Blood on the Snow

by Graydon A Tunstall

  The 38th Honvéd Infantry Division retreated from its Styr River positions because of the unreliability of some Romanian soldiers. Czarist efforts forced South Army into a defensive stance to prevent an enemy breakthrough of their forty-kilometer front at Wyszkov Pass. The army front settled into trench warfare mainly because of insufficient troop strengths. Corps Hofmann, largely composed of exhausted Habsburg Landsturm troops, maintained its present positions and halted all enemy offensive efforts.179

  Unwarranted orders to retreat resulting from localized enemy breakthroughs had already brought the removal of two Second Army corps commanders and one Divisonaire. Such actions, however, had a deleterious effect on neighboring units, producing unnecessary casualties and further retrograde movement, lowering troop morale and lessening the troops’ faith in their ability to halt the enemy.180 More modern 15- and 10.5-centimeter field howitzers began arriving at the front lines. Gun crews, while preparing to utilize the howitzers, were discouraged from adding extra gunpowder into gun tubes to increase shell range because it would cause the guns to prematurely require repair and possibly render them inoperable.181

  On 12 April, the Russians launched further attacks, and Conrad issued the customary order to his troops to halt the enemy at any price until reinforcements arrived.182 When Conrad could not guarantee with complete certainty that his front would hold, it convinced Falkenhayn that he had to buttress his ally. The Germans could not allow Austria-Hungary to suffer a disastrous defeat. The Habsburgs continued to deploy every possible rifle into the front lines, and they hurled supply train and ammunition column troops, even civilian wagon drivers, into front-line duty. New recruits arrived at the front after just three weeks of training. The majority of trainees for supply train duty found themselves transferred to the infantry branch—a clear indication of the seriousness of the crisis.

  On 13 April, Conrad continued to ponder the ever-present Italian question. His proposed deployment of seven infantry divisions certainly could not halt an 800,000-man Italian army with half a million additional reserves (an army he misjudged as combat ready). The Carpathian situation appeared to be temporarily calm, which should assist the diplomatic problems relative to the neutrals. In the interim, Falkenhayn reiterated his opposition to Conrad’s proposition to deploy German troops to fill gaps in the Carpathian front lines and kept Conrad guessing as long as possible concerning the future German offensive. He only informed his counterpart three weeks before he attacked. He designated eight German divisions to launch an offensive at the Habsburg Fourth Army Gorlice front, where Conrad had planned to launch a similar operation for some time, but lacked sufficient troop numbers. A failed small-scale effort had been launched on March 8, a continuation of previous battle at this key point. Falkenhayn conveniently ignored the crucial question of the state of Habsburg forces, almost annihilated in August–September 1914 and most recently battered in the Carpathian campaign.

  Meanwhile, Second Army repulsed an early morning attack against Czeremcha in the Ung Valley. Repeated attempts to hurl the enemy from newly conquered positions provoked enemy counterattacks that the army repulsed, inflicting heavy czarist losses. Enemy assaults continued against Second Army until 20 April, but the Russian offensive had finally halted, a week earlier on the Habsburg Third Army front than on the Second. The final Russian success occurred with the seizure of the heavily contested Kozialta Mountain on 17 April. Unsuccessful Habsburg counterattacks to regain it, lasting until 20 April, produced the usual heavy losses. Then battle intensity diminished, as the opposing defensive lines solidified behind their barbed-wire entanglements.183 Exhaustion overwhelmed both opponents. On 14 April, Conrad traveled to Berlin to negotiate the transport and utilization of the recently promised German troops.184 Three days later, allied Railroad Bureau personnel determined transportation details. On 25 April, Conrad met the new German Eleventh Army commander, General Mackensen, setting the stage for the approaching Gorlice–Tarnov offensive. By the third week in April, Second Army had settled into a defensive posture, while Russian prisoners of war spoke of preparations for a new attack against the Habsburg army. In fact, General Ivanov planned to renew his offensive on 3 May, the day after the commencement of the Gorlice–Tarnov offensive.

  On 19 April, as the threat of Italian intervention loomed, preparations intensified for the forthcoming offensive. If Habsburg Second and Third Army lines actually held and the German offensive succeeded at Gorlice, it would unhinge the four Russian armies now deeply entrapped in the Carpathian Mountains. The offensive, launched from the northern Carpathian front, would penetrate the Russian defenses and then swing north to envelop and destroy a major part of the czarist forces. The successful offensive forced the Russian armies to evacuate the mountains and retreat to the San River line within a month. By the end of May, the Russians had retreated eighty miles to the San–Dniester River line. Massed German artillery proved decisive; the nearly 1,000 guns destroyed the opposing Russian Third Army’s shallow trenches; a breakthrough occurred almost immediately as fleeing Russian troops came under effective German artillery fire. The Habsburg ally accomplished its most urgent objective: neutralizing the Russian threat. However, the German General Staff had little confidence that their ally could survive without assistance, and thus they decided to continue the offensive. As in August and September 1914 and several times later in the war, Austro-Hungarian forces could not advance without German assistance.

  A further German objective was to ensure that the Russian army would be incapable of launching a major offensive for some time. The dire Carpathian Mountain situation and Dardanelles Gallipoli campaign had forced Falkenhayn to launch an Eastern front offensive. As noted, the neutrals, such as Italy and Romania, were a major consideration. Diplomatic reports increasingly stressed the threat of Italy entering the war because of recurring Habsburg defeats. Particularly galling for the Habsburgs was the constant German pressure to cede territory to the perfidious ally just to assure its continued neutrality. Moreover, German High Command became concerned over the trustworthiness of Slavic units that had begun surrendering to the Russians during recent battles because it intended to retain the initiative on the Eastern front. Thus, once the advancing troops reached the San River, the fighting persisted. Falkenhayn also continued to favor launching a campaign against Serbia to relieve pressure on the Balkan front, provide armaments and weapons to the hard-pressed Turks, and assist the Austro-Hungarian army in regaining some of its lost military prestige.

  The Germans would utilize battle techniques, so successfully employed in the overwhelming victory at Gorlice–Tarnov campaign, throughout the middle years of the war. The May campaign, launched with only fourteen divisions, compromised the four Russian armies entrenched in the Carpathian Mountains. The resultant victory forced Russian withdrawal from the mountains and created a large salient in Poland, Warsaw being the main feature. The offensive rescued the Austro-Hungarian army from its dire Carpathian Mountain situation and provided the Central Powers with their greatest victory of the war. The advancing German troops, meanwhile, received flank protection from the Habsburg Fourth Army on their northern flank, Third Army on the southern. This and the failure of the Gallipoli campaign would result in Bulgaria joining the Central Powers to crush Serbia in October, making 1915 a very successful year for Germany in particular. Austria-Hungary had finally been rescued from the debacle resulting from the disastrous Carpathian Mountain Winter War.

  Conclusion

  CONRAD VON HÖTZENDORF’S PLANS for a two-front war unraveled almost immediately upon his decision to implement a War Case Balkan mobilization. The determination to deploy 40 percent of Habsburg troops to crush Serbia and then engage the Russian colossus had serious ramifications for the k.u.k. army. Conrad’s misjudgments resulted in defeat on both fronts and left his armies demoralized.

  Political infighting between the Austrian and Hungarian parliaments allowed the empire’s military standing to languish between 1867 and 1914, in comp
arison to its Great Power neighbors. Consequently, the Dual Monarchy found itself with insufficient troop stands, obsolete artillery, an insufficient railroad network, and an industrial base too deficient to fight a total war.

  The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand produced consensus among Habsburg leaders to declare war against Serbia. A war with Russia was only feasible with German military assistance, but Conrad abhorred relying on Germany. The War Case “B” mobilization assured that Conrad’s armies struggled to achieve a sufficient concentration of forces against the numerically superior Russian armies. Habsburg armies received attack orders before all participating troop units arrived throughout the October and December 1914 campaigns, which resulted in excessive losses, particularly to the professional officer corps. Conrad’s three Carpathian winter campaigns were no exception, but now they had the added burden of inclement weather and winter mountain-terrain conditions.

  In addition to Habsburg Supreme Command’s inability to achieve a sufficient concentration of force against the powerful Russian armies, it failed to provide and coordinate effective artillery support to the infantry. Obsolete equipment, a poorly functioning supply system, and a chronic shortage of artillery shells placed the Habsburg army at a further disadvantage.

  By the end of 1914, only 45,000 of the initial one million Habsburg combat troops remained. The once-proud k.u.k. army, which had perished on the fields of Lemberg, continued bleeding in the fall campaigns until it more closely resembled a militia. At this juncture, Conrad chose the Carpathian Mountains for his next offensive operation. During the successful early December Limanova-Lapanov campaign, it became clear that Habsburg troops seriously required rehabilitation, reinforcements, weapons, and more artillery shells. Nevertheless, throughout the first half of 1915, Conrad sought a major battle of encirclement launched from Prussia and Galicia, although he lacked the necessary forces. His inability to meld his armies’ capabilities with his strategic battle plans was a major flaw of Conrad’s military leadership. Ignoring the admonitions of other military leaders including his German ally, Conrad pursued his Carpathian winter campaign. As we have seen, the consequences were tragic and multifold.

  A staunch proponent of the cult of the offensive, Conrad ordered massive frontal attacks, producing extreme and avoidable losses. The high casualty rates resulted in a major portion of the Habsburg army being composed of replacement troops or recruits.

  During October, November, and December, Austro-Hungarian and German units fought side by side in common operations. Commencing in October, General Conrad instigated a fateful process by attempting to outflank the Russians’ far western flank positions from his extreme right flank. This placed the Habsburg armies squarely in the Carpathian Mountains—terrain not intended for maneuvering massive armies. Moreover, Habsburg armies relieved the antiquated, long-neglected Fortress Przemyśl (which fell to the Russians in September 1914) for a brief period in early October. Russian troops besieged the fortification again the first week in November, transforming it into the focal point of General Conrad’s war planning until its surrender on 22 March 1915.

  In its first significant victory of the war, the Austro-Hungarian Army soundly defeated Russian forces at the battle of Limanova-Lapanov. Meanwhile, on the Balkan front, Habsburg forces suffered three humiliating defeats. At the end of 1914, the Habsburg military faced several critical problems. To seize the initiative, General Conrad determined to attack.

  The concern that the Russians would outflank Habsburg forces on their extreme right flank is understandable. Therefore, Conrad sought the initiative against a numerically superior foe possessing superior artillery, strong prepared positions on higher terrain, and, during much of the Carpathian campaign, more favorable road and railroad connections to their mountain positions.

  However, in his efforts to encircle the Russians’ extreme left flank positions, Conrad placed Fortress Przemyśl in the center of his strategy, resulting in the Carpathian Winter War—the first example of total warfare conducted on mountainous terrain. The horrendous losses sustained during this campaign equaled the bloodbath battles of 1916, Verdun and the Somme. There were no historical models to use while planning for such a campaign, although indications of its potential terrible consequences were evidenced during the November–December 1914 Carpathian Mountain warfare.

  The real tragedy was the mental and physical trauma on the hundreds of thousands of troops on both sides of the lines. Blizzards, freezing temperatures, intermittent sleet, wind, and snow intermixed with thawing conditions created a nightmarish existence. Enormous casualties resulted from sickness, frostbite, and the ominous White Death. Snow buried the wounded who could no longer stand. Others succumbed during the wrenching cart rides down mountain slopes. Some exhausted soldiers who dared to stop along the mountain trails froze to death. Maintaining a steady flow of supplies was almost impossible, with thousands of horses dying in the mire during the melting conditions and more succumbing to the exertion of pulling heavy loads up the snowand ice-covered paths without sufficient feed and cover.

  Austro-Hungarian soldiers invariably encountered a numerically superior enemy. Thus, as casualties mounted, and with no reserves or inadequate or no reinforcements to insert into the thinning front lines, gaps appeared that could not be closed. The soldiers could not be relieved for rehabilitation, as could their enemy.

  Much of the blame for the flawed Carpathian Winter War strategy can be placed on the Habsburg Supreme Command. All three campaigns shared common characteristics: there was an obvious lack of preparation and forethought in the planning that resulted in faulty decision making; there was a general failure to concentrate troop mass at the most significant attack points; and insufficient reserve troops were available to maintain momentum if victory occurred. The customary tactic of withdrawing troops from a nonthreatened area to reinforce one under attack foundered when the Russians struck entire army fronts, as occurred three days after the initial attack when the Russians launched their counterthrust on 26 January, and again immediately after the Second Army offensive in late February 1915.

  The German ally again had to rescue its floundering partner. The subsequent Gorlice–Tarnov offensive produced the greatest Central Powers victory of the war and relieved Russian pressure in the Carpathian Mountains. In addition, the success prevented czarist armies from sweeping into the Hungarian Plains, knocking Austria-Hungary out of the war and keeping neutral Romania from entering the war against the Dual Monarchy. However, just as the Gorlice victory train was gathering speed, Italy chose the inopportune moment to declare war on Austria-Hungary.

  Fortress Przemyśl, a major focus of early 1915 Carpathian campaigns, surrendered on 22 March 1915. The Habsburg Army sustained at least 800,000 casualties in its futile efforts to rescue the garrison of 120,000 men. By the time the fortress finally capitulated, the once-proud k.u.k. army was reduced to a militia army. Germany meanwhile extended its command structure into the Dual Monarchy’s military establishment, first in the creation of the South Army and then again with the deployment of the Beskiden Corps, which saved the Habsburg Third Army front from disaster in its extended Laborcz Valley campaign.

  The Stalingrad of World War I, the Carpathian Winter War decimated the k.u.k. army for the third time since July 1914. Snow and mud buried the corpses of hundreds of thousands of Russian, Habsburg, and German soldiers. For their struggles, Second and Third Army troops that survived the Carpathian disaster received a special battle commendation from Habsburg Supreme Command. One of the most ill-conceived campaigns of the war, the Carpathian Winter War offers far too many examples of how not to conduct winter mountain battle, and provided a stark lesson about the negative effects of inadequate leadership.

  NOTES

  Introduction

  1. Manfried Rauchensteiner, Der Tod des Doppeladlers (Vienna: Verlag Styria, 1993), is by far the best; cited in Holger Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914–1918 (New York: Arnold, 1997
), 139.

  2. Graydon A. Tunstall, “The Habsburg Command Conspiracy: The Falsification of Historiography on the Outbreak of World War I,” Austrian History Yearbook 27 (1996): 181–198.

  3. Kriegsarchiv (KA) Nachlaß (KAN), B/23, Karl Mayern, Die k.u.k. 2. Armee in der Karpatenschlacht, 1914/15.

  4. KAN Conrad (KANC), B/13, Rudolf Kundmann, Tagebuch vom 1/1 1915–4/XI 1916; KAN, B/509, Karl Schneller; Kriegstagebücher, 1914–1918; KA Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät (MKSM), separate fasc. No. 75, Conrad Letters to Bolfras.

  5. Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society, rev. ed. (New York: Back Bay Books, 2009).

  6. Ibid., 68.

  7. Ibid., 69.

  8. Graf Stefan Tisza, Briefe, 1914–1918 (Berlin: Reimer Hobbing, 1928), 50; Freiherr von Musulin, Der Haus am Ballplatz. Erinnerungen eines österreich-ungarischen Diplomaten (Munich: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1924), 254.

  9. KA Armee Ober Kommando (AOK), Operations Abteilung, fasc. 523, Festung Przemyśl; KAN, B/1137, Hermann Kusmanek von Burgstädten, No. 2, Przemyśl; KA MKSM, separat fasc. 100, particularly Reserve No. 1956; a massive manuscript by Franz Stuckheil, KA MS1.Wkg., 1915, Rußland, No. 19, Festung Przemyśl, and his eleven-article series about the fortress in the periodical Militärwissenschaftliche- und technische Mitteilungen (hereafter MTM). Monographs include Franz Forstner’s excellent Przemyśl. Österreich-Ungarns bedeutendste Festung (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1987); Herman Heiden, Bollwerk am San, Schicksal der Festung Przemyśl (Berlin: Gerhard Stalling, 1946); G. M. Hans Schwalb, “Die Verteidigung von Przemyśl, 1914–1915,” Mitteilungen über Gegenstücke des Artillerie und Geniewesens 149 (1918): 1373–1392.