Operation Garbo

by Juan Pujol Garcia

  Although he did not refer to it directly, GARBO was actually attempting to explain away the prime minister’s gaffe. He was to return to this embarrassing subject the following day when, at 9.58 on the evening of D+1, GARBO explained that the Political Warfare Executive had now agreed to alter its directive so that ‘certain limited speculation in general terms as to future operations’ might be included. As for the prime minister, GARBO gave a reasonably plausible explanation:

  In spite of recommendations made to Churchill that his speech should contain every possible reserve, he based it on the consideration that he was obliged, on account of his political position, to avoid distorting the facts and would not permit that his speeches should be discredited by coming events.

  This message is particularly remarkable, bearing in mind that it is, in effect, a German spy claiming that Winston Churchill had failed to adhere to his advice!

  In the meantime, while GARBO was wriggling out of the discrepancy between his messages and the prime minister’s ill-timed speech, he had to report a distinct lack of activity elsewhere. Agent 3(3), the Greek seaman, could still see the fleet in the Clyde, so there was not much going on there, although there was apparently a continuing state of alert. GARBO had, therefore, decided to call all his subagents to London for a conference.

  For the present, I can only state a definite argument based on the studies and appreciations which my work in the ministry has facilitated, and it is that the enemy are biding their intentions behind this first action.

  GARBO concluded his second transmission of the evening with the following observation:

  Fortunately, the first action was robbed of the surprise which they wished to create through the information from CHAMILLUS as, from the hour at which the assault is said to have started, I am able to prove, with satisfaction, that my messages arrived in time to prevent the action coming as a surprise to our high command. There is no doubt that CHAMILLUS has accomplished through his action a service which, though it will make it impossible to use his collaboration in the future, has justified a sacrifice by his last report. CHAMILLUS left this morning accompanied by DAGOBERT who will arrange for him to be hidden in a safe place. For myself, and counting on your approval, I intend to take care of this friend and give him every consideration in order to make him aware of our recognition.

  Once this text had been transmitted, GARBO pretended to have received a visit from Mrs Gerbers, who had informed him, for the first time, about the delay in getting his signals acknowledged the previous morning. GARBO was suitably indignant, and his tone changed from self-congratulation to simulated outrage:

  On handing over today’s messages, ALMURA told the widow that he was not able to send the urgent messages until 0800 hours since you had not been listening. This makes me question your seriousness and your sense of responsibility. I therefore demand a clarification immediately as to what has occurred. If what I suspect is the case and ALMURA has failed in his duties, then I am absolutely decided in this event to abandon the radio service until I can find some other solution. I am very disgusted; in this struggle for life or death, I cannot accept excuses or negligence. I cannot swallow the idea of endangering the service without any benefit. Were it not for my ideals and faith I would abandon this work as having proved myself a failure. I write these messages to send this very night though my tiredness and exhaustion, due to the excessive work I have had, has completely broken me.

  The transmission had begun at 11.55 p.m. on D-Day, and Madrid’s reply came through at 8.10 p.m. on D+1, 7 June:

  I have read your last two messages of yesterday and I perfectly well understand your state of morale and feel moved to answer you the following. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to find out who is to blame if a culprit really exists with regard to the delay in the transmission of CHAMILLUS. After finishing on Monday at 2350 hours, having received your message, CENTRO was listening according to plan every hour up to 0300 hours and again from 0700 hours on Tuesday, getting the message of CHAMILLUS at 0800 hours. It is possible that, in spite of the staff having been listening properly, due to bad conditions having set in, there would have been no other calls from ALMURA during the night. Let us know at what time ALMURA tried to call us without success. But, even supposing the worst and ALMURA did not call, you must remember that ALMURA, according to what you have told us, is not aware of the true significance of your mission, and it is possible that he, after his day’s work and having been transmitting that night for nearly three hours, should have felt very tired and, considering that he had fulfilled his duties, he could not imagine that the message was one of such importance that it could not have been delayed for a few hours. I wish to stress in the clearest terms that your work over the last few weeks has made it possible for our command to be completely forewarned and prepared, and the message of CHAMILLUS would have influenced but little had it arrived three or four hours earlier. Thus I reiterate to you, as responsible chief of the service, and to all your collaborators, our total recognition of your perfect and cherished work, and I beg of you to continue with us in the supreme and decisive hours of the struggle for the future of Europe.

  Clearly the absurd amateur psychology exercised by GARBO and Harris had paid off handsomely. The Abwehr were anxious to cover up their own blunder and, at the same time, were desperate to maintain contact with their best source. But GARBO was not going to let the matter drop and, when he replied on 12 June, D+6, he pressed home his advantage:

  ALMURA communicated that on the night of the crisis he called at 0300 hours for half an hour and that he repeated his calls at 0700 hours without any result. With regard to the belief that ALMURA would not imagine the extreme urgency of the message handed to him, this I can dispel, as whether or not he knew its contents is nothing to do with the fact that he had his instructions given to him by the widow, which were to tell him that it was of extreme urgency that that message should be sent that night. I cannot, therefore, accept negligence, even if he were tired from his long hours of transmission. I am also exhausted but I know to fulfil my duties. Furthermore, the payment he receives is the highest of the network and it would, therefore, be unwise for him to accept the possibility that the atmospheric conditions were bad but, on future occasions, I intend to take my security measures in urgent cases as in the one mentioned and will endeavour to see that the widow remains present at any important transmission.

  The next item on MI5’s deception agenda was GARBO’s much vaunted conference of subagents. In general, his messages had fallen into three categories: those that expressed his own opinion (which, of course, expressed well-judged scepticism when the occasion suited); those that contained his own, first-hand observations (and were, therefore, verifiable and accurate); and, finally, those that summed up the combined wisdom of several agents. This latter group were reserved for matters of crucial importance and were only used for items which were required to be delivered with weight. The conference of 8 June was just such an opportunity, because three of DAGOBERT’s best agents had been called to London. The idea for the gathering had been Tommy Harris’s, and he had justified it in his secret master plan for GARBO’s contribution to FORTITUDE, dated 4 May 1944. In this historic document Harris observed:

  With the approach of D-Day and even after, until the nature and full significance of NEPTUNE (the landings in Normandy) is discovered, there will almost inevitably be a certain divergence of opinion as to Allied intentions, even in the German high command. There will, we hope, be among the leaders of Germany some who will draw the conclusion we are trying to inspire through FORTITUDE. If we can continue through GARBO and the Abwehr to supply those Germans who are already inclined to believe in our cover plan with further ammunition for our arguments … it may well be that we shall be helping those elements in Germany to influence plans in our favour during the few critical days of the post-assault period.

  Accordingly, those members of GARBO’s network who were reasonably available to come to Lo
ndon held a unique meeting to discuss the strategic implications of the events of the previous forty-eight hours. DONNY had travelled up from Dover; DICK, the Indian, had arrived from Brighton; DORICK had rushed over from Harwich; and BENEDICT had arrived late the previous evening. GARBO had set the scene just after midnight, imparting the first definite intelligence the Germans had received since the invasion had begun:

  I found BENEDICT awaiting me after a short interview he had had with DICK. Urgent points communicated; he learned that the 3rd British Battalion landed in the first assault and has identified it as the one with the insignia of the inverted triangle. The Guards Armoured Division will enter in action three days after initiating the first attack. The division has left the area.

  At 7.28 p.m. GARBO sent the following message to whet the Abwehr’s appetite further.

  I have had an extremely agitated day today, but I have the satisfaction of being able to give you the most important reports of my work. As I have not got all the messages ready, I hope you will be listening tonight at 10 GMT.

  GARBO was finally ready to start sending at seven minutes past midnight, and the resulting message was sent by Charles Haines for the next 122 minutes. The transmission was easily GARBO’s longest and by far his most important, for it encapsulated the entire FORTITUDE deception:

  From the reports mentioned, it is perfectly clear that the present attack is a large-scale operation but diversionary in character, for the purpose of establishing a strong bridgehead in order to draw the maximum of our reserves to the area of operation and to retain them there so as to be able to strike a blow somewhere else with ensured success. I never like to give my opinions unless I have strong reasons to justify my assurances, but the fact that these concentrations, which are in the east and south-east of the island, are now inactive means that they must be held in reserve to be employed in the other large-scale operations. The constant aerial bombardments which the area of the Pas-de-Calais has suffered and the strategic disposition of these forces give reason to suspect an attack in that region of France which, at the same time, offers the shortest route for the final objective of their illusions, which is to say, Berlin. This advance could be covered by a constant hammering from the air since the bases would be near the field of battle and they would come in behind our forces which are fighting at the present moment with the enemy disembarked in the west of France. From J(5) I learned yesterday that there were seventy-five divisions in this country before the present assault commenced. Supposing they should use a maximum of twenty to twenty-five divisions with which to attempt a second blow. I trust you will submit urgently all these reports and studies to our high command, since moments may be decisive in these times and before taking a false step, through lack of knowledge of the necessary facts, they should have in their possession all the present information which I transmit with my opinion, which is based on the belief that the whole of the present attack is set as a trap for the enemy to make us move all our reserves in a hurried strategical disposition which we would later regret.

  This single message is of extraordinary historic significance, and the decrypters watched its progress through the enemy’s military intelligence structure. From Madrid it was relayed to Berlin and then delivered to Hitler’s headquarters at Berchtesgaden, where it was received by Colonel Friedrich-Adolf Krummacher, the head of the Wehrmacht High Command’s intelligence branch. By that time it had been edited several times and code names had been slightly corrupted in the process, but it is entirely recognisable when compared to MI5’s original version, and the central theme remained intact:

  After personal consultation on 8 June in London with my agents JONNY, DICK and DORICK, whose reports were sent today, I am of the opinion, in view of the strong troop concentrations in south-eastern and eastern England, which are not taking part in the present operations, that these operations are a diversionary manoeuvre designed to draw off enemy reserves in order then to make a decisive attack in another place. In view of the continued air attacks on the concentration area mentioned, which is a strategically favourable position for this, it may very probably take place in the Pas-de-Calais area, particularly since in such an attack the proximity of air bases will facilitate the operation by providing continued strong air support.

  After the war the actual document summarising GARBO’s opinion was recovered intact, and a further assessment had been added:

  The report is credible. The reports received in the last week from the ARABEL undertaking have been confirmed almost without exception and are to be described as especially valuable. The main line of investigation in future is to be the enemy group of forces in south-eastern and eastern England.

  When Krummacher received the summary he underlined the sentence characterising the Normandy landings as ‘diversionary in nature’ and added the written comment: ‘Confirms the view already held by us that a further attack is to be expected in another place (Belgium?).’ Before being handed to Hitler, this paper was passed to Field Marshal Jodl, who initialled it and underscored the words ‘south-eastern and eastern England’. Evidently, GARBO’s poison had proved particularly efficacious on him.

  It was later established that this single message had a devastating effect on the German high command and led to the cancellation of a major armoured counter-attack in Normandy, using seasoned units from the Pas-de-Calais area. Instead, the troops en route were ordered to return to their bases. The much-feared armoured thrust simply never materialised, and credit for this coup can be given to GARBO and his notional conference of D+2.1

  This news did not filter through to GARBO or Harris for some considerable time, so the ARABEL network continued its routine, reporting numerous Allied troop movements to support the FORTITUDE master plan. On D+3, DICK and DORICK submitted their observations from Dover and Harwich respectively:

  DICK reports that the following divisions are to be found in his area without indication of embarking at present … Southern Command … 47th Division … DORICK reports that the activity in his area has greatly increased, giving the following divisions stationed in the area without indications of embarking for the moment … 47th London Division.

  Later the same day, GARBO sent a further signal to hammer the message home:

  Amplification and notes on the messages sent yesterday; Looking over the messages I see that I omitted to include, in the list of troops in the area of DONNY, the units 2nd Canadian Division and 2nd Canadian Corps. DORICK has learned through a well-informed channel that there are more than a hundred tank transport barges capable of transporting about five hundred tanks … which have gradually been concentrating in the ports of Yarmouth, Lowestoft and in the rivers of the Debenham and the Orwell.

  The invasion was now just seventy-two hours old, and the need for the Allies to consolidate their position before the enemy could amount a counter-offensive was greater than ever.

  Every day that the Germans could be persuaded not to send additional reinforcements to the Normandy front gave the Allied troops a greater chance of victory. All the Allied commanders were only too well aware of their vulnerability during the first few days ashore. GARBO’s message of D+2 was to have immense implications for the German defenders, but FORTITUDE called for continuous deception until well into July when, it was conceded, there would be no further advantage to pursuing the campaign. The next priority was to persuade the Abwehr that the non-existent First United States Army Group (FUSAG) had not yet been committed to Normandy and, therefore, constituted an immediate threat around the Channel.

  Although GARBO himself had played an exceptional role in the overall FORTITUDE plan, his agents had not contributed much to the existence of FUSAG. This had been left largely to two of MI5’s other double agents, BRUTUS and TATE. BRUTUS was a Polish air force officer, Wing Commander Roman Garby-Czerniawski, who had been imprisoned by the Nazis during the occupation of Paris. He had subsequently ‘escaped’ from their custody and made his way to England, where he revealed the true natu
re of his mission for the Abwehr. His dramatic escape had been stage-managed by them to give him cover and encourage the British to accept him at face value. After he had been turned into a double agent by his MI5 case officer, Hugh Astor, the Abwehr had been successfully duped into believing his reports, and he had made many of the notional observations which had created FUSAG. His contribution had worked well, and BRUTUS was held in high regard by the Abwehr.

  Roger Hesketh later commented that,

  of all the British controlled agents, it is evident that GARBO, BRUTUS and TRICYCLE enjoyed reputations of a high order throughout the whole period of FORTITUDE deception. This came as a surprise to us. We never doubted GARBO’s position. We knew that BRUTUS had attained something at least approaching GARBO’s stature by midsummer, but we had supposed that he had risen during the spring from comparative obscurity.

  Unfortunately, the same could not be said of TATE, a German spy who had parachuted into Cambridgeshire in September 1940. He been taken into custody quite quickly and had been persuaded to play his wireless back with what had seemed, initially at least, a degree of success. It had proved more difficult to double-check on his standing with the enemy because he reported direct to an Abwehr wireless station in Hamburg, which relayed his messages on to Berlin by a secure landline. The lack of wireless messages made interception impossible, but those relevant signals that were decrypted indicated that the enemy was not taking TATE’s messages too seriously. MI5’s problem lay in the parts of the FORTITUDE campaign, and in particular various sightings of FUSAG units in Kent, which had been allotted to TATE. In fact, the Abwehr’s poor opinion of TATE threatened to jeopardise FUSAG’s very existence in the minds of the enemy because the Hamburg Abstelle was consistently failing to pass on key pieces of intelligence. It was, therefore, decided to move GARBO onto the scene. On D+6, GARBO reported on a conversation he had had with the American sergeant, 4(3):