The Old Contemptibles

by Robin Neillands

  This first march, although short by comparison with those that were to follow, was not easily accomplished. The weather was hot and the cobbled roads of northern France proved a hardship to soft feet in stiff, newly issued boots. Smith-Dorrien's II Corps led the way with the 3rd Division on the right and the 5th Division on the left, followed by Haig's I Corps, 1st Division on the right and 2nd Division on the left, both corps screened by regiments from Allenby's Cavalry Division. During the afternoon the weather cleared and RFC patrols - already proving their worth - spotted a large German cavalry formation, with some infantry and guns, moving through Nivelles, 32 kilometres (20 miles) north-east of Mons. These were later identified as coming from the 9th Cavalry Division of von Kluck's army, and during the day two more cavalry divisions were spotted, the 2nd and 4th, the three making up General von der Marwitz's 1st Cavalry Corps.

  If this information was correct it implied that von Kluck's First Army was now coming south in force - a theory validated when von Bulow's Second Army was confirmed as being in action against the Fifth Army on the BEF's right. A total of seven German regular corps with four reserve corps were now somewhere to the north of the BEF, but in which direction were they heading? Von Bulow's men were in action against Lanrezac's forces to the east, but it seemed probable that as von Kluck's units came on the fighting would spread west, round that half-open flank. This being so, Field Marshal French was anxious to take up position west of Mons on the line of the Mons-Condé Canal, a waterway that offered a good defensive line- though the orders issued on the night of 21 August assumed that the BEF would cross the canal the next day, following Joffre's orders to advance to the north.

  The BEF's first encounter with the enemy came soon after dawn on 22 August. A patrol of the 4th Dragoon Guards of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade bumped into a German picket north of Obourg; after a brief exchange of fire the enemy fled. The dragoons followed up this success, bumped into a still larger enemy force and again engaged it, killing four and capturing three of the enemy before they were driven back by rifle fire. British and German cavalry continued to bicker north of the Mons-Condé canal for the rest of the day and although none had been seen, the British cavalry were left with the strong impression that large bodies of enemy infantry could not be far away; the cavalry had clearly been scouting the ground for the infantry. Later reports from Sordet's French cavalry and RFC patrols to the north confirmed this impression. Strong enemy forces were coming on; just how strong they were and where exactly they were heading remained to be seen- the best estimate on 22 August was that a full infantry corps was out there somewhere, heading in a south-westerly direction via Soignies.

  Meanwhile, screened by the cavalry, the infantry of the BEF's I and II Corps were advancing north. By the evening of 22 August the BEF was in position around Mons, the I Corps on the right, Smith-Dorrien's II Corps on the left; this put the II Corps in Mons itself, with its brigades and battalions spread out along the south bank of the Mons-Condé Canal, occupying a front of some 18 kilometres (11 miles), with Allenby's Cavalry Division covering their flank to the west.

  During the day the position on the northern French frontier gradually became clear. Two German corps- one of them the formidable Guards Corps - plus a Guards cavalry division from von Bulow's Second Army were engaged with the Fifth Army along the line of the Sambre, and the Fifth Army was in the process of being driven back. Sordet's French cavalry corps on the BEF's left, or western, flank had also fallen back and were now some 16 kilometres (10 miles) to the rear of the BEF line. This was a far from happy situation; if the Germans arrived now the British would be caught in an exposed salient and open to attack on the left, right and centre.

  Moreover, the Germans were coming on; some 50,000 German soldiers of the VII Corps were between Nivelles and Charleroi. Another corps, probably the IX Corps, was south of Soignies, and yet another, the II Corps, was moving on Landeuse, north-west of Condé. This force, plus two cavalry divisions, was closing inexorably on the BEF.

  This information did not arrive at French's HQ in one intelligence estimate; it trickled in over the day. Some of it was of doubtful provenance, some of it was speculative and some of it was duplicated, but the overall impression was accurate; a large German army was rolling south and the BEF was now 16 kilometres (10 miles) - a day's march- ahead of any French help and right in the German path.

  That evening Field Marshal French held a conference at his headquarters in Le Cateau. The position was fully discussed and the decision made that no further advance was possible at this time. General Lanrezac had meanwhile requested that the British attack into the right flank of the German forces currently attacking the Fifth Army, a request to which the field marshal was unable to accede, although he did agree that the BEF should hold its present positions for another twenty-four hours.

  The BEF's peril was eased somewhat by the fact that von Kluck was equally confused about the strength and position - even the very presence- of the BEF, whose appearance on the First Army's front that morning had come as a complete and unpleasant surprise. That surprise would intensify the following day when von Kluck's advancing battalions ran into the BEF, entrenched and well concealed in positions around the Belgian town of Mons.

  The Battle of Mons 23 August 1914

  The battalion is a mere wreck, my proud, beautiful battalion. Our first battle is a heavy, an unheard of heavy defeat, and against the English, the English we laughed at.

  Hauptmann Walter Bloem, Vormarsch, 1919

  Mons is a small Belgian town, close to the northern frontier of France and capital of the province of Hainault. With a population of around 30,000 people, in 1914 it served as the business and market centre for the surrounding villages, where most of the population were involved in coal mining. As a result of this long-established industry, the main physical feature of the Mons area was numerous, towering slag heaps -crassiers -and the Mons-Condé canal, an industrial waterway 20 metres wide and 2 metres deep, which runs through the town from the River Sambre and west for 24 kilometres (15 miles) to the town of Condé.

  The country around Mons is flat, partially wooded, scattered with hamlets and isolated farmhouses, seamed with ditches and streams and dotted with ponds. Visibility in any direction is restricted by clumps of woodland, with only a limited amount of high ground on the tops of the slag heaps offering observation points for artillery observers. Mons is, in short, a bad place in which to fight a battle.

  The Official History describes Mons as 'one huge unsightly village, traversed by cobbled roads and overlooked by pit heads and slag heaps, often over 100 ft high. It is a close and blind country such as no army had yet been called upon to fight in against a civilised enemy in a great campaign.' (1)

  One point the Official History neglects to make is that the real problem for the BEF on 23 August was a shortage of troops to defend such a long front along the Mons-Condé canal - over 32 kilometres (20 miles) when their line was extended east to circle Mons itself. In addition, the Condé canal, curving round to the north of Mons, puts any troops lining the south bank into a salient which an enemy coming from the north could bring under rifle and artillery fire from three sides.

  On coming up to visit his forward troops, Horace Smith­Dorrien saw immediately that, in spite of the canal, the 'Mons salient' was not defensible. He therefore proposed preparing a second, shorter defence line, a mile or so south of the canal, and digging in there. Field Marshal French, on the other hand, regarded the canal as a useful barrier that should not be quickly abandoned. Both were correct but, clearly, the canal position, and especially the Mons salient, could not be held for long if attacked by a superior force.

  To protect the II Corps' left flank, the newly formed 19th Infantry Brigade, made up of the 2nd Royal Welch Fusiliers, 1st Scottish Rifles, 1st Middlesex and 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders - battalions originally tasked to work on the lines of communication, while remaining under force command, the commanding brigadier reporting to French
rather than Smith­Dorrien- was therefore attached to II Corps and positioned to provide the link- a rather loose link- with the French 84th Territorial Division farther west. II Corps then dug in along the canal and around the Mons salient, while Haig's I Corps extended the BEF line east and south from Mons, their trenches and positions facing east between the Bois Haut position and the village of Grand Reng, where they formed another loose link with the French Fifth Army to the east.

  The Fifth Army was already in trouble. When the BEF arrived on their flank the Fifth Army divisions were engaged in what became known as the Battle of Charleroi, opposing the advance of von Bulow's Second Army, and ignoring Joffre's orders to join the Third and Fourth Armies in an all-out attack on the German line. Writing of the events of 21 August, Edward Spears, the British liaison officer with the Fifth Army, records:

  I was in the 2ème Bureau, going through the most recent intelligence reports, when General Lanrezac walked in. He began to talk of what the Germans were doing and he was always interesting when he talked like this for he was a brilliant speaker.

  Presently he went on to talk of the situation of his own Army ... he had not been speaking long before my interest changed to amazement and my amazement to incredulity. Pointing to the line held by the Fifth Army south of the Sambre and expatiating on its strength, he was saying it would be madness for troops in such strong defensive positions to abandon these and attack ... From that moment I felt that whatever orders he might receive, General Lanrezac would be most unwilling to attack.

  I was aghast as I thought of how this would affect the British ... that the enemy's corps believed to be slipping across its front would fall with full force on the British, who numbered some 80,000 men, whilst General Lanrezac, commanding a quarter of a million men, stood by with folded arms. (2)

  Spears is being a little unfair to General Lanrezac. His army was already being threatened by von Bulow's force, and Lanrezac knew that von Kluck was out there to the north and about to enter the fray; at such a time it would have been hard for any general to pay too much attention to the problems of his tardy allies.

  Several points need to be considered here. First, the composition of the 19th Infantry Brigade, made up of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of some famous regiments; the other BEF brigades were also composed of regular battalions. Second, the so-called Mons salient - this would prove to be the crux of the Battle of Mons; if the salient fell or holding it proved too costly, II Corps would have to pull back from the line along the Condé canal. Finally, the distance and communications problem; from Smith­Dorrien's advance HQ at Sars-la-Bruyère, eight kilometres (five miles) south of the canal, communication with units along the canal and with Field Marshal French's GHQ at Le Cateau, 40 kilometres (25 miles) to the rear, was poor, other than by staff car or motorcycle courier.

  There had been no time for the Royal Engineer sappers - the Signals Corps had not yet been formed- to lay out land lines and establish field telephone links either along the 32-kilometre (20 mile) front held by II Corps or between the divisions, corps and GHQ - and the French telephone network was neither extensive nor reliable in 1914 The chronic problem of battlefield communications, which would dog the actions of army commanders for much of the First World War, made an early appearance here during the BEF's first engagement.

  Intelligence was also poor, not least on the strength and movements of the enemy. The BEF marched up to the canal on Saturday, 22 August, arriving in position in the early afternoon, the first BEF encounter with the enemy taking place at dawn that day when a patrol from 'C' Squadron of the 4th Royal Irish Dragoon Guards, led by a Captain Hornby, charged a group of Germans from the 2nd Kuirassiers near Casteau, killing several.

  This skirmish attracted little attention. The troops that marched on to the canal had little idea of what lay before them and were not greatly worried about the future anyway. Arriving around Mons they dug in, screened their positions from view, cleaned their rifles, examined their feet, treated their blisters, lit their pipes or cigarettes and awaited further orders or the arrival of the enemy; what would happen now was a problem for Field Marshal French and his divisional commanders.

  This brief pause before the enemy arrived gave French time to work up the first of many resentments against both his superior officer, Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, and his newly arrived subordinate, Horace Smith-Dorrien, both of whom now provided a focus for his ever simmering anger. French was jealous of his position as commander-in-chief of the BEF and regarded the right to choose his own corps commanders as a perquisite of command. Kitchener had not only ignored his particular request for Lieutenant General Plumer but had sent out an officer French personally detested. The first indications of French's deeply ingrained enmity towards Smith­Dorrien would appear shortly, but for the moment he was more concerned with the actions of his latest enemy, General Lanrezac.

  As the BEF marched towards the canal on 22 August, Lanrezac's Fifth Army on their right flank had begun to withdraw, forced back from the Sambre by the weight of von Bulow's Second Army. There was no alternative to this, and the withdrawal was not Lanrezac's fault; his army had been forced back by enemy pressure on his front and right flank. The result of this pressure was the curious situation of the BEF marching north and the French Fifth Army moving south. German pressure was clearly building up from the north and east on both the BEF and the Fifth Army, but information reaching the Allied HQs -Joffre's, Lanrezac's and French's - was scanty, often confused and frequently ignored. On the evening of 22 August, having declined the request from Lanrezac that the BEF should advance and attack the flank of the Second Army, French told his corps commanders that while there would be no further advance he had agreed to hold the BEF on the canal for another twenty-four hours until the position was more clear. (3)

  However, there are indications that the Germans were equally in the dark over the dispositions, or even the presence, of the BEF in France and Belgium. A German General Staff intelligence estimate on the evening of 22 August stated that 'disembarkation of the English at Boulogne and their employment from the direction of Lille must be reckoned with ...but the opinion here, however, is that large disembarkations have not taken place'. (4) The following day, 23 August, German intelligence reported the presence of an English cavalry squadron at Casteau, 10 kilometres (six miles) north-east of Mons, and an aircraft of the 5th Squadron, RFC, was shot down near Enghien. (5) The intelligence report concludes that 'the presence of the English on our front was thus established, although nothing was known of their strength'. (6)

  Von Kluck's main fear at this time was that the British would appear on his flank as the First Army surged south and west into France; the possibility that they would appear to his front, entrenched and ready to give battle, had not occurred to him. Indeed, when the 2nd Battalion of the 12th Grenadier Regiment of the German III Corps reached Badour, three kilometres (two miles) north of the Mons-Condé canal, at noon on 23 August, they reported that there was no enemy within 50 miles. This impression did not last; shortly afterwards two German hussars galloped into their lines, covered with blood and shouting that the enemy occupied the line of the canal to their front.

  It therefore appears that on the morning of 23 August the fog of war was affecting both sides on the Belgian frontier. Allenby's troopers, moving on the left flank of the BEF, had already bumped into German cavalry and were reporting back that strong German forces seemed to be somewhere to their front, but their reports, like those received from RFC observers, were either ignored or discounted at French's HQ. French was waiting to hear from either Fifth Army HQ or Joffre at GQG- and until he had firm orders to the contrary he intended to stay where he was along the canal, neither advancing nor retreating.

  In fact, his situation was already grave. The left flank of the BEF was now largely 'in the air', fully open to the enemy with nothing to screen it but a division of French Territorial troops and General Sordet's small but willing French cavalry corps. This force had entered B
elgium on 6 August to check on German moves south of the Meuse and had ridden as far as Liège before turning back, the troopers wearing their horses out in the process; unlike the British cavalry, the French rarely dismounted to march on foot. Sordet was also sending back reports of strong German forces crossing the Sambre. All this should have rung alarm bells at the Field Marshal's HQ, alerting him to strong enemy forces to his front and on his left flank.

  No such bells rang. French was far more concerned with the situation on his right flank, where the BEF was now 16 kilometres (10 miles) ahead of the French Fifth Army ... and the more the Fifth Army withdrew or the BEF advanced, the wider that gap would become.

  For the BEF to wheel right into von Bulow's Army, as Lanrezac had requested, meant exposing its flank to the advancing Germans coming in from the north. This would have been a risky manoeuvre at any time, but on the night of 22/23 August Lanrezac informed Joffre that, far from being fourteen kilometres (nine miles) out in front, with German forces lapping at its flanks, the BEF was actually 'echeloned in rear of 5th Army'. This statement, which was obvious nonsense, indicates either that chaos was rife or that communications were non-existent between the BEF and Lanrezac's HQ. This situation was about to get worse as the German threat became a reality.

  In his diary entry for 22 August, Wilson writes: 'There is no doubt we are a little in the air; but Maubeuge on our right rear relieves from anxiety. How badly the [French] X Corps has been handled we don't know, but rather badly we gather. When they fell back they lost touch with Namur. Reports today said Namur would fall tomorrow but I can't believe it. Altogether the day has not been satisfactory, although nothing serious has happened. I wish I could have got Sir John to go and see Lanrezac. It is of great importance that they should understand each other.' (7) On the following day Callwell records that 'the BEF held its ground at Mons while the French Fifth Army gave way along the whole of its front'.