by Owen, David;
(ii) We knew the very large requirements of our own training establishments and formations. If the German Air Force was really four times as large as ours, presumably their training requirements must similarly be four times as great and would amount to an enormous total. Unless we believed that the Germans succeeded in carrying out their training with a far smaller proportion of wastage than ourselves (which seemed unlikely), we must accept the fact that training requirements made far greater inroads into their operational strength than was shown in the tables.
(iii) In January, 1940, the Air Ministry had estimated that Germany was turning out 2,000 aircraft per month. A detailed examination of this estimate had been carried out by the Ministry of Economic Warfare, however, and as a result of this the Air Ministry had finally accepted a very much lower estimate of only 1,000 aircraft per month. Our whole policy might depend on our assessment of the German air strength, and it was therefore essential that all estimates should be subjected to the most detailed scrutiny.
With regard to the figures for the Metropolitan Air Force given in Appendix ‘C’, the late Secretary of State for Air17 had given as his forecast of first-line strength on the 30th June, 1940, a figure of 2,150 aircraft. The figure given in the Tables, however, amounted only to 1,256, to which must be added some 200 to 300 aircraft in France, a total of, say, 1,550. If these figures were correct, they would imply that we had lost two-fifths of our effective force since active
NOTE: Since writing the above I have shown a copy to the Lord Privy Seal who concurs in the view expressed. A.G.
Treasury Chambers, S.W.1.
operations had begun on Western Front. The figures of our losses up to the 24th May were 360, but against this must be offset the new intake since May 12th of 610 machines.
The Prime Minister said that he proposed to go into these Tables of comparative strengths himself and try to obtain agreed figures on a truly comparable basis. The German bombing force might be four times as great as ours, but he did not believe the ratio was anything like so great in respect of our total air force.
The Vice Chief of the Air Staff18 agreed that Appendices ‘B’ and ‘C’ were not drawn up on comparable bases. The British figures referred to operational strength, and the German figures to first-line strength.
An attempt had been made to arrive at a true basis of comparison, and he handed to the War Cabinet a comparative Table drawn up on these lines.
The Prime Minister observed that from this Table it appeared that the odds against us were only 2½ to 1. If our airmen were shooting down 3 to 1, the balance was on our side.
The Chief of the Air Staff19 pointed out that at night the balance would be very much less favourable for us. It was only in the day fighting that we were able to inflict such heavy losses on the enemy.
The Secretary of State for Air20 drew attention to the importance of the factors of morale and superior equipment. One of our fighter squadrons operating from Kent had given battle to a crack German squadron equipped with MC.110s. The Germans had fought extremely well, but their losses had been very much greater than ours.
The Prime Minister paid tribute to the skill of the Air Ministry’s designers which had produced such a fine fighting machine as the Hurricane.
Continuing, he observed that the Chiefs of Staff Report was based on the assumption that French
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SECRET.
COPY No. 10
W.P. (40) 170.
26th May, 1940.
WAR CABINET.
SUGGESTED APPROACH TO SIGNOR MUSSOLINI.
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
By direction of the Prime Minister, I circulate this statement which shows briefly what has passed between His Majesty’s Government and the French Government on the subject of the possibility of securing mediation in some form by the Italian Government.
Monsieur Reynaud came to London today and explained the critical situation in which France finds herself.
He enquired whether His Majesty’s Government would join with the French Government in making a direct approach to Signor Mussolini on the following lines.
A frank explanation of position in which Signor Mussolini will be placed if the Germans establish domination in Europe.
Great Britain and France will fight to the end for the preservation of their independence: and they will be helped by the resources of other nations now outside the war.
If Signor Mussolini will co-operate with us in securing a settlement of all European questions which safeguard the independence and security of the Allies, and could be the basis of a just and durable peace for Europe, we will undertake at once resistance would collapse completely, and that we should be exposed at short range to the concentrated attack of the whole of the German naval and air forces, operating from bases extending from Norway to the North-west of France. If France went out of the war, it did not necessarily follow that his assumption was correct; France might become a neutral, and it was not certain that Germany would insist on retaining all the ports in Northern France. She might be so anxious to divide France from us that she would offer France very favourable terms of peace.
to discuss, with the desire to find solutions, the matters in which Signor Mussolini is primarily interested.
We understand that he desires the solution of certain Mediterranean questions; and if he will state in secrecy what these are, France and Great Britain will at once do their best to meet his wishes, on the basis of co-operation set out above.
Meanwhile, His Majesty’s Ambassador in Washington telegraphed on May 26th at 12.54 a.m. that he had agreed with his French colleague the text of a joint communication to the President of the United States.
The text reads as follows:
“The Allied Governments suggest the President on his own initiative should ask Signor Mussolini for the reasons which apparently induce him to contemplate an immediate entry into the war against the Allies and that he should further state that if Signor Mussolini will inform him of his grievances or claims against the Allies he will immediately communicate them to the Allied Governments in order to leave nothing undone to prevent an extension of the war.
They suggest the President should inform Signor Mussolini that he had reason to believe that the attitude of the Allies towards the Italian Government can be defined as follows.
(a)The Allied Governments are aware that the Italian Government entertains certain grievances in regard to the Italian position in the Mediterranean.
(b)The Allied Governments would welcome Italian participation at the Peace Conference with a status equal to that of the belligerents.
(c)Signor Mussolini would thus be invited by the President to notify him for transmission to the Allies the claims of Italy the fulfilment of which would in his view ensure the establishment
Fifth Meeting of Ministers
War Cabinet: Confidential Annex
(Cabinet papers, 65,13)
27 May 1940
4.30 p.m.
The Prime Minister said that the Foreign Secretary’s Note21 set out the kind of approach to Signor Mussolini which M. Reynaud wanted the French and British Governments to make. While M. Reynaud was prepared to fight on for honour’s sake, he was afraid that France was in danger of collapsing. If Italy undertook to stay out of the war, the French could remove ten Divisions from the Italian front. An attack by Italy at this juncture would give the coup-de-grâce to their existence. If France collapsed, Germany would probably give her good terms, but would expect the French to have the kind of Ministers who were acceptable to the Germans.
The Prime Minister said that it might be argued that an approach on the lines proposed by M. Reynaud was not unlike the approach which we had asked President Roosevelt to make to Signor Mussolini. There was, however, a good deal of difference between making the approach ourselves and allow
ing one to be made by President Roosevelt ostensibly on his own initiative.
The Lord President thought that the completely misleading account of military operations in Northern France, coupled with the share of praise which the French were claiming for themselves in connection with events in which they had taken no part, must have some explanation. Was it that they intended to say that the French had had a magnificent scheme, but that, owing to the withdrawal of the BEF, they had been unable to carry it out and the poor French had been let down by their allies and must take the best chance available to them to get out of things. It would be unfortunate if they were to add to this that we had been unwilling
in the Mediterranean of a new order guaranteeing to Italy satisfaction of Italian legitimate aspirations in that sea, if the negotiations succeeded the President would then formally record
(a)the agreement thus arrived at
(b)the undertaking of the Allies to execute the agreement at the end of the war.
(c)The assurance of Signor Mussolini that the claims of Italy would be satisfied by the execution of this agreement. The agreement thus arrived at to be dependent of course on Italy not entering the war against the Allies."
Lord Lothian was this morning authorised to make this communication to the President, with his French colleague, and he should have made it this afternoon.
Yesterday, I saw the Italian Ambassador, and I annex a record of my conversation with him.
Monsieur Reynaud was not given any definite reply, before returning to Paris, on the subject of his present proposal. In the actual circumstances it holds out only a very slender chance of success, and that chance would seem to depend principally on the degree of discomfort which the prospect of a Europe dominated by Hitler may cause to Mussolini.
It was understood that we should endeavour to give Monsieur Reynaud a reply tomorrow.
P.S.
Since drafting the above, I have seen the Master of the Rolls, who has just returned from Rome. He tells me that Sir P. Loraine had been informed by the United States Ambassador that President Roosevelt’s last attempt to deter the Italian Government had been bitterly resented by Signor Mussolini as unwarrantable even to allow them the chance of negotiations with Italy.
The Prime Minister said that the Lord President’s argument amounted to this, that nothing would come of the approach, but that it was worth doing to sweeten relations with a failing ally. He read the following telegram, which he had received from M. Reynaud that morning (No. 283 DIPP):—
'I thank you for your cordial welcome and for your telegram. Your friendship is precious to me. As for Italy, that (?ultimate)22 argument which to my mind carries most weight is that the assistance given by your country to mine through the approach we are making at this tragic hour will help to strengthen an alliance of hearts which I believe to be essential.’
The Prime Minister said that he was increasingly oppressed with the futility of the suggested approach to Signor Mussolini, which the latter would certainly regard with contempt. Such an approach would do M. Reynaud far less good than if he made a firm stand. Further, the approach would ruin the integrity of our fighting position in this country. Even if we did not include geographical precision and mentioned no names, everybody would know what we had in mind. Personally he doubted whether France was so willing to give up the struggle as M. Reynaud had represented. Anyway, let us not be dragged down with France. If the French were not prepared to go on with the struggle, let them give up, though he doubted whether they would do so. If this country was beaten, France became a vassal State; but if we won, we might save them. The best help we could give to M. Reynaud was to let him feel that, whatever happened to France, we were going to fight it out to the end. This manoeuvre was a suggestion to get France out of the difficulty that she might have to interference with Italy’s private affairs. He further reports that Sir P. Loraine’s judgement is that any further approach would only be interpreted as a sign of weakness and would do no good.
The Master of the Rolls, however, was disposed to think that the situation could hardly be made worse by the approach suggested by Monsieur Reynaud, and that the first consideration there set out must be very present to Signor Mussolini’s mind.
FOREIGN OFFICE,
26th May, 1940.
make a separate peace, notwithstanding her bargain not to do so.
At the moment our prestige in Europe was very low. The only way we could get it back was by showing the world that Germany had not beaten us. If, after two or three months, we could show that we were still unbeaten, our prestige would return. Even if we were beaten, we should be no worse off than we should be if we were now to abandon the struggle. Let us therefore avoid being dragged down the slippery slope with France. The whole of this manoeuvre was intended to get us so deeply involved in negotiations that we should be unable to turn back. We had gone a long way already in our approach to Italy, but let us not allow M. Reynaud to get us involved in a confused situation. The approach proposed was not only futile, but involved us in a deadly danger.
The Secretary of State for Air23 thought that it might help matters if the Prime Minister were to go to Paris and see other French Ministers.
The Prime Minister said that General Spears was in Paris. France had got to settle this matter for herself. It was a question of her word and her army’s honour. He had heard that day that there had been some change for the better in the fighting spirit of the French troops. There might be some hope in this. Otherwise everything would rest on us. If the worst came to the worst, it would not be a bad thing for this country to go down fighting for the other countries which had been overcome by the Navy tyranny.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs24 said that he saw no particular difficulty in taking the line suggested by the Lord President. Nevertheless, he was conscious of certain rather profound differences of points of view which he would like to make clear.
In the first place, he would have thought that, if we could persuade them to do so, there would have been some positive value in getting the French Government
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C. O. S. (40) 394.
COPY NO. 33
26th MAY. 1940.
WAR CABINET.
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.
____________________________________________
BRITISH STRATEGY IN A CERTAIN EVENTUALITY.
Note by the Secretary.
The Report which the Chiefs of Staff approved yesterday, the 25th May, on the above subject has been circulated this morning as a War Cabinet Paper.
2. At this morning’s (26th May) Meeting of the War Cabinet the Prime Minister remitted the following additional Terms of Reference, and directed that the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Vice Chiefs of Staff should together examine them and report at once.
“In the event of France being unable to continue in the war and becoming neutral with the Germans holding their present position and the Belgian army being forced to capitulate after assisting the British Expeditionary Force to reach the coast; in the event of terms being offered to Britain which would place her entirely at the mercy of Germany through disarmament, cession of naval bases in the Orkneys etc; what are the prospects of our continuing the war alone against Germany and probably Italy. Can the Navy and the Air Force hold out to say that they would fight to the end for their independence.
In the second place, he could not recognise any resemblance between the action which he proposed, and the suggestion that we were suing for terms and following a line which would lead us to disaster. In the discussion the previous day he had asked the Prime Minister whether, if he was satisfied that matters vital to the independence of this country were unaffected, he would be prepared to discuss terms. The Prime Minister had said
that he would be thankful to get out of our present difficulties on such terms, provided we retain the essentials and the elements of our vital strength, even at the cost of some cession of territory. On the present occasion, however, the Prime Minister seemed to suggest that under no conditions would we contemplate any course except fighting to a finish. The issue was probably academic, since we were unlikely to receive any offer which would not come up against the fundamental conditions which were essential to us. If, however, it was possible to obtain a settlement which did not impair those conditions, he, for his part, doubted if he would be able to accept the view now put forward by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister had said that two or three months would show whether we were able to stand up against the air risk. This meant that the future of the country turned on whether the enemy’s bombs happened to hit our aircraft factories. He was prepared to take that risk if our independence was at stake; but if it was not at stake he would think it right to accept an offer which would save the country from avoidable disaster.
The Prime Minister said that he thought the issue which the War Cabinet was called upon to settle was difficult enough without getting involved in the discussion of an issue which was quite unreal and was most unlikely to arise. If Herr Hitler was prepared to make peace on the terms of the restoration of German colonies and the overlordship of Central Europe, that was one thing. But it was quite unlikely that he would make any such offer.
reasonable hopes of preventing serious invasion, and could the forces gathered in this Island cope with raids from the air involving detachments not greater than 10,000 men; it being observed that a prolongation of British resistance might be very dangerous for Germany engaged in holding down the greater part of Europe."
(Signed)