John Bell Hood: The Rise, Fall, and Resurrection of a Confederate General

by Hood, Stephen

  Private J. P. Young of the 7th Tennessee Cavalry, later a judge in Memphis, Tennessee, wrote a lengthy article in Confederate Veteran magazine entitled “Hood’s Failure at Spring Hill.” Young, who described Hood as “able but unfortunate,” realized, as did everyone else, how important Spring Hill was to the campaign: “Hood, successful here [Spring Hill], would have taken his place as one of the great captains of the war.” Commenting on the debate that had raged in the decades after the war, Young wrote, “There are not lacking writers who have striven to demonstrate that General Schofield in the operations of the 29th was engaged in a game of profound strategy with General Hood, that he had known Hood at the Military Academy and known him to be a rash blunderer without mathematical capacity or power of combination, and that he [Schofield] had reasoned that Hood would helplessly dally before Spring Hill without power to attack or decide what next to be done… . It is scarcely necessary to point out the weakness of such an argument.” Young went on to point out that Schofield, in his correspondence with Gen. George Thomas during the desperate retreat from Pulaski to Franklin, made no claim of Hood’s lack of prowess or potency, and mentioned nothing of any ineptitude by Hood in his later reports. To the contrary, Schofield openly declared his perilous position to Thomas and that a mistake by him or his subordinates would have been disastrous.

  Judge Young went on to offer the following observation:

  It must be patent to the most casual observer … but for the failure of Hood’s subordinates to act promptly at Spring Hill, Stanley would have been crushed before nightfall, the wagon train and reserve artillery of the army captured, Schofield entrapped as he approached in the darkness with Ruger’s Division, and the remaining divisions … left at the mercy of Hood at daylight next morning… .

  Success here and the destruction of his antagonist would have placed Hood in the most exalted position among his people and his name high among the great masters of strategy in the war. The move was faultless; the success of it up to 4 p.m. startling. Triumph was within his grasp, but failure came, whatever the cause, where least to be expected among those splendid officers and men. General Schofield has been honored by the nation with the highest military office in the gift of the people. Hood, failing through no fault of his own, unless it was his failure to personally see that his orders were obeyed, is reckoned by the average reader of history as mediocre and inefficient.14

  Colonel Virgil Murphey of the 17th Alabama Infantry was captured during the fighting at Franklin on November 30 and taken to Schofield’s headquarters for interrogation. Murphey later recalled Schofield’s acknowledgment of his army’s “perilous position” at Spring Hill, and his chastisement of Hood for allowing the escape. According to Murphey, he responded in Hood’s defense that “a grave responsibility rested upon the general who failed to make the attack as we knew our advantage and Hood had ordered the attack.” While imprisoned at Johnson’s Island in Ohio, Murphey wrote of Hood’s assault at Franklin: “The same blow delivered with equal power at Spring Hill or Thompson’s Station would have yielded us dominion over Tennessee. A failure to obey [Hood’s] order lost us a noble commonwealth.”15

  John Copley of the 49th Tennessee Infantry described Forrest on the morning of November 30. When he learned that the Federals had slipped away during the night, an enraged Forrest “cursed out some of the commanding officers, and censured them for allowing the Federal army to escape.” It is important to note that Copley recalled Forrest’s blaming multiple officers—and not specifically Hood, or Hood alone.16

  Even a Yankee officer, Lieutenant Chesley Mosman of the 59th Illinois Infantry, felt compelled to comment on the matter. Having heard that Frank Cheatham was responsible for the Federal escape, according to the lieutenant, the Confederate corps commander “deferred seriously engaging for fear he would be flanked, thus refusing to obey General Hood’s positive orders. Had Hood’s order been obeyed, the entire face of the campaign would have been changed.”17

  However, none of these or other eyewitness accounts impressed author Barbara G. Ellis, who wrote in her 2003 book The Moving Appeal that Hood “ignored his generals’ frantic pleas” to attack Schofield’s retreating columns. As should be more than readily apparent, no pleas by Hood’s subordinates— frantic or otherwise—appear in the Ellis’s sources.18

  General Benjamin F. Cheatham, who led one of Hood’s three infantry corps during the Tennessee Campaign, played a major role in the Spring Hill Affair. Hood claimed in his memoir, published posthumously in 1880, that he sent repeated orders to Cheatham on November 29 to attack the Federals and seize the road to block the passage of Schofield’s army. In order to fully understand this issue, Hood’s discussion is quoted below at length:

  I thought it probable that Cheatham had taken possession of Spring Hill without encountering material opposition, or had formed line across the pike, north of town, and entrenched without coming in serious contact with the enemy, which would account for the little musketry heard in his direction. However, to ascertain the truth, I sent an officer to ask Cheatham if he held the pike, and to inform him of the arrival of Stewart, whose corps I intended to throw on his left, in order to assail the Federals in flank that evening or the next morning, as they formed to attack Cheatham. At this juncture, the last messenger returned with the report that the road had not been taken possession of. General Stewart was then ordered to proceed to the right of Cheatham and place his Corps across the pike, north of Spring Hill.

  By this hour, however, twilight was upon us, when General Cheatham rode up in person. I at once directed Stewart to halt, and, turning to Cheatham, I exclaimed with deep emotion, as I felt the golden opportunity fast slipping from me, “General, why in the name of God have you not attacked the enemy, and taken possession of the pike?” He replied that the line looked a little too long for him, and that Stewart should first form on his right. I could hardly believe it possible that this brave soldier, who had given proof of such courage and ability upon so many hard-fought fields, would even make such a report. After leading him within full view of the enemy, and pointing out to him the Federals, retreating in great haste and confusion, along the pike, and then giving explicit orders to attack, I would have soon expected the midday to turn into darkness as for him to have disobeyed my orders. I then asked General Cheatham whether or not Stewart’s Corps, if formed on the right, would extend across the pike. He answered in the affirmative.19

  After reading this account, Cheatham denied Hood’s charge in a speech in Louisville in late 1881. The former corps commander accused Hood (who was now dead) of lying. Here is the bulk of Cheatham’s reply:

  When I had returned from my left, where I had been to get Bate in position, and was on the way to the right of my line, it was dark; but I intended to move forward with Cleburne and Brown and make the attack, knowing that Bate would be in position to support them. Stewart’s column had already passed by on the way toward the turnpike, and I presumed he would be in position on my right.

  On reaching the road where General Hood’s field headquarters had been established, I found a courier with a message from General Hood, requesting me to come to him at Captain Thompson’s house, about one and a fourth miles back on the road to Rutherford’s creek. I found General Stewart with General Hood. The Commanding General there informed me that he had concluded to postpone the attack till daylight. The road was still open—orders to remain quiet until morning—and nothing to prevent the enemy from marching toward Franklin.

  “The dramatic scene with which [Hood] embellishes his narrative of the day’s operations,” Cheatham added, “only occurred in the imagination of General Hood.”20

  Unfortunately for Hood and the various Confederate commanders who have been accused over the decades of full or partial blame for the failure at Spring Hill, the person most responsible survived the campaign and the war, lived 21 years after the conflict ended, and repeatedly denied responsibility while accusing Hood of dishonesty. According to multip
le witnesses, the person responsible for the Spring Hill debacle was Frank Cheatham.

  Among the many witnesses who made various claims and denials after the war pertaining to events at Spring Hill was Maj. Joseph B. Cumming, one of Hood’s staff officers. Cumming left a detailed account of what he saw and heard on the evening of November 29:

  General Hood sent me forward with an order to General Cheatham to attack at once. I delivered the order, and as I had ridden hard to deliver it I returned to Gen. Hood’s headquarters at a slow pace expecting every minute to hear the sound of the attack on the pike. It was now getting dark. It was the 29th of November, chilly and drizzling. When I reached Gen. Hood’s headquarters, to my astonishment I found Gen. Cheatham there, he having out-ridden me by a different route. He was remonstrating with Gen. Hood against a night attack.21

  As a member of Hood’s staff, Cumming’s credibility has always been questioned, for he would have had a natural tendency to support his commander. However, among recently discovered documents are two postwar letters to Hood that corroborate Cumming’s account, one from Stephen D. Lee and another from William W. Old.

  Lee wrote the following in a letter dated August 25, 1875: “I met A. P. Stewart at Columbus about 6 weeks ago and profounded, why was no battle delivered at Spring Hill? He replied in substance that Cheatham & Cleburne determined it was not best to bring on an engagement at night [emphasis added].” Lee clarified that Stewart had not personally heard the two senior officers’ conversation firsthand, but “believed such was the case and had heard so.” In this same letter, Lee urged Hood to set the record straight on Spring Hill, and continued to do so up until his last correspondence a few months before Hood’s death four years later. Referring to Hood’s “natural modesty,” Lee wrote, “I think now you can write with more propriety than at any time to this date and possibly it is now your duty.” In reference to both Atlanta and Spring Hill, Lee added, “I believe now a correct statement as to your movements would do good. I will aid you all in my power as I sympathize with you in your feelings to vindicate yourself.”22

  Because Lee conveyed to Hood that Stewart did not personally hear Cheatham or Cleburne express displeasure with launching a night attack, “but believed such was the case and had heard so,” Hood apparently sought additional validation to support Cumming’s and Lee’s revealing information. Further corroboration arrived two years later.

  On September 10, 1877, William W. Old, a former Confederate major, met with another former major named E. L. Martin. Both men had been members of Gen. Edward Johnson’s staff during the Tennessee Campaign. The discussion that ensued so stunned Old that he sent a letter (see page 126) to Hood the same day. “In regard to the attack at Spring Hill,” wrote Old, “Mr. Martin says that Genl. Johnson did go to Gen. Cheatham and beg him to let him attack with his division, stating that he did not even require any support, but that Genl. Cheatham refused, stating finally he was opposed to night attacks. Mr. Martin says he was present [emphasis in the original letter].”23

  Stephen D. Lee letter to John Bell Hood, August 25, 1877.

  John Bell Hood Personal Papers

  Major James Ratchford, a member of General Lee’s staff, offered support for Major Martin’s claim and Old’s letter to Hood when he also recalled Cheatham’s refusal to allow Johnson to attack. “I heard General Ed Johnson say that during the night he could have routed the entire Federal army with only his division,” Ratchford wrote in 1909, “but was not permitted to attack them.”24

  In 1879, Hood was working feverishly on his memoirs and corresponding regularly with Lee, who implored Hood to rectify the narrative of Spring Hill.

  William W. Old letter to John Bell Hood, September 10, 1877.

  John Bell Hood Personal Papers

  Lee wrote on April 25 of that year, “I do hope your book will make clear the Spring Hill matter, for it is time for that mystery to be cleared up.” Lee’s feelings on the matter were so strong that he, in effect, threatened Hood that he would do it himself if the former army commander refused: “If you do not,” Lee bluntly wrote, “I will feel it my duty to do so after your book comes out.”25

  Hood complied with Lee’s suggestion (which was more of an ultimatum) by revealing in his memoirs that Cheatham had disobeyed orders to block the road at Spring Hill. Unfortunately, he failed to provide enough details to withstand Cheatham’s persistent denials. Because Hood died before the publication of his memoir, the more convincing details were consigned to Hood’s work papers, whose existence and whereabouts remained unknown until only recently. Hood’s premature death allowed Cheatham to deny Hood’s charges with impunity for the seven years he outlived his former commander. Hood’s lost letters contained testimony from others that were both explicitly and implicitly confidential, and Hood honored that confidentiality by not revealing evidence that would have otherwise strengthened his account. With those letters seemingly lost and Hood in his grave, Tennessee native Frank Cheatham’s repeated and eloquent denials convinced historians that Hood was the real culprit, unfairly blaming others for the Spring Hill fiasco.

  In Hood’s Tennessee Campaign, Thomas Hay held Hood culpable for failing to ensure that his orders were “promptly obeyed and correctly executed.” Hay believed Cheatham’s false denials. “General Cheatham” the historian boldly asserted, “was not to blame” for the failure at Spring Hill.26

  Stanley Horn wrote in The Army of Tennessee, “From reading Hood’s account and Cheatham’s account of the same events, it is clear that both cannot be right. Either one of them misrepresents the facts, or one or both had a hazy recollection. And though it is a serious matter to challenge a commanding general’s veracity, the weight of evidence favors Cheatham.” Horn added that “Cheatham says even more positively and convincingly that Hood’s recital of his alleged responsibility is ‘a statement for which there was not the slightest foundation.’”27

  Wiley Sword picked up the cudgel to once again bludgeon Hood. “It was Hood’s mismanagement and his assorted careless errors that led to such disastrous consequences,” he wrote about Spring Hill in The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah. “Indeed, despite the failure of others the primary fault was Hood’s. His careless attitude can perhaps be explained only in terms of the fatigue and possibly the opium derivative which clouded his mind. The responsibility for the conduct of operations was Hood’s, and yet he had acted with gross carelessness. By failing to adequately communicate with his chief subordinates, he had created a fatal leadership malaise.”28

  Thomas Connelly was less critical than Sword in Autumn of Glory. Hood’s corps commanders “had not served him well,” explained Connelly, but “Hood was partially responsible.” Several years later, Connelly and co-author James McDonough sharpened their pen when they described Hood’s reaction to the Spring Hill failure in their book Five Tragic Hours: “Hood furiously lashed out at his subordinates, placing the blame on them rather than on himself.”29

  With the recent discovery of Hood’s personal papers, at least four separate witnesses are now known to have testified that Cheatham, despite his repeated denials, disobeyed orders to attack at Spring Hill. S. D. Lee wrote to Hood, “The blunder was at Spring Hill. Had that not occurred all would have been well. There the responsibility of failure in the campaign rests. As noble and gallant an effort was made at Franklin by commander and army knowing the blunder, as was ever made and it was the last chance to strike with success. With what results we both know.”30

  According to Lee, “Franklin was a result of blunders made at Spring Hill.” The ensuing bloodbath on November 30 was among the most tragic in American military history, and has been consistently portrayed as John Bell Hood’s fault. Unless four independent witnesses are not to be believed, Cheatham’s insubordination resulted in the Federal escape at Spring Hill, precipitating the tragedy that followed hours later at Franklin. It will be interesting to see what changes, if any, are made to Civil War scholarship’s future portrayals of John Bell Hood and Benjami
n Franklin Cheatham at Spring Hill, and by extension, the battle of Franklin.31

  As previously noted, Frank Cheatham outlived Hood for seven years, and during that time took full advantage of the opportunity to promote his version of the disputed events of November 29, 1864. Scholars and writers found one of his stories in particular to be persuasive. During the march from Columbia to Spring Hill, Hood recalled pointing out the retreating Federals to Cheatham. Hood wrote in his memoirs, “I led the main body of the army to within about two miles and in full view of the pike from Columbia to Spring Hill and Franklin. I here halted at about 3 p.m., and requested General Cheatham, commanding the leading corps, and Major General Cleburne to advance to the spot where, sitting upon my horse, I had in sight the enemy’s wagons and men passing at double-quick along the pike.” According to Hood, he ordered Cheatham to go “at once” with Cleburne’s division and take possession of the pike at or near Spring Hill.32

  Cheatham later admitted that Hood did personally give him orders to seize the pike, but placed the location of the brief meeting at the Rutherford Creek crossing, roughly two and one-half miles south of Spring Hill. However, Cheatham vehemently denied that Hood ever pointed out the retreating Federal trains on the road, and added that the Columbia to Spring Hill pike “was never in view” at any point along the adjacent roads over which the Confederate army marched. With Hood in his grave, Cheatham wrote, “Only a mirage would have made possible the vision which this remarkable statement [by Hood] professes to record.”33

  Since Cheatham and Hood both agreed that Cheatham had been given orders to move rapidly to Spring Hill and seize control of the pike, the dispute is solely over the location of the meeting between the two commanders, and whether or not the retreating enemy could be seen. Remarkably, historians have become captivated by this seemingly minor quarrel, perhaps because its resolution would shed light on which commander was more truthful in his account of Spring Hill. For whatever reason, the disagreement over where Hood and Cheatham precisely met has taken on a prominent life of its own. In this otherwise insignificant feud of facts, historians have unanimously sided with Cheatham.