Hard Choices

by Hillary Rodham Clinton

  In early July, at a regularly scheduled meeting with President Obama and his full homeland security and counterterrorism teams, I presented our strategy. Danny brought a detailed PowerPoint presentation that described the four initiatives and the resources and authorities we’d need to execute them. Panetta immediately backed me up, telling the President that this was exactly what was needed. Secretary Gates agreed. Attorney General Eric Holder and Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano also spoke in favor. Then we turned to the President. I could see he was a little upset. “I don’t know what I have to do around here to get people to listen to me,” he said, with exasperation. Not a good start. “I’ve been asking for this kind of plan for more than a year!” That was a green light from the top. “We have everything we need,” I told Danny afterward. “Let’s get started.”

  * * *

  * * *

  “We’ve got a lead.”

  It was early March 2011, and Leon Panetta and I were having lunch in a private dining room on the eighth floor of the State Department.

  Not long before, he had taken me aside after a meeting in the Situation Room and said he had something important to talk about privately. No staff, no notes. I had offered to pay another visit to his office at Langley, but this time he insisted on coming to the State Department. So here we were at lunch. I was eager to hear what was on his mind.

  Leon leaned in and said that the CIA had been tracking the best lead they’d had in years about the possible whereabouts of Osama bin Laden. The Agency had been quietly working this for some time. Leon had slowly started telling senior administration officials, starting at the White House. He went and saw Bob Gates at the Pentagon in December. In February, he brought in the Joint Chiefs and Admiral Bill McRaven, commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, whose troops might be called upon to lead a raid if the intelligence was strong enough. Now he was telling me, because he wanted me to join a small group at the White House to discuss what to do.

  I knew that President Obama had told Leon shortly after the inauguration that he wanted the CIA to refocus its efforts on al Qaeda and finding bin Laden. Agents and analysts worked triple-time in Langley and out in the field, and now it seemed their efforts were yielding results. It had been nearly a decade since I stood at the smoldering pile at Ground Zero, and Americans still wanted justice. But I also knew that intelligence is an uncertain business and that previous leads had failed to pan out.

  I couldn’t tell anyone at the State Department—or anywhere, for that matter—what was happening, which created some awkward moments with my staff. It has been more than twenty years since I’ve been able to do much of anything without at least a dozen people noticing, but with a little misdirection, I pulled it off.

  Our small group met at the White House multiple times in March and April. Leon and his team presented the case that led them to suspect that a “high-value target,” possibly bin Laden, was living in a walled compound in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad, not far from the country’s premier military training academy, the equivalent of our West Point. Some of the intelligence analysts were highly confident they finally had their man. Others were far less confident, especially those who had lived through the failed intelligence process that concluded that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. We sifted through the reports, listened to the experts, and weighed the probabilities on both sides.

  We also debated our options. One was sharing intelligence with the Pakistanis and conducting a joint raid, but I and others thought we could not trust Pakistan. The President immediately took that option off the table. Another was to bomb the compound from the air. That would pose little risk to U.S. personnel but was likely to cause significant collateral damage in a densely populated neighborhood, and there would be no way to determine with absolute certainty if bin Laden had really been there at all. Using a targeted missile fired from a drone or other platform might limit the damage, but there would still be no way to recover and identify the body or to collect any other useful intelligence on the premises. Worse yet, it could miss, or not do the trick. The only way to be certain he was there, and equally certain that he would be captured or killed, would be to insert Special Operations forces deep into Pakistan to raid the compound. Admiral McRaven’s special operators were highly skilled and experienced, but there was no doubt that this option posed by far the greatest risk, especially if our men ended up in conflict with Pakistani security forces, hundreds of miles from a safe haven.

  The President’s top advisors were split on the wisdom of a raid. Leon and Tom Donilon, by then National Security Advisor, ultimately recommended launching the operation. Bob Gates, who had spent decades as a CIA analyst, wasn’t sold. He thought the intelligence was circumstantial, and he worried that a blowup with the Pakistanis would jeopardize the war effort in Afghanistan. Bob also carried painful memories of Operation Eagle Claw, the disastrous botched rescue attempt of hostages in Iran in 1980 that left eight U.S. servicemen dead when a helicopter collided with a transport aircraft. That was a nightmare scenario that nobody wanted to see repeated. He thought the risks of a raid were just too high and preferred a strike from the air, although he would eventually change his mind. Vice President Biden remained skeptical.

  These were difficult and emotional discussions. Unlike most matters I handled as Secretary of State, because of the extreme secrecy of this case there was no trusted advisor I could turn to or expert I could call.

  I took that seriously, as President Obama found out when, after the raid was over but before he went on television to inform the country, he called all four living ex-Presidents to tell them personally. When he reached Bill, he began, “I assume Hillary’s already told you . . .” Bill had no idea what he was talking about. They told me not to tell anyone, so I didn’t tell anyone. Bill later joked with me, “No one will ever doubt you can keep a secret!”

  I respected Bob and Joe’s concerns about the risks of a raid, but I came to the conclusion that the intelligence was convincing and the risks were outweighed by the benefits of success. We just had to make sure it worked.

  That would be the job of Admiral McRaven. He was a Navy man who had come up through the ranks, including a stint leading an underwater demolition SEAL team. The more I got to know him and watch him plan this mission, the more confident I felt. When I asked about the dangers of the raid on the compound, Admiral McRaven assured me that his Special Operations forces had conducted hundreds of similar missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, sometimes two, three, or more in a single night. Operation Eagle Claw had been a disaster, but the Special Operations forces learned from it. The complicated part would be reaching Abbottabad without triggering Pakistani radar and a response from its security forces stationed nearby. Once his Navy SEALs were on the ground, they would get the job done.

  The SEALs and the Night Stalkers, the pilots of the Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, trained extensively for the mission, including two rehearsals on full-sized replicas of the compound conducted at two different secret locations in the United States. There was also a specially trained Belgian Malinois dog named Cairo who worked alongside the SEALs.

  On April 28, 2011, President Obama convened our group for one last meeting in the White House Situation Room. He went around the table and asked everyone for their final recommendation. The President and I are both lawyers, and I had learned over time how to appeal to his highly analytical mind. So I methodically laid out the case, including the potential damage to our relationship with Pakistan and the risks of a blown operation. But, I concluded, the chance to get bin Laden was worth it. As I had experienced firsthand, our relationship with Pakistan was strictly transactional, based on mutual interest, not trust. It would survive. I thought we should go for it.

  There was also the question of timing and logistics. Because the raid had to be conducted under cover of darkness, Admiral McRaven recommended launching on the soonest moonless night, which would be Saturday, A
pril 30, just two days away. Some officials raised an unexpected concern. The annual White House Correspondents’ Dinner, a high-profile black-tie event at which the President usually tells jokes in front of a room full of reporters and celebrities, was scheduled for Saturday night. These officials worried about how it would look to have the President doing a stand-up routine in case he was needed while the mission was under way. And if he canceled or left early, it would look suspicious and might jeopardize the secrecy of the operation. Admiral McRaven, always the good soldier, gamely promised to make Sunday work if that was the final decision, although any further delays would be a major problem.

  I’ve sat through a lot of absurd conversations, but this was just too much. We were talking about one of the most important national security calls the President would ever make. The mission was already complicated and dangerous enough. If the commander of Special Operations wanted to move on Saturday, then that’s what we should do. While I don’t remember exactly what I said, some in the media have quoted me using a four-letter word to dismiss the Correspondents’ Dinner as a concern. I have not sought a correction.

  The President agreed. He said that if worst came to worst and he had to bow out in the middle of the dinner, they could just blame a stomachache. In the end, fog was predicted for Abbottabad on Saturday night, and the mission had to be postponed to Sunday anyway. But at least it wasn’t for a Washington party.

  After the final meeting the President took time to think it over. The team was still divided. It was a decision only he could make. Then he gave the order. The operation, code-named Neptune Spear, was a go.

  * * *

  * * *

  I spent Saturday night at the wedding of a close friend of my daughter’s. The bride, a bright young military strategist fluent in Mandarin who studies the Chinese military, and her friends are all smart and engaging young people. It was a cool spring night, and at the reception on a rooftop overlooking the Potomac, I stood off to the side looking at the river and thinking about what the next day would bring. Guests kept coming up and talking to me, and soon I had about a dozen clustered around. One of them asked, “Secretary Clinton, do you think we’ll ever get bin Laden?” I barely suppressed a double take, startled that he had asked me that question on this night of all nights. I responded, “Well, I sure hope so.”

  At 12:30 P.M. the next day, Sunday, May 1, I took the fifteen-minute drive from my home to the White House and joined other senior members of the national security team in the Situation Room. White House staff had brought in food from a local deli, and everyone was dressed informally. Two of the CIA officers who had chased bin Laden for more than a decade joined us; it was hard to believe their hunt might soon be over. We reviewed the details of the operation again, including the calls we would make afterward.

  At 2:30 P.M. Washington time, two Black Hawk helicopters carrying Navy SEALs took off from a base in Jalalabad, in eastern Afghanistan, where it was 11 P.M. Once they crossed into Pakistan, three large Chinook transport helicopters followed with reinforcements ready to deploy if needed.

  The whir of the Black Hawks’ rotors cut into the silence of the Abbottabad night about two minutes before they swooped in over the compound. Their approach was visible, fast and low, on the video screen in a small conference room where we had gathered, across from the larger Situation Room. Then, instead of hovering in the air while the SEALs “fast-roped” to the ground, as the plan had called for, one of the Black Hawks quickly began to lose lift. The pilot “landed hard,” and the helicopter’s tail hit the compound wall. (Later the military was able to pinpoint the problem: the full-scale practice model of the compound had a chain-link fence instead of a stone wall, which changed the airflow dynamics enough to compromise the Black Hawk’s operability.) As if this were not alarming enough, a second helicopter, which was supposed to land and drop SEALs on the roof of the compound, had to improvise, flew past without stopping, and landed instead on the ground outside the compound.

  That was as tense a moment as any I can remember. It conjured up ghosts, not just of the tragic accident in Iran that Bob had presciently feared from the outset, but also the infamous “Black Hawk Down” incident in Somalia in 1993, in which eighteen American soldiers were killed in Mogadishu. Were we about to witness another disaster for the United States? I thought about the men risking their lives out there in the middle of the night on the other side of the world, and I held my breath. There is a famous photograph of that day that shows me holding my hand over my mouth as we all stared at the screen. I can’t say for sure at what moment that picture was taken, but it does capture how I felt.

  Finally we could exhale: the damaged Black Hawk landed and the SEALs jumped out, ready to begin the assault. It was the first of many heroic acts that night. Admiral McRaven was right: his team knew how to handle every bump in the road. The operation was still a go.

  We watched on the video feed as the SEALs improvised, sweeping through the courtyard of the compound and heading inside to look for bin Laden. Contrary to some news reports and what you see in the movies, we had no means to see what was happening inside the building itself. All we could do was wait for an update from the team on the ground. I looked at the President. He was calm. Rarely have I been prouder to serve by his side as I was that day.

  After what seemed like an eternity, but was actually about fifteen minutes, word came from McRaven that the team had found bin Laden and he was “E-KIA,” enemy killed in action. Osama bin Laden was dead.

  One of the backup helicopters had arrived to help ferry the SEALs to safety, along with bin Laden’s body and a treasure trove of captured intelligence. But first they had to blow up the disabled helicopter they were leaving behind so none of its advanced technology could be recovered and studied. While some of the team planted explosives, others gathered up all the women and children who were living in the compound—the families of bin Laden and the others—and led them to safety behind a wall so they would be shielded from the blast. Amid all the dangers and pressures of the day, this humane gesture by our military spoke volumes about America’s values.

  * * *

  * * *

  Once he knew the SEALs were back in Afghanistan and the body had been confirmed as bin Laden’s, it was time for the President to address the nation. I walked with him, Biden, Panetta, Donilon, Mike Mullen, and Jim Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, to the East Room, a place I had been countless times for announcements, musical performances, and state dinners. Now I was in a small audience watching the President deliver historic remarks. I was drained from the emotions and unrelenting tension of the day, not to mention the weeks and months that had led up to it. Listening to the President describe the successful operation made me both proud and grateful. As we walked back through the colonnade that borders the Rose Garden, we heard an unexpected roar coming from beyond the gates. Then I saw a huge crowd of young people, many of them students from nearby universities, gathered outside the White House in a spontaneous celebration, waving American flags, chanting, “USA! USA!” Most had been children when al Qaeda attacked the United States on 9/11. They had grown up in the shadow of the War on Terror; it had been part of their consciousness for as long as they could remember. Now they were expressing the emotional release our entire country felt after so many years waiting for justice.

  I stood still and let the shouts and cheers wash over me. I thought about the families I knew back in New York who still grieved for their loved ones lost on that terrible day. Would they find some measure of solace tonight? Would survivors like Lauren Manning and Debbie Mardenfeld, who had been so badly injured, face the future with renewed optimism and confidence? I also thought about the CIA officers who never gave up the hunt, even when the trail went cold, and about the SEALs and pilots who performed even better than Admiral McRaven had promised. And every one of them came home.

  * * *

  * * *

  I was not looking forward to the difficult convers
ations ahead with the Pakistanis. As expected, when news spread, the country was in an uproar. The military was humiliated and the public inflamed by what they viewed as a violation of Pakistani sovereignty. But when I connected with President Zardari, he was more philosophical than hostile. “People think I am weak,” he said, “but I am not weak. I know my country and I have done everything possible. I cannot deny the fact that the most wanted man in the world was in my country. It is everyone’s failure that we did not know.” He emphasized that Pakistan had been a friend to the United States for six decades, and he described the fight against terrorism in deeply personal terms. “I am fighting for my life and for the future life of my children,” he said. “I am fighting the people who killed the mother of my children.”

  I commiserated with Zardari and told him that a number of senior American officials were on their way to meet with him in person. I would come myself when the time was right. But I was also firm with him: “Mr. President, I believe strongly that there can be a way forward that meets both our interests. We would both be worse off if our close cooperation ended. But I want to be clear, as a close friend and someone with high regard for you, that finding this path will require you and your country to make choices. We want greater cooperation.”

  I would devote intense energy over the coming months to holding together our fragile relationship, as did our Ambassador in Islamabad, Cameron Munter, and his team. We came close to a serious rupture quite a few more times, but the fundamental shared interests that I had described to my colleagues in our White House deliberations continued to bring our two countries back together. Even without bin Laden, terrorism would remain a threat neither nation could ignore. Pakistan still faced a deadly Taliban insurgency and mounting social and economic problems.