The Old Contemptibles

by Robin Neillands

  This last stage took some time to develop. The Ypres battles at La Bassée and Armentières in early October can be presented as parts of the flanking attack process, largely because neither II Corps nor III Corps had the strength for a breakthrough. The battle for Messines, which followed, bridges the gap between these two strategies. Although all the engagements north of Béthune from 10 October form part of what became known as First Ypres, the turning point of that battle took place in the salient after Army Group Fabeck entered the fray on 29 October and struck out for Ypres down the axis of the Menin road.

  The previous chapters have described the development of the battles for Ypres. The overall effect of these engagements was stalemate on both sides, but the Germans were strong and growing stronger every day, and now had three armies in the field - the Sixth, the Fourth and Army Group Fabeck. By 29 October they had succeeded in stopping the Allied advance everywhere and driving it back in several places, but they had not curbed Foch and French's enthusiasm for a breakthrough.

  In accordance with Field Marshal French's orders, issued at 2015 hours on 28 October, Douglas Haig ordered the 2nd Division to push east soon after dawn, its attack being fully developed no later than 0930 hours. He also advised the I Corps divisions- which now included the 7th Division - that a strong German attack was expected to develop down the axis of the Menin-Gheluvelt road from 0530 hours, and all units were to be on the alert. Within the context of his orders, General Haig was behaving sensibly, sending the 2nd Division forward as directed but putting his entire corps on stand-by to fend off an enemy attack when it came.

  It came, as expected, promptly at 0530 hours, when artillery fire began to fall on the BEF's positions on the Menin road. This deluge of shells was followed by a strong infantry attack from three battalions of the 16th Bavarian Reserve Regiment from the 6th Bavarian Division, which struck the junction of the 1st and 7th Divisions, held by the 1st (Guards) Brigade of the 1st Division and the 1st Battalion, Grenadier Guards of the 7th Division, both astride the Menin road.

  None of these units was up to strength; the 1st Coldstream in the Guards Brigade had only 350 men, just over a third of its ration strength, and all the others were well below their establishment. Nevertheless, they stood their ground and greeted the enemy with rifle and machine gun fire. The problem was that their rifles and machine guns jammed, their trenches were little more than shell-scrapes, there was no wire, and not enough Guardsmen to hold this length of front. Nor did the British infantry enjoy a clear field of fire; the Great War image of an open, shattered landscape, totally devoid of life, had yet to become reality here. The Menin road was still lined with trees, houses and barns, the fields surrounded by thick hedges and deep ditches; all this offered cover for the German advance and restricted the fire of the British infantry.

  As a result the enemy, pressing home their attack with considerable resolution, was able to break through, overrunning the trenches of the 1st Black Watch and the 1st Coldstream, then rolling up the defending battalions from the flank, pushing the survivors of the Coldstream and the Black Watch out of their trenches.

  News of this breakthrough took time to get back to Brigade HQ- that chronic lack of communications again taking effect­ but when he understood the situation, Brigadier General C. FitzClarence sent the1st Battalion, The Gloucester Regiment forward to oppose the enemy advance and retake the positions near the Gheluvelt crossroads. The Gloucesters duly pressed forward, suffering heavy losses - by the end of the day this battalion had lost 167 men - but retaking the ground lost before they too were first held and then pressed back by the German advance.

  At about the same time, the 1st Grenadiers of the 7th Division, positioned south of the crossroads and unaware of what was happening a few hundred yards away, were also being subjected to heavy artillery fire followed by an infantry attack, which came in through the drifting fog at around 0800 hours. This battalion was also taken in the rear by Germans who had broken through to the north and was gradually driven back, making counter-attacks to delay the enemy advance and finally taking up a position south of the road and east of Gheluvelt, where they were joined during the day by the survivors of the 1st Gloucesters and a fresh battalion, the 2nd Border Regiment, sent up from brigade reserve.

  Heavy fighting for the Gheluvelt position went on all day but that mutual support and interlocking fire, so essential for defence, was limited by the thick woods and the persistent fog. In some respects, though, the weather and the terrain favoured defence, providing good cover for the rifle platoons while concealing an almost total absence of BEF reserves from the enemy. The outcome was that the conflict around Gheluvelt dissolved into a large number of small, separate company or battalion battles where the enemy's superior numbers gradually began to tell as British losses mounted. These losses were severe; the 1st Grenadiers, the left­ hand battalion of the 7th Division, lost 470 men that day, two­thirds of its parade strength that morning, and the 1st Scots Guards lost 344 The already under-strength 1st Coldstream lost another ten officers and 180 men, and on the night of 29 October, 'mustered only 80 men under the Quartermaster'. (1) The 1st Black Watch lost five officers and 250 men, two companies being 'annihilated'. (2) German losses were also high; some 240 German dead were counted in front of the trenches stoutly held by the 2nd Gordon Highlanders.

  All in all, the battle for Gheluvelt on 29 October did not go well for Haig's command. By dusk, and in spite of putting in a strong counter-attack with the 3rd Infantry Brigade, his corps had lost 460 metres (500 yards) of trench, the vital Gheluvelt crossroads and the best part of three regular infantry battalions, 1st Coldstream, 1st Grenadiers and 1st Black Watch, either cut to pieces by shellfire or during hand-to-hand fighting in the foggy woodlands. Nor was the battle for Ypres going well elsewhere. The advance of General Dubois' three French divisions north of Ypres had been held by German troops that 'were numerically strong and well entrenched and whose heavy artillery becomes day by day unceasingly stronger'. (3)

  The fact that this new Allied advance had been halted so quickly did not bother Field Marshal French; indeed, he seems unaware of the true situation. In his memoirs (4) he records that by the evening of 29 October I Corps had 'recovered all the ground they had lost' and were occupying a line 'well to the east of Gheluvelt [which] consequently represented a considerable gain as compared to the ground held the day before'.

  Were this so, one might ask why that evening he issued orders for any ground lost to be retaken and for the advance to continue the following day, cabling Kitchener that: 'If the present success can be followed up it will lead to a decisive result' and that 'slow but decided success is being made everywhere'. (5) In fact none of this was true.

  I Corps had been halted or driven back, many men had been lost and the Germans had been able to improve their positions by taking the spur of land between Kruisecke and Gheluvelt, which offered both higher ground for the artillery observers and the perfect, concealed forming-up position for another infantry attack. Guns from behind this ridge were soon bombarding Ypres and pounding traffic on the Menin road. The Official History records that 'On the morning of 30th October the Allied commanders in the north were still totally unaware of the massing of important enemy reinforcements opposite, strategically, the most important and, tactically, the weakest portion of the line near Ypres. The night of 29/30 had been fairly quiet; the troops reported the sound of an unusual number of vehicles and trotting horses, but the direction of the movement could not be ascertained with any certainty.' (6)

  While claiming success and ordering another advance on 30 October, French also claimed that more troops would be needed ensure this 'success'. He therefore decided to take the much­ reduced II Corps out of the line at Béthune and send it north, but this could not be done until the II Corps position was secure and given into the care of the Indian Corps on the night of 29/30 October. The only troops available to reinforce I Corps or the Cavalry Corps at Ypres on the evening of 29 October were a
Territorial unit, the 1st Battalion, The London Scottish, which arrived at Ypres that night. The London Scottish was the sole BEF reserve when the second phase of the German thrust began, an attack on the I Corps front by four and a half infantry divisions, three cavalry divisions and a jager brigade of Army Group Fabeck supported by 260 heavy and super-heavy guns. This attack began at 0600 hours on 30 October.

  General Haig's view of the situation on his front was considerably more cautious than that of Field Marshal French. Haig received and noted the GHQ order to resume the advance on 30 October but did not distribute it to his subordinates. Instead he ordered his three divisions to entrench on favourable ground, reorganize, improve their defences if possible - the 2nd Division were even able to string a little barbed wire - and carry out an active reconnaissance at daylight. Haig added that 'orders as to the resumption of the offensive will be issued in the morning, when the situation is clearer than it is at present'. This reconnaissance revealed an unusual amount of activity behind the enemy lines but the precise point or direction of this activity could not at first be determined- but there was plenty of it and it boded ill for any prospect of a further advance.

  The situation became clear soon after dawn when von Fabeck's main thrust was delivered between Messines and Hollebeke and came up against the 7th Division, the three cavalry divisions of the Cavalry Corps- these three worth perhaps two infantry brigades in firepower- and two Indian infantry battalions.

  This attack by the XIII and XV Army Corps, backed by most of the Fabeck artillery, should have breached the British defences with comparative ease. There was no deep or continuous trench line on this front, a shortage of men, very little barbed wire, and no heavy artillery to support the tired defenders; as the Official History comments, 'the British line was already all too thin'. (7) This fundamental fact, a shortage of troops, dictated much of Haig's policy in this battle; his line was too thin when the battle began and reserves were non-existent. His solution was to rest his units where possible and feed them into the line where needed, 'puttying-up the front' in the jargon of the time, hoping thereby to beat off any local attacks and keep the enemy out.

  The German tactics were a repeat of the previous day; a heavy artillery bombardment followed by infantry attacks, pressed home with considerable courage but a lack of tactical skill or fieldcraft. The Germans were determined to break the BEF line that day; orders for XV Corps attacking Haig's corps stressing that 'The breakthrough will be of decisive importance. We must and will therefore conquer, settle forever the centuries-long struggle against our most detested enemy. We will finish with the British, Indian, Canadians, Moroccans and other trash, feeble adversaries who surrender in great numbers if they are attacked with vigour.' This order called for an attack all along the line but stressed that the main thrust would be made by Fabeck's group south-east of Ypres, aiming a five-division thrust at the village of Zandvoorde and the Messines ridge. This was held by the 7th Division and three cavalry divisions; a breakthrough here would - or might - carry the Germans through to the heights around Mont Kemmel and split the BEF line in two. With this intention, the German soldiers hurled themselves forward against the Allied line, relying on their heavy artillery and superiority in infantry of three to one - or more - to carry them through to victory.

  In the face of this second onslaught all the BEF soldiers could do was hang on, hold their ground and flay the enemy with rifle fire while Haig and his commanders threw in a company here or a battalion there, wherever the line looked fragile, to hold back the German advance. The first German attack against the 1st and 2nd Divisions on the left at Zonnebeke did not succeed. This attack was made against another unit junction, this time between the 2nd Division and the French 135th Infantry Regiment, by two German divisions, the 54th Reserve and the 30th Division. It began at 0630 hours and went on until after 0900 hours, the British infantry shooting down the advancing German infantry in great numbers. German pressure then built up around Zandvoorde at the southern end of the 1st Division line, again at the divisional junction with the French brigade of Brigadier General Moussy. Infantry attacks continued and artillery fire began to fell trees, flatten the inadequate British defences and cause heavy casualties. By midday this artillery fire had helped the German infantry into Zandvoorde, where they evicted the 1st and 2nd Life Guards of the 7th Cavalry Brigade; two squadrons of the Life Guards were virtually wiped out during a massed attack by the 39th Division and three jager battalions, only a few wounded troopers surviving to fall into enemy hands.

  An immediate counter-attack on Zandvoorde at 1300 hours by the 7th Division and 3rd Cavalry Division failed. By 1500 hours Haig feared that the enemy were on the Zandvoorde ridge and about to break through south of Ypres, where the Cavalry Corps were also in difficulties. He therefore asked the French on his left flank for assistance, pointing out that if the Germans succeeded in breaking through south of Ypres they could cut the Allied line in two. General Dubois reacted promptly, sending his IX Corps reserve of two battalions up to Zandvoorde. Other units also sent forces to Haig's assistance, General Allenby placing three cavalry regiments at I Corps' disposal. Nothing was of any avail; by midday Zandvoorde was in enemy hands and the 1st Royal Welch Fusiliers, dug in just to the north of the village, were under flanking attack and artillery fire; fighting hard but eventually overrun, this battalion was reduced to eighty-six men at the evening rollcall.

  Attempts to retake Zandvoorde continued all day, but numbers would tell. By the time the German attacks south of Ypres petered out in the late afternoon of 30 October the Germans had taken Hollebeke, the Hollebeke Château, Zandvoorde and much of the Zandvoorde ridge, and had forced the British centre back for more than a mile between Messines and Gheluvelt. The loss of Hollebeke also put the Germans within five kilometres (three miles) of Ypres, three kilometres closer than they had been on 28 October. Heavy casualties had been inflicted on the 7th Division and I Corps' grip on the line east of Ypres was growing increasingly loose.

  On the other hand, the Germans had lost heavily, and as the day wore on their infantry became less inclined to press home their attacks. The 7th Division and the 3rd Cavalry Division, repulsed from Zandvoorde that afternoon, were now preparing a new defence line west of the Zandvoorde ridge and were already stemming any attacks across it. With reinforcement, this new line could be held ...provided some reinforcements could be found.

  The attacks against I Corps around Gheluvelt were matched with a strong thrust against the 1st Cavalry Division of Allen by's corps at Messines. This was launched by the 26th Division of XIII Corps and followed a now familiar pattern - drenching artillery fire from heavy guns followed by massed infantry attacks. The shelling and infantry probes went on all day but the British cavalry held their ground and seemed ready to go on doing so whatever force was sent against them.

  The crucial point now was Zandvoorde and the Zandvoorde ridge, both of which had to be retaken or the line there shored up to prevent the enemy gaining more ground. That night Field Marshal French, who was still apparently unaware of the forces to his front, visited I Corps HQ and, having been briefed on the situation by Haig, sent a message to Foch asking for more French troops as soon as possible. Foch promised to send five infantry battalions and three artillery batteries into Ypres the following day. (8)

  Haig had now established his HQ in the White Château at the Hellfire Corner crossroads, just east of Ypres and three kilometres (two miles) behind the front line. I Corps spent that night establishing a new defence line from the Ypres Canal at Hollebeke north to a point just east of Gheluvelt, forming the last viable defensive position in front of Ypres. Plans were also laid for a dawn counter-attack to retake Hollebeke and Zandvoorde by a force of six battalions under Major-General Bulfin (and therefore known as Bulfin's Force) -the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Divisions and three French battalions. Unfortunately, while this work was in progress, the Germans struck again at the village and ridge of Messines, eight kilometres (five miles) south
of Zandvoorde.

  At 2200 hours on 30 October, a heavy artillery barrage fell on Messines. A strong attack was clearly coming in at dawn, if not before, and Haig, who appeared to be issuing orders to the Cavalry Corps as well as his own divisions at this time, requested that all available reserves be sent to shore up the Cavalry Corps position on his right flank. The snag was that there were no BEF reserves; the only significant force available in the entire BEF was that Territorial battalion, the 1st London Scottish, 750 strong and fairly fresh but as yet untested in battle. Even so, this unit was attached to the 2nd Cavalry Division and sent to assist the defenders at Messines.

  Messines occupied a small salient projecting from the rest of the BEF line and was currently held by the 1st Cavalry Brigade, plus the 9th Lancers from the rst Cavalry Brigade and two com­ panies of the 57th Rifles from the Indian Corps. After hours of shelling the German infantry attack came in at 0430 hours on 31 October, overrunning some trenches at the southern end of the village before the enemy were driven back by a local counter-attack. The shelling then began again, concentrating on the village centre, and a further infantry attack on the northern end of the village succeeded in pushing the defenders out. Orders were therefore issued to abandon the eastern edge of Messines and withdraw to the western side. This at least eliminated the costly Messines salient, but it was clear that the cavalry units in Messines - in total about a thousand troopers strong - were now being attacked by no fewer than twelve German battalions. At 1000 hours, after another heavy burst of shelling, these German units came on again and the battle in Messines really began.

  The rest of that morning in Messines was spent in house-to­house, hand-to-hand fighting with rifles, bayonets and pistols, fighting in which the vastly outnumbered defenders were gradually driven back, eventually forming a line along the main street. Half the village was now in flames and the Germans troops man­ handled field artillery into the village to engage the dogged British defenders at close range, blasting them out of the houses. Even so, the cavalry troopers were still hanging on grimly in the blazing ruins of Messines in the early afternoon when infantry reinforcements began to arrive.