The Old Contemptibles

by Robin Neillands

  The decisive point in the week-long retreat from Mons came on 30 August, when the Field Marshal informed Joffre and Kitchener that he intended to withdraw the BEF from the Allied line to some­ where south of Paris and keep it there until, in his opinion, it was rested and re-equipped and again ready for battle. His report to Kitchener, justifying this decision, stated: 'I feel very seriously the absolute necessity for retaining in my hands complete independ­ ence of action and power to retire towards my base should circumstances render it necessary.' (5)

  This blunt declaration caused considerable consternation in London and Paris. Joffre called on the French War Minister, M. Millerand, to intervene, and Millerand took this request to President Poincare, who immediately contacted the British ambassador, Sir Francis Bertie, who passed on their appeals to London. Within hours, frantic messages from the French and British Governments came pouring into GHQ, urging French to keep the BEF in the line; should he carry out his stated intention, a wide gap would appear in the Allied front and the coming Marne counter-attack would be in serious jeopardy.

  It would probably be unfair to attribute French's decision on withdrawal simply to pique with his French allies - though his memoirs give that as one of the reasons. (6) French certainly believed that the situation he imagined actually existed- that his army was unable to fight, was sorely tried and in need of rest and resupply. This situation took some time to remedy; writing of the situation a month later, Frank Richards recalls: 'Our clothes were beginning to show signs of wear, though, and some of the men were wearing civilian trousers which they had scrounged. A lot of us had no caps; (7) I was wearing a handkerchief knotted at the four corners, the only headgear I was to wear for some time. We looked a rag­time lot but in good spirits and ready for anything that turned up. About eighty per cent of us were Birmingham men; I never saw better soldiers or wished for better pals.' (8)

  It is perfectly true that the troops were very tired after their gruelling march from Mons, were in less than perfect order and in need of rest and reinforcement. It is not true, as French apparently believed, that they were unable to fight or, indeed, in a worse state than their French allies or their German opponents. If anything, the men were fitter, their boots were 'broken in' and causing fewer blisters, the supply situation was improving and on 30 August Lieutenant General Pulteney arrived to form III Corps, which consisted initially of the 4th Division and the 19th Infantry Brigade, pending the imminent arrival of the 6th Division, which had now been ordered to France.

  The Field Marshal discounted these encouraging facts and pursued his intention to withdraw in spite of numerous appeals to hold fast. 'The demand that we should stand and fight was not only urgently repeated', fie writes, 'but was actually backed by imperative messages from the French President, and from Lord Kitchener and the British Government.' (9) There was also an appeal from General Joffre, startled out of his customary calm and busy preparing his counter-stroke against the enemy. Joffre begged the Field Marshal 'not to retire too rapidly and at least contain the enemy on the British front', but French's reply to all these appeals was a blunt refusal. (10)

  Appeals having failed, some personal contact was called for. By now thoroughly alarmed, the Cabinet duly dispatched Field Marshal Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War, to Paris to confer with French - and change his mind. The situation was critical, so no time was lost; Kitchener arrived in Paris before dawn on 1 September and summoned French for an urgent conference at the British embassy.

  Kitchener left no account of this meeting so again one is forced to rely on Field Marshal French's account, which proves damning enough. The meeting began with a typically petulant display of temper when French objected to Kitchener appearing in uniform. French chose to regard Kitchener's appearance in this dress as an attempt by the Secretary of State for War to overawe him and, he says, Kitchener, 'from the outset of his conversation assumed the air of a Commander-in-Chief'. That Kitchener was also a Field Marshal and fully entitled to wear uniform in wartime - and habitually wore uniform in London - did not impress the BEF's thin-skinned commander.

  Then, again according to French, having heard the Field Marshal's assertion that his force was exhausted and short of equipment and supplies, Kitchener 'announced his intention of taking the field and inspecting the troops'. Given the situation and French's claims, this seems a perfectly reasonable request but - again according to French - it aroused the ire of Lord Bertie, the British ambassador. French tells us that Bertie 'stated his views', but fails to tell us what these views were- presumably an endorsement of French's position - or why the ambassador chose to involve himself in a purely military matter that was none of his business, and was not equally concerned with the state of the troops. French's manner was now so close to insolence that Kitchener suggested they retire to another room and continue their meeting in private.

  When the two Field Marshals were alone, according to French, ‘I told him what was on my mind. I said that the command in France had been entrusted to me by His Majesty's Government and I alone was responsible for whatever happened and that on French soil my authority as regards the British Army must be supreme until I was legally superseded by the same authority which had put that responsibility on me. I further remarked that Lord Kitchener's presence in France in the character of a soldier could have no other effect than to weaken and prejudice my position in the eyes of the French and my own countrymen alike ... and while I valued his advice I would not tolerate any interference with my executive command and authority as long as His Majesty's Government chose to retain me in my pre­ sent position ...we finally came to an amicable understanding.’ (11)

  Assuming that any of this is true, the outcome was certainly an understanding; that it was amicable is extremely doubtful. Kitchener was a man who did not suffer fools at all, let alone gladly, and his ire when aroused was both fearful to behold and hard to endure. It is probable that he brushed French's objections aside and gave his subordinate a blunt order- to do as he was told or resign. Kitchener did not leave an account of this discussion, and by the time French's account came out in 1919 he had been dead for three years. However, the best indication of what actually happened in that meeting comes not from French's arrogant bluster in 1919 but from subsequent events in 1914.

  At 1930 hours on 1 September, Kitchener cabled the Cabinet with the news that 'French's troops are now engaged in the line and will remain there, conforming to the movements of the French Army'. (12) By the time that cable was dispatched French had already written to Joffre suggesting that the BEF take up a defensive line along the Marne and hold that 'for as long as the situation requires, provided our flanks are not exposed'. Two days later, on 3 September, French, having received a copy of Kitchener's cable to the cabinet, confirmed that: 'I fully understand your instruc tions ... I am in full accord with Joffre and the French.' (13) Naturally, no mention of these later communications appears in the Field Marshal's memoirs, published in 1919, and the Official History did not appear until 1922, but all the evidence suggests that Kitchener overruled French's decision of 30 August and ordered the Field Marshal to keep his troops in the line- or else.

  Kitchener should have gone farther; Field Marshal French should have been sacked on the spot. His arrogant assumption that once a general has been given command of an army he can do what he likes with it is ludicrous. That, plus his showing in command so far, should have been grounds for instant dismissal; by 1 September there was ample evidence that French was failing to provide the BEF with the necessary leadership and was reluctant to cooperate with his French allies.

  Joffre was quick to sack any French general who failed to measure up to the demands of the situation. In spite of his successes at Guise and St Quentin, General Lanrezac was sacked on 3 September and replaced by General Franchet d'Esperey, and the same harsh but necessary measures should have been taken against Field Marshal French. As it was, this action was delayed until another year had passed and a great number of live
s had been lost, but the British Army is notoriously reluctant to sack failing or incompetent commanders and for now Field Marshal French remained in post.

  He was also nursing a new range of resentments. Six days later, in the middle of the Battle of the Marne, when he might have had more important matters to worry about, French was writing to Winston Churchill, again expressing his resentment at Kitchener for wearing uniform and wanting to see the troops.

  While this matter was being settled the retreat from Mons continued. On 1 September, as related, while Kitchener and French were at odds in Paris, the cavalry and RHA were in action at Nery and I Corps clashed with the enemy at Villers-Cotterêts. On that day also the two corps of the BEF, separated for almost a week after passing the Forêt de Mormal, finally regained contact - another boost to morale. Many of the problems the BEF experienced at this time - not least the supply of food and ammunition - may have been due to the chronic lack of reliable communications.

  Lieutenant-General Sir William Robertson, then QMG of the Expeditionary Force, refers to the problem in his memoirs:

  The maintenance of communications on the Western Front, particularly in the forward areas, was very difficult owing to heavy shellfire, mud and exposure and as no one means could be relied on many alternative methods had to be provided. Telegraph and telephone by wire and cable, wireless telegraphy, telegraphy through the ground, (power buzzer), visual signalling with electric lamps, helio and flags, carrier pigeons, messenger dogs, message-carrying rockets, firework signals, despatch riders, mounted orderlies, cyclists and finally runners, were all employed in turn, according to circumstances. (14)

  Robertson is describing the situation after the Western Front settled down, but during the retreat from Mons the problem was compounded by the fact that GHQ moved frequently and the various Corps and Division HQs moved daily - if not more often - while the front-line units were widely dispersed and the roads crowded with refugees. Since good communications are vital to command and control, this problem may account for some of Field Marshal French's various errors and confusions, but he made no real effort to find out what was going on - and appeared particularly uninterested in the affairs of II Corps, unless they provided an excuse for criticizing Smith-Dorrien.

  Even his own memoirs contribute to an impression that the size and violence of this war exceeded the field marshal's ability to command, and there can be no doubt that far too much attention was devoted to brooding over the presence of his unwanted subordinate. Where Smith-Dorrien is involved, even tactical victories such as Mons should be discounted. According to French's memoirs, the German forces opposing Smith-Dorrien at Mons- two army corps and a cavalry division, six full divisions by the German count - are fictitious; the battle becomes a mere skirmish with German cavalry patrols. Smith-Dorrien is criticized for evacuating the Mons salient, though a glance at any map reveals that this position was untenable once the enemy advanced.

  It is also interesting, and somewhat ironic, that the pages of French's regrettable memoir, spattered with complaints about Horace Smith-Dorrien, devote considerable praise to the actions of Douglas Haig and I Corps, a unit that was hardly troubled during the retreat from Mons- certainly not in comparison with the problems encountered by Smith-Dorrien's troops.

  The irony is that French's main internal enemy in 1914 was Lieutenant-General Sir Douglas Haig, who was keeping a con­ stant and critical eye on his wayward superior. On hearing of French's appointment to the BEF, Haig's first- and entirely justifiable - reaction was that French was not the man to command Britain's only field army in this kind of war. By September, with a month's experience of French in the field, Haig was openly informing anyone who would listen that French was not up to the job; if unaware of this in 1914, French must have known of Haig's perfidy by 1918 when he started writing his memoirs, but none of this mattered. In his antipathy, if in nothing else, French was consistent; if destroying the reputation of Horace Smith-Dorrien required showering praise on the slippery Douglas Haig, so be it.

  On 1 September 1914, Joffre made the decision that was to reverse French fortunes and give the generalissimo his enduring reputation as the saviour of France. Joffre has had numerous critics, but not even the most dedicated will deny that by keeping his nerve in the midst of apparent disaster, by remustering his forces and biding his time, Joffre saved France from defeat in 1914. A general's true abilities often arise from a combination of competence and character. It was Joffre's character - steady, dour, unflappable which saved the situation in August 1914, when the Germans were powering forward in unexpected numbers and threatening to prise the French armies apart.

  As for his decision to attack the German forces on the Marne, this must rank as one of the most critical in any war. Indeed, according to Liddell Hart, 'Germany lost the war when she lost this battle'. (15)

  Given that the war went on for another four years and consumed a great number of lives, this claim seems a little extreme, but Liddell Hart makes a good point. Germany's entire strategy required a rapid victory and, as related, that depended on defeating France in six weeks and then turning on Russia. If the Schlieffen Plan could deliver that outcome Germany would avoid 'encirclement' - a war on two fronts - and achieve mastery of Europe. Now, clearly, the Schlieffen Plan had failed, the French, Russian and British armies were still in the field, and the French, far from being defeated, were about to strike back on the Marne.

  As with the Schlieffen Plan, the essence of the Marne offensive was time- or timing. Joffre had to wait until the Sixth Army was in position, his front stabilized, the German supply lines fully extended - all this aided by von Kluck's decision to abandon the plan and turn east north of Paris. While waiting until the time was ripe was essential, the Marne counter-stroke, delivered on 6 September, could not have been delayed much longer. On 2 September the French government fled to Bordeaux, and with the French armies falling back everywhere and Paris threatened the crisis point of the war had arrived.

  It can be argued, with the benefit of hindsight, that the French situation was not as desperate as it then appeared, for the enemy too were failing. The German soldiers were exhausted, at the limits of their endurance, and could not keep up the pace of recent days; they had been marching and fighting for five weeks without rest. The weariest of all were the soldiers of von Kluck's army on the far west wing, who had marched over 480 kilometres (300 miles) in that time and fought at Mons, Le Cateau, St Quentin and Guise, and in large and small skirmishes almost every day. 'The men stagger forward, their faces coated in dust, their uniforms ragged, like living scarecrows. They march with their eyes shut, singing to keep themselves from falling asleep on the march. The prospect of victory and of a triumphal entry into Paris alone keeps them going; without this certainty of victory they would fall exhausted.' (16)

  From its inception the Schlieffen Plan had placed too heavy a burden on the German infantry. It had been pointed out to von Schlieffen that heavily laden soldiers could not march so far without regular rest and resupply but since- to make the timings work- they had to cover that distance within that time, the problem was simply ignored by von Schlieffen. It surfaced again on the cobbled roads of France in August 1914.

  Quite apart from the requirements outlined above, Joffre was holding back because he was still not fully aware of what the German armies were doing. One thing the Germans were not doing- an omission that would have dire consequences later- was to extend their front as far as possible to the west and come south, sweeping all before them. 'Let the last man on the right brush the Channel with his sleeve,' von Schlieffen had declared. The German right wing had failed to follow this precept, partly because of the necessity to leave several divisions at Antwerp, partly because of a desire to round up the BEF and the French left wing. The result left a large area of north-west France untaken and available for exploitation, and von Kluck compounded this strategic error, this departure from the plan, by swinging his army to the east.

  Allied aircraft ha
d been following the divergent paths of the German First and Second Armies for some days, and Joffre's decision to attack was finally initiated on 1 September - that day of dramatic events - when a cavalry patrol found documents on the body of a German officer revealing the dispositions and intentions of the German First Army. These were rushed to GQG and Joffre learned for the first time exactly what the German armies were trying to do.

  Joffre's previous shift of forces to the left wing and the creation of the Sixth Army under General Michel-Joseph Maunoury were now about to pay off. Joffre had also ensured total cooperation and a rapid response to his attack order by placing General Maunoury under the command of General Joseph-Simon Gallieni, the Military Governor of Paris. This shrewd move stopped Gallieni's constant complaints to President Poincare that the defence of Paris was being neglected, and obliged him to support the Sixth Army with the men and resources of the Paris garrison when the counter­attack began on the Marne.

  However, it is important to understand that even before von Kluck swung his army east, Joffre had intended to group several corps from the Third and Fourth Armies on the left flank and, together with the Fifth Army and the BEF, strike hard at the inner flanks of the German First and Second Armies, hoping to split them in two. The newly captured documents from the German staff officer revealed that von Kluck was about to abandon the Schlieffen Plan, and this offered Joffre a far more tempting prospect - that of striking these forces in the flank as they moved across his front.

  By 2 September, von Kluck was faced with a stark choice. There was a widening gap between his army and the Second Army on his left; he could carry out his orders and continue to the west of Paris or follow his military instincts by maintaining contact with von Bulow's army. Moreover, as related, on r September his forces had bumped into the British at Villers-Cotterêts and it was abundantly clear that the gap between the two German armies was providing­ or soon would provide - the BEF or the French with an opportunity to advance and split the German right wing in two. This must not happen so, opting for the second course - a decision that Helmuth von Moltke promptly endorsed - von Kluck started to swing east to maintain contact with von Bulow, thereby exposing his flank to the French counter-attack. This attack took place between 6 and 9 September, either side of the River Marne.