Blood on the Snow

by Graydon A Tunstall

  While Second Army XIX and Corps Schmidt continued their offensive efforts on 3 March, the enemy struck the key position at Elevation 906 multiple times from three directions. All Second Army troops had been deployed, but the army had lost its numerical advantage. At its decisive left flank, 13,000 troops battled 21,000 to 28,000 fresh enemy troops. The Second Army had bled (and frozen) white.117

  The weather remained a major factor.118 Front-line troops had long recognized the futility of continuing the bloody effort. The following quote summarizes the feeling of innumerable officers concerning the offensive:

  The operation in East Galicia appears to have begun again without sufficient forces. Why can’t we strike the Russians as Hindenburg did (overpower them right away at the onset) so they are given no time to reinforce and dig in. . . . What was needed most was not false geniuses, but simply well trained officers with human relations skills and good judgment—where are they?119

  With the arrival of the 31st Infantry Division, Attack Group Tersztyánsky numbered 75,000 troops deployed on a thirty-four-kilometer front extending from the Beskids to the Solinka River. Nevertheless, no major Habsburg gains occurred once the Russians launched their fierce counterattacks along the Baligrod roads. On 3 March, the attack group nevertheless persevered in its attack efforts. In a clever tactical maneuver, czarist troops utilized the dense fog cover and a driving snowstorm to attack the 41st Honvéd Infantry Division (XIX Corps) at Manilova, but the division repulsed twenty-four enemy assaults. The 29th Infantry Division launched an uncoordinated attack, but extreme weather conditions soon halted an attempted flank advance. Having to cooperate with the 41st Honvéd Infantry Division robbed the division of freedom of movement north of the Oslava River. Overpowering czarist fire halted an eight-battalion assault against Elevation 704. The division commander recorded that this was another example of attempting to launch a coordinated thrust, but “too many cooks spoiled the soup.”120 The increasing number of Russian prisoners of war confirmed the enemy’s continuing rapid transfer of significant reinforcements for their repeated counterattacks. Habsburg XVIII Corps failed to penetrate enemy lines and thus retreated, but the corps mission remained to bind enough enemy forces to assist Second Army offensive efforts.121

  The Carpathian campaign was vicious; the struggle to conquer the Manilova heights proved no exception. An eyewitness account related that a Honvéd infantry regiment received an order to seize Manilova’s key heights. Forty officers and 2,038 men with ten machine guns launched a surprise attack to seize the treacherous, steep slopes in a region heavily forested and shrouded with deep snow, retarding movement. Honvéd soldiers advanced to within 600 to 800 paces of enemy positions, to be halted by furious defensive gunfire. Once the soldiers overcame the initial shock, they advanced again. Because the Russians aimed their rifles too high, casualty numbers remained inconsequential. Four machine guns were inserted into the first infantry line to take enemy positions under fire.

  The well-entrenched enemy received reinforcements as two separate Hungarian groups launched an attack. One group traversed a huge gorge to attack, while the other crossed steep and forested terrain. Fallen trees retarded the advance. When Honvéd troops came to within 300 paces of the main enemy positions, they encountered heavy defensive fire. However, the wooded terrain and deep snow camouflaged the attacking soldiers and again kept casualties to a minimum. The troops were difficult to observe when they advanced in a crouching position. The assault halted twenty paces from the main enemy lines as a result of enemy infantry fire and the attackers’ physical exhaustion. When the fighting recommenced, it turned brutal. Russian soldiers refused to surrender even when Honvéd troops broke into their lines. The Honvéd order of the day emphasized that they must show no mercy and take no prisoners, which produced desperate battle. No orders could be dispatched in the melee; hand-to-hand combat determined the outcome. The enemy finally retreated from its main positions but then unleashed its customary counterattack against the most threatened Honvéd flank when they failed to solidify their newly captured positions. Nevertheless, the victors successfully warded off enemy attacks—but the situation remained critical. The Russians attempted to recapture Manilova at any cost, while the Honvéd troops could not continue their attack because of severe casualties and lack of reserves. Ammunition resupply occurred at night, and the wounded evacuated and new defensive positions prepared. A renewed Russian attack hurled the defenders out of their positions, followed by a general attack that surrounded the Honvéd positions. Bayonets halted the massed czarist troops during a heavy snowstorm. In the early morning, the enemy launched a partial attack that was repulsed.

  Surviving soldiers performing reconnaissance missions encountered a horrific sight: mounds of fallen comrades blanketed the terrain. The troops had to remain on constant alert because enemy movement was observed. On 2 March, both sides attacked almost simultaneously, the Russians in mass formations. Both sides established well-positioned machine gun emplacements during the night, which produced enormous casualties. The Honvéd troops initially maintained their positions, although they sacrificed most of their officers—only three of forty survived the battle. Without sufficient leadership, the Magyar troops retreated, crushed by overwhelming czarist numbers. All available reserves hurled into battle could not halt the Russians. The Honvéd regiment suffered 939 dead and 430 wounded, including the officers. Prisoners of war stated that Russian Infantry Regiment 137 had been almost destroyed, and Regiments 49 and 50 had sustained such heavy losses that they had to be withdrawn from the front lines. Two additional regiments also sustained heavy casualties. The Honvéd postcombat battle report emphasized that determined, well-trained soldiers could attack and defeat a larger enemy force.

  Elsewhere, Third Army X Corps continued fighting through the evening of 3 to 4 March to repulse alternating czarist counterattacks and storm attacks. The VII Corps, ensconced at close range to czarist forward lines, was ordered to continue its attack, but it lacked sufficient troop numbers. Only major reinforcements could sustain the attack.122

  Further orders to continue the offensive were dispatched, as Conrad harangued his troops to exceed the small gains achieved because of the increasing time pressure relative to Fortress Przemyśl. Despite Herculean efforts and human sacrifice by many units, Second Army could not achieve significant progress. Because of the circumstances, Böhm-Ermolli requested that the attack be postponed until 5 March. Conrad, however, replied that the deteriorating Fortress Przemyśl situation allowed no delay in further action.

  Meanwhile, South Army had to advance either to shift direction or intervene in Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s battle. Heavy snowfall continued to create difficult conditions for the army.123 Conrad considered Pflanzer-Baltin’s recent retreat at Stanislau a tactical error. The group’s mission, while still awaiting XI Corps’ arrival, remained to bind enemy forces and assist South Army efforts by providing flank protection. It must also secure the Dniester River right flank area and prevent a czarist advance into Transylvania, but two meters of snow made it all but impossible to advance. Too few exhausted soldiers covered a vast frontage. A unit logbook entry explains, “The men simply remain lying down,” and the enemy could easily break through the “spider web”–thin lines.124 XIII Corps numbers dropped from 20,000 to 1,453 soldiers. The 42nd Honvéd Infantry Division provides examples: Infantry Regiment 26 had 178 troops available, and the 16th Infantry Brigade numbers sank from 1,900 to 500 men.125 Further north, Third Army right flank forces must advance. A Fourth Army southern flank four-division assault force would attack toward Jaslo, while other units attempted to relieve enemy pressure on the Third Army northern flank.126 Third Army left flank units must prevent enemy intervention against Fourth Army’s efforts to seize the high ground at Gorlice, while in turn, Fourth Army must divert enemy troops from the Second Army front. On the southern portion of the German Northwest front, Habsburg First Army and German Army Group Woyrsch must prevent any significant czarist
transferal of troops to the Second Army front.

  General Conrad calculated that Fortress Przemyśl’s garrison numbered 125,000 troops, of which 60,000 consisted of combat troops. Thirty-five thousand could launch a breakout attempt against the estimated siege army of two infantry, two cavalry, and various Reichswehr (third-line) divisions ensconced in multiple strong siege lines. Some czarist troops reportedly had been transferred to the Carpathian front to counter Habsburg operations. A fortress breakout attempt would coincide with Second Army offensive efforts, its details determined by Second Army progress. Even if Second Army efforts failed, the sortie must be launched, while a separate garrison force must destroy the citadel’s works, defensive positions, and weaponry.127

  The Habsburg military crisis persisted. Garrison provisions should now last until 19 March, adding a few days to earlier estimates. Seemingly disregarding the multitude of adverse conditions, General Conrad continued to expect more of his battle-weary troops. He intended to divert czarist attention from the middle Carpathian Mountain region to Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s front south of the Dniester River.

  On 4 March General Tersztyánsky renewed his offensive efforts after deploying the late-arriving 13th Infantry Division between the 27th and 31st divisions. Although the division was decimated rapidly, its action enabled Corps Schmidt to attack Manilova again. XIX and Corps Schmidt continued their efforts, while X and VII Corps regrouped in preparation for a further advance on 5 March.128 V Corps and Group Szurmay continued attempts at the San River, but the bitter cold and new meter-deep snow continued to create poor visibility conditions, halting fighting because it proved impossible to advance.129 Activity had to be suspended except for patrolling and shoveling paths to deliver ammunition, food, and replacement troops. The XVIII Corps, whose earlier supporting endeavors had failed, joined the San River undertaking.

  On the Third Army front, X Corps continued to bear the brunt of fierce enemy attacks. Despite recent devastating losses, VII Corps was ordered to launch decisive attacks, which faltered because of czarist counter efforts, although all available troops had been inserted into the front lines. As a result of its losses, VII Corps had to rehabilitate its troops while simultaneously defending its positions. Fighting continued at close range to enemy lines, while the persistent blizzard conditions assured that the infantry received no artillery support. Group Szurmay troops sustained further substantial losses as a result of frostbite. The perpetual battlefield setbacks and concomitant heavy losses unnerved Third Army troops. VII and X Corps commanders realized that any attack against the strong enemy positions had little chance of success.130

  Further examples of the substantial casualties abound: X Corps’ 45th Infantry Division had 1,500 men, and Infantry Regiment 89 lost 1,200 between 28 February and 4 March. By 5 March, VII Corps had suffered 60 percent losses. At the San River front, V Corps surrendered terrain because of casualties and enemy numbers. On 6 March, accompanied by extreme weather change, casualties skyrocketed, and exhaustion and apathy became pervasive.131

  Archduke Joseph, VII Corps Commander, commented:

  General Boroević ordered the offensive continued “energetically.” . . . Over the last two days, my Honvéd Division suffered terrible losses; its effective force numbers less than 2,000 . . . and tomorrow, despite the casualties, we have to attack again. My corps losses since 1 March: 12 officers, 1,121 men killed, 46 officers and 2,121 men wounded, 2 officers and 685 men missing. This is really terrible.

  Further:

  The attack . . . was halted by the enemy’s horrific infantry and machine gun fire close to the Russian trenches, and collapsed with horrible losses . . . my artillery had to remain silent because there was wild hand-to-hand fighting in the forest. . . . My medical corpsmen were shot by the Russians as they ventured close to the wounded . . . of my own volition, I ordered that we remain in place. In the event we can advance, which is impossible under the circumstances . . . my right-flank neighbor was forced back. I could no longer take the responsibility for moving forward at such a high price of heavy losses, to make the X Corps’s offensive possible. . . . Yet the X Corps did not attack, but withdrew. . . . My right flank was undefended and hung in the air.

  We counted up to 1,500 of our own dead, and how many didn’t we find in the deep forest? The medical station treated 4000 wounded. If the Russians attack my completely exposed right flank, my brave corps . . . would be annihilated . . . during the last three days my losses were more than 60 percent! . . . my brave Infantry Regiment 46 lost more than 75 percent, and my Honvéd regiments lost 60 to 95 percent of last week’s effective forces. . . . After nightfall my 39. Infantry Regiment was attacked by the Russians with superior numbers! The entire brave regiment consisted of only 450 men and yet they forced back the Russian masses, which, shot to pieces just in front of our trenches, mostly collapsed.132

  Meanwhile, on 3 March General Ivanov informed Stavka that a powerful Austro-Hungarian–German effort launched toward Lisko–Sanok to relieve Fortress Przemyśl represented a dangerous attempt to unhinge czarist left flank positions and force the evacuation of Galicia. He insisted that halting the present Habsburg offensive could destroy his armies. His arguments convinced Stavka to assume the defensive on the German front because the main Russian offensive effort would now be launched on the czarist Southwest front. Ivanov’s forces would smash through the last Carpathian Mountain ridges and invade Hungary, as the Russian general had intended since October and November 1914. On 19 March, Ivanov directed his left flank units to attack toward Budapest and outflank the Central Power lines between Cracow–Posen–Thorn. Stavka’s decision also involved political considerations because the collapse of Hungary would signify the defeat of the Dual Monarchy. Pressure would be placed on Italy, which might react to the British Dardanelles operation to attempt to open the straits, which in turn could also influence Romania’s stance. Thus, on 20 March, czarist forces launched a series of short, powerful thrusts through the Carpathian valleys that continued into mid-April, when they finally ceased because of heavy casualties, troop exhaustion, and the adverse conditions. They also encountered more difficult supply conditions the further they progressed into the mountain imbroglio, reversing the earlier situation between the two opponents. Renewed heavy snowfall on 4 March brought a short period of relative calm to the Carpathian front.

  The failure of the early March Habsburg Carpathian offensive forced military and diplomatic leaders to reconsider Italy’s diplomatic and military position. Count Istvan Burian, Habsburg foreign minister since early January 1915, expressed growing concern over Italy’s ultimate intentions. Meanwhile, General Falkenhayn again urged that an offensive be launched against Serbia to provide ammunition supplies to the Turks, allies since November 1914. General Conrad maintained his position that no Habsburg troops could be spared from the Russian front, and that a Serbian campaign would provide Rome an excuse to go to war.133

  Before the 6 March Habsburg-renewed general offensive, no significant progress had been achieved after a week of effort. The critical element of surprise had again been compromised. Much time was squandered during the futile attempts to reinforce the threatened Cisna front. Constant interrupted heavy logistical traffic along the single supply roadway created sufficient delay, enabling the Russians to transfer reinforcements to counter any Habsburg offensive efforts.

  All Habsburg units reported significant losses resulting from sickness and frostbite. V Corps’ losses resulted from attempting to fulfill impossible multiple missions that included crossing the San River, binding enemy forces, and breaking through the enemy positions across the river. The corps suffered, as did so many others, from the combined effects of dwindling numbers and enemy numerical superiority.134 Second Army lost 40,000 soldiers to frostbite alone in the first five days of March.

  General Conrad dispatched a revealing letter to the emperor’s military chancellery on 5 March to justify the 6 March renewal of the stalled Second Army offensive effort.
Conrad reiterated that the Carpathian operation objective remained to liberate Fortress Przemyśl and drive the enemy from western and middle Galicia. Thus Second Army’s sixteen divisions had attacked along the shortest, most direct route to the fortress toward Sanok–Lisko–Chyróv. The nine-division Third Army’s mission had been to attack toward Krosno–Sanok, and Fourth Army’s four-division southern flank toward Jaslo–Zmigrod. South Army’s six and Pflanzer-Baltin’s six (later seven) divisions must assist South Army escape from its mountain entrapment. Conrad claimed that every available division had been hurled into the Carpathian hellhole—a serious exaggeration.135

  Conrad also raised the critical issue of neutral countries, especially Italy, because of the recent Habsburg battlefield failures. In addition, Fortress Przemyśl food stores reputedly would last until 23 March, adding four days to previous estimates. Thus, Conrad again reiterated that Rome’s territorial demands for continued neutrality did not have to be met at this time.136 He also criticized Germany’s persistent military and diplomatic pressure to accede to Rome’s demands for surrender of Habsburg territory. Denouncing his ally’s brutal egotism, Conrad suggested negotiating a separate peace treaty with Russia and insisted that Berlin must participate in any territorial sacrifice to Italy.

  He further urged that the “decisive” Carpathian military operation could still achieve a major victory. Herculean Habsburg efforts had failed (so far) because of fierce Russian resistance and the winter mountain weather conditions. Conrad lamented that previously victorious Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin had suffered a battlefield reversal, blaming the setback on South Army because it failed to attain its objectives after six weeks of battle. Second Army efforts terminated when they struck a solid, reinforced czarist defense line. Heavy frost and bitter cold continued at the front, and by 4 March, under mounting enemy pressure, Pflanzer-Baltin’s right flank units were forced to retreat. Fierce, inconclusive battle raged against four czarist cavalry divisions and one Schutzen (rifle) brigade until 13 March.137