The Old Contemptibles

by Robin Neillands

  The general strategy employed during the Race to the Sea is easily grasped. Each side was attempting to outmarch the other, get around the northern flank of the opposing force, and then turn south to 'roll up' the enemy line. The problem was that neither side could quite do it. Early-twentieth-century armies had weight but lacked mobility. They relied on the marching abilities of their infantry, on horse-drawn transport and where possible on railways. Neither side had any technological advantage and the use of motor transport- the 'taxis of the Marne', lorries, London buses, tractors and motor cars - was limited, not least by a shortage of drivers. Any rapid advance still depended on cavalry exploitation, hence the appearance of cavalry at the extreme end of the opposing lines.

  The German cavalry moving up from Picardy had hoped to outflank the French by a rapid advance west towards Béthune and St Orner, but French cavalry and Territorial units had so far managed to hold them off. Clearly, the Race to the Sea would be won by the side that could disengage sufficient forces from the existing line and move them north in time to make a deep penetration before an opposing force arrived; in that sense it was a true race. General Joffre doubted that the cautious, pessimistic Field Marshal French would be able, or indeed willing, to attack east from the line La Bassée--Ypres, but he thought that the BEF would at least be able to stave off any German attack heading west until French forces came up in support.

  Smith-Dorrien's II Corps detrained at Abbeville on 8 and 9 October and then concentrated on the banks of the River Authie, 20 kilometres (12 miles) north-east of Abbeville, close to the 1346 battlefield at Crecy. II Corps then advanced towards Béthune, being joined en route by the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Divisions. These had arrived from the Aisne by route march and were now formed into the I Cavalry Corps under Allenby and tasked to cover the II Corps' advance to the east.

  III Corps arrived on 11 October, concentrated at St Orner and Hazebrouck and then moved east to Bailleul and Arrnentières on the Franco-Belgian frontier. A week later, on 19 October, Haig's I Corps arrived. Having concentrated at Hazebrouck, I Corps moved north-east to Ypres, where it linked up with Rawlinson's IV Corps. These BEF units now deployed between La Bassée and Dixrnude and there linked up with the Belgian Army, so extending the Allied line to the North Sea coast. The Western Front of infamous memory was about to become a reality. It is important to note that ten-day gap between the arrival of the first BEF unit, II Corps, and the arrival on 19 October of Haig's corps; the Northern Front was not quiet at this time and many events took place in that period.

  After the loss of Antwerp, Ypres was the only Belgian town still in the hands of its own people, a fact that gave it an emotional and political significance far in excess of its military utility and accounts for the various terrible battles that took place there in the following years. The First Battle of Ypres- or 'First Ypres'- in the autumn of 1914 was a long-drawn-out and very complicated engagement, which began around La Bassée, south of Ypres, and spread north to embrace the entire Northern Front, culminating in a major clash in early November. The Official History wisely refers to First Ypres as the 'battles' of Ypres, and to make any sense of it the reader must grasp both the overall picture and the general sequence of events.

  The first point is the strategic opportunity, presented to both sides, of a breakthrough in the north; whoever could win this outflanking battle would be well placed to win the war. The second is the positions adopted by the BEF corps when they carne north, gradually falling into line on the left flank of the French Tenth Army. Between 8 and 19 October the BEF was extending the Allied line to link up with the Belgians, arriving just in time to stave off a German thrust towards the west. As these attacks came in and the BEF line crept towards Ypres, so the series of battles that came to be called 'First Ypres' began, beginning with the engagements at La Bassée, Messines and Armentières.

  These three battles fall roughly between 11 and 24 October­ 'roughly' because they did not end abruptly on that date but were continued by other battles around the Ypres 'salient', the line of low hills circling Ypres to the east. All these first engagements were attempts by the BEF to turn the right flank of the German Sixth Army and were followed by a short advance to the line of the River Lys which runs through Armentières.

  II Corps was in position by 9 October, and on 10 October Field Marshal French agreed with General Foch - who on 1 October became commander of the Northern Group of French armies - that II Corps would support a push east by the Tenth Army towards the city of Lille, which was now some 16 kilometres (10 miles) east of the Allied positions but not yet occupied by the enemy - it is important to stress that the front was still fluid. II Corps' first task was to secure the railway centre at Hazebrouck, 20 kilometres (15 miles) north of Béthune, and to get them there quickly the French would supply sufficient buses to transport 10,000 men. By the night of 10 October II Corps was in touch with the left of Maud'huy's Tenth Army at Béthune and was ready to push east. Since there appeared to be little to oppose it west of Hazebrouck but some scattered German cavalry units, this thrust appeared simple.

  Foch declared on 10 October that: 'I propose to advance our left [Tenth Army] by Lille to the Scheidt at Tournai or Orchies, the British Army forming a line from Tournai through Courtrai - in this way all the French, British and Belgian detachments would be united on the left banks of the Scheidt or the Lys. After that we can see.' This sounded a sensible plan but, unfortunately, the enemy got in the way.

  On 11 October II Corps made good progress east of Béthune while the French III Corps on their right reached the outskirts of Lille and Allenby's Cavalry Corps secured Messines and Wytschaete, two villages on the higher ground overlooking Ypres from the south. This move linked the cavalry with the British 7th Division east of Ypres, and with the Belgian troops now digging­ in on the River Yser north of that city, by the evening of 11 October the Allies formed a loose but continuous front from the Swiss frontier to the North Sea coast, a distance of some 725 kilometres (450 miles).

  However, the Allied attempt to push this line east and secure Lille quickly petered out. The Germans reacted quickly and countered the attempt with troops brought down from Antwerp and another four reserve corps, which were brought forward in an attempt to turn the Allied flank and break through to the sea; German troops occupied Lille on the evening of 11 October and they held it for the next four years.

  The Tenth Army and the BEF's II Corps collided with the enemy at La Bassée, a small town on the Lys Canal east of Béthune, on the afternoon of 11 October; the French left wing ended at Vermelles, six kilometres (four miles) south of La Bassée, so the battle was mainly a BEF engagement with a six-kilometre (four­mile) wide gap between the Tenth Army and II Corps. (10)

  The battle at La Bassée began with the commitment of a single infantry battalion, theIst Royal Norfolks, at Annequin, tasked to cover the gap between II Corps and the French XXI Corps at Vermelles. The II Corps reserve, the 13th Infantry Brigade, was on hand should anything develop, and this proved wise. Soon after dawn on 12 October it became clear that the French had been forced back from Vermelles and II Corps' right flank was fully exposed.

  This situation presented Smith-Dorrien with a now familiar problem. His orders from Field Marshal French were to move east, north of Lille, in the general direction of Brussels, but his flank was now open. Should he now follow French's orders and move north and east towards Lille - or obey the Field Marshal's other instruction, that he should, at all costs, keep in touch with the French on his right? Smith-Dorrien, weighing up the odds, elected for the second course and chose to advance due east, so keeping in touch with the Tenth Army, rather than north-east towards Lille, which would have widened the existing gap with the French. This advance took II Corps across open country seamed with dykes and ditches and dotted with small farms and villages, towards a long, low mound, running north to south, 16 kilometres (10 miles) east of Béthune; this mound was Aubers Ridge, a slight rise in the ground that would see bitter fighti
ng in 1915.

  In October 1914, II Corps barely obtained a brief foothold on Aubers Ridge; German opposition, from infantry, artillery and cavalry, soon made itself evident and beat them back. These troops came from the German II Cavalry Corps, but German cavalry units contained jager infantry, machine guns, cycle battalions and artillery, and these units were soon putting up a stiff resistance to the British advance. The five infantry brigades of II Corps were opposed by four cavalry divisions and eight infantry battalions, all well-concealed or dug in. Even so, II Corps pressed on against steady opposition and by the evening of 12 October it had reached the village of Givenchy at the southern end of the corps line. The fighting on 12 October cost II Corps around 200 men, killed, wounded or missing, not a large total for a hard day.

  The fighting on 13 October was considerably stiffer. Field Marshal French approved of Smith-Dorrien's decision to hang on to the left of the French XXI Corps and ordered III Corps, now detraining at Hazebrouck, to render Smith-Dorrien assistance if required. He also ordered the II Corps advance to continue- if the French were willing to proceed. Willing, perhaps, but not able; the French closed up on II Corps' right but no advance was made to the east and the Allied battle now developed into a struggle for Givenchy. The centre of the village was held by the 1st Bedfords, who lost 149 men that day in close-quarter fighting among the burning houses, with the Germans holding one end of the village street and the Bedfords the other.

  Eventually the Bedfords were driven out and the fighting spread into the surrounding countryside and along the banks of a nearby canal. By the time the battle petered out at dusk, one battalion of II Corps, the 1st Dorsets, had lost their colonel and 400 men. Total casualties to II Corps on 13 October were close to a thousand men, and the Battle of La Bassée was only beginning. This situation provided the field marshal with another opportunity to criticize Smith-Dorrien:

  On the afternoon of the 14th I again visited Smith-Dorrien at Béthune. He was in one of those fits of deep depression, which unfortunately visited him all too frequently. He complained that the 2nd Corps had never got over the shock of Le Cateau and that the officers sent out to replace his tremendous losses were untrained and inexperienced; and, lastly, he expressed himself convinced that there was no fighting spirit throughout the troops he commanded. (11)

  This is a typical French piece of fiction. There is no other evidence to support the allegation about Smith-Dorrien's frequent 'fits of deep depression' - but note the attempt to drive a wedge between Smith-Dorrien and his officers and men in the statements that the officers were untrained and the men unwilling to fight - two comments that Smith-Dorrien certainly never made.

  In fact II Corps continued to fight, and fight hard. Over the next two days, while the fighting astride the Lys Canal continued, II Corps lost another 1,000 men, including Major-General Hubert Hamilton, GOC of the 3rd Division, who was killed by shellfire near Estaires. No progress was made along the north bank of the canal, and a notable feature of the fighting, something new in this war, was a series of German counter-attacks at night.

  On the night of 14/15 October, the 2nd King's Own Scottish Borderers (2nd KOSBs) were attacked at Cuinchy by a battalion of German troops. This attack was pressed home hard but was even­ tually beaten off with loss. After that the 13th Infantry Brigade (2nd KOSBs, 2nd Duke of Wellington's, 1st Royal West Kents and 2nd KOYLI) moved north of the Lys Canal; from then on this waterway formed the southern boundary between the Tenth Army and the BEF Heavy fighting continued along the Lys but the advance east was painfully slow and very costly; by the evening of 15 October II Corps had advanced just six miles in four days at a cost of nearly 2,000 men, ninety of them company officers. (12)

  On 13 October, Foch wrote to Joffre, remarking that 'The Marshal [i.e. French] wishes at all costs to go to Brussels. I shall not hold him back'. (13) This intention again confronted Smith­Dorrien with his original dilemma- how to advance north-east, a point the field marshal kept pressing, while keeping contact with both the French on his right and the BEF's III Corps, which had now come into line on his left. II Corps was simply not big enough to hold this sector of the front and push ahead, especially after sustaining heavy casualties. However, over the next three days, until 18 October, II Corps pushed forward, retaking Givenchy and getting a footing on Aubers Ridge. The suburbs of Lille were only two miles away but the enemy was fighting hard for every metre of ground and II Corps' losses had now reached 3,000 men in this advance, which finally came to a halt when the German XIII Corps came up to assist the VII Corps.

  For the moment II Corps could do no more. The Official History notes ruefully that, 'The high water mark had been reached and the 15th Brigade was nearer to La Bassée than any British troops were to be for the next four years.' (14) Inevitably, the enemy then counter-attacked. On 19 October II Corps suffered a severe setback when the 2nd Battalion, The Royal Irish Regiment in the 8th Brigade were overrun at Le Pilly, a hamlet on Aubers Ridge. The 2nd Royal Irish had already lost 200 men taking Le Pilly, a position beyond the rest of II Corps' line, and before orders to retire could reach them the battalion was attacked by two German infantry regiments. Only thirty of the Irishmen regained the British lines; losses at Le Pilly totalled 571 men, including the Royal Irish commanding officer, Major E. H. E. Daniell, who was killed in the final stand.

  By 17 October the BEF, far from advancing, were being heavily counter-attacked, and any further advance on this part of the front was now impossible. Writing to his wife on 19 October, Wilson records: 'Our news tonight is not so good although there is nothing to be anxious about. But the Germans are crowding up against us and I am afraid that from the fact that we have not pushed as hard as we ought during the last week we are now going to find the boot on the other leg. We shall know more tomorrow. I still think the campaign will be over in the spring ...' (15)

  Wilson, that devoted Francophile, inevitably blamed French for these delays, in particular for not falling in with Foch's plans. Anglo-French Entente was not improved when, on 21 October, Field Marshal French asked Joffre to 'provide facilities to make a great entrenched camp at Bordeaux to take the whole EF'. (16)

  On hearing this, says Wilson, 'Joffre's face instantly became quite square and he replied that such a thing could not be allowed for a moment. He would make some works to safeguard against a coup de main but an entrenched camp he would not allow. Sir John was checkmated straight away and said I was to discuss the matter with General Joffre. So that nightmare is over.'

  On the II Corps front the nightmare continued. By the morning of 20 October, Smith-Dorrien's problems had, if anything, increased. His tired and much depleted ranks were now confronted by two fresh German divisions, both spoiling for a fight. These were able to come in on the left flank of II Corps, which had been exposed by the need to wheel right in support of the French XXI Corps. If II Corps could hold their ground here they would be doing well, but late on 20 October Field Marshal French called off this first BEF attempt to turn the German line. Clearly, the enemy had brought up enough troops to fend off the BEF's attack at La Bassée and their line would not be broken or outflanked here. II and III Corps were therefore to go on to the defensive and hold their ground - if they could - while Haig's I Corps renewed the turning effort at Ypres.

  Whether II Corps could hold their current line was doubtful. The German counter-attack to II Corps' advance had begun at Le Pilly on the 19th and would continue on 21 October. On that day the French XXI Corps was strongly attacked south of the Lys Canal and the BEF's 3rd Division was struck by infantry attacks, backed with artillery, north of it. Once again the power of defence became apparent; the German infantry made splendid targets advancing across the open ground, and although their attacks were pressed home with great resolution, all had petered out by mid-afternoon, leaving the fields before the BEF line carpeted with enemy dead, the misty air loud with the cries of wounded men.

  British losses on 21 October were also very high, mostly from artiller
y fire. In the 3rd Division 1,079 men had been killed or injured; the 1st Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry lost 266, the 3rd Worcesters 83, the 2nd South Lancashires over 200. This division was therefore ordered to retire to a new line a mile west of their existing position and await reinforcements.

  The advance of II Corps since 11 October placed it in a perilous position when these German counter-attacks came in. Fortunately, as at Mons in August, Smith-Dorrien had prepared another defence line to the rear of his front-line troops. When compared with Western Front entrenchments later in the war, this reserve position of 1914 was barely adequate, but it was still a great improvement on anything the division had had so far. The line of shallow trenches and dugouts -later known as the 'Smith-Dorrien Line' - ran from the east of Givenchy via Neuve Chapelle to Fauquisart. The Smith-Dorrien Line wavered behind the corps front; it was only a short distance behind the 3rd Division positions on the right, but some two miles behind the front line at Fauquisart on the left.

  This position quickly came in useful when the French cavalry covering the left flank of II Corps suddenly fell back on 22 October. On the night of 22/23 October, French gave permission for II Corps to occupy this new position, a move screened by the newly arrived Jullundur Brigade of the Lahore Division, the first unit of the Indian Army to arrive in France. With their assistance, the withdrawal of II Corps to the Smith-Dorrien Line proceeded without any opposition from the enemy.

  For the moment II Corps could do no more. On 25 October Wilson records Smith-Dorrien coming to GHQ and telling French that 'he was afraid his Corps might go during the night'. (17) Wilson adds that 'Sir John was rather short with him and I think fails to realise what it would mean.' The BEF's problems were no longer confined to halting German advances; the Germans were also improving their defences, so Allied attacks north of La Bassée were now meeting wire entanglements and well-prepared trench lines.