by Owen, David;
5. I said that I had always thought, if any discussions were to be held with a view to solving European questions and building a peaceful Europe, that matters which caused anxiety to Italy must certainly be discussed as part of the general European Settlement.
6. Whether or not it might be possible to bring matters, which caused anxiety to Italy, to solution while the war was still in progress would no doubt depend upon the nature of the issues raised, and upon the course which any discussions might take.
7. Signor Bastianini then said that he would like to know whether His Majesty’s Government would consider it possible to discuss general questions involving not only Great Britain and Italy, but other countries. On my saying that it was difficult to visualise such wide
Author’s Note
The upcoming document (‘British Strategy in the Near Future’, pp. 156, 158, 160) was essential reading for ministers and of a different level of importance to other documents seen by them. This is why it influenced continuous narrative of Mussolini discussions available to some on the 26th and read by others only on the 27th. It was the first document under the signature of Dill, having taken over from Ironside, and its optimism, that despite all the problems the Chiefs believed Britain could hold its own alone after the fall of France, must have arrived on Ministers’ desks like ‘manna from heaven’. Politicians are usually optimists, military men less so. All the time the question in the minds of politicians would have been whether Britain could make it. Halifax was the most doubtful. Even for those politicians brought into the Government since 13 May, the news for a fortnight had been unremittingly awful. Now a new Chief of the Defence Staff was bringing hope to the table. This ‘Near Future’ paper is referred to in Chapter 5, pp. 216–217.
discussions while the war was still proceeding, the Ambassador replied that once such a discussion were begun, war would be pointless.
8. Signor Mussolini, said the Ambassador, was interested in European questions – the Ambassador mentioned Poland – and was always concerned to build a European settlement, that would not merely be an armistice, but would protect European peace for a century. I said that the purpose of His Majesty’s Government was the same, and they would never be unwilling to consider any proposal made with authority that gave promise of the establishment of a secure and peaceful Europe. I added that I thought I could say that this would also be the attitude of the French Government.
9. The Ambassador warmly agreed with an observation that I had made to the effect that when we come to such discussions, Signor Mussolini would have an absolutely vital part to play. Signor Mussolini was always ready to help in securing a wider European settlement because he saw the solution of Italian problems only within the framework of the solution of all the problems of all other European countries.
10. His Excellency said that he would like to be able to inform Signor Mussolini that His Majesty’s Government did not exclude the possibility of some discussion of the wider problems of Europe in the event of the opportunity arising. This I told His Excellency he could certainly do, for plainly the secure peace in Europe that both Signor Mussolini and we desired to see established could only come by the finding through frank discussion of solutions that were generally acceptable and by the joint determination of the Great Powers to maintain them.
(Signed) HALIFAX.
26 May 1940
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.
It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.
SECRET.
W.P. (40)169.
(Also Paper No.
C.O.S. (40) 397).
26th MAY 1940. COPY NO. 17
WAR CABINET.
BRITISH STRATEGY IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
_______________________________________________
Report by the Chiefs of Staff Committee.
We have reviewed our Report on “British Strategy in a Certain Eventuality” (Paper No. W.P. (40) 168) in the light of the following Terms of Reference remitted to us by the Prime Minister.
“In the event of France being unable to continue in the war and becoming neutral with the Germans holding their present position and the Belgian army being forced to capitulate after assisting the British Expeditionary Force to reach the coast; in the event of terms being offered to Britain which would place her entirely at the mercy of Germany through disarmament, cession of naval bases in the Orkneys etc; what are the prospects of our continuing the war alone against Germany and probably Italy. Can the Navy and the Air Force hold out reasonable hopes of preventing serious invasion, and could the forces gathered in this Island cope with raids from the air involving detachments not greater than 10,000 men; it being observed that a prolongation of
OUTWARD TELEGRAM
[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government and should be kept under Lock and Key.]
(R.6198/G)
SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION AND WAR CABINET
TO: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Cypher telegram to The Marquess of Lothian (Washington) Foreign Office 25th May, 1940. 7.30 p.m.
No. 887 DIPP.
________________
MOST IMMEDIATE
My telegram to Paris No. 198 [of May 24th: possible approach to Italy].
French Government concur and are instructing French Ambassador in Washington in this sense so soon as Monsieur Daladier has enlisted support of United States Ambassador in Paris which he has, we understand, done today. Please therefore approach the President at once in the sense of my telegram under reference. You need not wait until your French colleague has received instructions.
Repeated to Paris 206, Rome 471.
British resistance might be very dangerous for Germany engaged in holding down the greater part of Europe.”
2. Our conclusions are contained in the following paragraphs.
3. While our air force is in being our Navy and air force together should be able to prevent Germany carrying out a serious seaborne invasion of this country.
4. Supposing Germany gained complete air superiority, we consider that the Navy could hold up an invasion for a time, but not for an indefinite period.
5. If with our Navy unable to prevent it and our air force gone, Germany attempted an invasion, our coast and beach defences could not prevent German tanks and infantry getting a firm footing on our shores. In the circumstances envisaged above our land forces would be insufficient to deal with a serious invasion.
6. The crux of the matter is air superiority. Once Germany had attained this, she might attempt to subjugate this country by air attack alone.
7. Germany could not gain complete air superiority unless she could knock out our air force, and the aircraft industries, some vital portions of which are concentrated at Coventry and Birmingham.
8. Air attacks on the aircraft factories would be made by day or by night. We consider that we should be able to inflict such casualties on the enemy by day as to prevent serious damage. Whatever we do, however, by way of defensive measures and we are pressing on with these with all despatch, we cannot be sure of protecting the large industrial centres, upon which our aircraft industries depend, from serious material damage by night attack. The enemy would not have to employ precision bombing to achieve this effect.
TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.
It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.
S E C R E T.
W.P. (40)171.
COPY NO. 20
26TH MAY, 1940
WAR CABINET.
BRITISH STRATEGY IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
Notes by the Minister without Portfolio1 on Report By Chiefs of Staff (W.P. (40???68).
The memorandum on “British strategy in a certain eventuality” envisages the steps which should be taken “if French resistance were to collapse completely”. As seems desirable to consider now the prop
osals of the Chiefs of Staff.
This paper is confined to the economic aspects of the problem.
In the section of the memorandum dealing with our ability to defeat Germany it is said that “Germany might still be defeated by economic pressure, by a continuation of air attack on economic objectives in Germany and on German morale and the creation of widespread revolt in her conquered territories” (paragraph 14).
In paragraph 15 it is stated that “upon the economic factor depends our only hope of bringing about the down-fall of Germany.”
Whilst, as a result of her conquests, Germany may have secured new economic assets, she will suffer
9. Whether the attacks succeed in eliminating the aircraft industry depends not only on the material damage by bombs but on the moral effect on the workpeople and their determination to carry on in the face of wholesale havoc and destruction.
10. If therefore the enemy presses home night attacks on our aircraft industry, he is likely to achieve such material and moral damage within the industrial area concerned as to bring all work to a standstill.
11. It must be remembered that numerically the Germans have superiority of four to one. Moreover, the German aircraft factories are well dispersed and relatively inaccessible.
12. On the other hand, so long as we have a counteroffensive bomber force, we can carry out similar attacks on German industrial centres and by moral and material effect bring a proportion of them to a stand-still.
13. To sum up, our conclusion is that prima facie Germany has most of the cards; but the real test is whether the morale of our fighting personnel and civil population will counter balance the numerical and material advantages which Germany enjoys. We believe it will.
J.G. DILL. (Signed) C.L.N. NEWALL.
T.S.V. PHILLIPS. DUDLEY POUND.
R.E.C. PEIRSE. EDMUND IRONSIDE.
[The Chiefs of Staff have not had an opportunity to see this Report in its final form and reserve to themselves the right to suggest such modifications as they may wish to put forward.]
certain economic and political disabilities in consequence.
Though she may have obtained new resources as, for example, Iron ore, her ability to utilise them effectively for war purposes depends upon the possession of non-ferrous metals, which she must obtain from abroad.
Moreover, for the effective prosecution of the war she requires further supplies of food, rubber, oil, and fibres for clothing and footwear. For these there is no adequate source of supply close at hand.
Therefore, given a tight economic blockade, Germany can be strangled, her war effort seriously reduced, and her industrial manpower made impotent. In this connection, it is vital, as the memorandum under consideration points out, that we must take the necessary steps to secure allies to assist us in this direction. The memorandum sets out two important assumptions in the plan of the Chiefs of Staff for facing a desperate situation. The first is that “the United States of America is willing to give us full economic and financial support, without which we do not think we could continue the war with any chance of success.”
In paragraph 17 it is asserted that “given full Pan-American co-operation, we should be able to control all deficiency commodities at source”. Paragraph 21 emphasises the view that the conclusions as to our ability to bring the war to a successful conclusion “depend entirely upon full Pan-American economic and financial co-operation”.
It is vital, therefore, whether the French resistance is weakened or not, that steps should be taken to secure this co-operation.
I suggest that immediate steps should be taken
Fourth Meeting of Ministers
Starting in War Cabinet
War Cabinet: minutes
(Cabinet papers, 65/7)
27 May 1940
11.30 a.m.
Various suggestions had been made that we should cede some of our possessions in the New World to the United States in part payment of our war debt, but suggestions of this kind had always been discouraged by President Roosevelt.
Lord Lothian14 thought that we should consider making a formal offer to the United States Government that, while we were not prepared to discuss any question of sovereignty, we were prepared to lease to the United States landing grounds on British territory, in view of the importance of such facilities to USA security. Lord Lothian mentioned particularly Trinidad, Newfoundland and Bermuda.
Lord Lothian believed that an offer of this kind made by us would make a deep impression in the United States and add to our security. If we acted quickly, our action would have the advantage also of spontaneity. If this proposal were to be pursued, it was very desirable that Congress should vote the necessary appropriations before its adjournment in early June.
The Prime Minister said that he would be opposed to a proposal that we should offer such facilities except as part of a deal. The United States had given us practically no help in the war, and now that they saw how great was the danger, their attitude was that they wanted to keep everything which would help us for their own defence.
through diplomatic channels to press for active economic assistance and that a strong mission should be sent out to America without delay to secure economic and financial allies for the prosecution of the blockade with the utmost vigour.
Our position will be strengthened by maintaining control as far as possible of the output of the overseas Empires of France, Holland and Belgium.
Further questions are raised in Paragraph 33 of the memorandum which reads as follows:-
35. Plans have already been prepared to divert all shipping to West Coast ports and, provided we can maintain approximately 60 per cent of our present imports, we believe that we should be able to obtain enough food to support the population and sufficient raw materials to continue our essential armament production, although at a reduced rate. We again draw attention to the importance of reducing now the unimportant imports (such as bananas and children’s toys), so that the maximum import of important raw materials may be available to increase our stocks of these essentials. Moreover, even if our imports were reduced to a mere trickle, we should still be able to tide over a critical period of a few weeks by drawing on our reserve stocks, which have been accumulated to meet a crisis of this nature. To increase our ability to hold out in a critical period, we should now put into operation plans for drastic rationing and distribution of stocks. Nevertheless, our ability to carry on the war is absolutely dependent upon the eventual maintenance of supplies through the West Coast ports, and we would point out that this will raise major problems of labour transference. Moreover, the West Coast ports themselves will be subjected to air attack,
War Cabinet: Confidential Annex
(Cabinet papers, 65/13)
27 May 1940
11.30 a.m.
The Prime Minister said that at the meeting with M. Reynaud the previous afternoon, complete agreement had been reached that the British Expeditionary Force must be withdrawn to the coast. The BEF was being pressed on both flanks, and the Germans had made a break in the line East of Courtrai. It was clear that we could not allow the security of our Army to be compromised in order to save the First French Army. He asked the Chief of the Imperial General Staff15 to make the position in this respect clear to Lord Gort.
The Prime Minister thought that it would be as well that he should issue a general injunction to Ministers to use confident language. He was convinced that the bulk of the people of the country would refuse to accept the possibility of defeat.
The Prime Minister dealt with the main Report by the Chiefs of Staff first.16 In his opinion this Report did not give a true picture of the position. In particular he challenged the Tables of the British and German air strengths, which gave a misleading impression. He had caused a statistical examination of the comparative position of the two Air Forces to be made, and although it had been extremely difficult to arrive at a true comparison, there were certain observations which he wished to make.
(i) Durin
g the last three years, according to the figures provided by the Air Ministry, the Germans had turned out 25,000 aircraft and we had produced 15,000 i.e. a ratio of 5 to 3. On this basis it was quite misleading to say that the Germans had a superiority of 4 to 1 over us. Either we credited the Germans with getting a although possibly on a lesser scale to that on the East and South Coasts.
It should be possible to maintain approximately 60% of our present imports, provided there is not abnormal waste and provided also that the importation of commodities not required for the prosecution of the war is prohibited. To make the scheme effective consideration must be given to harbour accommodation, to the dispersal of raw materials and foodstuffs, and to rail and road transport both of which would be called upon to meet substantially increased demands.
Finally the situation demands the most drastic action regarding both home production and consumption. All kinds of production which can be postponed should be damped down and every effort concentrated on two objectives:- (1) the needs of the fighting and civil defence services and (2) the maintenance of the civil population under wartime conditions.
This will necessitate the re-allocation of raw materials and the transfer of labour.
It is also of great importance to restrict unnecessary consumption. This appears to be essential if the country is to be put on a war footing.
These considerations require further exploration.
This aspect of the question is not dealt with in the memorandum of the Chiefs of Staff, but it is an integral part of the problem which now confronts us.
This memorandum is purely personal and has been drafted by me after considering memorandum W.P. (40)168, without consultation with my colleagues or with any of the officers concerned.
(Intld.) A.G.
much greater operational strength out of a given production than ourselves, or we made insufficient allowance for all the difficulties which, if our own experience was to be any guide, they must have encountered in expanding their air force.