Blood on the Snow

by Graydon A Tunstall

  Any Third Army chance of reconquering the Mezölaborcz–Lupkov area disappeared when the enemy unexpectedly launched a general offensive against the army, again battering X Corps. If Third Army had no chance of regaining the crucial Mezölaborcz area, it served no purpose to launch a Second Army attack because it would invite swift enemy retaliation before Habsburg reinforcements could intervene in the battle. General Boroević informed Böhm-Ermolli on 20 February that he thought it doubtful that his forces could reach Mezölaborcz, partly because of the impassable conditions on the sole connecting road, whose side arteries had deteriorated so badly that his army could not launch its assault because it could not be resupplied. This upset Second Army command because Boroević’s effort was vital for achieving military success.40

  Böhm-Ermolli favored postponing the offensive until better weather conditions prevailed.41 However, General Conrad, cognizant of Fortress Przemyśl’s deteriorating situation, demanded that the offensive be launched without delay. Realizing that a Third Army attack was no longer feasible, he proposed to launch a left flank attack toward Chrysczczata to seize the railroad stretch north of Lupkov to threaten Russian rear echelon formations and force a czarist retreat. Unfavorable conditions continued on 21 February, as Second Army accelerated preparations for its offensive and XIX Corps commenced its advance.42

  Second Army logbook entries revealed that on 21 February, Field Cannon Regiment 24’s movement into the mountain terrain was hampered by the poor condition of the overused roads. XVIII Corps requested modern 15-centimeter howitzers or 10-centimeter cannons to counter the effects of “superior” enemy artillery, but, as with so many such requests for additional artillery units, they fell on deaf ears. The corps logbook also revealed that five artillery batteries and several major supply train sections remained below the mountain ridges.43 Multiple corps logbooks continued to record complaints about the lack of sufficient artillery.

  Excerpts from a X Corps manuscript in the Vienna War Archives provide a glimpse into the events leading up to the second Carpathian offensive. The author, the chief of staff of the Corps, wrote: “It is always the same events. In the beginning there is an attitude of ‘hurray!’ Then neighboring units balk, followed by the inevitable reversals, retreats and rehabilitation, demoralizing the neighboring units.”44 Meanwhile, the offensive timetable adjusted to coincide with the arrival of the IV Corps’ 32nd Infantry Division into the area of Cisna (anticipated on 26 February), and in transit 27th and 32nd Infantry Divisions. On 23 February impassable conditions continued to plague the single supply route.45

  A V Corps report complained about the inferior training and moral worth of arriving replacement troops—thus their limited battle worthiness.46 Böhm-Ermolli, like Boroević, insisted that replacement troops fill the widening gaps in the lines because of excessive losses.47 Third Army X Corps repelled renewed enemy breakthrough attempts in the blood-soaked Laborcz Valley.48 Inclement weather conditions continued to frustrate Habsburg military efforts. Along the supply route, rising floodwaters threatened to wash out bridges, and the important Cisna road had become a vast expanse of mud. Close to half a kilometer of the route had been washed away; keeping supply lines functioning continued to be a futile effort.49

  On 22 February, Attack Group Tersztyánsky received orders emphasizing that its achieving success was essential relative to Fortress Przemyśl.50 The five-division XIX Corps (27th, 29th, 34th, 41st, and 43rd Infantry Divisions) transferred to General Tersztyánsky’s command. As the offensive launch date fluctuated because of the horrendous overall conditions, the Russians remained ensconced in their strong defensive positions, posing a serious threat to the area of Wola Michova, which, if compromised, could cripple Second Army efforts.51

  The lack of rifles attained crisis proportions as wounded soldiers abandoned their weapons on the battlefield. Emergency measures became necessary to conserve arms as IX March Brigade troops could not dispatch to the front before May because of the weapon shortage. Rifle training was often performed with wooden staffs, with actual weapons issued just before dispatch to the front. Wounded soldiers were ordered to retain their weapons, but many rifles disappeared on the way to the medical aid stations.52

  Third Army command announced that its inadequate troop stands and the debilitated state of its men rendered them incapable of performing their ambitious missions. The 1914 Habsburg Imperial and Royal Army had long since perished on the battlefields of Lemberg, Ivangorod, Limanova-Lapanov, Serbia, and now the Carpathian Mountains. By early 1915 most front-line troops consisted of either older Landsturm or younger drafted soldiers. Possessing only the most rudimentary training, many conscripts soon met their fate. The escalating number of unseasoned soldiers in the front lines also catapulted the nationality problem into the foreground, threatening the cohesiveness of Habsburg fighting forces. Antidynastic and antimilitary propaganda spread through reserve officers, Czechs in particular.

  A XVII Corps report depicted poorly executed marches that created serious delays in schedules. Many units, particularly March battalions, proved incapable of performing the demanding treks to the front. Rehabilitation of XIX Corps’ 43rd Infantry Division had become a necessity.53 Relative to the inadequate communication, telegrams arrived up to six hours after dispatch. Deciphering them lost further precious time.54 The overexertion and undernourishment of pack animals further hampered transporting artillery over mountainous terrain, which remained ice-covered and slippery.

  Only heavy-caliber guns could penetrate the well-dug-in Russian emplacements, so numerous batteries were ordered forward as fast as possible. Key road stretches continued to pose serious problems for efficient traffic flow. Some batteries arrived by 26 February, but too late to support the initial offensive action. In preoffensive planning, artillery preparation and gun emplacements had been scheduled for 25 February, with all batteries placed into firing position by the night of 26 February. Supporting barrages would begin at daybreak on 27 February when the offensive commenced.55

  Arriving at the front just thirty-six hours before the operation, Attack Group Commander Tersztyánsky witnessed the supply roads’ wretched conditions. Multiple supply train wagons were stuck in the mud; horse carcasses littered the long road. Thousands of exhausted laborers worked feverishly to maintain the ravaged roadway.56 Many improvised methods were utilized in an effort to improve the dire situation.

  The following day, a mixture of rain and snow further inundated the valleys. Sections of the Cisna roadway remained eroded or washed away. At one location, one and a half kilometers of roadway had been destroyed.57 Multiple dispatches emphasized the critical supply situation. Meanwhile, the final offensive disposition was issued on 24 February. XIX Corps must attack toward Lupkov on 26 February, while the major Baligrod roads operation would commence on 27 February.58

  On 23 February, Third Army issued directives that X Corps’ 24th Infantry Division advance toward Mezölaborcz while its right flank units maintained liaison with Second Army’s left flank 34th Infantry Division advancing toward Lupkov. Group Krautwald (X Corps, 2nd, 21st, and 45th Infantry Divisions), would attack on 25 February in the Laborcz Valley. Group Joseph (VII Corps) would advance while Group Kritek (11th Infantry Division and Group Berndt cavalry forces) and III Corps maintained their present positions.59

  The Second Army numbered 99,852 rifles while anticipating the arrival of replacement formations within a few days. Its troops’ physical condition, however, had deteriorated. Three times the number of veteran troops reported to sick call as just-arrived soldiers. Army health reports indicated the preponderance of bronchial and intestinal illness and frostbite cases.60

  General Tersztyánsky’s orders for the campaign provide an interesting insight into the mounting pressure to launch the offensive.61 The urgency of liberating Fortress Przemyśl remained paramount, but the increasing threat of Italian intervention also demanded a rapid military victory over the Russians. Urged on by the battle cry “Free Przemyśl!” and
unrelenting Habsburg Supreme Command pressure, the troops were driven to the limit of physical and mental endurance even before the campaign commenced. A swift offensive stroke must prevent the enemy from transferring reinforcements to the battlefront, while a Fortress Przemyśl report estimated that the fortress’s food stores would last until 12 March, increasing the urgency for its immediate rescue.62

  In addition, the surrender of Fortress Przemyśl would free Russian siege troops for transfer to the teetering Carpathian front, as well as representing a major military defeat. Numerous documents from the last two weeks of February 1915 emphasized that a military action must begin before the onset of the spring rainy season. The fortress remained 100 kilometers away, which explains initiating the offensive before assembly of the entire attack group had been completed. The northern Third Army front consisted of only 21,300 troops, of which 8,600 protected the vital Wola Michova area. Fresh troops, 9,400 in all, stretched across a twenty-kilometer front. Two in-transit divisions would reinforce these insufficient numbers.63

  With the offensive launch date rapidly approaching, General Staff Railroad Bureau officials’ priority was to transport the five infantry divisions designated to reinforce the main offensive group while facing the typical problems associated with maintaining a regular supply movement. The five divisions (13th, 27th, 31st, 32nd, and 38th Infantry Divisions), however, did not reach their deployment areas in time to participate in the operation. As the 13th and 38th Infantry Divisions detrained in their staging area, 32nd Infantry Division vanguard units began arriving while 27th Infantry Division remained in rail transit, with the 31st Infantry Division also arriving into its rear echelon area.64 To compound preoffensive difficulties, the arrival of these divisions in the army’s rear echelons created chaos. Meanwhile, intelligence reports indicated that significant enemy troop concentrations had deployed at the extreme Second Army left flank positions, while Pflanzer-Baltin reported that his group also encountered large enemy formations.

  Weather conditions continued to delay offensive preparations, which were already two days behind the original scheduled jump-off. An additional meter of snow fell on high terrain.65 Thus, launching the offensive on 24, 25, or 26 February proved impractical. These difficulties would have made any offensive attempt at that time a catastrophic sacrifice. A lack of engineering technical crews had a negative effect, and after fourteen days of deplorable road conditions, transport difficulties only worsened. An unimaginable number of horses collapsed from sheer exhaustion and starvation because hay supplies had been depleted; oats would soon follow.

  The abominable conditions caused traffic directed toward the Takcsany depot to grind to a halt. The critical roadway segment between two villages remained impassable to the frontier ridges for days at a time, and the route to Cisna was barely usable. Combat troops had to transport ammunition and provisions. The offensive’s success depended on regular traffic flow on the Takcsany–Baligrod roads.66 Flooding and concomitant bridge damage continued to negatively affect operations in the Ondava and Laborcz valleys. Material preparations for the offensive were described as “downright pitiful.”67

  Emergency requests were repeatedly dispatched for additional labor detachments, partly to relieve exhausted work crews who worked ten- to twelve-hour days and often late into the night close to the front area.68 Fatigue had long been the norm for such workers, causing a corresponding decline in health and physical conditions. Daily status reports indicated an average of 40 to 50 incapacitated men from a total of 320. Thousands of civilian workers and prisoners of war worked in nonendangered areas.69

  A 24 February Takcsany Expositor report emphasized the impassable supply roads in a critical area for the offensive. In addition, IV Corps’ 32nd Infantry Division vanguard train columns had been halted since 8:00 a.m. A forty-eight-hour pause must be granted to restore supply routes and service in the most deplorable state. During this two-day period, roads must remain closed to allow the emergency repair services.70 Thus, combat units had to improvise ammunition and food supply transport.

  Meanwhile, along the critical road stretch Takcsany–Nagypolany, the late-arriving 32nd Infantry Division supply train personnel toiled to keep that section open.71 A report indicated that some improvements had been accomplished along the vital supply routes, which caused Conrad to urge launching the offensive as soon as possible. Attack Group Commander Tersztyánsky, however, insisted on testing his repaired supply apparatus for an additional day because of the recent supply difficulties and availability of a mere three-day accumulation of supplies.72

  On 25 February, as the designated attack formations fine-tuned final adjustments for their mission, they still lacked three infantry divisions. Just the 13th, 31st, and 32nd Infantry Division vanguard units were available. XVII Corps’ 45th Infantry Division’s delay resulted from march difficulties.73 At this optimal point, General Böhm-Ermolli discovered the absence of sufficient artillery battery emplacements for a successful offensive. At the last moment, he demanded that additional units be transported forward, particularly to the army’s western flank positions. Thus, on 26 February several batteries were ordered to advance to Cisna by 1 and 2 March, but multiple batteries remained idle while a shell shortage persisted at the front.74 Because heavy howitzer batteries remained in rear echelon areas, enemy artillery dominated the battlefield, and the solid czarist positions remained untouched.75 Units had to continue to utilize their own means to transport ammunition supplies to their front.76

  All activity on the major offensive supply thoroughfare ceased from 1800 hours on 26 February to 1800 hours the next day. Thus, when the roads could again handle two-way traffic on 27 February, the Second Army offensive was ordered to commence.77 Meanwhile, on 26 February Third Army Commander Boroević announced that its attack must be delayed, and thus the main endeavor was rescheduled for 28 February. On 27 February, Third Army would demonstrate along its front. X and VII Corps with a XVII Corps division would launch an attack. Army reports indicated that 66 percent of the army’s manpower and 75 percent of its horses remained without cover.78 South Army launched a corps-size (XXIV) enveloping attack against strong opposing enemy positions, and the Fourth Army prepared to initiate a right flank advance.79

  Also on 26 February, General Tersztyánsky assumed command of the XIX and XVIII Corps deployed in the Second Army right flank area at the Solinka River. A Third Army advance along the Beskid and Magura ridges would have assisted Second Army left flank unit efforts to regain the Lupkov railroad line. The five-division XIX Corps must seize the heights of the narrow Dzial ridges and Beskid Mountain crest,80 with its initial efforts requiring close cooperation with Third Army X Corps. However, little consideration was given to the fact that X Corps remained in a weakened condition. Its 2nd Infantry Division numbered 1,778 men, and 24th Infantry Division, 2,884 troops; thus, the two equaled one third of a full-stand division.81

  Ultimately, Second Army’s offensive failed because it lacked sufficient numbers to assure success, although on 25 and 26 February March Brigade replacement formations arrived, and half of the scheduled VII March Battalions was scheduled to arrive on 1 March.82 The final offensive grouping would be completed when much of the 27th Infantry Division and a portion of the 32nd and 43rd Infantry Divisions moved into the front lines. Contingents from the 13th and 31st divisions arrived after multiple rail delays. Their remaining units would arrive with the remainder of the 27th Infantry Division on 1 March.83

  Conrad pressured Fourth Army to launch an attack to relieve pressure on the Third Army northern flank. But Fourth Army staff argued against striking in the Gorlice area because the troops would encounter strong czarist fortified positions and sustain enormous casualties.84 Then, during the next two weeks, the Russians launched forays into the sensitive inner flank area of Third and Fourth Army, which smashed those defensive lines until they almost collapsed.

  Both Second and Fourth Army commanders attempted to convince Conrad to transfer reinforceme
nts to Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s front to supplement his heretofore successful campaign, thus transferring the onus to achieve success to him. Conrad responded that the Army Group could neither be reinforced nor advance quickly enough. In addition, the Russians continued to reinforce their vulnerable flank area against the army group, threatening its continued progress.

  On 27 February a weak six-division assault force commenced its difficult mission. However, the return of warm temperatures again transformed the single available supply line into a sea of mud, hampering normal supply efforts, and Second Army soon encountered strong enemy resistance. Various units became separated in wooded valleys and along mountain slopes, resulting in numerous uncoordinated and isolated battles. The terrain’s narrow roadways hampered operational movement. Repeated orders to press the attack despite the overwhelming obstacles indicated Fortress Przemyśl’s pervasive influence on field operations. Pressure to liberate the fortress shaped General Conrad’s military planning until its surrender on 22 March 1915. He calculated that his momentary numerical superiority, the first in any major Habsburg campaign, countered thirty and a half czarist divisions. Russian numbers gradually increased until they equaled, then surpassed, Second Army troop stands.

  Corps (adjacent to XIX Corps) undertook efforts to improve its positions. V Corps launched short assaults, while a detachment prepared to cross the swollen San River. They soon encountered strong enemy positions protected by several rows of barbed wire. The weakened VII Corps’ 20th Honvéd Infantry Division, with 5,000 reinforcements, would attack. Group Szurmay (the Army’s extreme right flank) must “unconditionally hold its lines.”85