The Legacy of the Crash

by Terrence Casey

  The question of what might be a successful strategy for the left in the future is inevitably highly speculative; we will know what works for the left only after it has succeeded. One point, however, is clear and obvious: the GFC seemed to provide the center-left with an unexpected opportunity for dominance but that has proved to be an illusory promise.

  References

  Alter, Jonathan (2010) The Promise; President Obama Year One (New York: Simon and Schuster).

  Blair, Tony (2010) A Journey: My Political Life (New York: Alfred Knopf).

  Bradbury, Katherine, and Jane Katz (2009) ‘Trends In US Family Income Mobility 1967–2004’, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working Papers 09–7.

  Campbell, James E., et al. (2011) ‘Postmortems of the 2010 Midterm Election Forecasts’, PS: Political Science and Politics, 44, 1–6.

  CBS News Poll (2009) May, www.cbsnews.com/.

  Clarke, Harold, David Sanders, Marianne C. Stewart and Paul F. Whitely (2009) Performance, Politics and the British Voter (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press).

  Crewe, Ivor, and Anthony S. King (2010) ‘On the Causes of Domestic Policy Failure in UK Government’. Paper presented to the Annual Convention of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, September 2010.

  Curtice, John, and Alison Park (2011) ‘A Tale of Two Crises: Banks, M.P.s’ Expenses and Public Opinion’, in British Social Attitudes 27th Report (London: Sage).

  Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2010) The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States (Washington, DC: GPO).

  Hacker, Jacob S. (2002) The Divided Welfare State: The Struggle Over Public and Private Social Benefits in the United States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

  Hacker, Jacob (2006) The Great Risk Shift: The Assault on American Families, Jobs, Health Care and Retirement and How You Can Fight Back (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

  Hacker, Jacob S., and Paul Pierson (2010) Winner Take All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer and Turned its Back on the Middle Class (New York: Simon and Schuster).

  Hall, Peter, and David Soskice (eds) (2001) Varieties of Capitalism; The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

  King, Anthony S. (ed.) (1998) New Labour Triumphs: Britain at the Polls (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House).

  Lindblom Charles E. (1977) Politics and Markets: The World’s Political and Economic Systems (New York: Basic).

  McKinsey Global Institute (2010) Debt and Deleveraging; The Global Credit Bubble and Its Economic Consequences (McKinsey).

  Rodgers, Daniel T. (1998) Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

  Sorkin, Andrew Ross (2010) Too Big To Fail: The Inside Story of How Wall Street and Washington Fought to Save the Financial System – And Themselves (New York: Viking).

  Washington Post (2008) ‘GOP Doubts, Fears “Post Partisan” Obama’, 7 January.

  Wilson, Graham K. (2011) ‘The British General Election of 2010’, Forum, 8, Article 1, Berkeley Electronic Press.

  8

  Third Parties and Political Dynamics in the UK and the US

  Arthur I. Cyr

  Two countries, two systems

  The differences between politics in the United Kingdom and in the United States are both obvious and subtle, providing a relatively wide range of opportunities for comparative analysis. The quip that Britain and America contain two populations separated by a common language is popular because the observation is not only insightful but also readily applicable to a range of experiences, from daily life to more complex encounters. Because cultural differences are relatively subtle, comparative research can become particularly challenging.

  Following the Second World War, the established tradition of praising Britain’s political system for effectiveness and party responsibility continued for a time, but was challenged relatively quickly. A new, more negative attitude was a function of both the drastically weakened economic condition of the nation, and the replacement by the US as principal maritime and military power with great global reach. The established party system seemed unable to initiate public policy departures effectively to arrest long-term decline, either internationally in perceived power and influence, or domestically in deteriorating standards of living and industrial production. A corollary trend involved renewed emphasis on perceived strengths and advantages of political dynamics in the United States, reflected with persuasive though differing insights in the work of Leon Epstein, Samuel P. Huntington, Kenneth Waltz and others (Epstein, 1980; Huntington, 1957; Waltz, 1967, especially chapter 3).

  This chapter evaluates the respective fates in the 2010 elections of the Liberal Democrats in the UK and the Tea Party in the US. Both political movements gained extraordinary attention in the mass media. The Liberal Democrats did not significantly increase their vote, but nonetheless held the balance of power in the House of Commons, and joined the Conservatives in the first Coalition government in Britain since the Second World War. More Tea Party candidates lost than won election, but the movement emerged as a significant faction of the Republican Party, especially in the House of Representatives. On the surface, support for a party or informal association distinctive from the major parties does not appear to be a logical or rational choice, at least on the most obvious level of participating in political formations closest to or most engaged with the power to govern. Surely for a vote to count it should be cast for one or the other of the two major parties. That at least is the argument used in both countries by major-party partisans to dissuade unconventional voting. Political activism, however, encompasses a variety of drives and incentives. Emotional and moral, as well as more dispassionate and pragmatic, sentiments define political participation in total by activists and voters. Whether or not a particular party is likely to secure actual governing power may be a principal consideration for large sections of the electorate, but not necessarily the only one, even for voters who are attempting to make a rational calculation of how their individual votes can be translated into influencing the outcome. Voters demonstrate significant incentives running from dispassionate evaluation of which party’s policies are most in line with their own views, to being drawn to the charisma of a particular candidate and how that individual articulates a message more in personal than substantive terms. That helps to explain the appeal of third parties relatively far removed from power. For example, Professor Bryan Caplan, in his economist’s study of electoral options, quotes Lewis Carroll’s classic Through the Looking Glass to explain the complexity of human drives: ‘“I can’t believe that!” said Alice. “Can’t you?” the Queen said in a pitying tone. “Try again: draw a long breath, and shut your eyes.”’ (Caplan, 2007, p. 115).

  Third parties in the US historically have pursued distinctive policy initiatives, which in turn often have been adopted by one or the other of the two major parties. Walter Dean Burnham, in a now classic work, persuasively analyzed the proposition that third parties can be indicators of strategic party realignment in the US (Burnham, 1971). A variety of other scholars and more informal observers have developed these points. A principal argument developed herein is that both the Liberal Democrats and the Tea Party currently are performing this function in Britain and the US, though so far with contrasting consequences which reflect the different party structures and political cultures involved. Additionally, the inability of either the Conservatives or Labour to win a clear House of Commons majority in the 2010 general election reflects very broad growth of third party movements in Britain, including but reaching well beyond the Liberal Democrats per se (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010, pp. 385–9). By contrast, the Tea Party has operated within the context of the Republican Party, at least so far.

  Arguably, third parties historically have been more prominent in the US than in Britain. In the US, the twentieth century witnessed Theodo
re Roosevelt’s Bull Moose Party, the independent Progressive Party presidential candidacy of Robert LaFollette, the Dixiecrat nomination of Stom Thurmond in 1948, and Ross Perot’s presidential candidacy in 1992 and 1996. The last major party realignment in Britain occurred with the rise of the Labour Party early in the twentieth century. However, Britain has been experiencing significant expansion in number and support for small parties beyond the established major parties.

  Liberal Democrats and Conservative ‘Tea Party’

  There are very obvious differences in history and structure between the two political organizations which are the focus of this study. The Liberal Democrats are heirs to an impressive political history of major party role and rule in the nineteenth century, along with the long-term frustrations experienced by the Liberal Party in the twentieth century and the short-term spiral from political birth to extinction of the Social Democratic Party. However much frustrated over the years in efforts to achieve governing power, especially in general elections, the Liberal Democrats are a clearly defined and well established party, with a national organization and membership. The party also has established procedures for leadership and candidate selection. While arguably not as rigorous or disciplined as the Conservative and Labour Parties, they are nonetheless a competitor roughly on a par with these two dominant political organizations (Cyr, 1977, pp. 24–5, 188–9).

  The Liberal Democrats fought the 2010 general election following relatively dramatic leadership turnover and some turmoil. Leader Charles Kennedy had been overthrown from within following the 2005 general election because of growing concern, even among his inner circle of strongest supporters, that he was not effective as a leader. Some argued that, beyond a publicized weakness for alcohol, his leadership style was inherently relatively disengaged, more chairman than chief executive. Reflecting the power of the modern media, simmering discontent became a major internal leadership crisis when at the start of 2006 the Liberal Democrats learned that the Independent Television Network (ITN) was about to run an exposé on the internal controversy over Kennedy, with very specific quotes from unnamed party members. After several days of internal party strife, centered on revolt among Liberal Democrats in Parliament, Kennedy was out. His successor, Sir Menzies ‘Ming’ Campbell, provided a study in contrasts with Kennedy, who had personified youth and, to his critics, immaturity as well. Campbell was senior and sober by whatever definitions one chooses. He also shrewdly emphasized teamwork in his campaign for the top post, underscoring the vital mission for any seasoned executive of bringing along younger talent and encouraging potential successors. He secured support from a majority of the Liberal Democratic MPs, and in the leadership election among party members was victorious by a comfortable margin. However, two of his competitors were forced to withdraw in the wake of public revelations regarding their personal behavior. Dennis Kavanagh and Philip Cowley note that in combination with publicity about Kennedy’s problem with alcohol, that meant ‘Many within the party were worried that these revelations … were beginning to turn the Liberal Democrats into a laughing stock’ (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010, p. 99). This was more than an immediate concern. During decades in the wilderness as a small party, the Liberal Party had to battle constantly against an image of eccentricity and a reputation for erratic behavior. Former party leader Jeremy Thorpe had been involved in a particularly disturbing personal scandal and trial in the 1970s (Cyr, 1988, p. 122).1

  Campbell soon ran into problems of his own in maintaining leadership. In the ruling Labour Party, Gordon Brown succeeded Tony Blair as prime minister. The new prime minister quickly made moves to sound out Liberal Democrats about participating in a possible Coalition government. Campbell, apparently following the advice of his very close adviser Lord Kirkwood, seemed to encourage the possibility. Prime Minister Brown briefly publicized his desire for ‘a government of all the talents’, specifically offering a cabinet post to former Liberal Democrat leader Paddy Ashdown and advisory posts to other individuals (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010, p. 102). When this became known within Liberal Democratic ranks, the reaction was highly negative. Throughout the years since the Second World War, party leadership has explored possibilities for coalition with one or the other of the major parties, usually Labour. Very substantial elements of the membership have generally been opposed to such pragmatic efforts. The principal exception is the Liberal–Social Democratic Alliance of the 1980s, which evolved in the following decade into the Liberal Democrats. In the case at hand, when Brown decided against holding a general election in 2007, this effectively isolated Campbell, who stepped down. Among other additional considerations, he would be nearly 70 years old when the next general election likely would be held (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010, pp. 103–4).

  Sir Menzies’ successor was Nicholas Clegg, a favorite of the relatively traditional Liberal Democratic establishment, and notably younger than Campbell. Clegg had a reputation for pragmatism and a stated desire to broaden the party’s base beyond the strongly committed and declared individual membership. This proved a challenge in his leadership contest with Chris Huhne, who had earlier run for leader and was the more doctrinaire of the two, reflected in his role as Environment Spokesperson, a portfolio congruent with the dedicated activism of some of the most committed Liberal Democrats. Clegg’s more flexible style, however, was doubtless well suited to the Coalition government negotiations which occupied the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democratic parties following the 2010 election. Moreover, in the ultimate contest each of the leaders of the three main parties was in the top party post for the first time in a general election.

  By contrast with the relatively well-established if often frustrated Liberal Democrats in Britain, the Tea Party in the US is a very recent phenomenon, at least in terms of historic continuity of organization. According to accepted party gospel, the founding moment was 19 February 2009. Rick Santelli, a financial commentator for CNBC, was on the floor of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Apparently spontaneously, he declared that the Obama administration’s economic bailout policies were misguided, to say the least. Specifically, he denounced a mortgage assistance plan. He was specific in complaining about ‘losers’ who look to government subsidies, in contrast to honest hardworking citizens who had ‘played by the rules’. An enthusiastic, robust crowd of commodities traders cheered him on. Mr Santelli went on to talk about a possible reenactment of the Boston Tea Party, which had helped spark the American Revolution, to be held on the shores of Lake Michigan in July. He declared there would be ‘a Chicago Tea Party’. According to the widely circulated story, this led to enormous, spontaneous grassroots eruptions of popular support, and masses of television viewers responded to the message (Zernike, 2010, p. 13).

  Unfortunately for the promoters of this legend, as for those who purvey other legends, the real story is different, or at least not as dramatic. Three days earlier, the first of the contemporary Tea Party rallies had been held in Seattle, Washington. The prime initiator of this protest was Keli Carender, whose main job was teaching mathematics to adults receiving public aid, supplemented by acting in an improvisational theatre company on weekends. She did not have a history of political activism, and had become energized by specific unhappiness with the rapidly escalating federal spending and deficits under President George W. Bush, and the unconventional, at least quasi-liberal leanings of Senator John McCain, the Republican Party presidential nominee in 2008 (Zernike, 2010, pp. 8–9, 13–17).

  The election of clearly liberal President Barack Obama, especially given the by then dominance of the Democratic Party as well in both houses of Congress, seemed to foreclose likely attractive policy alternatives in both major parties. While some moderate and conservative Democrats were part of the new Senate and House majorities elected in 2006, the congressional party was rightly perceived to be predominantly liberal. Hence, there developed the apparently independent radical conservative statements and initiatives of Carender, Santelli, and a growing population of othe
r disaffected citizens. A common theme which quickly emerged to unify these apparently disparate groups and individuals is that Washington and associated policy and interest group elites are distant from average, struggling American taxpayers, who in turn are systematically being disenfranchised. These events sparked a number of others, such that the Tea Party movement was a national force as candidates and party organizations were gearing up for the 2010 elections for Congress, governorships, and state legislatures. Prominent Tea Party activists are fairly consistent in stating that they are conservatives and not inherently Republican partisans or naturally aligned with that party.

  Critics of the Tea Party, especially those given to conspiratorial interpretations of events, were quick to accuse established conservative activists and groups of engineering the movement.

  FreedomWorks, a powerful ideological lobby for conservative causes, which is well funded and also based in Washington, is frequently mentioned as an instigator, along with popular commentator Glenn Beck of FOX News, and even the FOX network itself. Australian media executive Rupert Murdoch, with worldwide commercial holdings, great wealth, and a very private operating style, makes an ideal devil for devil theories of politics.

  Kate Zernike, author of the superb book Boiling Mad – Inside Tea Party America, argues persuasively that Freedom Works and other established national organizations, at least some of them well connected to the national Republican Party establishment, did not spark the Tea Party movement but did move expeditiously and efficiently to provide organizational as well as financial support. Glenn Beck is also credited for charisma as well as support in mobilizing supporters. He organized a mass rally in Washington, DC, in the summer of 2010 which not surprisingly drew extensive media attention, although by 2011 his television program was cancelled by the FOX Network. The movement remains, however, essentially a grassroots phenomenon. While supporters regularly deny formal affiliation with either major party, polls show that in fact they are heavily Republican in partisan orientation. Their efforts to influence elections have been concentrated on Republican nomination processes (Zernike, 2010, pp. 4, 221).