24 July 1914, the Cabinet were still discussing the Irish Home Rule bill and attempting to fix the boundaries of Fermanagh and Tyrone when 'Sir Edward Grey's voice was heard, reading a document which had just been brought to him from the Foreign Office. It was the Austrian Note to Serbia.' Churchill continues: 'This Note was clearly an ultimatum,' and its arrival in Grey's hands marks the point where the British Government first realized that Europe was on a path for war.

  On 1 August, France declared war on Germany, and the situation predicted in the report of the CID subcommittee in 1909 (31) had now come to pass. The decision on whether or not to aid France had then been reserved for 'the Government of the day', which, it now transpired, was still essentially the Government of 1909. The 'necessary details' required of the General Staff in 1909 had been worked out by Henry Wilson and the moment of decision could be put off no longer. Would the British Government send the BEF to France or not?

  The Government hesitated. This hesitation, however understandable in retrospect, infuriated many people at the time.

  M. Cambon, the French ambassador, was soon asking
Sir Edward Grey whether England was 'going to wait until French territory was invaded before intervening?' ... in which case, he added, British help might be 'very belated'. As tension mounted and nerves frayed, M. Cambon's demands became ever more shrill. Reminded that the British 'commitment', in so far as it existed at all, was no more than a matter of honour, he retorted, 'Et l'honneur? Est-ce que l'Angleterre comprend ce que c'est l'honneur?' (32) Asquith's problem was that the Cabinet was split. On August, twelve out of eighteen Cabinet members declared themselves totally opposed to giving the French any assurance of British support, and there were signs of similar opposition in the House of Commons. Even so, some moves in support of France were being made. On 28 July the British Grand Fleet, assembled at Spithead, was ordered by Churchill to sail for its war stations at Scapa Flow, and other naval units were put on a war footing. However, on 1 August, when Grey asked for authority to implement the naval agreement and seal off the Channel, four members of the cabinet resigned.

  To muster Cabinet support and gain parliamentary approval, Asquith and Grey needed something more fundamental than a desire to help France in her hour of need. This was found in the 1839 treaty guaranteeing Belgian neutrality, to which Britain, France and Germany were signatories; if Germany violated the frontiers of Belgium, Asquith and Grey would have the justification they needed to put Britain in the field with France.

  Asquith's problems in Cabinet and the House of Commons were not appreciated by Henry Wilson. His plan called for the BEF to mobilize on the same day as the French Army, and as the hours and days went by Wilson became, in Callwell's words, 'seriously disturbed'. (33) On 1 August Wilson and Nicholson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, went to see Grey, and Wilson spent the rest of that day moving ceaselessly between the War Office, the French Embassy and the Foreign Office - by the evening he was 'very pessimistic, all countries mobilising except us'.

  On that day Germany declared war on Russia, Belgium mobilized her army and General Joffre went to the French Minister of War and asked permission to begin a general mobilization at midnight. Britain then asked the French government if the French Army would respect the neutrality of Belgium, and a similar query went to Berlin. The French replied that no French soldier would cross the Belgian frontier. Germany made no reply at all, knowing that her advance brigades were in Luxembourg and already close to or over the Belgian frontier.

  Brigadier Wilson was by now frantic. Everyone knew- for had he not told them?- that Britain must mobilize at the same time as the French; now the French reservists were rushing to their depots and Asquith still refused to order the BEF to France. The Royal Navy would protect French shipping and Channel ports against aggression but the French wanted the immediate commitment of a British Expeditionary Force and muttered about British perfidy when the troops did not arrive. The hours and then the days went by, and still the BEF did not move.

  With the rest of Europe mobilizing, diplomatic attention now turned to London, where Asquith and the Cabinet were still deliberating. The Foreign Secretary was coming under considerable pressure from the French ambassador, M. Cambon, while in Berlin the British ambassador, Sir Edward Groschen, was coming under similar pressure from the German Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg. M. Cambon wanted the British to come out in support of France and send troops to the Continent at once. Germany, said Bethmann-Hollweg, wanted Britain to stay neutral, declaring that Britain should not intervene in a continental quarrel 'just for a word, neutrality- just for a scrap of paper'- his term for that 1839 treaty that guaranteed Belgian neutrality.

  On the afternoon of 3 August Sir Edward Grey went to Parliament and presented the government's position to the House of Commons. His task was difficult for he was, says Barbara Tuchman, 'committed to support France by virtue of something that was not a commitment'. (34) Therefore, in presenting his case to Parliament, Grey wisely decided to come clean about past actions and events.

  He told members about the long-running staff 'conversations' and about the British naval agreement with France. He admitted that there was no treaty requiring Britain to aid France in the event of war but urged consideration of 'British interests, British honour and British obligations', asking the House whether Britain could stand by while Belgium was overrun. Finally, Grey presented members with a choice- the issue was the neutrality of Belgium, the choice was to intervene or do nothing. Amid loud applause and the waving of order papers, the House signified its support for war if the German Army did not withdraw from Belgium within twenty-four hours.

  This support was not unanimous. Two leaders of the Labour Party, Ramsay MacDonald and Keir Hardie, spoke out against further involvement, MacDonald opting for neutrality, Keir Hardie taking the line adopted by many European socialists at this time - total opposition to war on any grounds. Nevertheless, Grey carried the day; two of the four Cabinet members who had resigned that morning agreed to return and an ultimatum was sent to Berlin, requiring Germany to halt the invasion of Belgium by midnight Continental Time on 4 August- 11 p.m. in Britain- or face war with Great Britain.

  On 4 August, Germany informed the Belgian government that German troops would march through Belgium, using force if necessary to clear their path. In fact this move had already begun; German troops were already exchanging fire with Belgian troops and would soon be shooting Belgian civilians allegedly for acting as guerrillas- francs-tireurs- and slowing their progress through the country. That afternoon the British government ordered general mobilization and sent out telegrams recalling all reservists to the Colours. No reply was received to Britain's ultimatum, and at 11 p.m. (2300 hours) on 4 August 1914, Britain was at war with Germany.

  The delivery of the ultimatum, the general mobilization and the declaration of war led to an immediate flurry of activity- closely resembling panic - in both Downing Street and the War Office. Britain had entered the war or was about to do so, but what would happen now and what action should be taken? Fortunately, the chief secretary to the cabinet, Maurice Hankey, had long since prepared a 'War Book', a fat volume covering the actions every Government department needed to take on the outbreak of war.

  This War Book went into the greatest detail. It included proclamtions that needed only the King's signature, detailed plans for the dispatch of telegrams to reservists via the Post Office, orders for the immediate requisition of trains and boats- and horses-and warrants for the arrest of known spies. Nothing had been neglected, and every department of state knew what to do, but inevitably there were flaws. The most notable was in the orders for the dispatch of the BEF to France. These ordered the troops 'to mobilise' but failed to add the words, 'and embark'.

  This flaw enraged Brigadier General Wilson. According to his plan, the BEF should already have mobilized and be on its way to the ports. Now it could not even begin to move until 5 August at the earliest- five days behind his long-prepared schedule- and in military matters delay is often followed by dissent. So it was here. Wilson's plan dictated that the BEF should consist of six divisions - the entire British Army in the United Kingdom, less the Territorial force. Now the Government prevaricated yet again, unable to face the prospect of totally denuding the country of its prime means of defence- though Winston Churchill was sure that the Royal Navy alone could deter any possible aggressor.

  The lack of a War Minister since Seeley's resignation four months previously was resolved on 4 August when Lord Kitchener -Kitchener of Khartoum, Britain's most distinguished soldier - was located boarding a ferry at Dover on his way back to Egypt, and was summoned back to London and offered the post of Secretary of State for War. Kitchener accepted and took up his new position on 6 August- so adding another opinion to the BEF debate.

  Although the post of Secretary of State for War was a political appointment, Kitchener was on the active Army List. His selection as War Minister was to cause problems, not least for Wilson and the newly-appointed commander of the BEF, Field Marshal Sir John French, who had now been recalled to duty. Kitchener was an auto
crat, a soldier rather than an administrator, and a poor conciliator of opposing views. On the face of it he was ill-suited to his task, but he took up his new duties at once and flung himself into the job of expanding the British Army and the munitions industry that supported it. His first decisions as War Minister showed sound judgement, and the decisions he took in his first weeks in office would serve Britain well in the years ahead.

  His first proposal was to keep two Regular divisions in Britain-a decision that naturally infuriated Henry Wilson. Kitchener was also one of the few people in Britain to realize that this war would be a long one- Haig was another- and that Britain would need to raise and train armies running into millions, create a munitions industry and prepare for a conflict that might last for years. Trained soldiers, officers and NCO instructors were essential for this process and must not all be sent to France. In both these conclusions Kitchener was quite correct. His next decision, that the Territorial force was not a suitable medium for the raising of vast new armies, was at best debatable and probably wrong.

  The final decisions in this eight-year-long, pre-war saga, were taken at a War Council meeting in Downing Street at 4 p.m. (1600 hours) on 5 August. Those present included almost everyone with a point of view, including the elderly Field Marshal Lord Roberts and Henry Wilson, whose diary gives some idea of the proceedings:

  Asquith stated that he had summoned the great soldiers at the earliest possible moment. Then a lot of platitudes on the situation and strategy generally. Winston said the Dover Straits were now completely sealed. Jimmy Grierson spoke up for decisive numbers at the decisive point. Sir John French said we should go over at once and decide destination later. Haig asked questions and this led to our discussing strategy like idiots.