Rise and Kill First

by Ronen Bergman

  a complex exercise, involving the coordination and integration of different units The landing and the car ride to the destination were practiced on the beach near a new upscale neighborhood in north Tel Aviv, Ramat Aviv, which had skeletons of high-rise apartment blocks under construction that were somewhat similar to the luxurious buildings where the targets lived. Interviews with Shaked, May 1, 2013, and Barak, January 13, 2012.

  Yael and Model continued gathering intelligence Harari decided not to tell Yael about the details of the operation or its timing. “The possibility, even the very slightest, that she would be exposed without our knowing, and be forced to tell what she knew, would have endangered our forces,” he told me. Mossad, intelligence summary for Operation Spring of Youth, April 6, 1973 (author’s archive, received from “Gustav”). Interview with Amnon Biran, June 5, 2011.

  Shaked exploded in anger and turned to Zamir Reconstruction of the meeting from interviews with Shaked, May 14, 2013, Harari, March 29, 2014, and Ammon Biran, June 5, 2011.

  “after you make sure that he won’t get up again” Various notes in the handwriting of the operation’s commander, made close to the force’s departure, and notes for the last briefing by Brig. Gen. Immanuel Shaked on April 4, 1973 (author’s archive, received from “Stark”).

  “an operation for which there was no rescue option” Interview with Eli Zeira, June 29, 2010.

  Barak thought he was either sick or injured Interview with Barak, November 24, 2013.

  “It reminds me of Rome” Interview with Muki Betser, June 10, 2016.

  One bullet hit the car and set off its horn Betser, Secret Soldier, 163.

  “More proof that there’s always some new surprise” Interview with Betser, June 10, 2016.

  “Shoot him, Muki” Chief Infantry and Paratroops Officer headquarters, operations report for Operation Spring of Youth, May 11, 1973 (author’s archive, received from “Stark”). Amnon Biran, “Spring of the Elite Forces,” Mabat Malam, April 2011 (Hebrew). Interviews with Barak, November 24, 2013, “Dark Chocolate,” November 2012, “Black,” January 2013, and Aviram Halevi, October 12, 2010. Betser, Secret Soldier, 164–66.

  Pressler thought he’d been left alone Interview with Yigal Pressler, July 6, 2017.

  “My hardest moment…was not during the actual combat” Interview with Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, May 26, 2011. Klein, Striking Back, 168–69.

  they found the Caesarea man sitting in his car Interview with Lipkin-Shahak, April 3, 2012.

  Two of the paratroopers couldn’t restrain themselves Interview with “Sinbad,” October 2013.

  When she woke up she was surprised to find her husband Interview with Barak, November 24, 2013.

  Yael had written a letter to her case officer Copy of the letter in author’s archive, obtained from “Midburn.”

  “When the plane took off…I relaxed in my seat” Mass, Yael, the Mossad Warrior in Beirut (uncensored draft manuscript in author’s archive, received from “Maurice”), 117 (Hebrew).

  shortly before the raid he left one of the targeted apartments He and his aide, Tawfiq Tirawi, were visiting with the three terrorists who took part in the Munich massacre and had been freed by the Germans. At about 1 A.M., Tirawi recounts, they heard shooting and one of the bodyguards who’d been waiting outside burst in and yelled, “Al-Mossad, al-Mossad, they are here.” Interview with Tawfiq Tirawi, June 2002.

  details about PLO cells in the occupied territories Additional documents pointed at the links between the PLO and left-wing organizations in Europe, strengthening the standing of the Mossad as a body that could be useful to Western states in their battle against local terrorism, as well as Israel’s argument that only cooperation would be able to block the phenomenon. Interviews with Shimshon Issaki, September 2, 2015, and Reuven Hazak, February 1, 1999. Sayigh, Armed Struggle, 311.

  no attention was paid in Israel A few days after the operation, Brig. Gen. Shaked demanded that the director of the Mossad fire the Caesarea operative, and when he refused, Shaked urged chief of staff Elazar to ask the prime minister to order that it be done, but “In the euphoric atmosphere after the operation, no one would listen to me.” Interview with Shaked, May 1, 2013.

  The operation left Lebanon in shock Quoted in Haaretz, March 12, 1973.

  CHAPTER 11: “WRONG IDENTIFICATION OF A TARGET IS NOT A FAILURE. IT’S A MISTAKE.”

  before they shot him dead The Mossad suspected al-Kubaisi of planning an attempt on Golda Meir’s life by detonating a car bomb as her convoy passed by during a visit to New York. Al-Kubaisi arrived in Paris in February and checked in to a small hotel near the Place de la Madeleine. He soon began visiting bars frequented by young Arabs. Nehemia Meiri felt that he was too old to mingle with them, so he took the extremely unorthodox measure of sending his son, Moshe, to keep an eye on al-Kubaisi. The boy lacked any formal training in spycraft, but Moshe says Nehemia was convinced he had passed some of it on in his genes. “I used to go in to the bar, order something to drink and start talking to one of the Arabs. I had a bag with a concealed camera and while I was sitting there I snapped the people in the bar.” From these photographs as well as documentation from other surveillance teams, the Mossad identified meetings between al-Kubaisi and Fatah members. Interviews with Moshe and Nehemia Meiri, June 12, 2012.

  only hours after the Spring of Youth forces returned “To our regret, they don’t just croak on their own. They have to be helped,” explained Kurtz, who participated in the killing of Hussein Abd al-Chir. Interview with “Kurtz,” October 2005. Klein, Striking Back, 137–38.

  “an outstanding source with excellent and exclusive access” Mossad, History Department, Report on Operation Heartburn, 1996, 17, quoting from AMAN’s Annual Report for 1978–79 (author’s archive, received from “Lexicon”).

  A few seconds later…the button was pressed Interview with Harari, April 11, 2014. An account similar in certain aspects appears in Klein, The Master of Operations, 17–19. “Two Bomb-Carrying Arabs Injured in Explosion,” JTA, June 18, 1973.

  “Sadness” also reported on the activities of Mohammed Boudia Interview with Hadar, February 7, 2012.

  During June 1973, Sadness reported Interviews with Harari, February 12, 2014, “Dark Chocolate,” November 2, 2012, and Klein, May 28, 2014.

  Bayonet’s string of triumphs instilled a sense of euphoria Boudia was a major loss for the PFLP. Two days later, the organization announced that it had avenged Boudia by killing the Israeli military attaché in Washington, D.C., Col. Yosef “Joe” Alon, who had been shot dead in the driveway of his Maryland home on July 1. The actual circumstances of Alon’s death remain a mystery and at the center of many conspiracy theories. The investigation has recently been reopened, after evidence surfaced that Ilich Ramírez Sánchez—Carlos “the Jackal”—was involved in, or at least knew about, the affair. Adam Goldman, “I Wrote to Carlos the Jackal, and an Israeli’s Assassination Case Was Revived,” New York Times, January 8, 2017. Email correspondence with Sophie Bonnet, director of a future documentary about “Carlos the Jackal,” May 2017.

  “there was nothing the Mossad couldn’t do” Interview with “Kurtz,” October 2005.

  Ali gave in and presented himself at the Fatah recruitment office Nadia Salti Stephan, “Abu Hassan by Abu Hassan,” Monday Morning, April 1976.

  “raised eyebrows in Fatah” AMAN Research Department, “Terror Activity Abroad” May 1, 1969 (shown to author by “Lexicon”).

  Documents seized in al-Najjar’s apartment Interview with Issaki, September 2, 2015. Bird, Good Spy, 90.

  maintained that Salameh wasn’t involved Bird, Good Spy, 133–34. Klein, Striking Back, 192.

  “The fact that Abu Daoud…wanted to take all the credit” Interview with Issaki, September 2, 2015.

  Salameh was a marked man Harari quote from Yarin Kimor, Sealed Lips, Channel
1, September 20, 2014.

  The Caesarea men trailing Benamene Klein, Striking Back, 186–87. Interviews with Harari, March 10, 2014, Ilan Mizrahi, October 22, 2014, “Kurtz,” October 2005, “Dark Chocolate,” November 2012.

  two Bayonet teams engaged in missions elsewhere in Europe In another version, Benamene embarked in Milan on a train to Oslo, followed by a Mossad team, and there, according to one of the followers, “The error occurred when we confused him with another passenger on the train.” Interview with “Shaul,” June 2017.

  “like two brothers look like each other” Gen. Aharon Yariv, BBC interview, November 23, 1993.

  She was not the only one Meiri, on the other hand, did believe that the man apparently leading a quiet life in Lillehammer was indeed Salameh. Interviews with Harari, March 10, 2014, Nehemia and Moshe Meiri, June 12, 2012, and “Shaul,” June 2017.

  “Seven operatives make a positive identification” Interview with Harari, March 23, 2014.

  Harari told the logistics man, Arbel, to park the car They abandoned the car in the parking garage of a prestigious Danish hotel, where it remained for three years before an attendant realized that there was something wrong and it was returned to the car rental company.

  Harari’s climb to the directorship of the Mossad Interviews with Harari, March 29, 2014, and “Shaul,” July 2011. Y. turned down a request for an interview conveyed to him via a relative, a former commander of the Israeli Air Force, on March 20, 2017.

  a Moroccan working as a waiter Bouchiki was also the brother of Chico Bouchikhi, co-founder of the Gipsy Kings. Interview with Uli Weidenbach, February 26, 2017.

  “All of a sudden, my husband fell” Moshe Zonder, “I Was Sure They’d Kill Me Too,” Maariv, September 13, 1995.

  Zamir tried to dismiss the disaster Yarin Kimor, Sealed Lips, Channel 1, September 20, 2014.

  Bayonet’s problems were just beginning Interviews with “Shaul,” July 2011, and Harari, March 23, 2014.

  The police were waiting at the rental car return In the Norwegian police records, however, there’s a slightly different account of the circumstances under which Arbel was detained, crediting themselves and not the alert neighbor who’d taken the number down. Either way, the end result was a disaster for the Mossad. Yossi Melman, “Protocols of Lillehammer Failure Revealed,” Maariv, July 2, 2013.

  “A man writes an honest report and no one reads it” Reacting to “Shaul’s” words, Harari said, “Until Lillehammer, we didn’t know he [Arbel] suffered from claustrophobia. On the contrary, in all his previous missions he had functioned superbly.” The question is whether they should have known. Harari, when confronted with this question, interrupted me in a distinctly sarcastic tone: “You’re a serious person, right? So look, let’s say you’re an operative and you’re in Norway, the end of the world, next to the North Pole, and you don’t know the language or the alphabet. So you can’t read the street names, or the nameplate outside an apartment or a headline in a newspaper that could be relevant to your mission. Which is to say that my trained people can’t speak the language, so I take the half-trained, including ‘quasi-operatives’ by which I mean people in the middle of the course, but who do know Norwegian, because that’s what I’ve got, and I need someone who can translate.” Interview with Harari, March 23, 2014.

  Documents found on the detainees Many questions around the performance of the heads of Caesarea in the Lillehammer affair and harsh criticism of them are to be found in an anonymous letter written by one of Harari’s subordinates in April 2014, which contains thitherto unpublished information and which is in the author’s archive.

  Israel did not admit that it was responsible for killing Bouchiki Only in the mid- 1990s did Israel decide to own up to the killing, after legal proceedings were instituted against Harari and Zamir in Norway. Israel paid Torill Larsen Bouchiki and her daughter, Malika, twenty-two, the sum of $283,000, while Mr. Bouchiki’s son by a previous marriage, Jamal Terje Rutgersen, won a separate settlement of $118,000. “Israelis to Compensate Family of Slain Waiter,” New York Times, January 28, 1996.

  a secret agreement was reached between the governments of Israel and Norway Israel’s diplomatic and legal entanglement in Lillehammer is well described in Palmor, The Lillehammer Affair, a report by a Foreign Ministry official who was appointed to coordinate the efforts on the subject.

  “Lillehammer was a real failure” Interview with Kfir, June 9, 2011.

  That miracle was Golda Meir, the Mossad’s greatest fan Interview with Harari, March 23, 2014.

  planning to shoot down an El Al airliner Gaddafi had his own reasons for wanting to bring down an Israeli aircraft. On February 21, 1973, the Israeli Air Force shot down a Libyan Airlines passenger plane en route from Tripoli to Cairo that had lost its way and entered Israeli-controlled airspace over Sinai and was heading toward the secret nuclear facility at Dimona. Of the 113 people on board, 108 were killed.

  “a catapult shot from the runway” Interview with Harari, March 23, 2014. Zamir, With Open Eyes, 142–46. Klein, Master of Operations, 28–35.

  “Don’t worry, Nehemia” Interviews with Harari, March 23, 2014, Nehemia Meiri and Moshe Meiri, June 12, 2012, and “Black,” November 2015.

  arrested all the members of al-Hindi’s squad Most of the Palestinian prisoners were loaded onto an Italian Air Force cargo plane, which took off for Libya but exploded in midair over the Mediterranean. Everyone aboard was killed. Some Italian officials blamed the Mossad for the mysterious technical failure that caused the explosion. Israel denies the allegations, and as far as I was able to ascertain, they are telling the truth.

  CHAPTER 12: HUBRIS

  the general mood in the defense establishment remained euphoric Spring of Youth wasn’t the only success of the intelligence community in 1973. The Mossad had been running, with what it believed to be great results, a spy in the top echelons of the Egyptian government—a man by the name of Ashraf Marwan, who was the chef de bureau of President Anwar Sadat and the son-in-law of the late President Nasser. In addition, Sayeret Matkal placed surveillance devices deep inside Sinai in Operation Consulate, hooking up to the main communications cables of the Egyptian military and making parts of their top secret conversations accessible to AMAN. Interviews with “Constantine,” November 2011, Ehud Barak, January 13, 2012, and Levin, May 10, 2017. On the matter of Ashraf Marwan’s recruitment and handling and his possible involvement in the Egyptian deception prior to the Yom Kippur War, see Bergman and Meltzer, The Yom Kippur War: Moment of Truth, 31–41, 470–522 (Hebrew).

  Dayan climbed to the top of the mountain fortress of Masada Davar, April 17, 1973.

  Chief of staff Elazar, in a letter to Zamir Quotes from scanned documents printed in Zamir, With Open Eyes, photo insert after 128.

  confidence can too easily slip into overconfidence Interview with Barak, January 13, 2012.

  Kissinger launched a secret diplomatic initiative Kissinger to President Nixon, Washington, February 25–26, 1973. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 131.

  “I prefer Sharm el-Sheikh without peace” Kipnis, 1973: The Way to War, 89 (Hebrew).

  would be able to give Israel at least forty-eight hours’ warning Testimony of CoS David Elazar before the Agranat Commission, January 31, 1974, February 17, 1974, February 21, 1974 (author’s archive, received from “Picasso”).

  On October 6, at 2 P.M., the Egyptian and Syrian armies launched Harari and Caesarea had several contingency plans for the outbreak of war, including the consignment and detonation of a container full of explosives in the harbor at Port Said, and the placing of explosive charges in various military HQs and government offices in Cairo. Harari offered them to Prime Minister Meir, but, shocked and appalled by the events, she did not want to take additional risks and declined. Bergman and Meltzer, The Yom Kippur War: Mo
ment of Truth, 23–97 (Hebrew). Interview with Harari, March 29, 2014.

  three members of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine Yedioth Ahronoth, May 16, 1974.

  The normally aggressive Golda Meir…was prepared to concede The Truth Behind the Maalot Massacre, documentary film by Orly Vilnai and Guy Meroz, Channel 10, March 2014.

  the Sayeret proved inadequate to the task Zonder, Sayeret Matkal, 119 (Hebrew).

  the operation had had a chilling effect Interview with Issaki, September 2, 2015.

  “It obliged them to hide and run” Interview with Harari, March 29, 2014.

  strengthened the hand of Abu Jihad Sayigh, Armed Struggle, 310–11.

  a secret military report IDF General Staff Branch, History Department, The Terror Attack at the Savoy Hotel, August 1975 (author’s archive, received from “Gomez”).

  The terrorists were so close to the Kirya compound Interview with Gazit, September 12, 2016.

  This was seen as yet another significant failure Interview with Omer Bar-Lev, November 15, 2012.

  a Mossad mole inside Fatah reported Interviews with “Greco,” October 2014, and “Jacob,” August 2015.

  the head of AMAN…vigorously opposed it Interview with Gazit, September 12, 2016.

  His objections were overruled The operation was code-named Operation B’nei Mazor (Sons of Relief). Interview with Aviem Sella, July 10, 2013. (The report on the occurrence in the air force archives was shown to the author by “Roi.”)

  murderous attacks against Jewish and Israeli targets abroad In the period between December 1973 and May 1978, the Popular Front perpetrated twenty acts of international terrorism. Merari and Elad, International Dimension of Palestinian Terrorism, 170–74 (Hebrew).

  the organization’s most brilliant operational mind Interview with Mizrahi, April 22, 2014.

  “He preferred quality operations” Interview with Issaki, September 2, 2015.