Cabinet's Finest Hour
Page 29
When introducing the Chilcot Report David Cameron chose to highlight the creation of the National Security Council (NSC) by the coalition government in May 2010. This system, however, is yet to be tested in the face of a Prime Minister prepared to override existing conventions, or one determined not to operate under agreed NSC mechanisms. Chilcot did not consider whether, in the run up to the Iraq War, it could have been bypassed legally. Could it have met less frequently, or might its deliberations have been superseded by small ad hoc Cabinet Committees? Could the Chiefs of Staff have been prevented from bringing their concerns directly to the NSC? Could the Cabinet Secretary or senior civil servants have been prevented from doing likewise? These are just some of the fundamental questions that must be considered in the restoration of Cabinet government in the UK.
It was encouraging to see Theresa May, as her first major action on becoming Prime Minister in the wake of the Brexit vote, visit Edinburgh to talk to Nicola Sturgeon, Scotland’s First Minister. Then Wales, Northern Ireland and inviting the Irish Prime Minister to No. 10. Of course there are important constitutional questions that arise from the UK leaving the EU and they are best sorted out through an all-party UK Constitutional Convention with a view to creating a new Second Chamber to replace the Lords, reflecting the emergence of a federal UK. That is the most appropriate democratic response to the decision to reject being sucked into a United States of Europe, which is the essence of Brexit.
An important debate that took place in the House of Lords in July 2016 stressed that good practices do not guarantee good decisions. Nor do they guarantee good behaviour, or prevent the participants succumbing to groupthink. Lord Bridges of Headley, Parliamentary Secretary for the Cabinet Office, and grandson of the Cabinet Secretary in 1940, concluded the debate, saying that in 2016 the Attorney General had become a member of the NSC as of right and would therefore be privy to all NSC discussions relating to conflict as well as other national security issues. That is a wise decision. A stabilisation unit has also been established for post-conflict work and will come under the NSC. A dedicated Conflict, Stability and Security fund will routinely support training, planning and the working together of officials from DFID and the MOD. Lord Bridges also spoke movingly of the importance of creating a culture and an environment in which politicians would welcome challenges, indeed provoke it themselves, and a framework that encourages both debate and deliberation. It is to precisely this culture we must now return – that of a government making collective decisions; only then will the presidential model that has proved so disastrous since 2001 be buried never to return, and will a Prime Minister uphold the practices of Cabinet government both in times of peace and war.
In his important book The Myth of the Strong Leader, Archie Brown, Emeritus Professor of Politics at the University of Oxford, writes of a much-needed check on the merits of charismatic leadership.21 It ends: “Leaders who believe they have a personal right to dominate decision-making in many different areas of policy, and who attempt to exercise such a prerogative, do a disservice both to good governance and to democracy. They deserve not followers, but critics.”22
The opportunity to exercise decisive and sometimes controversial leadership is one of the strengths of representative democracy and there is undoubtedly a need from time to time for boldness. But under the UK system representative democracy also demands that leaders’ decision-making be open to democratic scrutiny in full Cabinet as well as a War Cabinet. Also that during times of war, information be released to Parliament wherever possible. This system has operated well for this country, except for the last 15 years, and it is of paramount importance that after the referendum decision to leave the EU in 2016 the effective working of Cabinet government is restored.
1 Anthony Nutting, No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez (C.N. Potter, 1967).
2 Eden had high fevers because of his cholangitis, the result of a surgical mistake cutting his bile duct on 12 April 1953. Only a week before meeting Challe he had a fever of 107°F and rigors.
3 Geoffrey Marston, ‘Armed Intervention in the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis: The Legal Advice Tendered to the British Government’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1988), vol. 37, pp. 773–817.
4 A Canal Too Far, BBC Radio 3, 31 January 1987.
5 Transcript of interview with Sir Richard Powell, papers of the Suez Oral History Project 1989–91, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, London, ref. SUEZOHP 16.
6 John Colville, Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries 1939–1955, rev. ed. (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2004), pp. 671–2.
7 Eden, Clarissa Eden, p. 250.
8 Alistair Horne, Macmillan 1894–1956: Volume I of the Official Biography (London: Pan Macmillan, 1998), pp. 420-
9 Bernard O’Donoughue, Westminster Diary: A Reluctant Minister under Tony Blair, 2016
10 Lord Owen ‘The Ever-Growing Dominance of No. 10 in British Diplomacy since 5 April 1982’, Graham Ziegner (ed.), British Diplomacy. Foreign Secretaries Reflect (London: Politico’s, 2007) pp. 19–42.
11 David Owen, ‘Two-Man Government’, Prospect, December 2003; Owen, ‘The Ever-Growing Dominance of No. 10 in British Foreign Policy since 5 April 1982’.
12 Leaked memorandum of 29 April 2000 from Tony Blair to staff, reported in The Times, 18 July 2000.
13 David Marquand, ‘A Man Without History’, New Statesman, 7 May 2007.
14 Christopher Meyer, DC Confidential: The Controversial Memoirs of Britain’s Ambassador to the US at the Time of 9/11 and the Iraq War (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006), p. 190.
15 Philip Ziegler, Wilson: The Authorised Life of Lord Wilson of Rievaulx London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993), pp. 222–3.
16 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary, 2016, pp. 58–59.
17 David Owen, In Sickness and In Power, pp. 370–375.
18 ‘Catalogue of Failure’, 7 July, 2016.
19 Hansard, HL Deb, 22 February 2007, vol. 689 col 1231.
20 SA Goodman, The Imperial Premiership: The role of the modern Prime Minister in foreign policy making 1964–2015 (Manchester University Press, 2016).
21 Archie Brown, The Myth of the Strong Leader: Political Leadership in the Modern Age (Bodley Head, 2014).
22 Archie Brown, The Myth of the Strong Leader, p. 362.
Index
Note: Page numbers in bold indicate coverage on alternate pages.
Abyssinia, Italian invasion, 17–18, 47, 241
Afghanistan, 257–8, 261 air raids, 138, 179
air warfare: belief in British success, 160, 216–17; British successes, 203; German superiority queried, 164–8; strategic factors, 137–9, 156–60, 177–9, 216–17
aircraft production, 94, 139, 158–60, 164–6, 216
Al-Qaeda, 257–8
alcoholism, 20–21, 45
Alexander, A.V., 76, 109, 214
Amery, Leo: and Chamberlain’s resignation, 69; Commons attack on Chamberlain (May 1940), 60–64; May 1940 diary extracts, 205–6; “Speak for England”, 2; Vigilante group, 43; wartime expenditure criticism, 57
Anderson, Sir John, 94, 243
Anglo-Italian Agreement, 31
Ashfield, Lord, 8–9
Asquith, Herbert, 21
Attlee, Clement, 17, 205, 206; against appeasement, 23, 28–9; Commons debate (May 1940), 65; concerns over Hitler’s domination, 23–4; and Cripps, 18; defence preparations, 21; faith in Greenwood, 2; and General Strike, 10; on Halifax, 228; ill health and convalescence, 2, 24; Indian Statutory Commission, 10; knowledge of Italy, 125; Labour Party deputy leader, 13–14; Labour Party leader, 19–20, 21–4; leadership challenges, 25–6; and MacDonald, 12–13; Mayor of Stepney, 6; money problems, 10, 14; MP for Limehouse, 5, 7; National Union of Clerks, 5; rearmament policy, 22–3; refusal to serve under Chamberlain, 70–71, 75–6; and Spanish Civil War, 22; Vigilante group, 43; War Cabinet member (Lord Privy Seal), 76, 77, 93, 96, 115, 148; War Office Minister, 7; World War I service, 6
Austria, German occupation, 23
Balbo, Italo, 142
Baldwin, Stanley, 7, 8, 241
Barkley, Alben, 242
Bastianini, Giuseppe (Italian Ambassador), 151–5, 198
Beaverbrook, Lord, 85, 93–4, 241, 243
BEF (British Expeditionary Force): battle for Calais and Boulogne, 113–18, 123–4, 203; in Calais, 118, 119–21; consequences of Belgian Armistice, 182–6; desperate situation, 223; in Dunkirk, 118; evacuation, 152, 200, 202–3, 206, 232; French response to withdrawal plans, 115–17, 140; march to the coast, 130; withdrawal plans, 136, 146, 150, 164, 172, 185
Belgium: Armistice, 182–8, 223–4; Armistice terms, 192, 224; army demoralisation, 190; civilian population evacuation, 190; evacuation of the King, 118–19, 134, 152; government flight, 190
Ben-Gurion, David, 254
Berlin, Isaiah, 246–7
Bevin, Ernest: Abyssinian invasion, 18; criticism of Chamberlain government, 54; dislike of Morrison, 9; and Labour politicians, 9; and London Traffic Bill, 8–9; and MacDonald, 12–13; Minister of Labour, 92–4, 106; rearmament policy, 23; relations with Churchill, 53–4, 77; War Cabinet member, 92, 94, 106, 107, 243; wartime impact, 30
Blair, Tony: as chief executive, 258–9; lack of ministerial experience, 258; marginalisation of Cabinet, 262–3, 265, 266; possible ‘misfeasance in public office’, 264; presentism, 261; presidential government style, 210, 248, 258; promise of support to Bush, 254, 265–6; response to 9/11 attacks, 258, 260–61; written statement on Chilcot findings, 263–4
Blanchard, General Georges, 116, 123–4, 132–4, 182, 197
Blum, Léon, 22
Boothby, Robert (Bob): abdication crisis, 47; Churchill’s PPS, 46; and Dorothy Macmillan, 46; and Hitler, 46–7; junior Food Minister, 48; life peerage, 49; relations with Churchill, 47–8, 52; resignation as minister, 48; support for Churchill as PM, 45, 53; Vigilantes group, 43; and Weininger association, 48
Bourget, Colonel P-A, 125
Brexit, 267–8
Bridges of Headley, Lord, 269
British Army, equipment, 139, 233
Brooke, General Alan, 243
Brown, Archie, 269
Brown, George, 21
Brown, Gordon, 210, 265
Bullitt, William Christian, 196n1
Bush, George W., 254, 257, 265–6
Butler, Lord, 266–7
Butler, R. A. (Rab), 36, 38–9, 77–8, 239–40
Cabinet government: Blair’s dual Presidency approach, 257, 263; Blair’s marginalisation, 259–60, 262–3; Blair’s presidential style, 210, 248, 258; Suez Crisis, 252–3; under Cameron, 267–8; under Major, 257; under Thatcher, 256–7, 259; value of a collective approach, 247–8, 262–3; see also War Cabinet; War Cabinet documents; War Cabinet meetings
Cabinet meeting, 28 May 1940, 196, 202–4, 205, 207, 226–7, 227
Cadogan, Sir Alexander, 33–4, 40–41, 215, 232, 234–5; influence on Halifax, 33–4, 215, 222
Cameron, David, 210, 248, 267–8
Campbell, Alastair, 259
Campbell, Sir Ronald (Ambassador to Paris), 113, 117, 124, 131
Canada, 233–4, 237
cartoon, Wartime Cabinet, 208
Challe, General Maurice, 249–50
Chamberlain, Neville: appeasement justification, 121–2; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 31; Churchill’s flattery, 80, 211–12; Conservative Party leadership, 108–9; criticised in Guilty Men, 241; criticises French military, 82, 218; crossparty opposition towards, 37; desire to restore place in history, 220; and Eden, 31–2; German invasion of Poland, 3–4; and Halifax, 31, 219; on Hitler, 4, 241; Hubris Syndrome, 35, 219–20; ill health, 91–2; and Italian invasion of Albania, 36; and Italian negotiations, 55, 194, 218–19; and Lloyd George, 82–3, 84, 85; Lord President of the Council, 76–7; loss of parliamentary support (May 1940), 59–69; meetings with Hitler (1938), 33–5; Munich Agreement, 34–5, 219–20; Opposition’s refusal to join coalition, 70–71; Paris visit, 35; Polish Guarantee, 38–9; post-resignation support from Churchill, 81–5, 88; on prospects for continuing without France, 138; resignation and death, 242–3; resignation and successor as Prime Minister, 70–74, 79–81; statement following Polish invasion, 1; three-power cooperation initiative, 41, 42; War Cabinet deputy, 99, 107, 112; War Cabinet discussions, 148, 152, 172–4, 194, 195, 226; war declaration, 27
Chilcot Report, 210, 263–4, 265, 268
Churchill, Clementine, 245
Churchill, Winston: abdication crisis, 47–8, 49; advocates cooperation with Soviet Union, 37, 39, 42; against appeasement, 23; Belgian Armistice Commons statement, 189–91; better off without France, 148, 150, 215; ‘Black Dog’ depression, 50–52; censorship in his historical memoirs, 128–9; and Chamberlain, 80, 211–12; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 13; Commons adjournment debate (May 1940), 67–8; Conservative hostility, 77–8; Conservative Party leadership, 108–9, 243; cross-party support as potential PM, 44, 45, 53; determination to fight on, 138, 144, 174–6, 193–5, 196, 204, 207; differences with Halifax, 176–80, 193, 195, 220–23, 244–5; Eastern Front strategy, 6; First Lord of the Admiralty, 27, 49; France visits (1940), 97–9, 113–15; futility of Reynaud’s approach, 174–6; Hitler, refusal to talk with, 209; hubristic traits, 212, 214; and Italy, 150–52; and Lloyd George, 82–3, 84, 85, 86–91; Minister of Defence and military interventions, 214; ministerial support, 196, 202–4, 205, 207; on Munich Agreement, 35, 219; Norway campaign, 58, 66–7; Paris visit (31 May), 230–31; power in Cabinet, 213–14; prospects for continuing without France, 138; radio broadcasts, 111; relations with Bevin, 53–4; relations with Roosevelt, 101–6, 246–7; requests US help, 102–6, 232, 235; Reynaud phone call, 197–9, 224–5, 226; Roosevelt Formal Naval Person correspondence, 101–6; succeeds Chamberlain as Prime Minister, 74–8; support for Chamberlain, 32, 70, 81–5, 88; War Cabinet appointments, 76–7; World War I service, 49
Ciano, Galeazzo, 55–6, 151, 235
civil defence, 139, 147
Clinton, Hillary, 265
Colville, John, 51, 109, 222, 235, 251; on working with Churchill, 110
Cooper, Alfred Duff (Minister of Information), 67, 186, 192, 241, 244
Cooper, Frank, 255
Cripps, Sir Stafford, 14; Abyssinian invasion, 17; and Attlee, 18; Bristol East MP, 18; expelled from Labour Party, 24; Moscow mission, 109–110; Solicitor General, 18
Cromwell, Oliver, 62–3
Daily Herald, 24, 25, 27, 29, 84
Daily Mail, 7–8, 27, 30
Daily Telegraph, 27
Daladier, Edouard, 34, 114
Dalton, Hugh, 8, 14, 18, 20; Cripps Moscow mission, 110; declines to challenge Attlee for leadership, 25–6; League of Nations Italian sanctions, 17; Minister for Economic Warfare, 110; rearmament policy, 22–3; recollections of May 1940, 202–4; resignation, 18
Darlan, Admiral Jean-François, 236, 238
Davies, Clement: alcoholism, 45; and Chamberlain’s downfall, 60, 65–6, 69, 75, 82; Liberal Party leader, 44–5; pre-war activities, 44; Vigilantes action group, 43, 58, 66, 82, 206
Davy, G.M.O., 189n1
Defence of the Realm Act, 112
Dickson, Sir William, 251–2
Dill, General Sir John, 113; CIGS (Chief of Imperial General Staff), 122, 124, 154, 160, 164, 184, 205–6, 217; head of Washington Joint Staff Mission, 243
Dodecanese, 142, 211
Donoughue, Bernard, 259
Dunkirk evacuation, 82
economic blockade, 144n7, 161–3, 183
Eden, Anthony: against appeasement, 23; Foreign Secretary, 243; ill health, 251, 254; Minister of War, 76, 146, 214; resignation as Foreign Secretary, 31–2; resignation as Prime Minister, 254; Suez crisis, 249–54
Edward VIII, 47
Edwards, Alfred, 25
Egypt: Suez Crisis, 249–54; WWII options, 141
Eisenhower, Dwight D. (Ike), 253 elections: (1919), 6; (1922), 5, 7; (1923), 7; (1924), 7–8; (1929), 10–11; (1931), 13; (1955), 249
emergency powers, 10
6–7
Emrys-Evans, Paul, 69
European Union, UK referendum, 267–8
evacuation: civilian, 147; of government not envisaged, 204
Evening Standard cartoon, 208
Falklands War, 255–6, 262–3
“Fifth column” activities, 145
finance: French resources to the US, 185; gold standard crisis, 13
food imports, 141, 163–5
food reserves, 147
Foot, Michael, 241
France: Britain unable to provide further air assistance, 111; Chamberlain visit, 35; Churchill’s visits, 97–9, 113–15, 202; consequences of Belgian Armistice, 182, 184; discussion should the French wish to make a separate peace, 181–7; French fleet, 235, 236, 237–9; German guarantee would be worthless, 183, 187; German invasion and request for fighter squadrons, 94, 95, 96, 97–101; Germany’s likely surrender terms, 138, 170; grievances towards Allies, 126; inability to fulfil any guarantee after occupation, 138; measures to be taken before capitulation, 185; military pessimism, 122–3, 132–4, 140–42, 148–50, 172; morale collapse, 202; naval resources, 185; post-occupation factories and manufacturing, 138, 142, 146, 148; prospects for continuation of war alone, 136–8; Suez Crisis, 153, 249–50, 251, 252, 254; surrender, 235–7; three-power cooperation initiative, 39–40, 41; Western Front campaign, 113–27; see also Reynaud, Paul
Gaulle, Charles de, 235, 236, 239
Gazier, Albert, 249
General Strike (1926), 9
George VI, King, 34, 116