Cabinet's Finest Hour

by Owen, David;

  It was not that letter but Churchill’s speech to Parliament on 4 June that had the electric effect on Roosevelt and American public opinion. The international broadcast had Churchill’s voice impersonated by Norman Shelley, as Churchill did not have time to repeat what he had said. “Roosevelt’s response was dramatic. He ordered a reluctant War Department (where stubborn officials managed to delay implementation for three weeks) until overwhelmed by direct presidential instruction to fill British requests for, and to despatch at once, 500,000 Enfield rifles, 900 75mm artillery pieces, 50,000 machine guns, 130 million rounds of ammunition, a million artillery shells and large quantities of high explosives and bombs. The neutrality legislation was circumvented by selling this equipment and ordnance to private corporations, which sold it on at once to the British. Except for tanks, the British Army would be substantially rearmed, albeit with twenty-year-old rifles and field pieces, within six weeks of returning, shorn and waterlogged, from Dunkirk.”1

  On 5 June Churchill sent a Most Secret Message to the Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King in which his anxiety about President Roosevelt’s view that the British Fleet might need to go to Canada is revealed in stark language: “We must be careful not to let Americans view too complacently prospect of British collapse, out of which they would get the British Fleet and the guardianship of the British Empire, minus Great Britain. If United States were in the war and England conquered locally, it would be natural that events should follow line you describe. But if America continued neutral, and we were overpowered, I cannot tell what policy might be adopted by a pro-German administration such as would undoubtedly be set up. Although President is our best friend, no practical help has been forthcoming from the United States as yet. We have not expected them to send military aid, but they have not even sent any worthy contribution in destroyers or planes, or by a visit of a squadron of their Fleet to Southern Irish ports. Any pressure that you can supply in this direction would be invaluable”.2 Churchill ends by showing his disappointment with America, thanking King “for destroyers which have already gone into action against a U-Boat” and also demonstrating his Minister of Defence role, aware of every development and engagement of the forces in effect under his direct command.

  On 9 June Churchill wrote to Lord Lothian, Ambassador in Washington to guide him for a conversation he was due to have with the President:

  If Great Britain broke under invasion, a pro-German Government might obtain far easier terms from Germany by surrendering the Fleet, thus making Germany and Japan masters of the new world. This dastardly deed would not be done by His Majesty’s present advisors, but, if Mosley3 were Prime Minister or some other Quisling4 government set up, it is exactly what they would do, and perhaps the only thing they could do, and the President should bear this very clearly in mind. You should talk to him in this sense and thus discourage any complacent assumption on United States part that they will pick up the debris of the British Empire by their present policy. On the contrary, they run the terrible risk that their sea power will be completely over-matched. Moreover, islands and naval bases to hold the United States in awe would certainly be claimed by the Nazis. If we go down, Hitler has a very good chance of conquering the world.

  No tougher message could have been sent and Churchill must have calculated that when read out in the Oval Office it would have a significant impact.

  On 10 June the Italians declared war. Cadogan wrote in his diary: “Am rather glad. Now we can say what we think of these purulent dogs.”5 When Ciano, the Foreign Minister, informed the British Ambassador, Loraine, of Italy’s decision, Cadogan wrote that the Ambassador supposedly responded: “I have the honour to remind Your Excellency that England is not in the habit of losing her wars.” Churchill’s reaction was recorded by John Colville in his diary “People who go to Italy to look at ruins won’t have to go as far as Naples and Pompeii in future.” Roosevelt also took the opportunity that same day to condemn the choice of the Italian Government, in a speech delivered at the University of Virginia: “the hand that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbour”.

  On 11 June Churchill wrote to Roosevelt having heard his speech the night before: “I have already cabled you about airplanes, including flying boats, which are so needful to us in the impending struggle for the life of Great Britain. But even more pressing is the need for destroyers. The Italian outrage makes it necessary for us to cope with a much larger number of submarines which may come out into the Atlantic and perhaps be based in Spanish ports. To this the only counters are destroyers”. The next day Churchill told Lothian that he had just learned the President was not convinced and must be updated with figures concerning losses and damages.

  On the 12 June Churchill wrote once again to Roosevelt: “I spent last night and this morning at the French GQG where the situation was explained to me in the gravest terms... The aged Marshal Pétain, who was none too good in April and July 1918, is I fear ready to lend his name and prestige to a treaty of peace for France. Reynaud on the other hand is for fighting on, and he has a young General de Gaulle who believes much can be done. Admiral Darlan declares he will send the French Fleet to Canada. It would be disastrous if the two big modern ships fell into bad hands.”

  On the 14 June German forces entered Paris and two further messages were sent in 24 hours to Roosevelt about France. On 15 June in yet another message Churchill asks: “Have you considered what offers Hitler may choose to make to France? He may say, ‘surrender the Fleet intact and I will leave you Alsace-Lorraine’, or alternatively, ‘if you do not give me your ships I will destroy your towns’. I am personally convinced that America will in the end go to all lengths, but this moment is supremely critical for France.” He goes on to indicate the possibility of a declaration that the United States would if necessary go to war. At 10.45 he sends another, “I am of course not thinking in terms of an expeditionary force, which I know is out of the question. What I have in mind is the tremendous moral effect such an American decision would produce, not merely in France, but also in all democratic countries in the world, and, in the opposite sense, on the German and Italian people.”

  At the War Cabinet on 22 June “The Prime Minister said that in a matter so vital for the safety of the whole of the British Empire we could not afford to rely on the word of Admiral Darlan. However good his intentions might be, he might be forced to resign and his place taken by another minister who would not shrink from betraying us. The most important thing to do was to make certain of the two modern battleships Richelieu and Jean Bart. If these fell into the hands of the Germans they would have a very formidable line of battle when the Bismarck was commissioned next August”. Halifax thought “we should exhaust every means of persuasion before using force … The Prime Minister agreed, but stressed that we must at all times keep in our view the main object, which was that in no circumstances must we run the mortal risk of allowing these ships to fall into the hands of the enemy. Rather than that, we should have to fight and sink them.”6

  On 23 June, the War Cabinet agreed in principle to the request from General de Gaulle to recognise a Council of Liberation (Comité National Français) and Churchill described him as a “fine fighting soldier, with a good reputation and a strong personality, and might be the right man to set up such a council”. On 24 June, the War Cabinet agreed:

  1. French shipping should not be allowed to sail from any British port

  2. All French ships on the high seas should be diverted into British ports

  The Cabinet also approved Churchill’s reply to the Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King in a follow-up to Churchill’s earlier message on 5 June. This telegram further expressed Churchill’s position that “I see no reason to make preparation for or give any countenance to the transfer of the British Fleet. I shall myself never enter into any peace negotiations with Hitler but obviously I cannot bind a future Government which, if we were deserted by the United States and beaten down here, might very easily be a
kind of Quisling affair ready to accept German overlordship and protection. It would be a help if you would impress this danger upon the President as I have done in my telegrams to him. All good wishes and we are very glad your grand Canadian division is with us in our fight for Britain.”

  “The real question at issue” however, “was what to do as regards the French ships at Oran”, and in a Confidential Annex to the War Cabinet meeting of 27 June “the view was expressed that it was most important to take action to ensure that the French Fleet could not be used against us … The Prime Minister summed up the discussion as follows: He thought that the War Cabinet approved in principle that the operation proposed should take place on 3 July. It might be combined with further operations in the Mediterranean, or with operations designed to secure the Richelieu and the Jean Bart … The War Cabinet approved in principle the operation on the lines indicated by the Prime Minister”.

  No decision was more important in setting the tone of Churchill’s defiance than on 2 July 1940 when the First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound, sent a signal to Admiral Somerville which had been drafted by Churchill: “You are charged with one of the most disagreeable and difficult tasks that a British Admiral has ever been faced with, but we have complete confidence in you and rely on you to carry it out relentlessly.” At 2.00 am on 3 July, Somerville’s ships began shelling the French naval vessels at Mers-el-Kébir while aircraft from HMS Ark Royal dropped torpedoes. The French Navy lost 1,297 men, dead or missing. Churchill on this issue had stamped his authority ruthlessly and in a way that could allow no doubt anywhere in the world that the British Empire would fight on alone.

  Just prior to a Secret Session, the Prime Minister made a statement to the House of Commons on 4 July on the War Situation and the French Fleet.

  It is with sincere sorrow that I must now announce to the House the measures which we have felt bound to take in order to prevent the French Fleet from falling into German hands. When two nations are fighting together under long and solemn alliance against a common foe, one of them may be stricken down and overwhelmed, and may be forced to ask its Ally to release it from its obligations. But the least that could be expected was that the French Government, in abandoning the conflict and leaving its whole weight to fall upon Great Britain and the British Empire, would have been careful not to inflict needless injury upon their faithful comrade, in whose final victory the sole chance of French freedom lay, and lies.

  As the House will remember, we offered to give full release to the French from their Treaty obligations, although these were designed for precisely the case which arose, on one condition, namely, that the French Fleet should be sailed for British harbours before the separate armistice negotiations with the enemy were completed. This was not done, but on the contrary, in spite of every kind of private and personal promise and assurance given by Admiral Darlan to the First Lord and to his Naval colleague the First Sea Lord of the British Admiralty, an armistice was signed which was bound to place the French Fleet as effectively in the power of Germany and its Italian following, as that portion of the French Fleet which was placed in our power when many of them, being unable to reach African ports, came into the harbours of Portsmouth and Plymouth about ten days ago. Thus I must place on record that what might have been a mortal injury was done to us by the Bordeaux Government with full knowledge of the consequences and of our dangers, and after rejecting all our appeals at the moment when they were abandoning the Alliance, and breaking the engagements which fortified it.

  The House of Commons had one of its unique moments; both sides clapped – which is very rare (the last occasion was in 2016 after the killing of the young Labour MP Jo Cox on the street of her con-stituency) – cheered – which they often do – and some had tears in their eyes. As did Churchill. The Commons is a hugely sentimental place. It loves eulogising over members who have died and recognising Royal events. Here was Churchill, a Francophile to his core, a former naval person (First Sea Lord twice in two World Wars) who everyone knew had friends in the French Navy and had done everything in his power to avoid sinking the French Fleet; yet he had done his duty. That same recognition touched people worldwide. The former naval person in the White House understood its significance – the British were going to be resolute and utterly ruthless. General de Gaulle, in what was a difficult and courageous broadcast for him to the French people on 8 July 1940, said of the French Fleet, “There cannot be the slightest doubt that, on principle and of necessity, the enemy would have used them either against Britain or against our own Empire. I therefore have no hesitation in saying that they are better destroyed.”7

  On 5 July a very different moment of significance occurred. Gollancz published Guilty Men written under the pseudonym ‘Cato’. The publication came at an unfortunate time for Churchill; he knew the Government was facing bigger challenges and he had no intention of supporting a witch-hunt against the appeasers. Indeed, back on 25 June Churchill, still on the alert for any sense of defeatism amongst those known appeasers, had written to Halifax on a sensitive issue relating to his Deputy Minister, Rab Butler:

  It is quite clear to me from these telegrams and others that Butler held odd language to the Swedish Minister and certainly the Swede derived a strong impression of defeatism. In these circumstances would it not be well to find out from Butler actually what he did say. I was strongly pressed in the House of Commons in the Secret Session to give assurances that the present Government and all its Members were resolved to fight on to the death, and I did so taking personal responsibility for the resolve of all. I saw a silly rumour in a telegram from Belgrade or Bucharest and how promptly you stamped upon it, but any suspicion of lukewarmness in Butler will certainly subject us all to further annoyance of this kind.

  The issue is dealt with fully by Butler’s official biographer, Anthony Howard, where his letter of explanation to Halifax is printed in full:

  I can see that in this case I should have been more cautious and I apologise. I now place myself in your hands … Under the circumstances I await your and the Prime Minister’s final opinion …8

  Halifax handled the incident well; he did not tell Churchill that Butler was ready to resign, and said he was “satisfied that there is no divergence of view … I should be very sorry if you felt any doubt either about Butler’s discretion or his complete loyalty...” What is significant is that Churchill was not looking for a political scalp. He had put a shot across both men’s bows about defeatism, but that was all.

  However, with the publication of Guilty Men came a very public criticism of those involved in the Munich Agreement. The book was a series of vitriolic character assassinations of originally fifteen appeasers, with the title from the French revolutionary writer Saint-Just. “The leader of the angry crowd replied ‘The people haven’t come here to be given a lot of phrases. They demand a dozen guilty men.’”9 It was more than a bestseller, there were six impressions by the printer in one month, it sold over 210,000 copies, and was given huge coverage in newspapers and passed from hand to hand amongst soldiers and factory workers. The ODOB refers to its sensational sales as “reminiscent of a pornographic classic”. Gollancz himself, on the left, had consulted friends about the advisability of publishing in case its message had a negative impact on morale. An addendum was published in the front by ‘Cato’ in block capitals, the first line of which was: At long last, the aeroplanes, the tanks, the arms of every kind are piling up.

  The words inside were, however, very tough. Two former Foreign Secretaries were quoted. Sir John Simon: “I was not prepared to see a single ship sunk … in the cause of Abyssinian independence”; Sir Samuel Hoare: “We are obsessed with the urgent necessity of doing everything within our power to prevent a European conflagration.” Then how “Hoare passed from experience to experience, like Boccaccio’s virgin, without any discernible effect on his condition.” Baldwin, who had appointed a Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, Thomas Inskip, a lawyer who admitted he had no qualificati
ons, was chastised through a quote “by a famous statesman” (a reference to Churchill): “There has been no similar appointment since the Roman Emperor Caligula made his horse a consul.” Chamberlain was quoted, when answering a question at a dinner party as to why Hitler should be trusted, as saying: “Ah, but this time he promised me.” The actual authors were journalists all writing for Beaverbrook newspapers. One of them was Michael Foot who became Leader of the Labour Party from 1980–1983 and a close friend of Lord Beaverbrook. Somehow the authors were able to justify to themselves not branding Beaverbrook guilty despite his well-known period as an appeaser. The hardest jibe of all in Guilty Men was to remind readers that Chamberlain had said on 3 April 1940 that “Hitler had missed the bus” five days before he struck at Norway. The Government machine it appears was quietly guided by Churchill, through Duff Cooper, as Minister for Information, to push public criticism towards Baldwin, MacDonald and Simon as far as they could in an attempt to protect Chamberlain, Halifax and the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Kingsley Wood. He, too, had been an appeaser, but here was the man who, so it is claimed, had advised Churchill in early May to keep silent when he met Chamberlain and Halifax, to sit it out and not proffer any view, to let Halifax speak for himself.

  It was not just politicians but civil servants too who were branded. Sir Horace Wilson, a sinister figure, was named as a ‘guilty man’ and a Chamberlain confidant. He was a top civil servant seconded to Chamberlain and had a room at No. 10. When Churchill became Prime Minister, Wilson was politely told by Churchill that he was making changes to the rooms in No. 10 and was asked to vacate his. Wilson, called ‘Sir H Quisling’ by Labour, was still there by 6.00 pm, at which point Churchill turned to Brendan Bracken, “Tell that man, if his room is not cleared I will make him Minister for Iceland.” Arthur Greenwood allegedly hated Wilson whom he had known for 20 years. Nevertheless, despite the objections Churchill allowed Wilson to stay on as the head of the Civil Service and head of the Treasury and he kept him in this post until July 1942, long after Chamberlain had left in the autumn of 1940. Such actions by Churchill again suggest he was a leader fearful of a coup, anxious about a potential uprising among appeasers.