Blood on the Snow
Page 1
BLOOD ON
THE SNOW
MODERN WAR STUDIES
Theodore A. Wilson
General Editor
Raymond A. Callahan
J. Garry Clifford
Jacob W. Kipp
Allan R. Millett
Carol Reardon
Dennis Showalter
David R. Stone
Series Editors
BLOOD ON
THE SNOW
The Carpathian
Winter War of 1915
Graydon A. Tunstall
University Press of Kansas
© 2010 by the University Press of Kansas
All rights reserved
Published by the University Press of Kansas (Lawrence, Kansas 66045), which was organized by the Kansas Board of Regents and is operated and funded by Emporia State University, Fort Hays State University, Kansas State University, Pittsburg State University, the University of Kansas, and Wichita State University
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Tunstall, Graydon A. (Graydon Allen)
Blood on the snow : the Carpathian winter war of 1915 / Graydon A. Tunstall.
p. cm.—(Modern war studies)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-7006-1720-3 (cloth : alk. paper)
ISBN 978-0-7006-1858-3 (pbk : alk. paper)
ISBN 978-0-7006-2725-7 (ebook : alk. paper)
1. World War, 1914–1918—Campaigns—Carpathian Mountains. 2. Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Heer—History—World War, 1914–1918. 3. Russia. Armiia—History—World War, 1914–1918. 4. Winter—Carpathian Mountains—History—20th century. 5. Carpathian Mountains—History, Military—20th century. I. Title.
D556.T86 2010
940.4'25—dc22 2009052229
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data is available.
Printed in the United States of America
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3
The paper used in the print publication is recycled and contains 30 percent postconsumer waste. It is acid free and meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992.
TO WENDY, MY WIFE AND SOUL MATE
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments
Introduction
1. Background to the Battles
2. The First Carpathian Offensive, January–February 1915
3. The Second Carpathian Offensive, Late February–Mid-March 1915
4. The Third Offensive and Easter Battle: End of the Carpathian Winter War
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
Index
Photo Gallery
Acknowledgments
MANY PEOPLE HAVE BEEN of inestimable assistance throughout this multiyear project. Among them is Peter Broucek, retired head of the Austrian War Archives World War I Section, who first suggested the topic to me years ago. My utmost gratitude goes to Dennis Showalter, a constant mentor, for encouraging me to complete this work. I thank my editor, Michael Briggs, for his enduring support throughout this book’s long gestational period. Special mention is also due Vannina Wurm in Vienna for her diligence and keen eye; and Ferenc Pollmann, in Budapest, who brought to my attention key holdings in the Budapest War Archives on the Honvéd participation in the war, and to the memory of Leopold Moser, a true friend and former librarian in the Vienna War Archives.
I am especially grateful to Carolyn Pointer Lowry and Brittany Vosler for their pleasant demeanor in the face of innumerable manuscript revisions, and to Jessica Magro for her valuable assistance in the early stages of this work. I thank my good friend and colleague, Kazimierz Robak, for helping to locate and translate relevant Polish sources, and the University of South Florida for its support of my research.
. . . and to those who fought and died in the Carpathian Mountains in the winter of 1915, may your sacrifice finally be recognized.
BLOOD ON
THE SNOW
Introduction
There is no enemy more formidable than nature. Anonymous
THE CARPATHIAN WINTER WAR of 1915 presents one of the most significant—and, in terms of human sacrifice, most tragic—chapters of World War I military history. The winter mountain battle that pitted allied Austro-Hungarian and German armies against Russian troops was unprecedented in the age of total war. The Karpathenkrieg comprised three separate campaigns launched by the Habsburg Supreme Command from mid-January to April 1915. The Eastern front operation, which ultimately engaged more than one million men on each side, could hardly have been conducted under worse conditions. The Carpathian theater lacked the railways, roads, communication lines, and other important resources necessary for maneuvering mass armies. Moreover, the contenders soon found themselves ensnared in an inhospitable mountain environment in wintertime. The three-month campaign, which ended in spring 1915, left the Austro-Hungarian Army under chief of the General Staff, Conrad von Hötzendorf, in shambles. The Russians did not fare much better. Casualties on both sides surpassed those of the so-called blood pump battles of Verdun and Somme in 1916, earning the Carpathian Winter War the dubious title of the Stalingrad of World War I.1
Historically significant, though little known (in the United States, virtually unknown), the Karpathenkrieg served as the background to the Gorlice-Tarnor offensive, the Central Powers’ greatest victory of World War I. The months-long campaign saw some of the most brutal combat of the war. Before the last rifle fell silent, the blood of some one million Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and German soldiers soaked the snowy Carpathian terrain. Countless others lost limbs to frostbite or suffered similar debilitating fates. Exhaustive archival research has unearthed detailed eyewitness accounts of the battles that raged on the Eastern front. Major primary sources are deposited in the Feldakten and Nachlaß (private donation) collections of the Vienna War Archives, others in the Budapest War Archives. These archival documents, many written in Kurrentschrift, oftentimes contradict the official Austrian historiography on World War I, Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg.2
Of particular importance to this study is the extensive manuscript collection of the Vienna War Archives. Several manuscripts detail the events of key participants in the Carpathian Winter War, including those of the South Army, a combined Austro-Hungarian and German entity deployed to support the buckling Habsburg front lines. The conditions encountered by Hungarian troops, particularly Group Szurmay, are recorded and housed in the Budapest War Archives.3 Interestingly enough, the personal diaries, telegrams, and other communiqués of commanders situated a safe distance from the front at Habsburg Supreme Headquarters offer a diverse account of Carpathian Winter War events. The daily logbooks (Tagebücher) of Conrad von Hötzendorf’s personal adjutant, Rudolf Kundmann, are particularly enlightening, as are those of Colonel Karl Schneller, section head of the “I” (Italian) Group in the General Staff.4
Personal accounts of participants in this tragic chapter of World War I history offer additional relevant source materials. A detailed chronicle by Kralowetz von Hohenrecht Gottlieb, chief of staff of the Habsburg Third Army X Corps, describes the hardships the corps encountered. The corps, one of the main offensive units deployed in all three Carpathian campaigns, was ill-prepared for the winter weather and terrain conditions. Habsburg Colonel Georg Veith, another key witness, describes in gut-wrenching detail the adversity his men encountered battling the Russian armies in the Carpathian hellhole. Veith is cited in numerous important sources, including the Austrian official history of the world war.
Before World War I, potential battle zones were classified as either a Manoverierzone, suitable for conducting a war of maneuver using mass a
rmies, or a Durchzugzone, through which armies would march to reach the major battle site, but not conducive for a major military operation. Though Russian, Habsburg, and German military strategists designated the Carpathian region a pass-through zone, the territory would provide the setting for the largest confrontation in the world war to date, and one of the largest in modern warfare. Hundreds of thousands of Habsburg infantry were subjected to extreme deprivation in their simultaneous struggle against overpowering Russian forces and the harsh winter mountain environment. Blizzard conditions alternated with periods of thaw, wreaking havoc on military and supply operations. The challenge to provide the front lines with a steady stream of food, supplies, ammunition, and artillery proved insurmountable.
The defense of Galicia presented a special challenge for the Dual Monarchy’s military. The Galician province extended beyond the Carpathian Mountains, and its northern and eastern frontiers were indefensible. Though three major rivers traversed the province, the Dniester, the Moldova, and the Ceremuş, none provided an effective defensive barrier. Thus, invading forces could attack from three directions. The extremely limited road and rail access to inner Austria posed another major problem in securing the monarchy. Entrée to the region required navigating five major Carpathian passes, a time-consuming undertaking.
In winter 1915, moving troops and supplies into the Carpathian Mountains proved a serious challenge, one that Habsburg Supreme Command failed to overcome during the Carpathian campaign. Roads that were easy to traverse in the summer months required several hours, often days, to navigate in winter. However, of all the Habsburg military’s missteps, its blind adherence to the short war dogma is perhaps most noteworthy. Despite indications to the contrary, Habsburg Supreme Command remained in a state of denial. The conflict would not endure; therefore, making provisions for a winter battle was superfluous. Conrad’s decision to launch a major military operation in the densely wooded mountain region in the winter of 1915 seemed even more far-fetched. Habsburg shortsightedness and Conrad von Hötzendorf’s determination to conduct a major offensive in a pass-through zone cost hundreds of thousands of k.u.k. (kaiserlich und königlich, “imperial and royal”) soldiers their lives. In the three months spanning the Carpathian Winter War, Habsburg Supreme Command deployed infantry masses into the mountainous theater with no provision for winter uniforms or suitable equipment. The men’s boots, with soles constructed of cardboard, quickly disintegrated in the wet and snowy conditions. The more fortunate received winter clothing from home. Icy mountain slopes caused many to lose their footing—and their lives—slipping into the path of Russian sniper fire. Contrary to official Austro-Hungarian military reports, the majority of Carpathian war casualties were not related to combat. Hundreds of thousands of Habsburg troops fell victim to der Weisse Tod (the White Death) lying in the open in subfreezing temperatures with no shelter. How could soldiers, deployed in a region where timber was plentiful, freeze to death? The answer lies in Habsburg Supreme Command’s stubborn refusal to acknowledge the possibility that the war would extend into the winter months. Conrad’s troops were sent to the Carpathian war theater without the most rudimentary winter provisions, including warm clothes, winter boots, and saws with which to fell trees for firewood.
All three Habsburg offensives relied heavily on the element of surprise—a factor all too often compromised by poor weather and terrain conditions, which gave the Russians ample time to initiate countermeasures. Conrad’s armies became easy targets for czarist troops situated on well-fortified positions on dominating terrain in late December 1914 and early January 1915. The Habsburg attackers were forced to strike uphill amid a volley of Russian gunfire. Moreover, czarist troops were better acclimated to the cold and adept at exploiting the winter weather conditions to their advantage, oftentimes attacking unsuspecting Habsburg troops during a snowstorm.
The Carpathian Mountain range, stretching in an arc from the Czech Republic in the northwest to Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Ukraine, and Romania in the east and Serbia in the south, evokes legendary tales of werewolves and vampires, particularly the region of Transylvania. For participants in the Carpathian Winter War, life in the mountains became a terrifying ordeal, particularly at night. Wolves howled, wind whistled through the trees, and ominous shadows rattled the nerves of the most daring souls. While lying in the open with no shelter during the long winter nights, soldiers’ fears of an enemy ambush intensified. Survival required the utmost physical and mental fortitude. In many respects, survival meant leaving the civilized world behind and relying on primal instinct. Veterans of the Carpathian Winter War later recalled feeling surrounded by death and a lingering sense of impending doom. Many were unable to cope and committed suicide.
Mountain warfare as characterized by the Carpathian winter offensives produced a combat experience vastly different from the trench warfare of the west. Heavy rainfall and blinding snowstorms left little time for rest or relaxation. Discomfort became the order of the day as troops became susceptible to lung disease, exposure, hypothermia, and frostbite. Snow, ice, and the rugged mountain terrain made large-scale troop movement difficult. The Carpathian Mountain terrain, which was considered unsuitable for large unit warfare even in the summer months, complicated military operations and supply efforts, and it placed increased physical demands and risks on the soldiers. The physically demanding daily routine of maintaining roads and reconstructing positions damaged by enemy action left Habsburg troops physically and morally weakened.
Readers of this investigation will note the frequent depiction of Habsburg troops as utterly exhausted and increasingly apathetic. At the risk of sounding repetitive, the mental and physical condition of Habsburg troops is critical to understanding the Carpathian Winter War. The exhaustion experienced in combat under winter conditions is incomprehensible to those who have not suffered under such circumstances. Reading the daily logbooks of Habsburg units participating in the Carpathian Winter War, one would be hard-pressed to find an entry that did not include the words ganz erschöpft (“utterly exhausted”). The men’s physical and mental exhaustion was exacerbated by hunger. Food supplies often did not reach the front, and those that did were often frozen solid. The men began to hallucinate about food, driving them to near insanity. In the winter of 1915, not only did Habsburg Supreme Command decide to deploy massive armies into a region unfit for a major combat operation, but also, it did so with no provision for the most basic of necessities—food, clothing, and shelter.
Combat exhaustion became even more widespread when a shortage of reinforcements forced soldiers to man the front lines for months at a time with no rehabilitation. Such was the fate of hundreds of thousands of Austro-Hungarian soldiers in the Carpathian winter campaign. Few conflicts, including World War I and World War II, have recorded such debilitating experiences. As a recent study on the psychological effects of war explains, “in war there’s perhaps no general condition that is more likely to produce a large crop of nervous and mental disorders.”5
The cumulative effects of exhaustion, hunger, and combat on a soldier are multifold. One is the physiological effect of battle stress on the human body. Sleep deprivation and too little food compound the effect, which natural elements, including rain, snow, cold, and the dark of night, then exacerbate. These factors in combination create “a state of prolonged and great fatigue.”6 Combat-induced stress causes the nervous system to alter its inner survival instinct. Bodily functions are similarly affected, often after the fighting has ended and the soldiers become weary.7 During combat, soldiers’ emotions rise and fall in dramatic sequence. That the soldiers could not escape their fate or overcome the violence during fighting periods pushed them into states of profound emotional and physical exhaustion. The men often drew inside themselves, finding it extremely difficult to communicate with anyone who had not suffered the same experience. Soldiers in this state usually collapsed as a result of nervous exhaustion.
The profound lack of sleep produced further psy
chological damage. The lack of food, or the few unappetizing rations, compounded their mental injuries and had a tremendous impact on the troops’ effectiveness in battle. In combat, soldiers were at the mercy of the weather, which caused further torment. The worst conditions were experienced during winter months. Weary soldiers spent the long winter nights struggling to stay awake to avoid frostbite or freezing to death. Emotional fatigue set in, compounded by the impact of the elements and the lack of food and sleep. Compasses malfunctioned, leading units, some as large as regiments, to march blindly in circles in dense woods during blizzards. Water jackets froze, leading machine guns to misfire or fail to fire. The troops often had to resort to warming their rifles over fires so the weapons functioned properly.
Sadly, much of the pain and suffering experienced by k.u.k. troops during the Carpathian Winter War could have been reduced, if not avoided, had Habsburg Supreme Command made provisions for the conflict enduring into winter. Command’s blind faith in offensive doctrine obscured the need for any serious training in defensive warfare. For the Carpathian Winter War, this signified that no precautionary measures were initiated or retreat plans determined until much too late. Most importantly for the planned major offensive actions, Habsburg Supreme Command failed to adequately consider the inherent terrain limitations, which restricted freedom of movement and logistical support for large troop formations. Unfortunately, except the November and December 1914 mountain campaigns, no practical experiences existed to study or review in preparation for the campaign. A fateful cynicism grew among the soldiers who were compelled to suffer the consequences of their leaders’ shortsightedness.
What, then, drew Habsburg Supreme Command to the Carpathian Mountain region? A garrison of 120,000 men in Fortress Przemyśl was under siege by Russian troops and in danger of surrendering. Time was of the essence, and the Carpathian Mountains offered the shortest route to the beleaguered fortress. Conrad von Hötzendorf convinced the Habsburg military leadership to launch a major offensive before the terrible summer and fall campaign losses had been replaced. The San River fortress became a metaphor for the very existence of the Dual Monarchy and a driving influence over Habsburg military strategy on the Eastern front.