General Ivanov’s forces encountered additional serious material problems, such as ammunition shortages, which delayed launching some attacks. The unexpected lack of heavy artillery became a major hindrance as Russian troops moved into higher mountain terrain, where troops could only move such weapons with the utmost difficulty. The quality of czarist replacement troops also declined, which, combined with the concomitant heavy casualties and escalating troop exhaustion, negatively affected czarist troop morale. Increasingly, the unfavorable terrain conditions, delays in vital troop supplies, and multiplying communication difficulties took their toll.55 Such negative factors assisted the retreating Habsburg troops, who previously had suffered the same dire disadvantages. Intercepted Russian communications detailed and confirmed the escalating enemy problems with conducting operations.
The often-hasty Habsburg retreats produced immeasurable suffering and additional casualties, accompanied by an enormous reduction in troop resistance power. Winter conditions replaced melting trench environments with a vengeance.56 A 22 March operations order underscored the need to halt all enemy attacks against Third and Second armies. Habsburg commanders hoped that the enemy had finally expended its offensive strength. Fourth Army transferred its 26th Infantry Division to the imperiled Third Army while anticipating an attack against its own southern flank positions. Fourth Army must continue to “unconditionally” maintain its positions and counter an anticipated czarist attack to protect the critical Gorlice area.57
After the 22 March surrender of Fortress Przemyśl, the military situation turned further to Russia’s favor. The besieging Eleventh Army transferred into the fierce Carpathian battle zone, enhancing the czarist numerical advantage. Russian Third and Eighth armies each received a reinforcing corps to deploy against the Habsburg Third Army. Politics also affected czarist strategy as decisive military action, in conjunction with the Entente’s Dardanelles campaign, could bring Romania into the war against the Dual Monarchy.
General Ivanov finally attempted to smash into Hungary after crushing Habsburg resistance in the critical Homonna–Mezölaborcz area. The czarist advance concentrated on disrupting Habsburg railroad connections behind the Dniester River leading to the Habsburg Hinterland. The mission of General Brusilov’s Eighth Army became to seize the major Homonna–Mezölaborcz road net and important connecting road between Wola Michova and Homonna–Telepocz. With former czarist siege troops currently in transit, Ivanov would strike a deadly blow against the flank and rear of defending Habsburg units. The limited number of roads prevented a rapid fulfillment of the mission and forced utilization of deep column march formations over the terrain.
As the Russians smashed into the main Beskid ridges defensive positions, Habsburg Third Army northern flank forces suffered severe losses, and the army possessed inadequate reserve formations to counter the new onslaught. The staggering Second Army casualties forced the creation of a detachment of five March Battalion replacement troops designated Group Biffl, consisting of many recruits and replacement troops. The novice entity received three artillery batteries to assist its important mission of preventing a czarist breakthrough at the Second and Third armies’ inner flanks on the Beskid ridges. These troops would arrive at the front between 22 and 24 March.58
On 22 March, an artillery officer noted that an enemy attack was imminent, but Habsburg troops were in no condition to resist. Indeed, a Habsburg retreat ensued over the main Carpathian ridges. In the meantime, the antagonists divided areas to gather straw and hay and forage for potatoes, causing the officer to remark that such sharing was only possible in an ehrlicher (honorable) war with the Russians. He wrote that one had the feeling that friend and foe agreed: “Don’t bother me and I won’t bother you.”59
As for artillery, we had to learn new shooting techniques because this is the first time in the mountains. . . . It was difficult to observe the effectiveness of the artillery fire because of distance, snow and wooded areas, bushes and steep ridges all prevented observation. The snow cover, in particular, proved to be a major deterrent.
On 23 March, the day after the capitulation of Fortress Przemyśl, the field army’s mission remained to repel enemy attacks. The day before, the fortress fired off heavy artillery shells, stuffed all gun tubes with explosives, and detonated them. They destroyed train installations. They took all the excess rifle ammunition and buried it or threw it into the San River, while demolishing all defensive works, slaughtering horses, and burning paper money.
Available reinforcements bolstered the threatened Second and Third armies fronts. V Corps transferred all dispensable forces to the more threatened neighboring XVIII Corps’ Wetlina front, the recipient of incessant attacks throughout the night. These hurled stunned defenders behind the river, where they received orders to hold their positions until reinforcements arrived. The heaviest fighting, however, occurred against X Corps, survivors of the serious February battle at Mezölaborcz.60
After the Fortress Przemyśl capitulation, the enemy threatened to break through both army fronts. Exhausted Third Army troops could not halt the czarist offensive by launching counterattacks as Second Army Command requested. Third Army right flank positions required immediate reinforcements, forcing the Fourth Army to relinquish further additional troops. When the Przemyśl garrison surrendered, Emperor Franz Joseph reputedly wept upon hearing the news. Some European historians have compared the fall of the fortress to the surrender of Stalingrad during World War II.61 Three former siege divisions captured Dukla Pass during the April 1915 Easter Battle.
Meanwhile, the gap between Second and Third armies’ inner flanks expanded. Group Biffl March battalion troops received orders to fill the breach because Second Army lacked the necessary troops. Though the Second Army’s front began to buckle, it temporarily transferred some of its troops to the threatened Third Army X Corps. The unrelenting enemy successes against Third Army’s critical right flank positions, however, also endangered Second Army positions north of the frontier ridges. The deteriorating Third Army situation prompted Böhm-Ermolli to request permission for a Second Army retreat.62 Conrad, however, refused the request, citing morale and political considerations, particularly Hungarian leaders’ fear of an invasion of their homeland.
V Corps continued to bear the brunt of ferocious enemy attacks as its situation grew increasingly desperate. Morale plummeted as troop numbers proved too weak to defend the corps’ extended San River front.63 Czarist counterstrokes neutralized all previous Habsburg offensive gains, forcing the thinning defensive lines to retreat further behind the main Carpathian ridgelines. However, the reeling armies came to enjoy an inherently stronger defensive advantage as they now forced the enemy to maneuver on higher mountain terrain.
The Russians hurled 100,000 troops against the Homonna railroad junction on 23 March, causing the Second Army defenders to buckle from the powerful attack. Conrad’s customary order to defend all positions proved impossible to fulfill.64 In one blow, Russia had established numerical preeminence and increased the threat of an invasion onto Hungarian soil. On Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s front, the Russian Eighth Army struck the flank and rear of his forces battling the czarist Ninth Army on the Dniester River front. The enemy’s objective became to encircle Pflanzer-Baltin’s forces in the Styr River area, which, if successful, would threaten all northwest Carpathian Mountain crossings.65 Major battle also erupted on III Corps’ front. Earlier, three full-strength czarist regiments attacked the 22nd Infantry Division.66 The corps lacked sufficient reserves to deflect an attack against its right flank position, where just one reserve battalion was available. Only 6,800 soldiers, many of them Ersatz troops, defended that portion of the front; therefore, the czarist action threatened to break through the entire corps’ front.67
The Fourth Army chief of staff argued that another offensive effort by his army had absolutely no chance for success. He insisted that Fourth Army’s 100,000 soldiers opposed 80,000 well-entrenched enemy troops, while its already limi
ted offensive capabilities had been further compromised by the transfer of the 26th Infantry Division to Third Army. The army mission remained to prevent the diversion of opposing enemy troops to Third Army. In desperation, Conrad nevertheless insisted that Fourth Army launch an offensive action.68
Habsburg casualties continued to mount. VII Corps, for example, sustained 4,000 battle losses, including a significant number of officers. The same held true for III Corps, especially at its flank positions, where savage enemy attacks took their toll. X and XVIII Corps troops could barely maintain their front positions, partly because they also possessed few reserve formations. Reinforcements were desperately necessary to prevent further Russian penetration toward Wola Michova.69 Examples of excessive smaller unit casualties included the decimated Infantry Regiment 12 and the 122nd Infantry Brigade, down to 400 soldiers, and 72nd Infantry Brigade to 100!
After two months of battle, South Army troop morale and battle effectiveness had decidedly diminished. Exhausted troops sometimes did not receive warm food for nine straight days. Unit strengths stood at best 30 to 40 percent of their original numbers. Hundreds of soldiers reported to sick call daily; by mid-March, that number climbed to 400 to 700 per day. Between 11 and 23 March, those classified as sick included 6,758 South Army troops. The army’s offensive efforts ended on 23 March.70 When Conrad ordered the South Army commander to transfer “dispensable” units to the embattled Third Army, he declined, stating that he required them for future operations.
The deteriorating Third Army situation raised the question of it retreating, which would endanger Fourth Army right and Second Army left flank positions. X Corps suffered four straight days of Russian storm attacks and concomitant severe casualties. For example, 24th Infantry Division absorbed five powerful attacks by as many as five czarist regiments. On the critical corps left flank, 2nd Infantry Division repulsed numerous enemy assaults. The unrelenting enemy pressure against X Corps and its subsequent retreats threatened the rear and flank positions of Second Army’s Group Tersztyánsky. An enemy flanking maneuver forced a 24th Infantry Division retreat and the surrender of two important positions. The Russians entered the strategic eastern Laborcz Valley by overwhelming the defending 21st Infantry Division. Both sides sustained numerous casualties.71 Third Army command frantically appealed for reinforcements, while Second Army shortened its front by a Group Tersztyánsky retreat to free up troops to assist Third Army. Conrad also appealed to General Falkenhayn for two German divisions to aid his Second Army. Falkenhayn, however, did not feel any compelling reason to place German divisions into the Carpathian hell.
Repeated field commanders’ pleas for rehabilitation time for their soldiers remained unanswered because of the small available troop numbers. A 65th Infantry Brigade request citing the pressing need for recuperation time for its soldiers received a terse reply: “Aushalten” (“hold out”). The 71st Infantry Brigade commander warned that his decimated unit contained only exhausted survivors. The negative response he received commenced with: “Experience shows that . . .”—an inappropriate reply. Many units had been in combat since the initial late January offensive. The quality of March formation troops diminished, and allegedly, some soldiers carried white flags in their knapsacks. A Russian officer prisoner of war related that on the day of his capture, some Austro-Hungarian troops raised the white flag of surrender—testimony that helps confirm the large number of soldiers listed as missing in action. In one incident, the Russians captured five officers, including two battalion commanders, and 700 soldiers.72
The increasing diversity of languages spoken within Habsburg combat units led to numerous difficulties on the front. March formation replacement troops were no longer conscripted exclusively from a regiment’s home territory. The language barrier, combined with the arrival of inadequately trained recruits, produced chaos. Soldiers often could not communicate with one another. The practice of interspersing kaisertreu units with those of questionable loyalty only made matters worse. So-called minority troops accused some Hungarian officers of displaying little concern for their welfare.73
Seriously depleted troop stands compelled the Habsburg army to assume a defensive stance. The senior German liaison officer at Habsburg Supreme Command headquarters, General Cramon, requested that they transfer German troops to Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin to support South Army’s efforts. By 24 March, new setbacks in the Laborcz and Ondava valleys worsened Third Army’s already tenuous situation. Unrelenting Russian pressure forced the army’s right flank positions rearward without serious defensive resistance. That retrograde movement negatively affected the entire army defensive line, as well as Fourth Army’s southern flank positions. Conrad’s aide-de-camp recorded, “Nothing more can be done because the instrument fails,” and “A drop of water on a hot iron always evaporates.”74 Böhm-Ermolli contemplated a Second Army retreat into the shelter of the lower valleys behind the main Carpathian ridgelines to provide his battle-weary soldiers with some long-overdue rehabilitation. A retreat would also shorten the army’s supply route, improving its efficiency, while releasing significant troop numbers previously necessary to maintain the longer supply and troop traffic.
The major 24 March attack against Third Army’s eastern flank positions led to a Fourth Army order to relinquish all available troops to the hardpressed army as quickly as possible.75 Russian assaults persisted throughout the night. Although it was imperative that III Corps resist enemy endeavors until reinforcements arrived, czarist troops broke through its 28th Infantry Division lines in hand-to-hand combat, creating a three-kilometer gap between Third and Fourth armies’ inner flanks. Severe losses forced III Corps to retreat. Low battle stands, an unusually wide front, and battle-weary troops explained the setback.76 Neighboring units joined the retrograde movement when the situation became irretrievable. Hazardous gaps appeared between the battered defensive lines. Fourth Army right flank units had to follow suit, so it could not transfer troops to Third Army because it had to defend its own positions.77
The enemy’s rupture of Hungarian defensive lines south of Lupkov required the immediate deployment of reinforcements to halt the onslaught because it threatened that entire front. Fierce Second Army battle continued throughout the waning days of March as the enemy repeatedly attempted to smash onto the Hungarian plains.78 The chronic shortage of troops, however, prevented the front-line breach from being sealed.79
Between 20 to 26 March, III Corps sacrificed 12,000 men, its regiments manned by 500 or fewer troops (a full-strength regiment consisted of 4,600 soldiers). The surviving exhausted troops actually slept through thunderous enemy fire.80 Second Army, as its own front crumbled, received orders immediately to dispatch reinforcements to its embattled neighbor.81 Two brigades prepared for transfer, while Conrad pressured Böhm-Ermolli to launch an attack to relieve the pressure on Third Army. Maintenance work on roadways often proved a wasted effort as rain instantly transformed them into a muddy morass. Böhm-Ermolli utilized the unfavorable terrain conditions to justify his request for an army retreat a week later.
General Falkenhayn, in evaluating his ally’s situation, calculated that thirty-four Central Power divisions opposed only twenty-four czarist units. He asked his liaison to Conrad whether German divisions would make a major difference on the Carpathian front. General Cramon, the ranking German liaison officer, acknowledged that the number of divisions was accurate. However, he added that Russian divisions consisted of considerably greater numbers than Habsburg entities, and that any German divisions transferred to this front could only help to achieve local successes rather than a decisive victory.82 Between 26 to 27 March, the Russians continued to pound Second and Third armies; they seized sizable amounts of territory but sustained severe losses for their efforts. The Russians, attacking the entire VII Corps front, tore the 20th Honvéd Infantry Division’s right flank asunder. However, developments particularly threatened X Corps’ 2nd Infantry Division. The deteriorating Habsburg situation forced Falkenhayn to tr
ansfer the weak German Beskiden Corps (German Reserve Corps) to the reeling X Corps’ Laborcz Valley position to prevent disaster on that sector.
Meanwhile, cold-related deaths finally began to subside, but cases of intestinal illness multiplied. Numerous instances of typhus resulted in the introduction of an immunization process. IX March Battalion units would not reach the front until the end of April, but any delay in the deployment of replacement troops could spell disaster for the Habsburg military situation. This prompted an urgent appeal to transfer the replacement battalions to the front as soon as possible. The urgency of the situation resulted in an abbreviated timetable for troop training.83
The unraveling of the Third Army front continued to threaten Second Army’s left flank positions. Böhm-Ermolli’s entire frontage began to crumble, which would force the army back to the northern frontier ridges, creating an even more serious predicament. They constantly hurled auxiliary forces into battle to stem the numerically superior enemy. Second Army Command again requested permission to retreat, but Conrad replied negatively, this time because of the necessity to protect the vital Laborcz Valley. He planned to halt the Russian advance by launching a counterattack after the arrival of the reinforcing German Beskiden Corps.
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