Target Switzerland

by Stephen P. Halbrook

  In the Soviet Union, the Germans had made one last attempt to deal a crippling blow to the Red Army, at Kursk, resulting in history’s greatest tank battle. On July 15, after ten days of heavy casualties, the attack was called off, and the Soviets immediately launched a series of counteroffensives. Even as the panzers gave ground, key units were pulled from the front and transferred to Italy. The Germans would never regain the strategic initiative in the East. Although the Swiss cheered any Wehrmacht defeat, the spectre of the main Nazi armies falling back on central Europe for defense implied a new and dangerous development.

  With its “unlimited will for independence,” Switzerland would have been a rebellious province had she been in the New Order, and in any event was “an enemy to the Reich” and was in “solidarity with the suppressed nations,” in the words of the Swiss Shooting Federation (SSV).63 These published comments no doubt confirmed to the Gestapo that the names of the SSV leadership must be on the list of persons to execute when the invasion came.

  The Allies completed their liberation of Sicily on August 17, although the German defenders had effected an evacuation to the mainland with most of their equipment during the preceding week. Mussolini’s fall intensified bombings of Italian ports, including Genoa, from which the Swiss had shipped goods for the American market. Business Week reported that “Swiss trade may now be reaching the end of the line.”64

  The British Eighth Army landed on the boot of southern Italy on September 3. Five days later the American Fifth landed farther up the coast, at Salerno, south of Naples. That same day the secret armistice between the Allies and Italy was announced. The security of northern Italy now became critical for Germany, and its factories ran overtime to turn out munitions for the Wehrmacht.65 Shortly after the capitulation, almost 4,000 Italian civilians and thousands of escaped Allied prisoners of war entered Switzerland.66

  After the Allied invasion of Italy, the Germans concluded that a decisive battle would eventually take place for “Fortress Europe,” in which Switzerland might be forced to play a role.67 The Germans continued to debate their Italian strategy. Field Marshal Rommel advocated falling back to defend the Alpine mountain passes in the north— a strategy that would have put Switzerland near the front line. Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, however, convinced Hitler that the Allies could be held off during the coming winter in the mountainous terrain south of Rome.

  On September 13, the SS accomplished the daring rescue of Mussolini, who was being held captive and waiting to be turned over to the Allies. The Führer set up a new fascist government in northern Italy under the Duce.68 Since Italy’s surrender could have sent German or Italian troops rushing into Swiss territory, on September 15 partial remobilization was ordered in Switzerland. The Swiss anticipated that the Wehrmacht might launch a surprise attack to seize the key positions protecting the passages to the center of the Alps in an attempt to keep transit lines open.69

  A broadcast to America from the Swiss Schwarzenburg station on September 16 asserted:

  Now that Italy has capitulated and the northern Italian territories have been occupied by German troops, the Swiss situation has become very difficult. She is now dealing not with just one coalition, but with just one country. The customs officers of that one country control all possible openings with the outside world. Switzerland must, therefore, now suffer from the effects of the counter-blockade and stop all economic exchange with America. It is not yet possible to measure fully all the consequences of this new situation. In any case, just one word describes it: “Encirclement.”70

  On September 17, officials in Bern denied a rumor that the Swiss government had received an ultimatum demanding transit privileges for German troops through Switzerland. Messages communicated by means of diplomatic circles in Stockholm contained information that, after setbacks to the Allies at Salerno, the Germans had demanded passage for the Wehrmacht. It was believed that the Swiss refused, but that the Germans would not take no for an answer. Even if the Swiss blew up the St. Gotthard and Simplon tunnels, the German high command was said to have planned to use the roads across these passes, built by Napoleon, which could carry artillery. The routes through Austria and France by which reinforcements could be sent were considered vulnerable to Allied air attack. While German control over northern Italy isolated Switzerland more than ever before, in the face of this imminent danger the Swiss mobilization demonstrated the nation’s resolve to maintain neutrality and prevent any passage by belligerents through her territory.71

  Now that the war was at their doorstep, the Swiss were never more determined.72 Heretofore, Hitler believed Guisan’s warnings that Switzerland would be defended at all costs, allowing her to avoid the fate of the other neutrals. But Switzerland was now even more of a prize than in 1939–40, for she separated the Reich from its own forces in Italy.73 Switzerland was a natural path for both reinforcements and retreat.

  On September 26, Federal Councillor Karl Kobelt, chief of the Department of Defense, told a gathering of women in St. Gallen:

  There can never be and must never be any doubt but that we will categorically reject any demand for passage through Switzerland by troops of a foreign country. Should an attempt be made to force such a passage, we will resist with arms.74

  The Swiss predicament was treated with understanding in the September issue of the Yale Review, which contended that “Swiss political sympathies . . . are reflected by the relative accuracy of her antiaircraft batteries. Only two British planes have been shot down, but some fifteen German planes have been brought down by their fire.”75

  While forced to conform to numerous German economic demands, Switzerland’s independence was protected by her ability to destroy her mountain tunnels and by her democratic army, which could hold out for a very long time:

  Stores of ammunition have been hidden in rocks and crevices, during the past four years, large enough to enable the Swiss to carry on a savage guerrilla warfare. . . . Swiss artillery is embedded in crevices at an altitude of 10,000 feet, where it is inaccessible to tanks and unassailable from the air.

  The author of the article noted that if a poll were taken “to determine whether the Swiss people want a victory of the Anglo-Americans or of the Germans, 95 percent would be in favor of the United States and Great Britain.”76

  Due to the change in Switzerland’s position after the German occupation of northern Italy, trade by the Swiss again became a vital question for the Allies. In a secret memorandum dated November 29, entitled “Trade with Switzerland,” representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff pointed out to their American counterparts:

  The British Chiefs of Staff attach considerable importance to the military advantages they now derive from Swiss neutrality and are anxious that our policy towards Switzerland should aim at ensuring that these advantages are neither discontinued nor curtailed.

  These advantages include the following:

  Switzerland is an important source of intelligence.

  Switzerland is the protecting power for prisoners of war. In addition to their official duties as protecting power the Swiss render many valuable services to our prisoners, e.g., the distribution of parcels to prison camps and assistance to escaped and escaping prisoners.

  Certain valuable materials of importance to the war effort find their way to us from Switzerland with the connivance of the authorities. These materials include special R.A.F. plotting equipment, jewels for instruments, machine tools, stop-watches and theodolites to the value of some £300,000 per year.

  The British Chiefs of Staff accordingly hope that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff will support the proposals which have been made by the British Government for the dispatch of certain supplies for the Swiss Army.77

  Tough negotiations over trade issues persisted throughout the year. Winfield Riefler, America’s chief negotiator, warned the Department of State about blacklisting: “When we threaten to list such firms, therefore, we simply force them to choose between Axis orders which they have the a
bility to fill and overseas orders, the continuation of which are uncertain because of Germany’s counter-blockade.”78

  In the trade agreement of December 19, 1943, the Swiss met most Allied demands.79 Swiss exports to Germany, particularly arms and machine parts, were sharply curtailed. The Allies restored the quotas for food, but could not guarantee the supply of scarce items needed for survival. Thus, as a result, trade with Germany was decreased without equivalent increases in Allied trade.80

  As late as 1943, the Waffen SS had not abandoned its earlier plans for an attack. The circles around Himmler hoped for an opportunity to retaliate against Switzerland for her anti–National Socialist stance. Preparations for an invasion plan were assigned to SS General Hermann Böhme, who became chief of the Austrian military intelligence service after the Anschluss. Böhme, who was knowledgeable about Switzerland as a result of his intelligence work, drafted his plan, entitled “Thoughts Concerning the Defense Situation of Switzerland in Event of a German Armed Intervention,” in late 1943.81 It is a highly important document, demonstrating how high-ranking Nazis regarded Switzerland during the war. In brief, they were both impressed with her capacity for resistance and angered at her refusal to be drawn into the New Order and particularly at her support for the Allies.

  Böhme analyzed the changing military situation since 1938 and how it had affected the Swiss. Germany’s 1940 victory in France had had profound effects on Switzerland. Deeply impressed by the great efficiency of the German Army, the Swiss Army leadership tried to adapt its forces to new military realities. Switzerland had two difficulties: first, she had to impress Germany with the speed of her military adaptability, and second, she had to obtain German approval to import the material required for her armament. Böhme described the Swiss rejection of the New Order:

  Although expectations would have been that the new military- political situation in Europe would also lead to a total alteration of Swiss politics in all areas, reports only showed too clearly, however, that internal politics degenerated into a peculiar defensive posture. The visible consequence is the Réduit: fight, instead of putting itself entirely into the concerns of the new Europe.82

  As a result of her rejection of the “New Europe,” Böhme noted, Switzerland failed to join the crusade against the Soviet Union. No significant number of Swiss volunteers joined. Yet Switzerland should have known that the realities of political power in 1941 made survival “dependent in first instance on the will of the German Reich.” The Reich’s late 1942 seizure of Vichy France demonstrated again that Switzerland was surrounded on all sides by territory under German control. Yet the Swiss continued their efforts to decrease dependence on German influence. Their food supply in particular was rearranged, as much as possible, to rely on domestic production.83

  One could not expect, Böhme continued, a reversal of the Swiss mood after 1942 brought the Allied invasion of North Africa and the German setbacks in the East. Yet the Swiss resistance to Germany’s potential power remained baffling, as the following demonstrated:

  The defense against Allied flights over Swiss territory is insufficient in view of the existing possibilities.

  A bulk of news reporting in broadcasting and the press is anti-German. Germany has no good press in Switzerland.

  The granting of asylum to so-called refugees and the presence of large numbers of Allied intelligence services greatly damage German-Swiss relationships.

  By its numerous interconnections of Swiss capital with foreign countries, Switzerland is organized in the interests of the Allied forces more and more. A German victory in Europe would have disastrous consequences for that Swiss capital.

  Members of German-friendly army circles, who always give an assurance of strict neutrality, fall cold.84

  Anticipating that the Allies might include Switzerland within their strategic plans, Böhme asked: “How can Switzerland be conquered quickly by military force under the present realities?” He proceeded to consider in detail the strength of Swiss national defense, recognizing that the Swiss Army had a great tradition which utilized the power of the people. While there were 470,000 soldiers to contend with in 1939, there would be 550,000 by the end of 1943. He calculated four corps with 10 to 12 divisions, including light brigades, mountain brigades and border troops. The troops were geared toward infantry. Domestic industry supplied the army with good quantities of firearms, machine guns to 34mm, cannon to 120mm, ammunition and motor vehicles. The air force had only 250 planes and no bombers. Fortifications both in the interior and at the borders had greatly increased.85

  Swiss weaknesses, on the other hand, included the inexperience of the army in combat, insufficient tanks and air power, and the nearness of industry to combat zones. Yet the value of the Swiss Army should not be underrated. Böhme wrote:

  The fighting spirit of Swiss soldiers is very high, and we will have to equate it approximately to that of the Finns. A people that produces good gymnasts also produces good soldiers. The unconditional patriotism of the Swiss is beyond doubt. Despite the militia system, the shooting instruction is better than, for example, in the former Austrian Federal Army with 18 months term of service.86

  General Böhme obviously had a high regard for the resistance spirit of Switzerland.87 In stressing that losses would be heavy because the Swiss were first-class shots, Böhme’s impressions reflected exactly what Swiss defensive strategy aimed to make known to potential enemies.88

  Since 1939, Böhme continued, numerous Swiss units of all weapons types had the opportunity to become proficient. While the Swiss lacked combat experience, they would be fighting in familiar terrain. If Switzerland could survive the critical first weeks, numerous combat-experienced troops would be available.89

  Swiss armament was insufficient in many ways, he observed, but the high command effectively promoted up-to-date training and arming, and, just as the Germans, the Swiss would improvise in making the best possible use of arms. Strong border fortifications which had been built since 1938 were an obstacle and would make up for other deficiencies. Thorough destruction near the border would create serious barriers. The Réduit would provide a strong defense and guarantee reserves.90

  The goal of an attack, Böhme was certain, must be to take complete possession of an intact Switzerland. An armed intervention was not profitable unless Swiss industry was captured undamaged, electric power and railways were intact and there was a population willing and able to work. The reprovisioning of Germany being a high priority, it would not be advisable to undertake a military operation that would transform Switzerland into a desert.91

  The German planner anticipated that it would take a large number of Axis forces to overcome the resistance of the Swiss troops defending the steep Alpine Réduit.92 Even after the conquest of the Swiss, Böhme acknowledged, permanent German security forces would be required to guarantee the pacification of the country.93

  Böhme detailed two operations to be executed independently of each other. Operation I would have the main focus of attack in the north with occupation of the Mittelland, swift occupation of the Swiss airfields, and capture of the mass of the Swiss Army. Operation II would penetrate the Réduit with paratroopers, mountain troops, and ground forces. It would be incumbent that, in the first 72 hours, the paratroopers cut off the Plateau from the Réduit. The Luftwaffe would fend off any possible Allied bomber attacks.94

  SS General Hermann Böhme’s attack plan against Switzerland completed in December 1943 after the Germans had occupied northern Italy. Recommended for execution in August 1944, the Allied invasion of Normandy in June rendered the plan moot. (Adapted from Kurz, Die Schweiz in der Planung, 51.)

  The actual operations and places of attack proposed by Böhme were highly detailed. He recommended a surprise attack from all sides with fifteen divisions. Casualties were expected to be twenty percent. The attack would be conducted in the summer of 1944, preferably in August.95

  The Allied invasion of Normandy in June 1944, two months before the rec
ommended time of Böhme’s plan of operations, would render the plan inoperable.96 But that was in the unforeseeable future. For now, General Guisan’s Christmas message to the soldiers at St. Gotthard included the watchwords: “Double our vigilance, hold the rifle tightly in our hand!”97

  Chapter 9

  1944

  War at the Border

  THE NEW YEAR OPENED WITH A DRAMATIC CONFIRMATION OF the continuing Nazi threat. A Luftwaffe twin-engine plane flying over the Bernese Jura Mountains responded with gunfire to Swiss orders to land. In the dogfight that followed, Swiss fighters shot it down.1

  War Department Minister Karl Kobelt, in a speech at Winterthur on January 24, expressed confidence that Switzerland could protect her independence because of

  an extraordinarily high number of small strongpoints, countless mined objectives, and sufficient quantities of arms, ammunition and war materials, including food, all stored at scientifically chosen central points, to enable us not only to bring the battle to the enemy if we are attacked but also to live, fight and hold in the interior of Fortress Switzerland. We are on guard and are ready for anything.2

  The same day, the government announced that “in view of the present necessities, a large part of the 19-year-old class will receive military instruction immediately.”3

  At the beginning of 1944, there were 16,000 German nationals in Switzerland. Desperate for manpower, Berlin called almost all able-bodied citizens home from various countries for war conscription that year. It is noteworthy that the Germans allowed some 12,600 to remain in Switzerland, the fifth column card that they believed might need to be played.4

  Swiss trade with the belligerents continued during 1944. Both the Allies and the Axis needed Swiss products and had an interest in allowing Switzerland access to raw materials. Both sides had servicemen interned in Switzerland and thus had greater incentive to preserve Swiss neutrality.5