During the night to 20 March, Russian artillery unleashed a powerful barrage against Third Army and attacked key positions using the weather to their advantage. Ethnic differences compounded the problem as replacement troops for XIX Corps’ 41st Honvéd and 29th Infantry Divisions did not assimilate easily. The threat of avalanches escalated; meanwhile, if snow continued to melt in the valleys, it threatened to uncover corpses, which would create a “terrible stink.”27
Austro-Hungarian officer casualties were highly disproportionate to those incurred by the other major World War I combatants. They categorized 48 percent as “missing and lost,” an extraordinarily high number, while the Germans listed only 16 percent and the Russians 25 percent. On the other hand, only 8.7 percent of Habsburg officers died, while Germany lost 16 to 18 percent and Russia 25 percent—another indication of Habsburg officers not fulfilling their duty in battle. Of the 19,296 Austro-Hungarian officer casualties sustained in 1914, three out of four officers killed, wounded, or missing were lieutenants, captains, or platoon and company commanders. Russian sharpshooters killed many, partly because they made such easy targets in the suicidal frontal assaults.28
A Habsburg artillery officer recorded that constant enemy harassment of nearby infantry troops denied them rest or rehabilitation; meanwhile, strong indications abounded of an imminent major enemy offensive. The infantry group commander ordered his soldiers to perform “busy work” to convince his superiors of “intense activity.” He depicted the situation at the front as “the calm before the storm.” The enemy apparently realized that it opposed a handful of ill, unsupported troops. The officer described Russian passivity as “eerie.”29
Although seven artillery batteries had been designated to support the V Corps undertaking, the number of guns proved far fewer. In one artillery battery, one gun was inoperable and three were damaged. The only effective artillery support emanated from neighboring Group Szurmay.30 However, the 20 March Russian general offensive that struck the Habsburg Third Army eliminated any possibility of rescuing the fortress. The Carpathian front remained in a state of constant flux between the 20 March czarist attack and mid-April 1915, as General Ivanov attempted to thrust through the Carpathian Mountains onto the Hungarian plains to end the war. Simultaneously, a major Russian assault struck Second Army in the crucial Lupkov Pass–Uzsok Pass areas.
The Russian attack resulted in the rapid seizure of key elevated terrain, which prevented V Corps Attack Group Lieb from gaining egress to its assigned attack area. Troops attempting to retake lost positions merely registered casualties and further delay. The enemy blow struck the XVII Corps and III Corps’ 22nd Infantry Division positions, while the strategic Laborcz Valley remained a major czarist objective. By 22 March, battle had extended to the VII Corps. When Third Army reported that it could not maintain its positions with its outnumbered troops, Fourth Army had to transfer troop units to the hard-pressed army.31
The czarist objective was to penetrate the Habsburg Second and Third Army fronts to capture positions that protected important approaches onto the Hungarian plains. The czarist onslaught again threatened the remaining Habsburg positions in the critical Laborcz Valley while striking the cornerstone of the two-army fronts, the inner flank positions along the dominating Beskid ridges. Throughout the last week of March, relentless enemy pressure forced the reeling Habsburg defenders back toward the Hungarian plains. The simultaneous pressure on both armies foiled the normal procedure of wrenching exhausted troops from one endangered front sector to assist another. The resulting marches over the treacherous mountain terrain merely increased the troops’ misery. Consequently, insufficient reinforcements reached the most threatened areas too late to make a difference. The enemy successes also threatened to disrupt the single supply route through Cisna to multiple Second Army corps.32
As Third Army commenced its retreat, enemy forces pummeled the III, VII, and X Corps in the Laborcz Valley. The Russians extended their attacks to the Fourth Army front. Despite sustaining enormous losses, the enemy attack momentum continued, bolstered by the arrival of further reinforcements. These Russian battlefield successes served as the background to the April 1915 Carpathian Easter Battle, General Ivanov’s last attempt to defeat the Austro-Hungarian Army and bring Italy and Romania into the war on the Entente side. The elevated terrain south of Mezölaborcz provided the setting for fierce battle in March 1915.
Serious enemy attention also shifted to the Second Army western flank positions adjacent to Third Army’s eastern area. Lacking reserve formations, Conrad considered transferring Second Army western flank forces to bolster the unstable neighboring Third Army front. This ignored the fact that neither army possessed sufficient troop numbers to close the threatening gap that now separated them. When General Ivanov extended his assault to the Second Army front, he concentrated on those weak inner army flanks to capture the main Beskid ridgelines running south of the Lupkov Pass, a major segment of the Habsburg front.
The czarist offensive also interrupted Conrad’s intention to reinforce Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin, as his attention again became riveted on the threatened Third and Second army fronts. Fortunately, the Russians failed to utilize their superior numbers in the wooded mountain terrain between the Lupkov and Uzsok passes. Had czarist troops captured the Homonna railroad junction, it would have unhinged flank positions on the Ondava River and precluded the recapture of the Mezölaborcz railroad junction, which was essential for any offensive effort to regain Fortress Przemyśl.
Map 9. Easter Battle, April 1915
General Tersztyánsky’s rapidly dwindling troop numbers and the renewed enemy attacks against the Baligrod front eliminated the possibility of transferring significant Second Army troop numbers to the threatened Third Army. Because of the increasing pressure on his own front, Tersztyánsky could transfer only 750 soldiers to the imperiled neighboring army.33 During the next few days, Second Army front began to crumble as V and XVIII Corps fronts disintegrated. These corps needed to force the encroaching enemy back across the San River, but when the Russians pierced those corps’ inner flank positions, it also eliminated any chance to rescue Fortress Przemyśl. The army had to recapture the surrendered terrain before they could again launch an attack toward the fortress.
Meanwhile, delayed preparations to launch V Corps’ ill-fated offensive effort continued. The folly of the proposed rescue mission became obvious—the attacking troops numbered only 33,000, enough to seize the initial objectives, but not to gain any significant territory or advantage.34 Also, V Corps command overestimated the protection against a surprise attack provided by its San River positions. Insufficient troop numbers existed merely to defend the overextended corps positions, and an icy snowstorm hindered troop movement. Exhausted, battle-weary troops comprised designated attack units, although they were no longer suitable for offensive purposes.35
In the interim, Russian forces crossed the San River undetected because of deplorable Habsburg security measures. Third Army command initially considered it insignificant that three companies of Slovak soldiers from the defending 37th Honvéd Infantry Division failed to perform effective security duty. However, the enemy quickly seized the blood-soaked Kiczera position as a direct result of the unpardonable negligence. The Honvéd Division received a belated order to hurl the enemy back across the river.36
When the Russians attacked the 37th Honvéd Infantry Division front, engineering and cavalry units moved into battle to halt the enemy. Most remaining division officers became casualties. The overextended V Corps defensive lines could no longer protect the San River front. The 37th Honvéd Infantry Division front finally crumbled when the enemy attacked the neighboring 33rd Infantry Division, its commander accused of “passive leadership” because his division retreated without pressing necessity. A poisoned bottle of soda water had reputedly incapacitated him. Division officers and troops who had reported to sick call in droves were returned to the front. Enemy efforts pressed back some division left flan
k units, partially because of the unreliability of Slovak troops. The badly mauled division surrendered eleven artillery pieces as the enemy rushed reinforcements to this vulnerable front sector.37
Any further V Corps retreat would seriously threaten XVIII Corps’ right flank positions, but no reserve formations existed to support this endangered area. San River floodwaters temporarily protected against renewed surprise enemy attack as Russian artillery pounded Habsburg positions. In the unfortunate V Corps offensive effort, twelve battalions finally attacked the heights of Loziov during the night to 21 March. However, earlier Russian successes on the difficult terrain south of Dvernik made a defensive line untenable, forcing further retreat.38 V Corps received an infantry division as reinforcement to rectify the 37th Honvéd Infantry Division’s collapse. A serious problem of trust in the Honvéd division officers ensued.39
Meanwhile, V Corps could not place supporting artillery batteries until the night of 20 to 21 March, further delaying the attack.40 The lack of reserve formations and sufficient troop numbers to maintain momentum negated any possibility of achieving success. The reinforced 31st Infantry Division and Infantry Regiment 76 finally launched the doomed offensive, with the support of the 33rd and 37th Honvéd Infantry Divisions. When the main attack division (the 31st) advanced to the northern slope of Loziov, it encountered enemy flanking fire. The solid Russian defensive positions repelled the frontal attacks. Infantry Regiments 73 and 76 advanced, but they completely exhausted themselves. The attack troops became apathetic, and their physical condition deteriorated.41
Böhm-Ermolli deplored the 37th Honvéd Infantry Division’s failure, which had resulted in the unnecessary and premature surrender of important positions. Neglecting to support neighboring units produced a series of disasters. For example, the enemy struck XVIII Corps’ Infantry Regiment 91 and captured numerous artillery pieces, precipitating its retreat just as czarist forces crossed the San River.42 On 21 March, Group Lieb’s attack units began retreating behind the river just as the enemy launched a strong attack. The Russians stormed the 33rd and portions of the 37th Honvéd Infantry Division positions after a night-long battle, forcing a retreat south of Dvernik.
Meanwhile, general conditions continued deteriorating as roadways remained in a wretched state, requiring constant maintenance and repair. The swollen San River swept away bridges, which required replacement and worsened the XVIII Corps situation. Stormy but thawing conditions during early 20 March reverted to frost and an icy snowstorm during the day. After a week of battle, Second Army no longer possessed any large intact combat units to halt the escalating enemy threat, thus neutralizing its offensive strength. The battered army retreated to its original jump-off positions. The enemy seized the dominating Zolobina heights and seriously threatened XVIII Corps’ flank positions when they crossed the San River, because defending units could not delay the enemy advance. A meager half-battalion reserve force proved insufficient to restore the situation.
As heavy snow covered XIX Corps positions, czarist troops attacked its 29th and 41st Honvéd Infantry Divisions, forcing them to retreat. Simultaneously, the enemy forced X Corps’ 24th Infantry Division’s right flank units off the Beskid ridges, exposing 34th Infantry Division positions.43 Because the Russians could easily hurl those units back, the order came to prepare a new rearward Habsburg defensive position. However, little progress occurred because they threw rear echelon labor units into battle to stem the enemy tide. The Russians also interrupted South Army’s renewed offensive efforts by establishing new resistance lines immediately following a forced retreat. Meanwhile, if the enemy forced the Second Army further rearward, it would endanger South Army’s left flank positions. The failure of Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin to achieve any further success finally forced South Army into a defensive posture.44
Meanwhile, the Fortress Przemyśl situation had become increasingly desperate: the garrison was on the verge of starvation, and the slaughtering of horses between 20 and 21 March left only enough animals to perform the most basic duties. Fortunately, the enemy did not launch serious attacks against the fortress on 19 to 20 March, but during the night, they assaulted defensive Sector VIII after a heavy artillery bombardment. During the next day, sustained Russian artillery barrages targeted the fortress’s north front positions at the Siedliska group. The Russians then unleashed storm attacks against the northern, western, and northeastern citadel sectors and the Pod Mazurami defensive positions. On 20 March, fortress artillery fired their remaining shells. Habsburg troops dumped rifle ammunition into the San River, and preparations commenced for the destruction of all militarily useful objects.45
General Falkenhayn telegraphed Conrad that because the Carpathian operations held no hope for success, particularly in view of the imminent surrender of Fortress Przemyśl, Conrad should assume a defensive posture and launch an offensive against Serbia. South Army troops should participate in the Balkan campaign to secure transport of ammunition supplies to Turkey and perhaps influence Bulgaria, and possibly even Romania, to become allies.46 By the end of March 1915, Foreign Minister Burian concluded that Russia could not be defeated in the near future. He thus urged Conrad to take Falkenhayn’s advice and launch an attack against Serbia. The renewed German pressure to initiate a Balkan campaign stemmed from the possible renewal of Entente attacks at Gallipoli and their continuing efforts to acquire Balkan allies.
A XVII Corps’ 11th Infantry Division battle report reflected the situation of many Habsburg units during this battle phase. The division front extended more than ten kilometers. The 1st Landsturm Infantry Brigade defended a 4,000-pace front with its five remaining companies drawn from four different regiments, numbering approximately 700 rifles. Only two companies of reserve troops remained until fresh replacement troops arrived. Second and Third armies could not plug the multiple gaps that the Russians punched through their lines. Second Army possessed no reserves, but neither Conrad nor Third Army was aware of this dire situation, nor of the army’s deteriorating situation. Third Army also could not maintain its forward lines when its numbers steadily declined, and thus the enemy threat to the two armies’ inner flanks increased substantially.47 Second Army received instructions to transfer any “dispensable manpower” to Third Army.48 Meanwhile, the Russians pierced General Tersztyánsky’s inner flank defensive position. Defending the Ung Valley roadways and rail line along the heights of the adjacent Uzsok Pass became critical as Group Szurmay’s ability to defend its front with only one traversable communication line became increasingly questionable.49 Second Army success required the possession of the Ung Valley.
A 21 March Second Army Command directive called attention to the embarrassing reports from the army front that created the impression that the officers’, not the troops’, attention now focused rearward. Thus during critical battle moments, field officers must master the dangerous situation regardless of the outcome. Böhm-Ermolli insinuated that Third Army, suffering greater losses and defending a wider front area, had halted night-long Russian storm attacks. He implored his army to maintain its positions at any cost, and he threatened that any commander that did not fulfill his duty would be relieved of command.50
Elsewhere, an enemy assault against the 20th Honvéd Infantry Division positions forced VII Corps to retreat, terminating its attack efforts as it sustained heavy casualties. The neighboring X Corps’ 2nd Infantry Division, seriously weakened during the February Mezölaborcz battles, again received the brunt of numerous Russian storm attacks. The 24th and 45th Infantry Divisions must hold their positions until reinforcements arrived.51 Fourth Army would transfer its 26th Infantry Division, described as qualitatively and quantitatively inferior, to Third Army.52
XVIII Corps proved too weak to either delay or halt the encroaching enemy, while a meager reserve force could not restore its battered front. V Corps’ 37th Honvéd Infantry Division received reinforcements to prevent an enemy breakthrough of its lines. Nevertheless, czarist forces tore the V Corps front asund
er when its defenders could not fill the numerous gaps in its front lines. The 37th Honvéd Division’s third defeat produced further demoralization, and its subsequent retreat raised the threat of enemy encirclement of V Corps Attack Group Lütgendorf, which launched the third offensive thrust toward Fortress Przemyśl. When the enemy repeatedly pierced XIX Corps’ lines, the maelstrom consumed its few reserve troops as the battered survivors increasingly became apathetic. The Habsburg lines desperately needed reinforcements as division numbers swiftly sank, but where would they come from?
A 13 March battlefield report described Infantry Regiment 91 troops captured at the San River as apathetic, even confused. When the regiment received orders to attack, many men wept, while some threw themselves to the ground and let the snow bury them. Others sat in a dazed state and some intentionally exposed themselves to enemy fire. “Another man committed suicide, it appears that others have shot themselves out of sight, but this cannot be proven.”53 The XVIII Corps, its resistance capabilities also compromised, reputedly contained units in the same dire straits. Continuation of the “mini” offensive appeared senseless in light of the failed Fortress Przemyśl breakout attempt and the 37th Honvéd Infantry Division’s lackluster performance. V Corps selected a new defensive line that its small numbers could maintain. The necessity to hold the 37th Honvéd Infantry Division positions caused V Corps Command to request more dependable troop replacements to prevent strong enemy forces from enveloping its eastern flank.54 On 22 March, 37th Honvéd Division events forced 31st Infantry Division to terminate its offensive.
Second Army failed to prevent enemy egress into the gap between V and XVIII Corps as the Russians unleashed new assaults against V Corps. Enemy pressure increased against the inner defensive flanks on the high mountain ridges south of the Lupkov Pass, a keystone Second and Third Army position, but no intact units were available to halt it. Group Tersztyánsky’s troops retreated to their original attack positions. While the exhausted Third Army proved incapable of launching counterattacks, the Second Army front reeled from czarist attacks during the next few days. Neither could counter the accurate and deadly czarist artillery fire, and supporting barrages proved woefully inadequate. However, the advancing Russians encountered increased terrain difficulties, and, as with the Habsburgs earlier in the campaign, they had to abandon multiple artillery batteries behind higher ridgelines. Thus, Russian formations discovered that their previous advantages dissipated as they moved deeper into the mountains.
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