Hannibal
Page 15
TAKING THE FOOD DEPOT AT CANUSIUM
Summer was hot and dry in Apulia, leaving Hannibal somewhat desperate, with little possibility of foraging or raiding to feed his army. Knowing his supplies were on the verge of running out, Hannibal had moved his army south to Cannae to be closer to the rich farmland around Canusium. He captured the entire grain supply and other harvested food at this Roman depot, which may have even staved off a Carthaginian or allied rebellion.
Now in late July, the massive Roman army under its two commanders followed Hannibal through Apulia. By taking the food depot at Canusium, Hannibal even forced the Roman army to engage his army perhaps sooner than it would have liked, since the Romans too would have faced some of the same food and supply limitations.11 Hannibal would also have known how many of the Roman army were recruits and would have preferred to face them before they were better trained, so the raid on Canusium could be construed as a brilliant tactic by Hannibal to get the Roman armies to fight prematurely.
PREPARING FOR BATTLE
Polybius says that like any good general before battle, when anticipation runs high but nervous fear can eat away at the very marrow of courage, Paullus gave a speech to encourage the huge assembled army, emphasizing their advantages. The Romans had an almost 2-to-1 numerical infantry superiority over Hannibal. Strengthening the resolve of the fresh recruits, Paullus told them they were fighting alongside two-year veterans who had fought under Fabius Maximus and knew Hannibal’s tactics. He added that Hannibal’s army was depleted—down to only a third of those who crossed the Ebro River in Spain—and was now far from home and deep in a hostile foreign land. Many of Hannibal’s troops were mercenaries fighting only for pay. Boldly, Paullus reminded the Roman army that their forces were defending their homeland, fighting for their country, wives, and children, and that the unlucky circumstances of Trebia and Trasimene were now reversed in their favor. “Behave like men,” he exhorted, “and there is no reason left why we should not be victorious.”12 It was mostly good advice, making some sense out of the previous reversals, but history would have it otherwise.
Plutarch tells the famous story of how some Carthaginians were in trepidation over the vast number of assembled Romans. A Carthaginian staff officer named Gisgo remarked how astonishing it was to see so many Roman soldiers, and, suggesting Hannibal overheard the comment, Plutarch places in his mouth the famous retort meant to ease fear: “Yes, but in all that sea of soldiers, not one of them is named Gisgo.” The assembled officers laughed at Hannibal’s wryness, and tension was broken as the ranks behind heard laughter and decided the situation must be favorable.13
THE BATTLE UNFOLDS
After replenishing his army’s food with Canisium’s supplies, Hannibal first set up his camp on the west bank of the Aufidus, facing north to the coming Roman army that his scouts had identified. This also gave him the benefit of not having the seasonal dust and sand-laden wind—the libeccio—blowing from Africa in his men’s eyes but at their backs. The libeccio would limit Roman visibility just enough to be a factor in battle. Livy mentions this phenomenon most clearly,14 and even Silius Italicus states it as a contributing factor in the battle.15 Hannibal’s decision to have the Romans face the wind must have been deliberate.16
The Romans—especially Paullus—were not happy with the flat ground Hannibal had chosen,17 knowing that it would favor Hannibal’s more numerous and more mobile cavalry. In fact, this large Roman army lacked full cavalry support, having only six thousand to Hannibal’s ten thousand.18 Several skirmishes took place over the next two days, with some of Hannibal’s light infantry and cavalry harassing surprised Romans still on the march, although the Romans beat them back and inflicted some casualties before nightfall. The Romans divided into two camps on either side of the river, the larger on the southeast bank. But the following day, Hannibal moved his camp to the southeast bank, where his Numidian cavalry prevented many of the Romans dispatched to the Aufidus River from obtaining water, something that could prove disastrous in the heat of summer before a major battle. Again, this must have been a deliberate tactic. The Romans left one legion and allies to guard their camp, leaving about ten thousand out of the battle.
August 2, 216 BCE, was the fateful day for Rome. Polybius says that due to his inexperience and impatience,19 the consul Varro was ready to fight on this terrain regardless of the disadvantage to heavy infantry, which needed more space. As the early morning sky lightened, Varro was in command, and at dawn the consular red flag could be seen from his tent, the sign of battle. The flag’s red color would prove to be an eerie omen. The Roman army assembled slowly and joined forces. Although there has been some debate about the battle’s exact location,20 the larger force crossed the Aufidus River and met the smaller force already there. Together they massed to form a line of battle, with the right Roman flank by the river facing south and the left Roman flank on the plain. Both flanks were made up of cavalry, with the remaining allied cavalry on the right. The Roman center was the heavy infantry of the eight combined legions: at least fifty-five thousand soldiers with the support of the fifteen thousand velites, the light infantry armed with hastae javelins, Roman short thrusting spears. Unusual for battle and perhaps a factor in what would happen, the Roman infantry was packed much closer than normal,21 probably because the river compressed its space. Not counting cavalry, the Roman line was likely a mile wide but much deeper, giving the combatants the confidence to press forward as needed, but unwise when they had little room to maneuver, retreat, or even flee as necessary because the plain was less than a mile and a half wide.22 The Roman plan seems predicated at least in part on not being outflanked by the superior and more numerous Carthaginian cavalry. The proximity of the Aufidus River was meant to prevent this maneuver. The Romans trusted their heavy infantry to hold ground in the first clash of battle and then inexorably advance to break the less numerous Carthaginian line at its center with their superior numbers. It could work if the Roman legions moved as one well-trained and organized unit in battle and if their dual cavalry stood its ground and then broke the Carthaginian cavalry. But given the narrow plain, and because so many seasoned Roman troops had been decimated by the earlier debacles of Trebia and Trasimene, the heavy infantry was composed mostly of recruits without battle experience, commanded mostly by new officers who also had little real experience. This would prove to be disastrous. Varro headed the Roman allied cavalry on the right with some infantry, Paullus commanded the Roman cavalry on the left, and the proconsul, a governor of a province, below a consul, who could command an army, Servilius Geminus held the center of heavy infantry legions.
Hannibal was ready and immediately brought his entire forces to face the Romans, many of his troops having also been encamped across the Aufidus but now moving quickly and then swinging to face the Romans and lining up according to expected battle order. Hannibal first sent out his Balearic slingers and javelin force to cover his troop movement. With a total of about forty thousand infantry, Hannibal was outnumbered by at least twenty thousand additional Roman infantry.23 His allied heavy cavalry of Spanish and Celtic horses was on the left under the command of Hasdrubal; on the right, Maharbal or Hanno commanded the Numidian cavalry.24 Hannibal himself commanded the center, where he placed the allied Celt and Spanish infantry, possibly made up of twenty thousand Celts and four thousand Spanish, with the Libyans and other Africans divided on the two sides, possibly as many as ten thousand soldiers. The Africans were behind the line, where the Romans did not see them.25 Hannibal’s shallower line was stretched thinly to match the Roman battle width. When every unit was in place, Hannibal commanded the center to move forward in an outward bulge to face the Romans. His brother Mago was with him behind the lines to encourage the allied infantry. Hannibal must have realized this was where the full force of the Romans was going to be concentrated and knew his presence was most important here if he was to turn the enemy’s own strength against itself, as planned.26
The spectacle of Can
nae’s massed armies just before full battle began must have been truly inspiring and at the same time frightening, especially to the Roman recruits. War trumpets and shouts of encouragement from officers would have been heard on the Roman side, along with prayers and the jostle of metal and leather as well as the stamping and whinnying of the horses. The early morning light would have reflected off the soldiers’ new armor. From the Carthaginian side also would have come a wave of sound, especially the intense war cries and boastful bellows of the Celts, some of whom may have worn painted faces but not much more than that, as many Celts fought naked. The Celts whipped up themselves for combat holding up their long and heavy iron swords with vows of mayhem and maiming. More than a few of the soldiers of both armies would have been banging their swords on their shields, so the clamor must have been deafening for the moment. Hannibal’s Spanish allies looked much like the Romans in their armor and shields confiscated from Trebia and Trasimene. They wore white tunics with proud purple stripes (“dazzling,” says Livy27), but they carried different swords than the Romans—Spanish swords28—and they may have wielded the wicked, sharp falcata: cleaver and sword together, with a blade that was narrower near the hand but widened toward the front; its center of gravity was near its heavier front end, and it then narrowed again to its thrusting point. Polybius notes that the falcatas could “thrust with as deadly effect as they cut.”29
Then the clear command for battle rang out across the plain on each side, and both armies surged forward with the growing thunder of cavalry. At first, the light infantry advance guards clashed—with the Balearic fighters doing damage with their slingshots, raining a barrage of missiles from a distance—until the bulge of Hannibal’s center made contact with the deep Roman infantry pushing forward from behind. Because the space by the river was so narrow, the cavalries near the Aufidus collided quickly without the normal wheeling about in this constricted space. Dismounted hand-to-hand combat was fierce—even barbaric, according to Polybius.30 Here, despite the bravery of the Roman cavalry, the superior experience, precise execution, and possibly greater numbers of the Carthaginians gradually gave them the upper hand. The Romans were driven along the river, where there was no escape, and slaughtered without mercy along the banks as they turned to retreat. However valiant they had been, this Roman cavalry unit was scattered and nearly destroyed by Hasdrubal’s cavalry, which chased the survivors until they either dropped or were cut down. Aemilius Paullus had been wounded at the very beginning with a slingshot blow to the face—a Balearic slinger could hurl a projectile at 120 miles per hour and kill a man fifty steps away.31 Although he no longer led the decimated cavalry, Paullus continued to rally the central mass of Roman infantry.
The Roman infantry legions pushed forward hard against the thinner line of enemy infantry at the center, massed in tight, traditional phalanxes, which was probably not the best formation under the circumstances because they were eventually so pressed together as a unit only the outer edges could actually wield weapons.32 The opposing bulge of Celts and Spanish infantry resisted with fierce combat but was never as numerically deep as the Romans. The Carthaginian allies slowly began to crumple as they backed up before the line of almost endless Romans. The Romans must have sensed the enemy giving way. The advancing soldiers penetrated deeper and deeper into the shallower Carthaginian infantry, which had to yield, although Romans as well as Carthaginians fell in the heavy fighting.
None of the Roman leadership thought anything amiss or seems to have considered that this Celtic and Spanish infantry retreat could have been intentional. After all, relentless pressure from their men seemed to be the reason that the Carthaginian center buckled.
The wounded Paullus may have no longer been able to oversee the battle. Dismounted as he was, he probably could not see over the chaos from so many thousands on the battlefield plain. The Roman infantry was now committed to moving forward while still countless soldiers pushed from behind. Only the outermost edges of each row were actually engaged in fighting—the rest of the Roman infantry was squeezed too close together to use its weapons. This was ominous because as they had pushed forward, the Romans would be gradually surrounded on three sides by their enemies.
On the other side to the east, the superior Numidian cavalry facing the Romans likewise gradually routed the allied cavalry under Varro on the Roman left wing. This engagement had been a stalemate until Hasdrubal arrived at the rear of the Romans’ left wing of allied cavalry after having destroyed the other Roman cavalry right wing by the river. This Roman cavalry on the left wing was now caught in a pincer between the Numidian light cavalry and Hasdrubal with the Celtic and Spanish heavy cavalry. The remaining Roman allied horsemen, still mobile enough to flee northward, did so with Varro, who abandoned the field of battle, the Numidians giving some chase. Instead of following them, an observant Hasdrubal turned his attention to the Roman infantry, as he was now behind it with his victorious force of Carthaginian heavy cavalry. The Roman cavalry had been taken out of battle and defeated, which would prove decisive.
This is the pivotal moment where history was made at Cannae. The savage intensity of the close fighting in the center of the battlefield now underlined the genius of Hannibal’s shrewdness in turning a numerical disadvantage into an advantage. Until now, a Carthaginian victory was not predictable. But now the variables came into play. Much of the Roman infantry were overcommitted to moving deep into the enemy line and were closely pressed because of the terrain—which Hannibal had chosen—and falsely thought that their brute numerical strength would be decisive. The Carthaginian cavalry had defeated the Roman cavalry, which then could not come to the aid of the infantry. Paullus was wounded and unable to lead untested Roman recruits and their officers. Varro had fled the battle and abandoned his comrades in arms. There had been a lack of unity in Roman leadership that continued until the day of battle; now there was also thirst and dust, and finally the abyss of Roman terror and surprising despair that more than filled the void of inexperience. During the twenty-seven-year Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE) between Athens and Sparta, the Greek historian Thucydides, who left an objective account of the Peloponnesian War in the late fifth century BCE, witnessed and recorded battlefield stress, noting that war was a “violent master teacher.”33 Surely the new Roman soldiers at Cannae suffered the classic symptoms of battle stress such as uncontrollable adrenaline flow causing a pounding heartbeat, a sinking feeling in the stomach, cold sweat, weakness, vomiting, involuntary urination and defecation, and other physical effects.34 These signs of trauma so often trump bravery and valor, as we now know.
Because they had advanced far forward, thousands of Roman infantry were now trapped. Perhaps they had never seen the Libyan and African heavy infantry troops being revealed on either side of them, especially if, like the Spanish, some of the enemy was wearing Roman helmets or holding captured shields amid the vision-obscuring dust. While Hasdrubal closed in from the rear along with much of the returning Numidian cavalry, and the dismayed Romans in the rear turned to face them, the two contingents of Hannibal’s Libyan and other African heavy infantry on the sides turned inward nearly simultaneously,35 and the famous double envelopment began. Hannibal’s central force stopped its retreat, whether genuine or false, and renewed the attack. The Romans were suddenly boxed in as Hannibal’s army pressed even closer. Roman gladius short swords36 were no match for Celtic long swords and the downward sweep of Libyan sabers and perhaps the deadly Spanish falcatas that could chop off arms and even legs.37 The heavy weight of the Roman infantry arms—chain mail, helmets, shinguards, shields, and weapons—hampered full movement and now began to cause exhaustion.38 Unable to even fully move their arms, the Romans were butchered. The plain began to fill with pools of Roman blood. There was no room to maneuver, let alone escape. This was the turning point at Cannae.
As Roman hopes evaporated amid an awareness of defeat, the army’s strength was sapped. Meanwhile, Paullus bled profusely from his wounds while seated on
the ground, too weak to remount a horse, surrounded by his few surviving cavalry guards. He was offered a horse to escape but refused, ordering his men to flee while they could in the precious minutes they had; to go and give word to defend Rome. Paullus was quickly surrounded and killed. The last thing he would have heard were the groans and screams of the dying men all around him as the pride of Rome was broken.
The awful sound of battle finally subsided as the dust settled. When it was over, Livy numbered fifty-five thousand Romans who died that day at Cannae; Polybius, seventy thousand. Carthaginian total dead numbered just under six thousand.39 It was maybe six hours from oblique morning light to the intense sun of midafternoon. One full legion survived, including the ten thousand captured Romans who had been left at the camp and the few survivors of six thousand horsemen. Four tribunes, including Publius Scipio and the son of Fabius Maximus, went to Rome with Varro as quickly as possible. Livy says nineteen thousand Roman prisoners were taken at Cannae, which would amount to about two legions.40 Historians estimate more dead soldiers at Cannae than in any other day of battle in Western History, and that 30,000 gallons of blood were spilled in that one day.41