Rise and Kill First

by Ronen Bergman

  “that we would be able to reach a peace agreement” Interview with Peres, September 17, 2012.

  “I was not impressed by the warnings” Interview with Olmert, August 29, 2011.

  “A pretty tough argument ensued” Interview with Weissglass, October 11, 2012.

  But there were spaces in between those three points The final decision to kill Yassin was made following another attack: On March 15, 2004, two Hamas suicide bombers blew themselves up at the Ashdod Port, after being smuggled in in a double-wall container. Ten people were killed, thirteen wounded. That night, chief of staff Mofaz scratched an entry in his diary. “Decision: To up the ante against Hamas leadership,” he wrote. “Gear Handle”—that was Yassin’s code name—“to raise for approval tomorrow.” Interview with Mofaz, June 14, 2011.

  “I did not think they’d fire at a cripple’s wheelchair” Eldar, Getting to Know Hamas, 55.

  people lying or crawling on the ground A video of the hit against Yassin, like all of the videos of Operation Picking Anemones, is stored in the digital archive of the Air Force’s internal system, shown to the author by “Hilton.”

  “We hit the bull’s-eye” Interview with Mofaz, June 14, 2011.

  Sharon ordered that his staff be woken up Interview with Assaf Shariv, June 9, 2011. After it became clear that Yassin had indeed been killed in the attack, one of the officers in the Turban bunker that had handled the operation printed out a small notice and stuck it on the door: “Only God forgives. We set up the meeting.”

  “They’re on the verge of hysteria” Interview with Weissglass, June 11, 2012.

  Turban had no difficulty keeping tabs on him Interview with “Diamond,” August 2011.

  a Brushlet missile exploded into his Subaru The video of “Electronic Erase,” the assassination of Rantisi, was shown to the author by “Hilton.”

  “Arafat should take note…that anyone whose business is terror” Itamar Eichner, “Not the Last Killing,” Yedioth Ahronoth, April 18, 2006.

  “We have to defeat them, not allow them to breathe” Conversation reconstructed from my interview with Mofaz, June 14, 2011, and a synopsis that Mofaz wrote in his notebook at the time.

  Suleiman appealed to Sharon Interview with Galant, August 19, 2011.

  “now you know their offer is serious” Interview with Mofaz, June 14, 2011. Eldar, Getting to Know Hamas, 62–63.

  Sharon, the sworn hawk…“underwent a dramatic change” Interview with Weissglass, December 23, 2014.

  “dispatching them to kill throughout Israel” Sharon’s speech in the Knesset, April 8, 2002.

  Sharon described Arafat as “a pathological liar, a murderer” Sharon, Sharon: The Life of a Leader, 363 (Hebrew).

  ensuring his survival as the Palestinian leader Bergman, Authority Granted, 17–28, 165–77 (Hebrew).

  the overseas publication of a book about these documents A high-ranking representative of Sharon, accompanied by a representative of Meir Dagan, offered to finance translation of my book about the Palestinian Authority, Authority Granted, into English and to assist with any other expenses involved. “Money is not an issue,” he said, “the most important thing being that the world gets to know the truth about this despicable man.” I declined the offer. Meeting with “the Prince” and “Leonid,” September 2002.

  “I have never seen so much cleverness, blood, and abomination” Pacepa, Red Horizons, 44–45 (Hebrew).

  Sharon dropped this distasteful idea Interviews with Kuperwasser, May 21, 2004, Mofaz, June 14, 2011, and Gilboa, April 9, 2014.

  a company of armored D9 bulldozers The company had a female commanding officer named Tali. Sharon was obsessive in regard to Arafat and would go into precise details with chief of staff Yaalon about where the bulldozers were advancing. “He would call me every day,” Yaalon recalls, “and ask: ‘So, what did Tali hahoreset do today?’ (Hahoreset is a double entendre here, meaning “destroy” and, in Hebrew slang, “the gorgeous woman.”) He enjoyed this so much, he really watered at the mouth.” Interview with Yaalon, December 21, 2016.

  and then Israel would announce his whereabouts to the world Interview with Halutz, July 5, 2011.

  “we couldn’t ensure that Arafat would come out of all this alive” Interview with Blumenfeld, May 28, 2010.

  (“I see your point”) Interview with Eiland, January 19, 2015.

  Laboratory tests…came to different conclusions “Swiss Study: Polonium Found in Arafat’s Bones,” Al Jazeera, November 7, 2013.

  the possibility that he died from AIDS Harel and Issacharoff, “What Killed Him?” Haaretz, September 6, 2005.

  categorically denied Here’s what some top Israeli officials said when I asked them what caused the Palestinian leader’s death: Chief of staff (at the time of Arafat’s death) Moshe Yaalon (August 16, 2011) said with a smile: “What do you mean? Arafat died of sorrow.” Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres (September 17, 2012): “I didn’t think we should kill him. I thought we would ultimately need him to make peace.” Deputy chief of staff Dan Halutz (July 5, 2011): “Ah, I understand that now is that part of the interview when you try to decipher my body language.” AMAN chief Zeevi-Farkash (April 10, 2013): “I was torn—sometimes I thought we needed to strike against him, and sometimes I thought we mustn’t, that there was a difference between him and Nasrallah or Yassin.”

  Sharon himself defined the goal of such an operation Aluf Ben, “A Responsible Leadership Will Enable Resumption of Negotiations,” Haaretz, November 12, 2004.

  close security cooperation with the two of them Interviews with Diskin, October 23, 2011, Gad Goldstein, September 2012, and “Hoover,” December 2015.

  “I am deeply concerned” Email exchange with Prof. Gabriella Blum, August 2017. For further reading see Gabriella Blum and Phillip B. Heymann, “Law and the Policy of Targeted Killing,” Harvard National Security Journal, vol. 1, no. 145, 2010.

  CHAPTER 33: THE RADICAL FRONT

  Syria and Iran signed a series of agreements Bergman, Secret War with Iran, 350–58.

  Bush did not include Syria in the “axis of evil” Interview with Hayden, August 20, 2014.

  An alliance with Syria was in Iran’s best interests Ronen Bergman, “The Secret Syrian Chemical Agent and Missile City,” Yedioth Ahronoth, September 6, 2002.

  Syria had practical motives for wanting to strengthen Hezbollah Ronen Bergman, “They Are All ‘the Hezbollah Connection,’ ” New York Times Magazine, February 10, 2015.

  developed strategy and supplied matériel Interviews with “Terminal,” September 2014, and “Iftach,” November 2016.

  They were camouflaged so expertly Interviews with Dagan, May 26, 2013, and “Advantage,” January 2016.

  it had not adapted itself to changing times Interview with “Loacker,” August 2015.

  the Mossad tried to thwart dangerous projects Bergman, Secret War with Iran, 352.

  “The operational aspect was like an appendix to him” Interview with Weissglass, December 23, 2014.

  the initial and most urgent targets on the liquidation list Bergman, Authority Granted, 269–96 (Hebrew).

  “there was a price to be paid” Interview with Farkash, April 10, 2013.

  drew up a list of targets (dubbed the Twelve Musketeers) Interview with Ronen Cohen, November 17, 2015.

  Obeid managed to lure a senior IDF reserve officer to Dubai Bergman, By Any Means Necessary, 462–63 (Hebrew).

  “We feared that this might start an all-out war” Interview with “Leo,” September 2016.

  no one was acting against the heads of the organizations Interview with Ronen Cohen, November 17, 2015.

  The first target was Ramzi Nahara He helped Imad Mughniyeh kidnap Ahmad Halak, the Mossad agent who had killed Mughniyeh’s brother (see chapter 23), he was at the center of Iran’s and
Hezbollah’s espionage efforts in Israel, and he dispatched money and instructions to the organizers of suicide terror.

  “The explosion tore Salah’s body into two” Interview with “Bourbon,” October 2016.

  the head of the Counter-Terrorism Bureau at the prime minister’s office Dagan was appointed deputy director of the Counter-Terrorism Bureau in 1997 and also engaged in political activity, including the movement against withdrawal from the Golan Heights. He managed Sharon’s Election Day operations in 2001 as well.

  “No problem,” said Dagan. “Let’s burn it” Interview with “Mozart,” May 2016.

  “a Mossad chief with a dagger between his teeth” Just after he appointed Meir Dagan as director of the Mossad in 2002, I asked Prime Minister Ariel Sharon if he thought that this man, with the reputation of an impetuous, bellicose, trigger-happy officer, averse to the regular chain of command, could restore the agency to its former glory. Sharon, with his sly grin and half-chuckle, shot back, “No doubt about it. Do you know what Meir’s great specialty is?” I shook my head, and Sharon answered his own question with his characteristically cynical black humor: “Meir’s great specialty is separating a terrorist from his head.” Interviews with Sharon, April 2004.

  Both men saw a nuclear Iran as an existential danger to Israel Interviews with “Eldy,” August 2014, and Galant, July 7, 2011.

  “Journalists will climb all over me and you” Dagan mentioned two journalists from whom he expected critical coverage—Amir Oren of Haaretz and Ronen Bergman. On both counts, Dagan was correct in his prediction. Interview with Dagan, May 29, 2013.

  “never stopped yelling at everyone that they weren’t delivering the goods” Interview with “Salvador,” May 2012.

  “to later pull the wool over my eyes” Interview with Dagan, June 19, 2013.

  the agency would have only two broad targets Originally, the list included another objective: the war against global jihad, which had been a priority ever since Al Qaeda’s attempt in November 2002 to down an Israeli aircraft with shoulder-launched missiles in Mombasa. This goal was later set aside when Dagan reached the conclusion that any contribution the Mossad might make in the global battle against Al Qaeda would be insignificant next to the enormous efforts being made by the United States.

  creating a joint “intelligence pool” Interview with Farkash, January 31, 2016.

  Since the first and second options were unrealistic Interviews with “Eldy,” September 2014, and “Iftach,” November 2016.

  Dagan ordered the Mossad to ramp up its secret liaisons Dagan named David Meidan, of Mossad’s Universe (Tevel) division, responsible for the secret liaisons with foreign intelligence bodies, to head up this effort. Both Dagan and Meidan would travel secretly to meet the heads of the governments and intelligence services of many Middle Eastern countries to persuade them to do the inconceivable—to collaborate with the Israeli Mossad against other Arab and Islamic countries. Meidan’s fluent Arabic and intimate understanding of the Arab world and culture greatly helped in breaking the ice. Interviews with Meidan, July 16, 2015, Dagan, June 19, 2013, and Turki bin Faisal al Saud, February 2014.

  Dagan’s reforms led…to the resignation of many senior Mossad officials Ronen Bergman, “A Wave of Resignations at the Mossad Command,” Yedioth Ahronoth, October 7, 2005.

  “I thought they were wrong, that it was idiocy” Interview with Dagan, May 29, 2013.

  “if, by the next morning, there were not another five passports ready” Interview with “Eldy,” January 2015.

  “Sporadic eliminations are worth nothing” Interview with Dagan, June 19, 2013.

  a vociferous quarrel broke out Interview with Ronen Cohen, February 18, 2016.

  “The moment Yassin was taken out of the game” Interview with Ilan, October 22, 2014.

  The line went dead Interview with “Iftach,” March 2017.

  “I don’t take responsibility for these events” Interview with Dagan, June 19, 2013.

  Israel consented to a humiliating prisoner-exchange deal The deal also included Col. (Res.) Elhanan Tannenbaum, the artillery officer who’d been lured into a drug deal in Dubai and was abducted to Beirut. Interviews with Elhanan Tannenbaum, August 2004, Lotan, January 13, 2009, and Aharon Haliva, November 17, 2002. Bergman, By Any Means Necessary, 440–56, 475–88 (Hebrew).

  These freed prisoners managed to direct eight suicide attacks Interview with “Amazonas,” October 2011.

  They hung Shalit’s flak jacket on the fence Bergman, By Any Means Necessary, 563–71 (Hebrew).

  the guidance Hamas received from Iranian intelligence Interviews with Barak, November 22, 2011, and “Fanta,” December 2016.

  It demanded that Israel release one thousand Palestinian prisoners Netanyahu had launched his international career by presenting himself as an expert on terrorism who had continually preached that one should never succumb to demands for the release of prisoners in exchange for hostages. And yet he was the one who ordered the release of 1,027 Palestinian prisoners, including countless Hamas members who had been directly involved in murdering Israelis, in exchange for Shalit. This was the highest price ever paid for a deal of this kind. Ronen Bergman, “The Human Swap,” New York Times Magazine, November 13, 2011. A few of the terrorists who were released during that deal were targeted and killed by Israel in the following years. One of them was Mazen Fuqaha, who was involved in suicide bombings and sentenced in 2003 to nine life imprisonments and an additional fifty years. He was shot several times in his head, near his house in Gaza, by Israeli-run assassins on April 24, 2017.

  This was a fatal error, which cost Israel dearly Interviews with Dagan, May 29, 2013, Barak, November 22, 2011, and “Iftach,” November 2011.

  the IDF launched a hesitant and ineffectual land invasion Interviews with Ehud Adam, August 9, 2006, and Mordechai Kidor, August 4, 2006. Bergman, Secret War with Iran, 364–78.

  “It was something like the North Vietnamese Army after the Tet Offensive” Interview with Dagan, May 29, 2013.

  “We did not approach this business…as prepared as we should have been” Interview with Halutz, July 5, 2011.

  the best the “resistance” axis could have hoped for Interviews with Dagan, March 19, 2013, “Eldy,” January 2014, “Iftach,” March 2017, and “Advantage,” December 2016.

  CHAPTER 34: KILLING MAURICE

  “I am going in. Give me the timing” Interviews with “Charles,” April 2012, and “Iftach,” December 2016.

  “every time Mustafa called Mohammed, Moishele was listening in” Interview with “Leila,” March 2013.

  remained totally invisible to Israeli intelligence Interview with Shahar Argaman, March 17, 2013.

  the construction of a building to house a nuclear reactor Israeli intelligence received contradictory reports about whether the Iranians were aware that part of the money was being used to finance the North Korean–Syrian nuclear project. Bergman, Secret War with Iran, 257–58.

  The more time went by and Dagan’s concerns were validated Interview with Shariv, August 10, 2006.

  “the crazy ideas that his agency came up with” Interview with Olmert, August 29, 2011.

  mostly it was a cause for serious concern Hayden, Playing to the Edge, 255.

  “Meir came to me with this material…and it was like an earthquake” Olmert set up a special panel, headed by Yaakov Amidror and with the participation of an AMAN research division expert, to carry out a critical examination of the Mossad’s material. The panel reached the same conclusion: Syria was building a reactor with the aim of making nuclear weapons. Interviews with “Charles,” April 2012, and Olmert, August 29, 2011.

  he was already a familiar and welcome guest Interviews with Dagan, June 19, 2013, and Hayden, August 20, 2014.

  The two men established the closest levels of trust Interview with Ha
yden, February 1, 2014.

  not even the experienced Hayden anticipated the bombshell Ibid.

  Hayden leaned over to Vice President Dick Cheney Hayden, Playing to the Edge, 256.

  “this reactor was not intended for peaceful purposes” Secretary of State Rice, “Syria’s Clandestine Nuclear Program,” April 25, 2008 (taken from the Wikileaks archive, as given to the author by Julian Assange, March 4, 2011).

  he wanted U.S. forces to destroy the reactor Interview with “Oscar,” April 2014.

  The Assad family…reminded him of the Corleone family Interview with Hayden, July 20, 2016.

  “Assad could not stand another embarrassment” That retreat was forced on Assad by the international community, led by the United States and France, for his involvement in the assassination of Rafik Hariri.

  Dagan had the exact opposite opinion Interviews with Dagan, May 29, 2013, and “Ed,” October 2016.

  The final decision was made in a meeting with the president Hayden, Playing to the Edge, 261–63.

  she did not think that the United States should get involved Rice’s view was supported by Hayden and the rest of the U.S. intelligence community. Hayden reminded Bush of the agency’s well-known slogan, “No Core No War,” and said that he had no evidence of the construction of a plutonium extraction plant, without which there could be no bomb. Interview with Hayden, August 20, 2014.

  “this is not an imminent danger” Hayden recalled, “I was quite calm about the matter of the Syrian reactor because it was clear to me that if we didn’t attack, the Israelis would.” Interview with Hayden, August 20, 2014. Hayden, Playing to the Edge, 263–64.

  Israel could rely only on itself In an interview for this book in 2011, when Olmert wanted to explain the gravity of the dilemma over the Syrian reactor and his decision to act, he pointed to a photograph on his office wall that he had taken with him when he left the Prime Minister’s Office. An identical picture can be seen on the walls of many of the offices of top-ranking Israelis. It was taken during Israeli Air Force flight 301, which took off from Radom in Poland on September 4, 2003. Three IAF F-15 fighters are seen flying over what may be the best-known gate and strip of rail track in the world, those of the Nazi death camp at Auschwitz. On the photo, which Air Force commander Eliezer Shkedi distributed to a number of top-level Israeli officials, he wrote: “The Israeli Air Force over Auschwitz, in the name of the Jewish people, the State of Israel, and the IDF: To remember and not to forget, to rely only upon ourselves.”