Spetsnaz: The Inside Story of the Soviet Special Forces

by Viktor Suvorov

  latest equipment to sniffer dogs, which are used in enormous numbers.

  Apart from operating against real Soviet military targets, spetsnaz

  units go through courses at training centres where the conditions and

  atmosphere of the areas in which they will be expected to fight are

  reproduced with great fidelity. Models of Pluto, Pershing and Lance missiles

  and of Mirage-VI, Jaguar and other nuclear-armed aircraft are used to

  indicate the `enemy'. There is also artillery capable of firing nuclear

  shells, special kinds of vehicles used for transporting missiles, warheads,

  and so forth.

  The spetsnaz groups have to overcome many lines of defences, and any

  group that is caught by the defenders is subject to treatment that is rough

  enough to knock out of the men any desire to get caught in the future,

  either on manoeuvres or in a real battle. The spetsnaz soldier constantly

  has the thought drilled into him that being a prisoner is worse than death.

  At the same time he is taught that his aims are noble ones. First he is

  captured on manoeuvres and severely beaten, then he is shown archive film

  shot in concentration camps in the Second World War (the films are naturally

  more frightful than what can be perpetrated on manoeuvres), then he is

  released, but may be seized again and subject to a repeat performance. It is

  calculated that, in a fairly short time the soldier will develop a very

  strong negative reaction to the idea of being a prisoner, and the certainty

  that death -- a noble death, in the cause of spetsnaz -- is preferable.

  ___

  One one occasion following my flight to the West I was present at some

  large-scale military manoeuvres in which the armies of many Western

  countries took part. The standard of battle training made a very favourable

  impression on me. I was particularly impressed by the skilful, I would even

  say masterly, way the units camouflaged themselves. The battle equipment,

  the tanks and other vehicles, and the armoured personnel carriers are

  painted with something that does not reflect the sunlight; the colour is

  very cleverly chosen; and the camouflaging is painted in such a way that it

  is difficult to make out the vehicle even at a short distance and its

  outline mixes in with the background. But every army made one enormous

  mistake with the camouflaging of some of the vehicles, which had huge white

  circles and red crosses painted on their sides. I explained to the Western

  officers that the red and white colours were very easily seen at a distance,

  and that it would be better to use green paint. I was told that the vehicles

  with the red cross were intended for transporting the wounded, which I knew

  perfectly well. That was a good reason, I said, why the crosses should be

  painted out or made very much smaller. Please be human, I said. You are

  transporting a wounded man and you must protect him by every means. Then

  protect him. Hide him. Make sure the Communists can't see him.

  The argument continued and I did not win the day. Later, other Western

  officers tried to explain to me that I was simply ignorant of the

  international agreement about these things. You are not allowed to fire on a

  vehicle with a red cross. I agreed that I was ignorant and knew nothing

  about these agreements. But like me, the Soviet soldier is also unaware of

  those agreements. Those big red crosses are painted so that the Soviet

  soldier can see them and not fire on them. But the Soviet soldier only knows

  that a red cross means something medical. Nobody has ever told him he was

  not to shoot at a red cross.

  I learnt about this strange rule, that red crosses must not be shot at,

  quite by chance. When I was still a Soviet officer, I was reading a book

  about Nazi war criminals and amongst the charges made was the assertion that

  the Nazis had sometimes fired on cars and trains bearing a red cross. I

  found this very interesting, because I could not understand why such an act

  was considered a crime. A war was being fought and one side was trying to

  destroy the other. In what way did trains and cars with red crosses differ

  from the enemy's other vehicles?

  I found the answer to the question quite independently, but not in the

  Soviet regulations. Perhaps there is an answer to the question there, but,

  having served in the Soviet Army for many years and having sat for dozens of

  examinations at different levels, I have never once come across any

  reference to the rule that a soldier may not fire at a red cross. At

  manoeuvres I often asked my commanding officers, some of them very

  high-ranking, in a very provocative way what would happen if an enemy

  vehicle suddenly appeared with a red cross on it. I was always answered in a

  tone of bewilderment. A Soviet officer of very high rank who had graduated

  from a couple of academies could not understand what difference it made if

  there were a red cross. Soviet officers have never been told its complete

  significance. I never bothered to put the question to any of my

  subordinates.

  I graduated from the Military-Diplomatic Academy, and did not perform

  badly there. In the course of my studies I listened attentively to all the

  lectures and was always waiting for someone among my teachers (many of them

  with general's braid and many years' experience in international affairs) to

  say something about the red cross. But I learnt only that the International

  Red Cross organisation is located in Geneva, directly opposite the Permanent

  Representation of the USSR in United Nations agencies, and that the

  organisation, like any other international organisation, can be used by

  officers of the Soviet Intelligence services as a cover for their

  activities.

  For whose benefit do the armies of the West paint those huge red

  crosses on their ambulances? Try painting a red cross on your back and

  chest, and going into the forest in winter. Do you think the red cross will

  save you from being attacked by wolves? Of course not. The wolves do not

  know your laws and do not understand your symbols. So why do you use a

  symbol the meaning of which the enemy has no idea?

  In the last war the Communists did not respect international

  conventions and treaties, but some of their enemies, with many centuries of

  culture and excellent traditions, failed equally to respect international

  laws. Since then the Red Army has used the red cross symbol, painted very

  small, as a sign to tell its own soldiers where the hospital is. The red

  cross needs only to be visible to their own men. The Red Army has no faith

  in the goodwill of the enemy.

  International treaties and conventions have never saved anybody from

  being attacked. The Ribbentrop-Molotov pact is a striking example. It did

  not protect the Soviet Union. But if Hitler had managed to invade the

  British Isles the pact would not have protected Germany either. Stalin said

  quite openly on this point: `War can turn all agreements of any kind upside

  down.'^1 <#fn_11_1>

  ^1 Pravda, 15 September 1927.

  The Soviet leadership and the Soviet diplomatic service adopt a

  philosophical attitude to all a
greements. If one trusts a friend there is no

  need for a treaty; friends do not need to rely on treaties to call for

  assistance. If one is weaker than one's enemy a treaty will not be any use

  anyway. And if one is stronger than one's enemy, what is the point of

  observing a treaty? International treaties are just an instrument of

  politics and propaganda. The Soviet leadership and the Soviet Army put no

  trust in any treaties, believing only in the force that is behind the

  treaties.

  Thus the enormous red cross on the side of a military vehicle is just a

  symbol of Western naivete and faith in the force of protocols, paragraphs,

  signatures and seals. Since Western diplomats have signed these treaties

  they ought to insist that the Soviet Union, having also signed them, should

  explain to its soldiers, officers and generals what they contain, and should

  include in its official regulations special paragraphs forbidding certain

  acts in war. Only then would there be any sense in painting on the huge red

  crosses.

  The red cross is only one example. One needs constantly to keep in mind

  what Lenin always emphasised: that a dictatorship relies on force and not on

  the law. `The scientific concept of dictatorship means power, limited in no

  way, by no laws and restrained by absolutely no rules, and relying directly

  on force.'^2 <#fn_11_2>

  ^2 Lenin, Vol. 25, p. 441.

  Spetsnaz is one of the weapons of a dictatorship. Its battle training

  is imbued with just one idea: to destroy the enemy. It is an ambition which

  is not subject to any diplomatic, juridical, ethical or moral restraints.

  --------

  Chapter 11. Behind Enemy Lines: Spetsnaz Tactics

  Before spetsnaz units can begin active operations behind the enemy's

  lines they have to get there. The Soviet high command has the choice of

  either sending spetsnaz troops behind the enemy's lines before the outbreak

  of war, or sending them there after war has broken out. In the first case

  the enemy may discover them, realise that war has already begun and possibly

  press the buttons to start a nuclear war -- pre-empting the Soviet Union.

  But if spetsnaz troops are sent in after the outbreak of war, it may be too

  late. The enemy may already have activated its nuclear capability, and then

  there will be nothing to put out of action in the enemy's rear: the missiles

  will be on their way to Soviet territory. One potential solution to the

  dilemma is that the better, smaller part of spetsnaz -- the professional

  athletes -- arrives before all-out war starts, taking extreme measures not

  to be discovered, while the standard units penetrate behind enemy lines

  after war has started.

  ___

  In every Soviet embassy there are two secret organisations -- the KGB

  rezidentura and the GRU rezidentura. The embassy and the KGB rezidentura are

  guarded by officers of the KGB frontier troops, but in cases where the GRU

  rezidentura has a complement of more than ten officers, it has its own

  internal spetsnaz guard. Before the outbreak of a war, in some cases several

  months previously, the number of spetsnaz officers in a Soviet embassy may

  be substantially increased, to the point where practically all the auxiliary

  personnel in the embassy, performing the duties of guards, cleaners,

  radio-operators, cooks and mechanics, will be spetsnaz athletes. With them,

  as their `wives', women athletes from spetsnaz may turn up in the embassy.

  Similar changes of staff may take place in the many other Soviet bodies --

  the consulate, the commercial representation, the offices of Aeroflot,

  Intourist, TASS, Novosti and so forth.

  The advantages of this arrangement are obvious, but it is not without

  its dangers. The principal danger lies in the fact that these new terrorist

  groups are based right in the centre of the country's capital city,

  uncomfortably close to government offices and surveillance. But within days,

  possibly within hours, before the outbreak of war they can, with care, make

  contact with the spetsnaz agent network and start a real war in the very

  centre of the city, using hiding places already prepared.

  Part of their support will come from other spetsnaz groups which have

  recently arrived in the country in the guise of tourists, teams of sportsmen

  and various delegations. And at the very last moment large groups of

  fighting men may suddenly appear out of Aeroflot planes, ships in port,

  trains and Soviet long-distance road transport (`Sovtransavto').

  Simultaneously there may be a secret landing of spetsnaz troops from Soviet

  submarines and surface vessels, both naval and merchant. (Small fishing

  vessels make an excellent means of transport for spetsnaz. They naturally

  spend long periods in the coastal waters of foreign states and do not arouse

  suspicion, so spetsnaz groups can spend a long time aboard and can easily

  return home if they do not get an order to make a landing). At the critical

  moment, on receipt of a signal, they can make a landing on the coast using

  aqualungs and small boats. Spetsnaz groups arriving by Aeroflot can adopt

  much the same tactics. In a period of tension, a system of regular watches

  may be introduced. This means that among the passengers on every plane there

  will be a group of commandos. Having arrived at their intended airport and

  not having been given a signal, they can remain aboard the aircraft and go

  back on the next flight. Next day another group will make the trip, and so

  on. One day the signal will come, and the group will leave the plane and

  start fighting right in the country's main airport. Their main task is to

  capture the airport for the benefit of a fresh wave of spetsnaz troops or

  airborne units (VDV).

  It is a well-known fact that the `liberation' of Czechoslovakia in

  August 1968 began with the arrival at Prague airport of Soviet military

  transport planes with VDV troops on board. The airborne troops did not need

  parachutes; the planes simply landed at the airport. Before the troops

  disembarked there was a moment when both the aircraft and their passengers

  were completely defenceless. Was the Soviet high command not taking a risk?

  No, because the fact is that by the time the planes landed, Prague airport

  had already been largely paralysed by a group of `tourists' who had arrived

  earlier.

  Spetsnaz groups may turn up in the territory of an enemy from the

  territory of neutral states. Before the outbreak of war or during a war

  spetsnaz groups may penetrate secretly into the territory of neutral states

  and wait there for an agreed signal or until a previously agreed time. One

  of the advantages of this is that the enemy does not watch over his

  frontiers with neutral countries as carefully as he does over his frontiers

  with Communist countries. The arrival of a spetsnaz group from a neutral

  state may pass unnoticed both by the enemy and the neutral state.

  But what happens if the group is discovered on neutral territory? The

  answer is simple: the group will go into action in the same way as in enemy

  territory -- avoid being followed, kill any witnesses, use force and cunning

 
to halt any pursuers. They will make every effort to ensure that nobody from

  the group gets into the hands of their pursuers and not to leave any

  evidence about to show that the group belongs to the armed forces of the

  USSR. If the group should be captured by the authorities of the neutral

  state, Soviet diplomacy has enormous experience and some well-tried

  counter-moves. It may admit its mistake, make an official apology and offer

  compensation for any damage caused; it may declare that the group lost its

  way and thought it was already in enemy territory; or it may accuse the

  neutral state of having deliberately seized a group of members of the Soviet

  armed forces on Soviet territory for provocative purposes, and demand

  explanations, apologies and compensation, accompanied by open threats.

  Experience has shown that this last plan is the most reliable. The

  reader should not dismiss it lightly. Soviet official publications wrote at

  the beginning of December 1939 that war was being waged against Finland in

  order to establish a Communist regime there, and a Communist government of

  `people's Finland' had already been formed. Thirty years later Soviet

  marshals were writing that it was not at all like that: the Soviet Union was

  simply acting in self-defence. The war against Finland, which was waged from

  the first to the last day on Finnish territory, is now described as

  `repelling Finnish aggression and even as `fulfilling the plan for

  protecting our frontiers.

  The Soviet Union is always innocent: it only repels perfidious

  aggressors. On other people's territory.

  ___

  The principal way of delivering the main body of spetsnaz to the

  enemy's rear after the outbreak of war is to drop them by parachute. In the

  course of his two years' service every spetsnaz soldier makes thirty-five to

  forty parachute jumps. Spetsnaz professionals and officers have much greater

  experience with parachutes; some have thousands of jumps to their credit.

  The parachute is not just a weapon and a form of transport. It also

  acts as a filter which courageous soldiers will pass through, but weak and

  cowardly men will not. The Soviet Government spends enormous sums on the

  development of parachute jumping as a sport. This is the main base from

  which the airborne troops and spetsnaz are built up. On 1 January 1985 the