Blood on the Snow
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Second Army soldiers’ confidence in their commanders suffered enormously upon learning that two of its infantry brigades had to transfer to the Third Army just as their army faced a renewed Russian onslaught. Retreat provided an obvious option, but should they surrender the blood-drenched terrain? Several compelling arguments supported a withdrawal, particularly the escalating threat to Second Army’s flank positions created by the progressive Third Army withdrawals. The battered army could no longer defend the Carpathian Mountain ridges without some assistance, but how much longer could the Third Army resist the intensifying and overpowering enemy pressure? The answer would prove vital to both armies. Conrad issued his standing order, “Durchhalten!” (“Hold out!”), to prevent the enemy from gaining additional territory, but neither army could comply with the order. Böhm-Ermolli impressed upon Conrad the danger to his forces from further Third Army retreat, but he failed to reveal his own army’s horrendous condition.
Second Army’s attention focused on the wretched state of its forty-eight-kilometer-long supply lines, which covered a very difficult mountain section. XVIII Corps supply trains could barely move necessities forward ten kilometers, while it required two to three days for a supply column to reach the front.84 Efforts to maintain regular supply delivery on the overused routes by now appeared futile. So many horses died that ammunition wagons could not supply sufficient shells to the few artillery batteries at the front.85 In addition, if Third Army utilized the Laborcz Valley road, if forced to retreat, they would have to share it with Second Army left flank units.
By 27 March, the Habsburg military mission had become to halt Russian assaults and hold present lines until German reinforcements arrived, but because the Russians still held the initiative, they could pierce Habsburg positions wherever they chose. III Corps’ 28th Infantry Division would attack the enemy at Sekova because corps flank protection required occupation of the ridges. The attack soon faltered as the seriously depleted ranks attacked full-strength Russian units, resulting in retreat. On 28 March, the Russians renewed their tenacious thrusts between the Lupkov and Uzsok passes. The single traversable Habsburg supply line and Hungarian invasion route at Cisna received particular enemy attention. As artillery units directed guns to rear echelon stations for repair, they continued to return in inoperable condition.86 Second Army sustained 47,000 casualties during the second half of March. The 37th Honvéd Infantry Division suffered more than 50 percent losses, while reports estimated V Corps and Group Szurmay losses as high as 7,000.87
Habsburg troops surrendered the blood-soaked, battle-scarred Manilova heights on 28 March. It became questionable whether any of the mauled Habsburg units could maintain their positions for much longer. IX Corps attempted to attack through deep snow, in conjunction with III Corps action, at the Third and Fourth armies’ inner flanks, but strong enemy resistance halted its efforts. Aggravating the situation, Third and Fourth armies failed to agree on a mutual strategy relative to their inner flank situation, a problem detailed in numerous Fourth Army logbook entries. The Third Army crisis continued unabated while czarist assaults against the Second and Third armies’ inner flanks and Third Army midfront kept them enflamed. The Carpathian front was in danger of collapsing.
During the afternoon of 28 March, the Russians smashed through Habsburg X Corps’ defensive lines. The Russian strategy to seize the Homonna railroad center and then storm onto the Hungarian plains appeared to be on the verge of success. Czarist forces also pierced Group Tersztyánsky’s front, forcing a swift retreat on the Baligrod and XVIII Corps fronts. The entire Second Army would soon follow suit, while the arrival of two Fourth Army divisions temporarily halted the Third Army’s left flank retreat.88
On 29 March, the raging battle between the Lupkov and Uzsok passes spread into the Ondava and Laborcz valleys. X and XVII Corps struggled to maintain their positions until the arrival of the German Beskiden Corps. The rapid diminution of Third Army fighting capability raised serious questions as to whether it could persevere much longer. The chronic lack of reserves compounded the crisis as the Russians continued to receive reinforcements. A decisive enemy assault on Palm Sunday sought to bind XVIII Corps troops to deliver a fatal blow through Wola Michova. Utilizing the inclement weather conditions, Russian troops approached Habsburg forward lines undetected, smashing into the unsuspecting defenders and hurling them back five kilometers.89 Many defending troops, too exhausted to retreat, collapsed in the snow.
On its San River front, V Corps rebuilt bridges the river had swept away, while the shortage of labor units necessitated the use of infantry troops to maintain critical supply columns and perform crucial repair work. Supply trains returning to rear echelon areas had to travel parallel to the crumbling front. Dense fog hampered V Corps’ efforts to defend its positions at Polonina, which a single company could have easily accomplished under more favorable circumstances.90 Mounting Russian pressure along the upper San River region increasingly threatened Second Army flank positions.
More than a thousand civilian workers prepared and maintained the steep approaches to Group Szurmay’s positions. When the Russians launched a concentrated attack against three XIX Corps divisions in the Mikov Valley, it also threatened Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s 42nd Honvéd Infantry Division’s flank and rear positions.91 Conrad ordered Second and Third armies to prepare strong reserve forces and admonished front-line officers to display greater leadership over their troops. Second Army troop strength continued to decline, exacerbated by widespread sickness and exhaustion; consequently, it could not create the desired reserve formations. At least an entire infantry division would be necessary merely to maintain present positions. Nevertheless, Conrad claimed that his Second Army opposed equal Russian numbers and that the enemy would soon exhaust itself from its continuing offensive actions.
In view of escalating losses, Böhm-Ermolli feared that his troops would be unable to resist the persistent enemy pressure much longer. With no hope of receiving reinforcements soon, his troops’ resistance power collapsed. Thus, XIX Corps requested permission to retreat when an overwhelming seven-regiment enemy force smashed into the reeling 41st Honvéd Infantry Division, producing over 60 percent casualties. When the division’s front buckled, it also threatened neighboring X Corps positions in the Laborcz Valley.92 The irresistible Russian pressure also forced Corps Schmidt’s left flank and XIX Corps’ right flank units to retreat to hastily prepared positions.93 Casualty numbers were staggering; IV Corps’ 32nd Infantry Division lost 2,300 men in battle and subsequent retreat on 27 and 28 March. V Corps’ 37th Honvéd Infantry Division suffered 2,400 casualties, while 13th Landwehr Infantry Division reported 1,530 losses from the 28 March battle and retreat. The 18,000 official Second Army casualties recorded during this brief period did not include those from the decimated 34th and 41st Infantry Divisions.94
As Russian troops infiltrated the Dukla Pass after a series of battles, Conrad grew despondent, with his adjutant describing the situation as hopeless.95 The Habsburg lines truly appeared to be collapsing. Meanwhile, 55,000 VIII March Battalions troops arrived to buttress the front lines. General Tersztyánsky, however, warned that his exhausted troops could not hold their positions and that the lack of reserve units assured they could not thwart any enemy breakthrough attempts. Despite Böhm-Ermolli’s command to “hold your positions to the point of total sacrifice,” the 13th, 32nd, and 43rd Infantry Divisions retreated.96
V Corps troops, meanwhile, fled their positions under no enemy pressure, assisted by the fog conditions in the higher mountain elevations. After another sound defeat, the 37th Honvéd Infantry Division retreated during a raging snowstorm under the cloak of darkness. Poor supply route conditions produced chaos. The Russians, again, did not press Conrad’s badly beaten troops, but V Corps must regain its surrendered San River positions, and V and XVIII Corps must hold their front lines.97 Otherwise, the Russians could attack XIX Corps’ 29th Infantry Division positions and rapidly overrun the dazed 37th
Honvéd Infantry Division. The ultimate collapse of this front and defeat of the newly deployed VIII Corps’ 9th Infantry Division finally forced a Second Army retreat. Though Conrad calculated the opposing troop numbers to be approximately equal, Second Army estimated that its 110,000 soldiers opposed 156,000 czarist troops.98
An entry in the V Corps logbook observed, “It is as though Heaven is against us. When we attack, it starts snowing and more than one meter deep. When the Russians attack, the snow freezes and movement is possible.”99 Under favorable weather conditions, one defending regiment could easily resist an entire enemy corps in the mountains, but dense fog and snow enabled smaller Russian troop units to overrun Habsburg positions with relative ease.
The increasing threat of a breakthrough of the Second Army front north of Cisna resulted in the transfer of undermanned weary western flank infantry units to the most seriously threatened area. Unrelenting Russian attacks on the entire Habsburg front interfered with the usual transfer of troops from less active portions of the front to hot spots. In addition to the unavailability of reserve troop formations, the inhospitable march conditions ensured that any reinforcements hurrying to the front arrived too late to affect the tide of battle. Pessimistic front-line reports to army headquarters caused Böhm-Ermolli to reflect that the commanders, not the troops, focused their attention rearward, while the neighboring Third Army continued to maintain its positions under perhaps much greater difficulties.
Böhm-Ermolli implored his field officers to inspire further effort from his mauled army to force the enemy to pay dearly for every inch they had conquered earlier at such great human sacrifice. Junior officers, however, responded that the overtaxing of front-line soldiers’ capabilities made continued resistance of the enemy risky at best. The preceding week-long sacrificial attacks caused the common soldier to further lose faith in his commanders. Hoping that his subordinate commanders had exaggerated their negative reports, Böhm-Ermolli took a supreme gamble by ordering his army to continue defending its present positions for a few more days, disregarding the fact that his officers readied themselves to retreat. Ignoring Second Army’s predicament, Conrad ordered it to attack to take pressure off the Third Army. A General Staff officer’s daily log entry summed up the situation: “The Second Army is pitiful, the 37. Honvéd Infantry Division is hurled back, the 42. Honvéd Division is broken through.”100
Multiple army reports blamed weather conditions for military failures, but Conrad’s unrelenting attack orders ignored the radical weather changes. Reports described the unfolding Carpathian tragedy as “a crazy, terrible crime.” An artillery officer complained that he was horrified at the nonchalance and negligence of the Habsburg Supreme Command. The inevitable result: the poor soldiers “melted away in a shocking manner” because no one stood up to Conrad and his Operations Bureau. An example of the travesty, Field Jäger Battalion 11 attacked with no artillery support, sustaining over 50 percent losses.101 Another officer complained that as frontline soldiers starved, weather conditions continued to retard supply efforts. Overnight icy conditions required that supply movement only be limited to late morning hours if the sun came out.
Commencement of the Carpathian April Easter Battle finally halted czarist efforts to break through the tenuous Habsburg positions along the lower mountain ridges at the Hungarian frontier. The hastily transferred German Beskiden Corps finally joined the battered Habsburg X Corps on the Laborcz Valley front and successfully reversed the unrelenting Third Army travail. Weather played a crucial role in the Easter Battle; however, this time, in a reverse of fortune, the Russians suffered more. Snowstorms followed by melting temperatures produced flooding and water-filled trenches in the valleys, with icy terrain in the higher elevations. In some lower areas, water saturated the ground to the extent that the corpses of fallen soldiers remained in an upright position. The Russians paid a heavy price for their early April successes, as growing indications suggested that the czarist esprit de corps had reached its limit. This indicated that the Russians no longer possessed adequate forces to exploit their successes. The czarist offensive halted, and they paused before preparing to launch another effort in early May. Fateful events would interfere with their plans.
One positive consequence of the severe Carpathian winter weather was the eradication of some battlefield diseases. However, rising temperatures heralded renewed widespread outbreaks of cholera. Indolence on behalf of the populace and local civil authorities exacerbated the appalling sanitary and supply situations. Oftentimes their shortsightedness hindered the implementation of preventive sanitary measures. Immunization programs often met passive resistance, and troops ignored good hygiene practices. Soldiers, out of necessity, wore the same uniforms for weeks and months at a time and rarely bathed, shaved, or cut their hair. This provided fertile ground for the spread of infectious diseases, particularly typhus, which also ran rampant on the Serbian front.102 Before discovering the connection between the spread of disease and lice, typhus sometimes claimed as many lives as battle; however, new delousing methods rid the Carpathian armies of this devastating illness.
The Balkan theater also influenced Habsburg military calculations, while British and French landings at Gallipoli near the Dardanelles raised the specter of possible Turkish defeat. This caused General Falkenhayn to again propose a rapid crushing of Serbia to open access to Turkey, at least to seize the northeastern Njegotine corner of the country.103 But where would Conrad find the troops for this military action? Then the failed Gallipoli campaign opened the Balkan peninsula to Central Power expansion, resulting in the fall 1915 conquest of Serbia by combined Austro-Hungarian, German, and Bulgarian forces after the Gorlice–Tarnov offensive had removed Russian pressure in the Carpathian Mountains and driven Romanov troops hundreds of miles into their own territory.
Meanwhile, in early April, Habsburg troops clung to the crests of ridges and passes against increasingly vehement Russian attacks. Conrad continued to hope that the horrendous Russian losses, particularly those suffered during the Laborcz Valley melee, would weaken czarist numbers. The arrival of Fortress Przemyśl siege divisions belied this speculation and provided renewed czarist numerical advantage. Several important questions arose, one being the critical protection of the Ung Valley heights located before the Uzsok Pass area. Could Group Szurmay defend Second Army’s extreme eastern flank area and Uzsok Pass despite possessing only one usable communication line? In addition, enemy encroachment threatened South Army’s left flank positions into the Ung Valley—could this key terrain be defended?
Upon its deployment behind the reeling X Corps front, the weak German Beskiden Corps prepared to halt the consistent czarist military successes in the Laborcz Valley and regain some terrain. Exhaustion finally overcame the Russian forces. Snow conditions caused serious delays in czarist troop movements and frequent supply stoppages. In the meantime, the Habsburg Second Army finally retreated behind the main Carpathian ridgelines to occupy much more favorable defensive positions while further complicating czarist logistical problems. The czarist Easter attack enjoyed an initial advantage of more favorable weather conditions and a lack of intact Habsburg defensive units. Thus, until mid-April, the Carpathian front remained in constant crisis as the Russians continued to batter the hapless defenders. The unfavorable Second Army preretreat positions at the last high Carpathian ridgelines unnerved the defending troops because it appeared that another major czarist thrust would easily bludgeon through their defensive cordon.
On 1 April, Conrad finally learned the true extent of the deteriorating Second Army situation. He immediately ordered the transfer of several divisions from the rupturing Third Army front with the important proviso that it occur only after the Beskiden Corps deployed on the X Corps front. Second Army had already reported that it could no longer maintain its ridge-line positions when another collapse of V and XVIII Corps’ inner flank positions forced the army to retreat.104 The deteriorating situation at the Cisna supply center portended it
s impending loss.105 The enemy also attacked potential retreat routes, precluding an orderly rearward movement. Second Army finally received permission for its western flank to withdraw, while the middle Carpathian battlefront broke at several locations. XIX Corps initiated its retreat on 2 April.106 Thirteen to fourteen enemy divisions opposed approximately 100,000 benumbed Second Army soldiers, but the high Carpathian ridges now posed a major hindrance to the advancing czarist forces.107 The leisurely czarist pursuit of the retreating Habsburg forces proved beneficial.
Second Army vanguard units maintained their main Carpathian ridgeline positions during the retreat. The army’s retrograde movement threatened the loss of Uzsok Pass. Group Tersztyánsky received orders to maintain its present positions until 3 April because of the pending arrival of the German Beskiden Corps for the Third Army. Second Army’s retreat must extend only as far as necessary. Meanwhile, the enemy deployed the previous Fortress Przemyśl siege formations against the decimated Third Army X Corps troops.108 The Russians appeared to be on the verge of invading Hungary just as the German Beskiden Corps arrived and deployed behind X Corps’ positions.
Through the ranking German liaison officer, General Cramon, Conrad requested four additional German divisions for the Carpathian front, but suggested the Fourth Army southern flank area for their deployment. Falkenhayn replied that he had no available troops. Relative to negotiations with Italy, Habsburg leaders unanimously continued to refuse to surrender the vital Adriatic coastal areas near the major Pola naval base to the erstwhile neighbor. Conrad repeated his earlier recommendation to negotiate a separate peace agreement with Russia, so they could counter Italy.109 Specifically, if Rome opened a third front, it meant an overextended and outnumbered Austro-Hungarian military force.