John Bell Hood: The Rise, Fall, and Resurrection of a Confederate General

by Hood, Stephen

  1 Timothy F. Weiss, “I Lead You to Battle: Jospeh E. Johnston and the Controversy at Cassville,” Georgia Historical Quarterly, XCI (Winter 2007). The author wishes to thank Mr. Weiss of Roswell, Georgia, whose excellent essay was a valuable source of information and guide for the writing of the Cassville Controversy chapter.

  2 Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations, 320.

  3 Craig Symonds, Joseph E. Johnston: A Civil War Biography (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1994), 293.

  4 Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations, 321-322; Stephen Davis, Atlanta Will Fall, 56.

  5 Hood, Advance and Retreat, 100-103.

  6 McMurry, 1864, 81.

  7 Stanley Horn, The Army of Tennessee (Norman, OK: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1952), 328.

  8 Connelly, Autumn of Glory, 347-348.

  9 Castel, Decision in the West, 196-206, note 101 p. 589.

  10 Hood, Advance and Retreat, 102-103.

  11 Ibid., 101-102.

  12 Paul A. Oliver letter to Daniel Butterfield, March 3, 1877, John Bell Hood Personal Papers. It is not known how a copy of the letter from Oliver to Butterfield found its way into John Bell Hood’s papers. If Hood had received a copy of the letter prior to 1879 he surely would have included Oliver’s recollections in Advance and Retreat. After the war Butterfield lived in New York City, which was also the home of Hood’s daughters Lillian and Ida; his daughters not only maintained his personal papers, but on some occasions in the 1900s also added to the collection. Wigfall’s daughter returned wartime letters from Hood to L. T. Wigfall to Lillian in the early 1900s, and other letters dated in the late 1800s and early 1900s are in the collection of Hood’s papers. It is possible that after Hood’s death, a copy of the Oliver to Butterfield letter was sent to Lillian or Ida, who placed it with their father’s papers.

  13 McMurry, Atlanta 1864, 81.

  14 David John Eicher, The Civil War in Books: An Analytical Bibliography (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1997), 83. The author wrote several times to Mr. Eicher, a chemistry teacher who also writes on astronomical matters, to inquire which of Hood’s statements in his memoirs were untruthful, and which responsibilities Hood had repeatedly avoided. He also asked Eicher to elaborate on his charge that Hood engaged in treasonous conduct at Cassville. No response was received.

  Chapter 5

  “The voice of history is often little more than the organ of hatred or flattery.”

  — Edward Gibbon

  The Battles for Atlanta: Hood Fights

  With Sherman’s three armies now on the outskirts of Atlanta, Jefferson Davis removed Joseph Johnston on July 17, 1864, and replaced him with John Bell Hood. Modern scholar Steven Woodworth observed that “The fate of Atlanta, from the Confederate standpoint, was all but decided by Johnston,” and that “Hood was given a hopeless assignment… so he had to attack.” With orders from Richmond to hold Atlanta, retreat was out of the question. Historian Albert Castel agreed, citing the “virtually impossible situation” Hood inherited.1

  The Atlanta Appeal newspaper declared that retreating had to cease and that attacks were required to restore the situation. “There is a limit to prudence,” explained an editorial published immediately after Hood’s appointment to command the Army of Tennessee. “When excessive, our enemies denominate it cowardice. This war must end and the final battle be fought. Why not here, and even now?” On July 20, the Augusta Constitutionalist editorialized on the meaning of Hood’s elevation to replace Johnston: “If it means anything it must mean this: Atlanta will not be given up without a fight [emphasis in original].”2

  A few hours before the new commander struck Sherman at Peachtree Creek on July 20, Hood told Mobile Advertiser and Register reporter Felix De Fontaine, “At once I attack the enemy. He has pressed our lines until he is within a short distance of Atlanta and I must fight or evacuate. I am going to fight. The odds are against us,” Hood added, “but I leave the issue with the Gods of battle.”3

  One day earlier, Hood received intelligence that the Federals force, which was maneuvering around the perimeter of Atlanta, had split, with several miles now dividing George Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland from Gen. James McPherson’s Army of the Tennessee and Gen. John Schofield’s Army of the Ohio. A rare opportunity beckoned Confederates to attack with at least equal numbers (Thomas’s command totaled about 21,655 troops to Hardee’s and Stewart’s two corps of Hood’s army of 20,250). More importantly, Thomas was just beginning to cross Peachtree Creek.4

  Hood quickly devised a plan to assault Thomas after much of his command had crossed the waterway but before the Federals could construct fortifications and reorganize themselves. Hood’s plan was to attack Thomas’s left flank en echelon by division and drive the enemy westward down Peachtree Creek to its confluence with the Chattahoochee River. The intended offensive was designed to force Thomas away from the rest of Sherman’s army, trapping the Federals without an escape route and without the support of McPherson’s and Schofield’s commands several miles away.

  The key to Hood’s plan rested with William Hardee, whose corps on the right side of the line was tasked with striking the enemy’s left front and flank. If all went according to plan, Hardee would enjoy an almost three-to-one numerical advantage. The remaining Confederate corps on the left under A. P. Stewart was numerically inferior to Thomas. Stewart’s role was to pressure the Federal front while Hardee rolled up the enemy line. As Hood intended, his attack initially caught Thomas in a vulnerable position. Hardee’s thrust, however, was hours late, uncoordinated, and he committed only about one-third of his available command. The Confederate attack ultimately failed, and Hardee withdrew into his breastworks.

  In Decision in the West, Castel blamed the Confederate failure at Peachtree Creek on Hardee’s poor coordination and the “half hearted” performance of several of his regiments. Stewart’s troops performed their role well, but lacked adequate numbers to make up for Hardee’s weak effort. “In brief,” wrote Castel, “where the Confederates had the advantage in strength, they did not fight well; and where they fought well, they were too weak. And because they did not fight well enough where they were strong enough, they lost. This in essence is the story of Peachtree Creek.” Woodworth agreed and concluded the Confederate defeat was due, in part, to “Hardee’s apparent lack of cordial cooperation.”5

  Both Hood’s and Sherman’s losses were about 10 percent of the forces engaged. Federal casualties totaled approximately 1,900 in killed, wounded, and captured, and Confederate losses were about 2,700—far fewer than the 4,800 casualties claimed by Sherman and repeated by many authors.6

  Only two days after the failed attempt to destroy Thomas at Peachtree Creek, McPherson’s Army of the Tennessee moved onto Bald Hill only two miles east of Atlanta and launched a howitzer bombardment of the city. McPherson was also within striking distance of the Macon and Western Railroad, the only remaining rail supply line into Atlanta. Cavalry reports informed Hood that McPherson’s extreme left (southeast) flank was exposed, and that a large number of Federal supply wagons were situated in the Federal rear near Decatur. To Hood, this intelligence offered an opportunity to save the Macon and Western, end the bombardment of the civilians in Atlanta, and destroy or capture McPherson’s wagon train of supplies. In addition, McPherson’s command, although in proximity to Schofield’s corps, was still separated from Thomas, who was several miles farther west (north of Atlanta). Hood decided to take the offensive a second time.

  Hood’s plan was to commit virtually all of his 30,000 available troops in a bold attack, the success of which depended upon a lengthy night march by Hardee’s corps to reach McPherson’s rear. If all went according to plan, Hardee would be in position to launch a surprise attack at sunrise on July 22. Unfortunately for the Army of Tennessee, the attack failed in large part because of the exhaustion of Hardee’s troops, who did not succeed in reaching the Federal rear before daylight despite marching all night. Straggling also reduced Hardee�
�s numbers so that when they did attack, only about two-thirds of their original strength was available to participate. In his book Atlanta 1864, Richard McMurry described Hardee’s initial assaults by W. H. T. Walker’s and William Bate’s divisions as “delivered piecemeal by brigades” and “poorly led.”7

  Federal losses in the battle of Atlanta totaled 3,700 killed, wounded, and captured, including McPherson. Although Sherman’s inflated estimate of 8,000 Southern losses is often repeated, Hood’s casualties were in fact about 5,600. Hood’s attack failed to destroy McPherson’s army and repel Sherman, but the critical Macon and Western Railroad continued in operation and Atlanta remained in Confederate hands.8

  Hood was again compelled to act less than a week later. During the early morning hours of July 28, he learned that Federal forces had withdrawn from their positions to the southeast, which seemed to indicate that the threat to the Macon and Western had subsided. The Federal Army of the Tennessee, however, which was now under the command of Gen. Oliver O. Howard, was observed maneuvering to the west of Atlanta. Hood promptly decided to attack the Federals before they could entrench in their new positions. Stephen D. Lee, who had arrived from Mississippi only one day earlier to assume command of Hood’s former corps, was ordered to move two divisions into position along Lick Skillet Road to block Howard’s advance. A. P. Stewart was also directed to move two of his three divisions out of the fortifications on Atlanta’s northeast side and march down Lick Skillet behind Lee’s divisions to a point beyond the Federal right flank. There, he would be in a position to attack Howard’s right flank and rear. Hood’s flanking plan was an attempt to do what the army was unable to achieve at the battles of Peachtree Creek and Atlanta. This time, however, Hood assigned the heavy fighting to Stewart’s troops, who had performed admirably on July 20. Unlike the logistic difficulties encountered on July 22, ample time (a full 24 hours) was allowed for Lee and Stewart to assume their positions. Hardee’s corps, which had been heavily engaged in the two previous battles, would remain in the Atlanta entrenchments to protect the city.

  Lee moved his command into position and engaged the Federals about one-half mile north of Lick Skillet Road. Stewart’s troops were moving along the road behind Lee to get into position when a message arrived from Lee informing Stewart that Hood had changed the plan. The new orders were for Stewart’s divisions to immediately attack on Lee’s left. Hood, however, had not changed the plan. Instead of continuing for another mile before deploying to sweep into the exposed Federal flank and rear, Stewart deployed his divisions on Lee’s left and directly assaulted the entrenched Federal line.

  The Federals easily repulsed the attack, suffering only 600 losses while inflicting some 2,900 casualties. “Lee disregarded his instructions and threw his men into a series of small-scale uncoordinated assaults,” explained McMurry, and Stewart “concluded that he had no choice but to join the attacks.” Castel agreed. “Historians will blame Hood for this slaughter,” he explained in Decision in the West. “The true culprit is Stephen Lee. Disregarding his instructions and ignoring subsequent orders, he attempted to crush Sherman’s supposedly vulnerable right flank with impromptu and disjointed attacks by his own and Stewart’s troops long after the failure of the first one demonstrated that they had no chance of success—the exact duplicate of his conduct two weeks earlier in Tupelo, from which experience he obviously learned nothing. What he should have done,” argued Castel, “is what Hood had directed him to do— simply keep open the Lick Skillet Road for the passage of Stewart’s forces.”9

  Steven Woodworth described the Ezra Church battle as “an unmitigated flop—a complete fiasco from a Confederate point of view. It is attributable to a gross blunder by Stephen D. Lee.” Woodworth speculated that the results might have been different had Hood himself been present. Hood, however, suspected that the Federal movement west of the city might be a diversion, and so remained in the Atlanta fortifications with Hardee’s corps and the Georgia militia, sending instead Lee and Stewart to Ezra Church to deal with Howard. Hood could not have been in two places at once.10

  Hood intended for Lee and Stewart to block, flank, and destroy a detached and outnumbered enemy force before they could entrench. His subordinates changed the plan.

  Many modern authors stress the unpopularity of Hood’s appointment and provide quotes and excerpts of critics to make their point. However, Hood had plenty of supporters, not only within the army but in the Southern press as well. Known as a fighter, the young general possessed optimism and enthusiasm that offered hope and inspired resolve among the war-weary Southern populace. “Amid the confusion and the destruction, the loneliness and the weariness, there rises one inspiring figure,” opined the Augusta Constitutionalist. “Early or late, or by the branding campfire or the sun’s first ray, may be seen a tall spare form, with a single arm and a single leg, a youthful face and a beaming eye in the line of the front. It is Hood.”11

  Although many officers of the Army of Tennessee opposed Hood’s replacement of Johnston, some gained confidence as a result of Hood’s efforts. “We still hold Atlanta,” wrote division commander William Bate to Braxton Bragg on August 23, “& I think under the present regime will continue to do so. The movements & fights of the 20th & 22d and the intended sequel to that of the 28 of July were well conceived & exhibited a high order of military ability on the part of Genl. Hood.” General Henry Clayton wrote to his wife the next day, August 24, “Our army which was very much depressed after the Battles of the 22d & 28th has very much improved in the past ten days… . I really feel encouraged that the war is soon to terminate.”12

  Cavalry commander Gen. Matthew C. Butler, who served in both the Army of Northern Virginia and, late in the war, under Johnston in North Carolina, wrote to Hood in 1874:

  I have always said that I did not believe that Genl. Johnston would ever have fought Sherman, and I have been reckless enough to assert that under the circumstances of his army at Atlanta, the only thing left to be done was to make the movements which you did, as I suppose by Mr. Davis’s directions, and I believe that the military critics of the operations of that army—I believe the dispassionate and disinterested ones—will justify its wisdom.13

  Although most modern students of the Civil War consider the July 1864 battles for Atlanta to be decisive defeats for Hood, many Southern soldiers viewed the engagements in a different light that summer. In his 1970 essay “Confederate Morale in the Atlanta Campaign of 1864,” McMurry observed that letters from late July and August show “a surprisingly large number of Hood’s men writing that they are confident of their ability to defeat Sherman,” and that the three battles were “Southern victories” that halted Sherman’s attempts to flank Atlanta.14

  Johnston frustrated the Confederate high command with his unwillingness to communicate his plans and intentions, not only during the campaign in north Georgia but throughout his previous commands as well.15 Unlike Johnston, Hood kept Richmond constantly acquainted with his plans. He wired Bragg on August 4, “I beg to assure you that I have no intention of abandoning this place, and that if no other recourse be left, I shall certainly give the enemy battle before I leave it.”16

  Davis had placed Hood in command to fight for and hold Atlanta, but after the three bloody July battles the Confederate president grew concerned about the increasing Confederate casualties and urged a measure of caution. “The loss consequent upon attacking him in his entrenchments,” Davis told Hood, “requires you to avoid that if practicable.” This admonishment of Hood’s tactics was unfair and undeserved. All three assaults against portions of Sherman’s command had been carefully calculated as flank attacks while the Federals were moving and before they could fully fortify. Unfortunately for the Confederates, unforeseen and unavoidable delays, among other factors, at the battles of Peachtree Creek and Atlanta gave the enemy time to entrench; at Ezra Church, S. D. Lee disregarded Hood’s explicit instructions by launching a series of uncoordinated frontal attacks against fortified Fed
eral positions.17

  Hood achieved some success following the sharp setback at Ezra Church. In addition to maintaining control of Atlanta, Southern forces managed to land some heavy blows against Sherman’s cavalry. A large contingent of Federal horsemen under Gens. Edward McCook and George Stoneman was sent on a raid to cut Hood’s remaining railroad lifeline south of the city, and then possibly move farther south to Andersonville to release the thousands of Federal prisoners being held there. On July 31 and August 1, Joseph Wheeler’s Confederate cavalry met and routed McCook’s troopers south of Atlanta at Brown’s Mill, and Stoneman and most of his cavalry were captured at Sunshine Church by Confederate forces under Alfred Iverson. With these defeats, Sherman lost about two-thirds of his entire mounted command. A few days later on August 5 and 6, a Federal infantry assault was repulsed west of Atlanta at Utoy Creek.18

  Sherman, however, remained undeterred. During the last week of August, he shifted six of his seven infantry corps west of the city to cut the vital Macon and Western Railroad below Atlanta between Rough and Ready and Jonesboro. Marching on the Federal right, Howard’s Army of the Tennessee reached Jonesboro about 15 miles south of the city. Unfortunately for Hood, Wheeler’s cavalry was raiding Sherman’s supply lines in north Georgia and thus was not available for reconnaissance purposes. Unsure whether this latest move by Sherman was a diversion, Hood remained in Atlanta with A. P. Stewart’s corps and the Georgia militia and ordered his remaining two infantry corps under Hardee and Lee to move south to Jonesboro, with Hardee in charge of both corps. Hardee intended to attack the advancing Federals before they could construct fortifications, with the blow designed to fall upon the right flank of Gen. John Logan’s corps. Hood was confident that Hardee had enough men to drive the Federals away and alleviate the threat to the railroad, not realizing that the bulk of Sherman’s entire army was involved in the movement. However, just as had occurred in the Confederate attacks at Peachtree Creek and Atlanta, Hardee’s and Lee’s troops arrived late. Patrick Cleburne’s division took almost 12 hours to move as many miles. According to Albert Castel, Lee’s exhausted troops had little sleep. Scores of men dropped out, “unable or unwilling to go on.”19