Death Ride of the Panzers

by Dennis Oliver

  CHAPTER FOUR

  WINTER

  By mid-December 1944, the British and Canadians had advanced into northern Holland as far as the Waal River after finally clearing the Scheldt estuary. In the center of the front the Americans had taken Aachen, the first German city to fall to the Allies, and advanced as far as Jülich, just 30 kilometers from Cologne. Further to the south, they had occupied Strasbourg and crossed the Saar and, although 19.Armee held a pocket around Colmar on the western bank of the Rhine, the only sector of the front where the Allies were not pressing forward was the heavily wooded area on the German-Belgian frontier known as the Ardennes. Despite increased armored vehicle production, Heeresgruppe B, the largest formation facing the Allies, could only muster 239 tanks, compared to a combined British and American total of over two thousand. Although the US Army’s intelligence services knew that a number of German armored formations were in the process of being rebuilt, in particular Dietrich’s 6.Panzerarmee, the Americans had faced one of the refitted divisions, Bayerlein’s Panzer-Lehr, and had found it to be both under-equipped and under-trained.1 In addition, it was felt that OB West was unlikely to risk any strategic reserve that could be built up with crossing of the Rhine and the advance into Germany just weeks away at most.

  Both sides had for some time used the Ardennes as something of a rest area. It was here that Hitler had decided that a decisive breakthrough, aimed at recapturing Antwerp, would force the western Allies into a negotiated peace, allowing the Wehrmacht to shift the bulk of its force to the Eastern front. Codenamed Wacht am Rhein, the planned offensive was Hitler’s creation in its entirety and an outline was first presented to a conference of generals as early as September 16, 1944.2 Preceded by a whirlwind artillery barrage, units of Model’s Heeresgruppe B were expected to break through the American lines in the weakly-held Ardennes sector by the end of the first day. By nightfall on the second day, the Panzers were to have exploited the success of the initial assault and then pushed on to reach the Meuse between Liège and Dinant by the end of the third day. By the end of the fourth and final day of the operation, Antwerp and the western side of the Scheldt estuary would be in German hands.

  To pad out the depleted divisions on the Western front and to raise new formations, the 16- and 17-year-old age classes were called up and many workers who had previously been considered essential to the war effort now found themselves in uniform. Replacements were also drafted from army units and paramilitary organizations, such as the RAD, which were on garrison duty in those eastern European countries still under German control.3

  In this way the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht was able to raise the number of available personnel on the Western front from around 400,000 to over one million. Although many would receive only rudimentary training before going into battle, they were highly motivated and, contrary to some accounts, reasonably well equipped. In addition, many German boys had received a form of military training in the Hitler Youth, membership of which had been compulsory since March 1939, and were at least proficient in field craft and the use of small arms. To outfit these new formations, German industry had actually increased production despite the intense Allied bombing campaign, and the initial attack would involve over 1,200 tanks and assault guns and more than 4,000 artillery pieces. This was at a time when Allied intelligence estimated that the Germans could field just 200 tanks to defend the whole front. No amount of effort, however, could alleviate the critical shortages of fuel and ammunition; these would have a telling effect in the coming weeks and months.

  Four armies would take part in the offensive and Hitler had personally chosen 6.Panzerarmee and its commander, Oberstgruppenführer Josep ‘Sepp’ Dietrich, to assault the crucial northern sector. From Monschau to just south of Losheim, 6.Panzerarmee was to advance across the Belgian border towards Malmedy and Stavelot along the Amblève River. This formation was given the task of breaking through the American lines, crossing the Meuse and, if all went well, swinging north to retake Antwerp. This was of course the most important aspect of the plan and Dietrich was given the most powerful armored formations, including four Waffen-SS Panzer divisions and an army Panzergrenadier division. In addition, 6.Panzerarmee contained four newly raised Volksgrenadier divisions and, although their manpower allocation was less than a normal infantry division, they were organized with an increased number of automatic weapons. Importantly, each division’s Panzerjäger battalion had been issued with a company of assault guns. A Kampfgruppe, under the command of Obersturmbannführer Joachim Peiper and composed of tanks from SS-Panzer-Regiment 1 and the Tigers of schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 501, would act as a spearhead. Another Kampfgruppe under Sturmbannführer Ernst Krag was made up of units from II.SS-Panzerkorps. Privately, both Dietrich and Peiper were less than optimistic, particularly in light of the condition that Peiper’s men would need to capture stocks of fuel if they were to have any chance of reaching the bridges over the Meuse.

  Protecting Dietrich’s left flank was General von Manteuffel’s 5.Armee, whose front stretched south as far as the area between Prum and Vianden, east of Bitburg. Manteuffel had at his disposal four Volksgrenadier divisions supported by the tanks of 116.Panzer-Division, 2.Panzer-Division, Panzer-Lehr-Division, and the Führer-Begleit-Brigade. The latter had been raised around a cadre made up from Hitler’s personal bodyguard and was commanded by Oberst Otto Ernst Remer, who had played a pivotal role in foiling the July assassination plot and had been given command of the brigade as a reward for his loyalty. As well as its own tanks, the Führer-Begleit-Brigade was temporarily reinforced by the assault guns of Sturmgeschütz-Brigade 200. Further to the south were the division’s of 7.Armee under General Erich Brandenberger. As 7.Armee was expected to guard Manteuffels’ southern flank and absorb the impact of the anticipated American counterattack from Luxembourg, it had been allocated little armor apart from the tanks of the Führer-Grenadier-Brigade, although three of Brandenberger’s four Volksgrenadier divisions had each been equipped with a company of Hetzer tank destroyers.4

  The infantry formations were, however, all near full strength and, in the paratroopers of 5.Fallschirmjäger-Division, Brandenberger had what were probably the best trained ground troops available to the Wehrmacht. In the north, immediately behind Dietrich’s army, was 15.Armee under General Gustav-Adolf von Zangen, which was to be used in the event of an American counterattack in the 6.Panzerarmee sector. Recently reinforced, many of Zangen’s men were veterans of the battles in Normandy and the defense of the Netherlands.

  In addition to these conventional formations, the offensive employed an airborne unit to be dropped behind the American lines and a Panzer brigade made up of personnel wearing US Army uniforms and riding in captured American vehicles or disguised German tanks and assault guns. Neither had any real impact on the operation.5

  Although the line-up of the attacking force may appear impressive, it made up just 70 percent of the total number which Hitler had calculated would be needed to drive the Allied armies back and take Antwerp. Bayerlein, the Panzer-Lehr-Division commander, later stated that not a single general officer believed the offensive had any chance of success, if for no other reason than that there was insufficient fuel available. To add to the supply difficulties, the German columns would have to advance under skies that were controlled by over 14,000 Allied combat aircraft, against which the Luftwaffe hoped to deploy 800 fighters and bombers. Model thought the plan overly ambitious and Rundstedt, who had returned as OB West in September, confided to his diary that only with the aid of the Almighty could the Panzers hope to reach the Meuse, let alone Antwerp.

  At precisely 5:30 am on the morning of December 16, 1944, an artillery barrage delivered by two thousand guns pounded the American positions between Monschau and Echternach, a narrow front of just over 100 kilometers in length. Before the artillery had lifted, German infantrymen were infiltrating the American lines with the Panzers following close behind.

  At the head of 6.Panzerarmee, Peiper’s Kamp
fgruppe moved towards Losheim but was held up by two collapsed overpasses along the Losheim to Losheimergraben road, which was also protected by an extensive minefield, and had to be diverted to Lanzerath. In an effort to preserve Peiper’s armor, a battalion of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 3 was ordered to take the town but could not move the small American garrison until around 4:00 pm, by which time a large traffic jam had built up behind Peiper’s tanks. Ironically, the poor weather, which the Germans had hoped would keep the Allied fighter bombers grounded, had actually hampered their advance and, coupled with the difficult terrain and unexpected resistance, ensured that none of the first day objectives had been taken.

  Early the following morning, as Kampfgruppe Peiper reached the village of Buchholz, the infantry of 12.Volksgrenadier-Division completed the occupation of Lanzerath. At the same time just to the south, elements of 18.Volksgrenadier-Division reached Schönberg, 10 kilometers from St. Vith. By 12:30 pm Peiper’s men had reached the village of Baugnez, between Malmedy and Ligneuville, and after a brief skirmish with an artillery unit of US 7th Armored Division, advanced to Honsfeld. At Hosfield, they were able to destroy a number of Allied tanks and armored vehicles and take prisoner a large part of an American infantry battalion. Importantly, Peiper was able to secure over 50,000 gallons of fuel here, allowing him to push on towards the west, reaching the area around Hünningen.6

  Behind Peiper, elements of 12.SS-Panzer-Division finally secured Losheimergraben and began their assault on the villages of Rocherath and Krinkelt. That evening, Peiper’s tanks were just outside Stavelot, 5 kilometers south-west of Malmedy, and although the Germans managed to capture the town on the following day, the American defenders had been able to evacuate much of the large fuel dump and destroy what could not be saved. Desperate to maintain the momentum of his attack, Peiper sent an advance guard to secure the bridge at Trois-Ponts. They reached by 11:30 am only to find that it had been destroyed. Swinging north, Peiper’s men headed towards La Gleize but outside Cheneux, less than a kilometer south of Stoumont, they were hit by the US fighter bombers now making their presence felt as the weather cleared. Within minutes the burning wrecks of two tanks and five halftracks blocked the narrow road. It was 4:00 pm before the Germans were able to get moving again and a further two hours before they could return to their original route heading towards the village of Lienne, where the Americans managed to destroy one of the two remaining bridges as the Germans approached. Undeterred, Peiper pushed his Kampfgruppe further north and halted to rest in the forested area between La Gleize and Stoumont. That night he learnt that Stoumont, and the last bridge before the Meuse, was strongly held and that the Americans were steadily bringing up reinforcements. To the east, the tanks and Grenadiers of 12.SS-Panzer-Division had given up their attempts to take Rocherath and Krinkelt and decided to bypass the town. Another battle group from 1.SS-Panzer-Division under Sturmbannführer Gustav Knittel had been directed to move towards Peiper and, after fighting their way through Stavelot, which was now under attack, they reached La Gleize. However, after a determined assault, the Americans had retaken Stavelot and both Knittel and Peiper faced the prospect of being cut off. Ominously, as December 18 drew to a close just 36 hours after the commencement of the offensive, the commands of both 6.Armee and 5.Armee reported shortages of fuel.

  Although Manteuffel’s 5.Armee lacked the armored strength of 6.Panzerarmee, they still enjoyed a marked numerical superiority over the Allied divisions that they faced. In the first days of the offensive, they were able to surround two infantry regiments and force their surrender. The German’s success here was largely attributable to Manteuffel’s tactic of infiltrating the Allied lines before the preliminary artillery barrage had lifted. Manning their positions as the bombardment ended, American infantrymen were surprised to find that they were being attacked from all sides. Perhaps significantly, Dietrich declined to adopt this method, preferring to rely on the artillery to smash a way through the Allied defenses. By December 20, the major road junction of Bastogne had been cut off and surrounded by units of XLVII.Panzerkorps. Their commander, General von Lüttwitz, left 26.Volksgrenadier-Division and a single Panzergrenadier regiment of Panzer-Lehr-Division to deal with the defenders and the mobile units of his corps raced westward. Led by a Kampfgruppe from 2.Panzer-Division and elements of Panzer-Lehr-Division, the Germans were able to very quickly advance to St.Vith, a major communications center, where they ran into elements of an American armored division that managed at least to slow their advance.7

  The town was evacuated on December 21 and, although the American troops were able to fall back to prepared defensive positions, within two days the Germans had forced them to withdraw as far as the Salm River, some 15 kilometers to the west. Despite these successes, the original plan had called for the town of St. Vith to be taken by 6:00 pm on December 17 at the latest; within the framework of the strict timetable that Hitler had imposed, the German units were far behind schedule. In addition, the Germans had advanced along a very narrow corridor and this now caused problems of supply and reinforcement. By the evening of December 22, the 2.Panzer-Division Kampfgruppe had pushed forward to Foy-Nôtre-Dame, within sight of the Meuse crossing at Dinant. However, they were constantly harassed by flanking attacks all through the next day and although their goal was within reach, the threat of encirclement was ever-present. On December 24, the tanks of Panzer-Lehr-Division captured the town of Celles but could go no further, faced by a determined American defense which by now had been reinforced with British armored units. Late on the same day Manteuffel called off the attacks in this sector.

  On the extreme southern flank of the German advance, the divisions of General Brandenberger’s 15.Armee had been halted after an initial advance of just 6 kilometers by a strong American defense, which included units of US 10th Armored Division. Brandenberger’s northern wing joined Manteuffel’s army near Vianden and fared much better, with the paratroops of 5.Fallshcirmjäger-Division pushing forward almost 20 kilometers to the area between Martalange and Bastogne.

  Meanwhile, on December 19 in the northern sector, infantry units of Kampfgruppe Peiper had infiltrated the American defenses around Stoumont in an early morning surprise attack. As the tanks of SS-Panzer-Regiment 1 broke through the eastern edge of the perimeter, an American tank battalion arrived and by 10:30 am, after a two-hour tank battle, the Germans were in possession of the town. Very soon after this Knittel and his Kampfgruppe arrived, but any relief that Peiper may have felt at being reinforced was soon dispelled. Knittel informed him that Stavelot was now in enemy hands and that they were effectively surrounded, although another battle group under Sturmbannführer Max Hansen was on its way. Unsure of what help, if any, Hansen could bring, Peiper immediately ordered Knittel to return to Stavelot and retake the town. He realized that his tanks did not have sufficient fuel to advance beyond Stoumont and at first ordered his men to take up defensive positions west of the town and later that night to withdraw into the streets and houses at the edge of the town. Beating off several attacks made by US 30th Infantry Division, Peiper abandoned Stoumont during the night of December 21 and withdrew his men towards La Gleize where, he had been told, he would meet reinforcements. Although Dietrich urged Gruppenführer Hermann Priess, the commander of I.SS-Panzerkorps, to increase his efforts to relieve Peiper and his men, Hansen’s Kampfgruppe was caught up by the American resistance along the southern route to La Gleize. The remainder of Priess’ corps, including Knittel, were trying to recapture Stavelot. On December 23, with little ammunition and no food or fuel, Peiper realized that he would not be relieved and ordered his men to abandon their vehicles and heavy equipment and break out towards the east and the German lines.

  On the same day that Peiper and the last 800 men of his command set out for the relative safety of their own frontline, the weather began to clear and allowed the Allied air forces to take part in the counteroffensive. As fighter bombers attacked the German forward positions and rear elements, transport p
lanes were able to drop much needed supplies into Bastogne, which was still under siege.

  By December 24, it was obvious that the heavily defended Meuse bridges would not fall to the Germans. The units which had made the furthest penetrations were without supplies and it was unlikely that they would receive any. In the south, US 3rd Army was now pushing forward steadily towards Bastogne, threatening to cut off all the German formations to the west of the town. In the center of what became known as “The Bulge,” the forward elements of 2.Panzer-Division were destroyed while the tanks of 9.Panzer-Division were pinned down by an American attack towards Marche. By December 27, further Allied advances, notably the relief of Bastogne, convinced OB West that no further offensive action towards the Meuse was possible and Rundstedt and Model both suggested that the army be pulled back to the fortifications of the Westwall to preserve what was left of the mobile reserve. Hitler, however, would not listen to any talk of retreat. On January 1, 1945 the divisions of Heeresgruppe G and Oberkommando Oberrhein launched a major offensive against Allied positions in the Saar valley along a thinly held front of just over 100 kilometers in an attempt to retake Strasbourg.

  Codenamed Nordwind, the main assault was led by 17.SS-Panzergrenadier-Division and 36.Volksgrenadier-Division. Although the initial attacks met with some success becauase the American units in this area had been weakened by sending troops north to deal with the Ardennes offensive, it became increasingly clear that any progress would be limited. On January 4, the town of Wingen-sur-Moder, over 30 kilometers north-east of the operation’s main objective, was captured by elements of 6.SS-Gebirgsjäger-Division and this would prove to be the high-water mark of the offensive. On the following day a supplementary operation, codenamed Sonnenwende, commenced with an attack made by a Kampfgruppe commanded by Major Hannibal Graf von Lüttichau, which quickly led to the establishment of a bridgehead on the Rhine at Gambsheim between Strasbourg and Hagenau.8