by Owen, David;
L.C. HOLLIS.
The Foreign Secretary said he would like to put the following question. Suppose the French Army collapsed and Herr Hitler made an offer of peace terms. Suppose the French Government said ‘We are unable to deal with an offer made to France alone and you must deal with the Allies together.’ Suppose Herr Hitler, being anxious to end the war through knowledge of his own internal weaknesses, offered terms to France and England, would the Prime Minister be prepared to discuss them?
The Prime Minister said that he would not join France in asking for terms; but if he were told what the terms offered were, he would be prepared to consider them.
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.
It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.
S E C R E T.
C. O. S. (40) 391.
COPY NO. 33
26th MAY. 1940.
WAR CABINET.
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.
__________________________________________
VISIT OF M. REYNAUD ON 26th MAY. 1940.
Aide Memoire.
We have been instructed to prepare an Aide Memoire for the Prime Minister on the assumption that the object of M. Reynaud’s visit on 26th May is to say that the French wish to make a separate peace.
2. We put forward our views under the following headings:-
(a)Arguments to deter the French capitulation.
(b)Arguments to strengthen the French will to continue the fight.
(c)Measures which we should press the French to take if M. Reynaud is determined to capitulate.
Arguments to deter the French from capitulation.
3. M. Reynaud is at once reminded that the French and British Governments have given a solemn undertaking not to conclude a separate peace. Even if the French decide to capitulate we shall continue the fight single-handed.
Sixth Meeting of Ministers
War Cabinet: minutes
(Cabinet papers, 65/7)
27 May 1940 10
Downing Street
10 p.m.
The Prime Minister informed the War Cabinet that a message had been received from Sir Roger Keyes to the effect that the King of the Belgians had ordered his Commander-in-Chief to send a plenipotentiary to the Germans to ask for an armistice for the Belgian Army to take effect from midnight that night.
News of this had been received in Paris and General Spears had rung up to say that General Weygand had advised the French Government to dissociate themselves from the Belgians in this matter and to order General Blanchard and Lord Gort to fight on. He had asked for the Prime Minister’s support in this advice.
The Prime Minister said that he had acceded immediately to this request.
The Prime Minister said that he had telegraphed to Sir Roger Keyes in the early hours of that morning that the British Expeditionary Force was withdrawing towards the ports, and that we should do our best to evacuate such of the Belgian Army as could get back to the coast. He had emphasised the importance of ensuring the King’s safety, and had made it clear that we should fight on to the end. This message should not have affected the King’s determination to continue the struggle, although, perhaps, he could not altogether be blamed now for the action he was taking. Nevertheless, he had been very precipitate in seeking an armistice. Apparently the collapse of the Belgians was due to the heavy bombing to which they had been subjected that day. Any grounds for recrimination lay rather in the Belgian action on the outbreak of war than in the more immediate past. At the time when there had been only fifteen German divisions on
4. However attractive the conditions which Germany may offer to France, in order to get her out of the war, while she deals with Great Britain, there is not the faintest chance of these conditions being kept when it no longer suits the German book. Thus by capitulating France will become a vassal, if not a slave, to Germany.
5. The only way we can defeat Germany if we fight alone, will be by instituting a virtual blockade of the whole of Europe, including France. This we should immediately do. We should forthwith acquaint the United States of America with the facts of the situation and seek their full cooperation. In the present economic state of Europe, the effects of the blockade would be to cause widespread starvation in Europe this year.
The French Colonial Empire would be entirely cut off from France by this blockade.
6. France could not escape the military measures we should have to take against German forces on French soil. Our necessity would compel us to treat the whole of French European and North African territories as hostile. If the military situation so dictated we should have no hesitation in bombing French cities.
7. Italy would certainly exploit the situation to her advantage and satisfy her claims against France.
8. Whatever peace terms the French may accept at German hands, these will by no means be final. There need be no illusion as to the ultimate fate of France.
Arguments to strengthen the French will to continue the fight.
9. The German economic position is already known to be serious. The commitments involved in holding down the territories already conquered must be placing further strain on German economic resources.
10. At the present moment Germany is staking her their Western frontier, and the bulk of the German Army had been engaged in Poland, if Belgium had then invited us to enter their country, we could have established ourselves in a strong defensive position or invaded Germany. The King’s action was certainly not heroic. Presumably, he would now make a separate peace with the Germans and carry on as a puppet monarch. This might well be the best that he could do for his country, but we had to face the fact that it had the most serious consequences for the British Expeditionary Force. It was possible, of course, that the four divisions in the Lille area might manage to draw back and cut their way out to the coast. Our formations were practically intact and the troops were in excellent heart. They did not realise the plight in which they had been placed.
The Chief of the Imperial General Staff25 said that the collapse of the Belgians would undoubtedly place the British Expeditionary Force in the most serious peril. Lord Gort had no troops with which to close the gap and prevent the Germans breaking through to Dunkirk. No information had yet been received by the War Office as to the casualties which our Army had suffered. Some personnel had been withdrawn from France that day, but a ship leaving Dunkirk that afternoon had been heavily attacked from the air and had suffered some casualties from machine-gun fire.
The Prime Minister said that General Spears had reported that the feeling in Paris was better than it had been a short time ago. This might perhaps be attributed in part to the results of M. Reynaud’s visit to London the previous day. As for the effect of the Belgian defection on French resistance, the French had probably already written off Blanchard’s army as a dead loss. The action of the Belgians might sting the French to anger, in which case they would be very much more formidable opponents to the Germans than in their present stunned and bewildered state.
Our chief preoccupation now was to get off as much of the British Expeditionary Force as possible. all on a desperate throw with a view to making a quick decision. The intense effort she is now making she cannot hope to sustain. If only we can stop and hold the present onslaught we shall be well on the way to precipitating an early German collapse. The greater the determination we can show in the face of heavy odds, the greater the chances will be of obtaining American support.
11. Moreover, Germany’s own military difficulties should not be overlooked. So far she has staked the pick of her forces both human and material. The forces which we have not yet seen are probably of lower fighting value.
Measures which we should press the French to take if M. Reynaud is determined to capitulate.
12. Before capitulation, the French should be pressed -
(a)To make a supreme effort to ext
ricate the British Expeditionary Force and the Advanced Air striking Force from the situation in which it has been placed by the virtual collapse of the French Army.
(b)To despatch the whole of the French Mercantile Marine to British or Dominion ports.
(c)To remove all gold and bearer securities to the United States of America.
13. As soon as the French capitulate, they should agree -
(a)To send the French Navy to British ports.
(b)To transfer what is left of their Air Force to British bases.
(c)To destroy as far as possible all military equipment, particularly anti-aircraft and long-range guns.
(d)To destroy all British secret equipment (e.g. R.D.F., Asdics), and burn all secret documents related to policy and plans.
14. It would of course be highly desirable from the There would be very confused fighting in the area of operations. The bombers on both sides would be able to do little, as the opposing troops would be very much intermingled. The German bombers, however, would get their opportunity when our men reached the coast.
The Minister of Information26 suggested that a statement should be issued referring to the gallant defence by the British troops.
The Prime Minister agreed, but thought that for the sake of relatives no names of regiments should be given at present.
The Minister of Information suggested that the public should be given some indication of the serious position in which the BEF had been placed. The French communiqués still had a cheerful tone. There was no doubt that the public were, at the moment, quite unprepared for the shock of realisation of the true position.
The Prime Minister thought that the seriousness of the situation should be emphasised; but he would deprecate any detailed statement or attempt to access the results of the battle, until the situation had been further cleared up. The announcement of the Belgian Armistice would go a long way to prepare the public for bad news.
The Minister of Information said that he realised the danger of announcements which appeared to contradict the French communiqués, and he thought that it would be as well to remind the public of the constant German efforts to drive a wedge between the two peoples. At the same time editors could be asked to tone down the French announcements. The Prime Minister thought that it would be necessary for him to make a full statement in Parliament, although it might be another week before the situation had cleared sufficiently to allow him to do so. He proposed to say that the essential dangers which had menaced this country in the first days of the war had not been greatly increased by what had happened. Our means military point of view that the French should stipulate that their territory should not be used by the enemy as a base of operations against ourselves. We feel, however, that even if the French were to attempt to obtain a guarantee of this nature and the Germans nominally subscribed to it the guarantee itself would be utterly worthless.
(Signed) C.L.N. NEWALL
,, DUDLEY POUND.
,, EDMUND IRONSIDE.
Cabinet War Room.
of meeting them, on the other hand, had increased since the beginning of the war; moreover, we could take heart from the superior quality and morale of our Air Force which had been so clearly demonstrated.
Winston S. Churchill: statement
(Hansard)
28 May 1940
House of Commons
WAR SITUATION
The Prime Minister (Mr Churchill): The House will be aware that the King of the Belgians yesterday sent a plenipotentiary to the German Command asking for a suspension of arms on the Belgian front. The British and French Governments instructed their generals immediately to dissociate themselves from this procedure and to persevere in the operations in which they are now engaged. However, the German Command has agreed to the Belgian proposals and the Belgian Army ceased to resist the enemy’s will at four o’clock this morning. I have no intention of suggesting to the House that we should attempt at this moment to pass judgement1 upon the action of the King of the Belgians in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Belgian Army. This Army has fought very bravely and has both suffered and inflicted heavy losses. The Belgian Government has dissociated itself from the action of the King and, declaring itself to be the only legal Government of Belgium, has formally announced its resolve to continue the war at the side of the Allies who have come to the aid of Belgium at her urgent appeal. Whatever our feelings may be upon the facts so far as they are known to us, we must remember that the sense of brotherhood between the many peoples who have fallen into the power of the aggressor, and those who still confront him, will play its part in better days than those through which we are passing.
The situation of the British and French Armies
Seventh Meeting of Ministers
War Cabinet: minutes
(Cabinet papers, 65/7)
28 May 1940
10 Downing Street
11.30 a.m.
The Prime Minister said that the Belgian Army had ceased fire at 0400 hours that morning. He invited Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, who had just returned from Belgium, to give the War Cabinet his appreciation of the present situation.
Sir Roger Keyes said that the Belgian Army had been completely demoralised by incessant bombing from large numbers of German aircraft. The Germans appeared to have maintained a ring of fighter patrols round the battle area and, although our fighters had been seen in many engagements with the German fighters, they had been unable to break through the ring in order to attack the German bombers, which had circled round at low altitudes, bombing the Belgian troops with impunity.
Sir Roger Keyes commented on the precipitate flight of the Belgian Government. King Leopold had said that he wished to have nothing more to do with them. In his (Sir Roger Keyes’s) view the Belgian Government were entirely responsible for the chaos caused by the evacuation of the civil population, who had been told that asylum would be found for them in England or France. It had been noticeable that the Local Authorities had in most cases been the first to get away.
The Prime Minister expressed the War Cabinet’s warm appreciation of what Sir Roger Keyes had done in such difficult and dangerous circumstances. He did not think, however, that Sir Roger Keyes should return to Belgium, at any rate for the moment.
(At this point Sir Roger Keyes withdrew).
The Prime Minister said that the King of the Belgians would now presumably become the puppet of now engaged in a most severe battle and beset on three sides and from the air, is evidently extremely grave. The surrender of the Belgian Army in this manner adds appreciably to their grievous peril. But the troops are in good heart, and are fighting with the utmost discipline and tenacity, and I shall, of course, abstain from giving any particulars of what, with the powerful assistance of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, they are doing or hope to do. I expect to make a statement to the House on the general position when the result of the intense struggle now going on can be known and measured. This will not, perhaps, be until the beginning of next week.
Meanwhile, the House should prepare itself for hard and heavy tidings. I have only to add that nothing which may happen in this battle can in any way relieve us of our duty to defend the world cause to which we have vowed ourselves; nor should it destroy our confidence in our power to make our way, as on former occasions in our history, through disaster and through grief to the ultimate defeat of our enemies.
Hitler, and might possibly obtain better treatment for his people than if he had left the country and continued to resist from foreign soil. No doubt history would criticise the King for having involved us and the French in Belgium’s ruin. But it was not for us to pass judgement on him.
The Prime Minister then read to the War Cabinet the terms of the armistice which the Belgians had agreed with the enemy, as follows:—
(1)All Belgian troop movement forbidden. Belgian troops must line up on the side of the road to await orders. They must make known their presence by means of white signs, flags, &c.
(2
)Orders must be given forbidding destruction of war material and stores.
(3)German troops must be allowed to proceed to the coast.
(4)Free passage to Ostend is demanded and no destruction permitted.
(5)All resistance will be overcome.
The Minister of Information read to the War Cabinet a message he had just received from Sir Walter Monckton1 pressing for a frank statement of the desperate situation of the British Expeditionary Force. He feared that, unless this was given out, public confidence would be badly shaken and the civil population would not be ready to accept the assurances of the Government of the chances of our ultimate victory. The Minister suggested that he should make a short statement in the 1 o’clock news of the BBC.
The Prime Minister said that he would also make a statement in the House of Commons in the afternoon.
Eighth Meeting of Ministers
War Cabinet: Confidential Annex
(Cabinet papers, 65/13)
28 May 1940
4 p.m.
The Foreign Secretary1 said that Sir Robert Vansittart2 had now discovered what the Italian Embassy had in mind, namely, that we should give a clear indication that we should like to see mediation by Italy.
The Prime Minister said that it was clear that the French purpose was to see Signor Mussolini acting as intermediary between ourselves and Herr Hitler. He was determined not to get into this position.
The Foreign Secretary said that the proposal which had been discussed with M. Reynaud on Sunday had been as follows: that we should say that we were prepared to fight to the death for our independence, but that, provided this could be secured, there were certain concessions that we were prepared to make to Italy.
The Prime Minister thought that the French were trying to get us onto the slippery slope. The position would be entirely different when Germany had made an unsuccessful attempt to invade this country.
The Foreign Secretary said that we must not ignore the fact that we might get better terms before France went out of the war and our aircraft factories were bombed, than we might get in three months’ time.