by Owen, David;
The various possibilities now under development of countering night-bombing were referred to.
The Prime Minister then read out a draft which expressed his views. To him the essential point was that M. Reynaud wanted to get us to the Conference-table with Herr Hitler. If we once got to the table, we should then find that the terms offered us touched our independence and integrity. When, at this point, we got up to leave the Conference-table, we should find that all the forces of resolution which were now at our disposal would have vanished. M. Reynaud had said that if he could save the independence of France, he would continue the fight. It was clear, therefore, that M. Reynaud’s aim was to end the war.
The Foreign Secretary said that M. Reynaud also wanted the Allies to address an appeal to the President of the United States.
The Prime Minister thought that a paragraph might be added to the draft outlined by the Lord President1 to the effect that we were ready in principle to associate ourselves with such an appeal.
The Minister without Portfolio2 thought that M. Reynaud was too much inclined to hawk round appeals. This was another attempt to run out.
The Prime Minister said that he came back to the point that the French wanted to get out of the war, but did not want to break their Treaty obligations to us. Signor Mussolini, if he came in as mediator, would take his whack out of us. It was impossible to imagine that Herr Hitler would be so foolish as to let us continue our re-armament. In effect, his terms would put us completely at his mercy. We should get no worse terms if we went on fighting, even if we were beaten, than were open to us now. If, however, we continued the war and Germany attacked us, no doubt we should suffer some damage, but they also would suffer severe losses. Their oil supplies might be reduced. A time might come when we felt that we had to put an end to the struggle, but the terms would not then be more mortal than those offered to us now. The Foreign Secretary said that he still did not see what there was in the French suggestion of trying out the possibilities of mediation which the Prime Minister felt was so wrong.
The Lord President said that, on a dispassionate survey, it was right to remember that the alternative to fighting on nevertheless involved a considerable gamble.
The War Cabinet agreed that this was a true statement of the case.
The Prime Minister said that the nations which went down fighting rose again, but those which surrendered tamely were finished.
The Foreign Secretary said that nothing in his suggestion could even remotely be described as ultimate capitulation.
The Prime Minister thought that the chances of decent terms being offered to us at the present time were a thousand to one against.
At this point the War Cabinet broke off its discussion, to enable Churchill to meet the full Cabinet, a meeting that had been arranged earlier in the day.
Ninth Meeting of Ministers
War Cabinet: Confidential Annex
(Cabinet papers, 65/13)
28 May 1940
7 p.m.
The Prime Minister said that in the interval he had seen the Ministers not in the War Cabinet. He had told them the latest news. They had not expressed alarm at the position in France, but had expressed the greatest satisfaction when he had told them that there was no chance of our giving up the struggle. He did not remember having ever before heard a gathering of persons occupying high places in political life express themselves so emphatically.
The Foreign Secretary again referred to the proposed appeal to the United States. It appeared that Mr Bullitt1 had told M. Reynaud that he favoured the plan, but thought that Lord Lothian should be consulted before anything was done. This differed somewhat from what M. Reynaud had said.
The Prime Minister thought that an appeal to the United States at the present time would be altogether premature. If we made a bold stand against Germany, that would command their admiration and respect; but a grovelling appeal, if made now, would have the worst possible effect. He therefore did not favour making any approach on the subject at the present time.
Winston S. Churchill to Paul Reynaud (Churchill papers, 4/152)
28 May 1940
11.40 p.m.
By telephone
I have with my colleagues examined with the most careful and sympathetic attention the proposal for an approach by way of precise offer of concessions to Signor Mussolini that you have forwarded to me today, fully realising the terrible situation with which we are both faced at this moment.
2. Since we last discussed this matter the new fact which has occurred, namely the capitulation of the Belgian Army, has greatly changed our position for the worse, for it is evident that the chance of withdrawing the armies of Generals Blanchard and Gort from the Channel ports has become very problematical. The first effect of such a disaster must be to make it impossible at such a moment for Germany to put forward any terms likely to be acceptable and neither we nor you would be prepared to give up our independence without fighting for it to the end.
3. In the formula prepared last Sunday by Lord Halifax it was suggested that if Signor Mussolini would co-operate with us in securing a settlement of all European questions which would safeguard our independence and form the basis of a just and durable peace for Europe, we would be prepared to discuss his claims in the Mediterranean. You now propose to add certain specific offers, which I cannot suppose would have any chance of moving Signor Mussolini, and which once made could not be subsequently withdrawn, in order to induce him to undertake the role of mediator, which the formula discussed on Sunday contemplated.
4. I and my colleagues believe that Signor Mussolini has long had it in mind that he might eventually fill this role, no doubt counting upon substantial advantages for Italy in the process. But we are convinced that at this moment when Hitler is flushed with victory and certainly counts on early and complete collapse of Allied resistance, it would be impossible for Signor Mussolini to put forward proposals for a conference with any success. I may remind you also that the President of the USA has received a wholly negative reply to the proposal which we jointly asked him to make and that no response has been made to the approach of Lord Halifax, made to the Italian Ambassador1 here last Saturday.
5. Therefore, without excluding the possibility of an approach to Signor Mussolini at some time, we cannot feel that this would be the right moment and I am bound to add that in my opinion the effect on the morale of our people, which is now firm and resolute, would be extremely dangerous. You yourself can best judge what would be the effect in France.
6. You will ask, then, how is the situation to be improved. My reply is that by showing that after the loss of our two armies and the support of our Belgian Ally, we still have stout hearts and confidence in ourselves, we shall at once strengthen our hands in negotiations and draw to ourselves the admiration and perhaps the material help of the USA. Moreover, we feel that as long as we stand together, our undefeated Navy and our Air Force which is daily destroying German fighters and bombers at a formidable rate, afford us the means of exercising in our common interest a continuous pressure upon Germany’s internal life.
7. We have reason to believe that the Germans too are working to a timetable and that their losses and the hardships imposed on them together with the fear of our air raids is undermining their courage. It would indeed be a tragedy if by too hasty an acceptance of defeat we throw away a chance that was almost within our grasp of securing an honourable issue from the struggle.
8. In my view if we both stand out we may yet save ourselves from the fate of Denmark or Poland. Our success must depend first on our unity, then on our courage and endurance.
War Cabinet: minutes
(Cabinet papers, 65/7)
29 May 1940
11.30 a.m.
The Prime Minister said that the latest information from the Admiralty was that 40,000 troops from the BEF had so been landed in this country, and that evacuation was now taking place at the rate of about 2,000 an hour.
Winston S. Churchill:
note to Cabinet Ministers and
senior officials
(Premier papers, 4/68/9)
29 May 1940
10 Downing Street
Strictly Confidential
In these dark days the Prime Minister would be grateful if all his colleagues in the Government, as well as high officials, would maintain a high morale in their circles; not minimising the gravity of events, but showing confidence in our ability and inflexible resolve to continue the war till we have broken the will of the enemy to bring all Europe under his domination.
No tolerance should be given to the idea that France will make a separate peace; but whatever may happen on the Continent, we cannot doubt our duty and we shall certainly use all our power to defend the Island, the Empire and our Cause.
Recollections of May 1940
From The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton 1940–45, edited by Ben Pimlott1
28 May 1940
In the afternoon all ministers are asked to meet the PM. He is quite magnificent. The man, and the only man we have, for this hour. He gives a full, frank and completely calm account of events in France. When the Germans broke through on the Meuse, French morale for the moment collapsed. Therefore, he flew to France and saw Reynaud and Gamelin. The latter said, ‘We have been defeated by German superiority in numbers, in material and in methods.’ Churchill said, ‘What then are you going to do?’ Gamelin merely shrugged his shoulders. Churchill said, ‘Will you please leave the room’, and then, alone with Reynaud, they went into everything, including the High Command. The French, before this war, had given up all ideas of the offensive. They were hypnotised by the Maginot Line. General Billotte commanding the forces north of the Somme, including our own, had given no important or significant order for four days! Since then he had been killed in a motor accident and succeeded by Blanchard. The French had failed to make a push northwards from the Somme. They had had too few Divisions between the sea and Amiens and their communications had been badly bombed. Therefore, though we had done our best from the north, it had been impossible to close the gap, and we were in grave danger of being surrounded. Now, therefore, it was necessary to fight our way through to the Channel Ports and get away all we could.
The act of the King of the Belgians had opened our flank, but this was not so grave as might have been supposed, owing to the inundations on the Ysère, which were perhaps a better defence than the Belgian Army! How many would get away we could not tell. We should certainly be able to get 50,000 away. If we could get 100,000 away, that would be a magnificent performance. Only Dunkirk was left to us. Calais had been defended by a British force which had refused to surrender, and it was said that there were no survivors. We could only use the beaches east and west of Dunkirk in addition to the port itself. Dunkirk was under a great pall of black smoke, to which our ships were adding artificial smoke so as to screen our embarkations from the air. The Air Force were maintaining the most powerful possible fighter patrols over this scene, and the Germans were suffering immense losses in the air, as on the ground, in their attempts to interfere with the embarkation. The superiority of our fighters was once again being manifested, and on two occasions great flights of German bombers had turned away and declined battle when they saw our fighter patrols.
The PM went on to say that our clawing-down rate was gradually rising, taking an average of one day with another, to 3:1, to 4:1, and lately to 5:1. It was clear that we had killed off most of the best Nazi pilots, unless, which seemed unlikely, they had been holding some of their best in reserve. ‘They’re cold meat,’ our airmen say.
He was determined to prepare public opinion for bad tidings, and it would of course be said, and with some truth, that what was now happening in Northern France would be the greatest British military defeat for many centuries. We must now be prepared for the sudden turning of the war against this island, and prepared also for other events of great gravity in Europe. No countenance should be given publicly to the view that France might soon collapse, but we must not allow ourselves to be taken by surprise by any events. It might indeed be said that it would be easier to defend this island alone than to defend this island plus France, and if it was seen throughout the world that it was the former, there would be an immense wave of feeling, not least in the USA which, having done nothing much to help us so far, might even enter the war. But all this was speculative. Attempts to invade us would no doubt be made, but they would be beset with immense difficulty. We should mine all round our coast; our Navy was immensely strong; our air defences were much more easily organised from the island than across the Channel; our supplies of food, oil, etc., were ample; we had good troops in this island, others were on the way by sea, both British Army units coming from remote garrisons and excellent Dominion troops, and, as to aircraft, we were now more than making good our current losses, and the Germans were not.
It was idle to think that, if we tried to make peace now, we should get better terms from Germany than if we went on and fought it out. The Germans would demand our fleet – that would be called ‘disarmament’ – our naval bases, and much else. We should become a slave state, though a British Government which would be Hitler’s puppet would be set up – ‘under Mosley2 or some such person.’ And where should we be at the end of all that? On the other side, we had immense reserves and advantages. Therefore, he said, ‘We shall go on and we shall fight it out, here or elsewhere, and if at last the long story is to end, it were better it should end, not through surrender, but only when we are rolling senseless on the ground.’3 There was a murmur of approval round the table, in which I think Amery, Lord Lloyd and I were loudest. Not much more was said. No one expressed even the faintest flicker of dissent. Herbert Morrison asked about evacuation of the Government, and hoped that it would not be hurried. The PM said certainly not, he was all against evacuation unless things really became utterly impossible in London, ‘but mere bombing will not make us go’.
It is quite clear that whereas the Old Umbrella4 – neither he nor other members of the War Cabinet were at this meeting – wanted to run very early, Winston’s bias is all the other way. When we separate, several go up and speak to him, and I, patting him on the shoulder, from my physically greater height, say, ‘You ought to get that cartoon of Low showing us all rolling up our sleeves, and frame it and stick it up in front of you here.’ He says, with a broad grin, ‘Yes, that was a good one, wasn’t it. ’He is a darling!
From The Empire at Bay: The Leo Amery Diaries of 1929–45
28 May 1940
Down to the House and presently attended a meeting of Cabinet Rank Ministers outside the War Cabinet convened by Winston to tell us the situation. … We heard in the morning that King Leopold had capitulated with his Army, refusing to follow his government outside Belgium. Roger Keyes told me that it was mainly because he could not bear the sufferings of his people who were being mercilessly bombed in every direction. All the same it was an extraordinary step and was lacking in loyalty to his Allies actually in the field. Winston told us the whole story very clearly and dramatically in no way minimising the extent of the disaster or of further disasters which might follow such a successful German march on Paris and a French surrender.1* One thing he was clear about was that there could be no greater folly than to try at this moment to offer concessions to either Italy or Germany, the powers which were out to destroy us. There was nothing to be done at any rate until we have turned the tide, except fight all out and then he drew a picture of the encouraging side of the position. We had a little question and answering after that which then left all of us tremendously heartened by Winston’s resolution and grip of things. He is a real war leader and one whom it is worthwhile serving under.
29 May 1940
Got in a short walk around the Park before leaving the office and dined with Clem Davies to meet Attlee and Greenwood. We had a good talk ranging over almost every aspect of the War Cabinet business. Both Attlee and Greenwood said that Ironside had been quite splend
id during the last three weeks and that his appointment to the Home Command was not a shelving but on the contrary appointing him to the job for which he is ideally fitted while Dill is probably better as CIGS. I should think they were right. Was interested to find that Attlee is a bit of a Classic and still quotes his Horace.
30 May 1940
Presently went to the War Room and was immensely cheered by hearing that over 100,000 of our men and some 5,000 of the French had been got away. Later in the evening Winston told me that the figure was over 120,000. Walked round the park and then dined with what was originally the Economic sub-Committee of Clem Davies’ Action Group at the Reform Club, but now consisted almost entirely of Ministers!Much good talk and the dinner which we propose to continue is likely to afford a very useful meeting ground for discussing business.
From Winston S. Churchill’s Their Finest Hour
28 May 1940
I had not seen many of my colleagues outside the War Cabinet, except individually, since the formation of the Government, and I thought it right to have a meeting in my room at the House of Commons of all Ministers of Cabinet rank other than the War Cabinet Members. We were perhaps twenty-five round the table. I described the course of events, and I showed them plainly where we were, and all that was in the balance. Then I said quite casually, and not treating it as a point of special significance:
‘Of course, whatever happens at Dunkirk, we shall fight on.’
There occurred a demonstration which, considering the character of the gathering – twenty-five experienced politicians and Parliament men, who represented all the different points of view, whether right or wrong, before the war – surprised me. Quite a number seemed to jump up from the table and come running to my chair, shouting and patting me on the back. There is no doubt that had I at this juncture faltered at all in the leading of the nation I should have been hurled out of office. I was sure that every Minister was ready to be killed quite soon, and have all his family and possessions destroyed, rather than give in. In this they represented the House of Commons and almost all the people. It fell to me in these coming days and months to express their sentiments on suitable occasions. This I was able to do because they were mine also. There was a white glow, overpowering, sublime, which ran through our Island from end to end.