Hard Choices

by Hillary Rodham Clinton

  But if rebels could be vetted and trained effectively, it would be helpful in a number of ways. First, even a relatively small group might be able to give a big psychological boost to the opposition and convince Assad’s backers to consider a political solution. Hezbollah gave credence to this view on the other side, when they helped shift the war in Assad’s favor by deploying only a few thousand hard-core fighters.

  Second, and more immediately, our action—or inaction—had consequences for our relationships with our regional partners. It wasn’t a secret that various Arab states and individuals were sending arms into Syria. But the flow of weapons was poorly coordinated, with different countries sponsoring different and sometimes competing armed groups. And a troubling amount of matériel was finding its way to extremists. Because the United States was not part of this effort, we had less leverage to corral and coordinate the arms traffic. I had heard this firsthand in difficult conversations around the Gulf. If, however, America was willing finally to get in the game, we could be much more effective in isolating the extremists and empowering the moderates inside Syria.

  One of the prime worries about Syria—and one of the reasons it was a wicked problem—was the lack of any viable alternatives to Assad on the ground. He and his allies could plausibly argue, like Louis XV of France, “Après moi, le déluge.” (After Assad, chaos.) The power vacuum in Iraq after the fall of Saddam and the disbanding of the Iraqi Army offered a cautionary tale. But if the United States could train and equip a reliable and effective moderate rebel force, it could help hold the country together during a transition, safeguard chemical weapons stockpiles, and prevent ethnic cleansing and score settling.

  But could it be done? The key would be thoroughly vetting the rebel fighters to ensure we first weeded out the extremists and then maintained close intelligence sharing and operational coordination with all our partners.

  In Iraq and Afghanistan the United States spent considerable energy training local soldiers, trying to mold them into a cohesive national army capable of providing security and defeating insurgencies. General David Petraeus, who commanded the U.S. military effort in both countries before becoming Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in 2011, knew firsthand how hard this could be. Despite some successes, the Iraqi and Afghan security forces were still struggling to find their footing. But through his experience in those countries, Petraeus had learned a lot about what worked and what didn’t.

  I invited Petraeus to my house in Washington for lunch on a Saturday afternoon in July to discuss whether it was possible to vet, train, and equip moderate opposition fighters. If he thought this kind of effort could be accomplished in Syria, that would mean a lot. He had already given careful thought to the idea, and had even started sketching out the specifics and was preparing to present a plan.

  Our military’s top brass, reluctant to get involved in Syria, consistently offered dire projections of the forces that would be required to overcome Assad’s advanced air defenses and conduct a Libya-style no-fly zone. But Secretary of Defense Panetta had become as frustrated as I was with the lack of options in Syria; he knew from his own time leading the CIA what our intelligence operatives could do.

  In mid-August, I headed to Istanbul to consult with President Abdullah Gül, Prime Minister Erdoğan, and Foreign Minister Davutoğlu. Turkey was deeply troubled by what was happening across its border and trying to cope with the massive influx of refugees from Syria, some of whom I met while there, as well as periodic incidents of cross-border violence, including Syria’s shooting down a Turkish fighter jet over the Mediterranean. The loss of that plane was a dramatic reminder that this crisis could explode into a regional conflict at any moment. In my meetings I affirmed that the United States and the rest of our NATO allies were committed to Turkey’s security against Syrian aggression.

  Although there had been continuous consultations between us and the Turks since the conflict started, I thought we should intensify operational planning by our militaries in order to prepare contingency plans. What would it take to impose a no-fly zone? How would we respond to the use or loss of chemical weapons? How could we better coordinate support for the armed opposition? The Turks agreed, and two days later Davutoğlu and I got on the phone to discuss our thinking with the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Germany.

  I returned to Washington reasonably confident that if we decided to begin arming and training moderate Syrian rebels, we could put in place effective coordination with our regional partners. By now interagency planning was in high gear, and Petraeus presented the plan to the President. He listened carefully and had a lot of questions. He worried that arming the rebels was not likely to be enough to drive Assad from power and that with all the weapons already flowing into the country from Arab nations, our contributions would hardly be decisive. And there were always unintended consequences to consider. The story of the mujahideen in Afghanistan remained a powerful cautionary tale never far from anyone’s mind. The President asked for examples of instances when the United States had backed an insurgency that could be considered a success.

  These were very reasonable concerns, but Petraeus and I argued that there was a big difference between Qatar and Saudi Arabia dumping weapons into the country and the United States responsibly training and equipping a nonextremist rebel force. And getting control of that mess was a big part of our plan’s rationale. What’s more, the goal was not to build up a force strong enough to defeat the regime. Rather the idea was to give us a partner on the ground we could work with that could do enough to convince Assad and his backers that a military victory was impossible. It wasn’t a perfect plan, by any means. In fact, the best I could say for it was that it was the least bad option among many even worse alternatives.

  Despite high-level support from the National Security Council, some in the White House were skeptical. After all, the President had been elected in large part because of his opposition to the war in Iraq and his promise to bring the troops home. Getting entangled in any way in another sectarian civil war in the Middle East was not what he had in mind when coming into office. And the President thought we needed more time to evaluate the Syrian opposition before escalating our commitment.

  The risks of both action and inaction were high. Both choices would bring unintended consequences. The President’s inclination was to stay the present course and not take the significant further step of arming rebels.

  No one likes to lose a debate, including me. But this was the President’s call and I respected his deliberations and decision. From the beginning of our partnership, he had promised me that I would always get a fair hearing. And I always did. In this case, my position didn’t prevail.

  With the plan to arm the rebels dead in the water, I threw myself back into the diplomatic push, trying to further isolate and pressure the regime while addressing the humanitarian catastrophe. In August 2012, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon had appointed Lakhdar Brahimi, an experienced diplomat from Algeria, to succeed Kofi Annan. He and I met and talked often, right up until my tenure ended. At a meeting of the Friends of the Syrian People in September, I announced additional aid to help get food, water, blankets, and critical medical services to people suffering in Syria. I also pledged increased support for civilian opposition groups, including satellite-linked computers, telephones, cameras, and training for more than a thousand activists, students, and independent journalists. As more parts of Syria slipped free from the regime’s control, we would also help local opposition groups provide essential services, such as reopening schools and rebuilding homes. But all of these steps were Band-Aids. The conflict would rage on.

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  By the time I departed the State Department in early 2013, tens of thousands of Syrians had been killed. Millions more had fled. International diplomacy had reached a standstill. Our fears were being realized as extremists were eclipsing the more moderate leaders of the Free Syrian Army.

  In Marc
h 2013, little more than a month after I left office, troubling reports started coming in from around Aleppo that the Assad regime had begun using chemical weapons for the first time. This had been a major concern for two years. Syria was believed to maintain some of the biggest stockpiles of mustard gas, sarin, and other chemical weapons in the world. Throughout 2012, we had received sporadic reports that regime forces were moving or mixing chemical agents. In response both President Obama and I issued stark warnings. In August 2012, President Obama said that moving or using chemical weapons was a red line for the United States. The clear implication was that if the regime crossed that line, actions, potentially including military force, would be taken. In 2012, that threat seemed to be an effective deterrent, and Assad backed down. So if these new reports about chemical weapons were true, the conflict in Syria had just taken a very dangerous turn.

  The President again said that the use of chemical weapons would be a game changer, but U.S. intelligence agencies were not yet ready to say with any certainty that an attack had actually happened. More investigation was needed. In June 2013, in a low-key statement, the White House confirmed that it finally felt confident that chemical weapons had indeed been used on a small scale on multiple occasions, killing up to 150 people. The President decided to increase aid to the Free Syrian Army. On background, administration officials told the press they would begin supplying arms and ammunition for the first time, reversing the President’s decision the previous summer.

  Then, in August 2013, the world was shocked by images of a massive new chemical attack in opposition neighborhoods around Damascus. The reported death toll would climb to more than 1,400 men, women, and children. This was a major escalation and a blatant violation of both the President’s red line and long-standing international norms. Pressure began building immediately for a robust response from the United States. Secretary of State Kerry took the lead in condemning the attack, calling it a “moral obscenity.” President Obama said, “We cannot accept a world where women and children and innocent civilians are gassed on a terrible scale.” Americans wondered whether military action was imminent.

  Some commentators and members of Congress asked why the President cared so much about chemical weapons when Assad had been killing so many people with conventional weapons. Chemical weapons are in a category by themselves. They have been banned by the international community since the 1925 Geneva Protocol and 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention because they are gruesome, indiscriminate, and inhumane. As President Obama explained, “If we fail to act, the Assad regime will see no reason to stop using chemical weapons. As the ban against these weapons erodes, other tyrants will have no reason to think twice about acquiring poison gas, and using them. Over time, our troops would again face the prospect of chemical warfare on the battlefield. And it could be easier for terrorist organizations to obtain these weapons, and to use them to attack civilians.”

  As the White House geared up for action, Prime Minister David Cameron lost a vote in the British Parliament to authorize the use of force in Syria. Two days later President Obama announced his intent to order air strikes to deter and degrade future use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime. But in a move that surprised many in Washington, the President said he would seek authorization from Congress, which was in recess, before acting. Suddenly Congress was plunged into a fierce debate about what to do. Parallels were drawn with the run-up to the war in Iraq. Worst-case scenarios and slippery slopes were invoked. The President’s plan for a limited strike to uphold a crucial global norm seemed to get lost in the bluster. As the days went by, the tide of public opinion began to turn against the White House. Vote counters in Congress began predicting that the President might lose, which would deal a serious blow to U.S. prestige and credibility. I watched the back-and-forth with consternation. Syria had become even more of a wicked problem. I supported the President’s efforts with Congress and urged lawmakers to act.

  During this time, I spoke with Secretary Kerry and White House Chief of Staff Denis McDonough about ways to strengthen the President’s hand abroad, especially in advance of his trip later that week to the G-20 summit in St. Petersburg, where he’d see Vladimir Putin. Not wanting Putin to be able to hold the contentious Congressional debate over the President, I suggested to Denis that the White House find some way to show bipartisan support ahead of the vote. Knowing that Senator Bob Corker, the leading Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was no fan of Putin’s, my advice to Denis was that he be enlisted to help send a message. The idea was to use a routine committee hearing that week to hold a vote on the authorization to use military force that the President would win. Denis, always open to ideas and very familiar with the ways of Congress from his time serving on Capitol Hill, agreed. Working with Corker, the White House got the vote. While not the world’s most significant statement, it was enough to telegraph to Putin that we were not as divided as he hoped. Denis called back a few days later to see if I had any other ideas, and said that the President wanted to call me the next day. Knowing how much he had on his plate, I told Denis the President shouldn’t feel it was necessary. But Denis said that POTUS (the President of the United States) was going to call, and we spoke the next day about the state of play of his Congressional efforts and other ongoing developments on the international stage.

  In a fortuitous coincidence, I was scheduled to go to the White House in person on September 9 for an event about illegal wildlife trafficking. At the State Department I had learned that African forest elephants were nearing extinction. While unfortunate on its own, what caught my attention was one of the reasons behind it: terrorists and armed groups like Al Shabaab and the Lord’s Resistance Army had entered the illegal ivory trade as a means of funding their illicit and destabilizing activities across Central Africa. When I left government and joined Bill and Chelsea at the Clinton Foundation, Chelsea and I began working with leading conservation groups to organize a global response that would “stop the killing, stop the trafficking, and stop the demand.” Thanks in part to our lobbying, the White House also saw this as an important issue, and President Obama signed an executive order in the summer of 2013 to step up antitrafficking efforts. Now the White House was holding a conference to plan next steps, and they wanted Chelsea and me to be there. Of course, all anyone in the rest of the world wanted to hear about was Syria.

  That morning, at a press conference in London, Secretary Kerry was asked if there was anything Assad could do to prevent military action. “Sure,” Kerry replied, “he could turn over every single bit of his chemical weapons to the international community in the next week—turn it over, all of it without delay and allow a full and total accounting for that. But he isn’t about to do it and it can’t be done.” Although Kerry’s answer may have reflected conversations he was having with allies and the Russians, it sounded to the world like an offhand remark. A State Department spokesperson downplayed it as “a rhetorical argument.” The Russians, however, seized on Kerry’s comment and embraced it as a serious diplomatic offer.

  When I arrived at the White House at 1 P.M., top administration officials were debating how to respond. I was given a briefing, and then I went into the Oval Office to talk with the President. It was strange being back in that familiar room for the first time since I’d stepped down seven months earlier, once again discussing an urgent international crisis. I told the President that if the votes for action against Syria were not winnable in Congress, he should make lemonade out of lemons and welcome the unexpected overture from Moscow.

  There were reasons to be cautious, of course. This latest diplomatic ploy by the Russians could be just another delaying tactic to keep Assad in power at all costs. The large chemical weapons supply wasn’t good for them either, with its own restive Muslim population. But the prospect of eliminating Assad’s chemical weapons stockpile was worth the risk, especially since the President was facing a potentially damaging standoff with Congress. This wouldn’t end the civil war or
do much to help civilians caught in the crossfire, but it would remove a serious threat to Syrian civilians, neighbors including Israel, and the United States itself. As the conflict worsened and instability increased, so too would the chances that these chemical weapons would be used again against Syrian civilians or transferred to Hezbollah or stolen by other terrorists.

  I told the President that I still believed it was crucial to pursue a diplomatic solution that would end the conflict. I knew exactly how hard this would be. After all, I had been trying since March 2011. But the road map we had signed in Geneva the previous year still offered a path forward. Maybe cooperation on chemical weapons would create momentum for broader progress. It was unlikely, but worth testing.

  The President agreed and asked me to make a statement. Outside the Oval, I huddled with Ben Rhodes, the President’s Deputy National Security Advisor and top foreign policy speechwriter, scribbling new language at the top of my remarks on ivory trafficking. Like Denis McDonough, Rhodes was one of the President’s aides whom I had come to trust and value over the years. He had also grown close with members of my team, and they would reminisce about how far we’d all come since the bad old days of the 2008 primary campaign, and how they missed working together. Now I was glad once again to have his advice on how to send just the right message to the world.

  When I walked into the wildlife event in the White House auditorium, it was packed with more cameras and journalists than had probably ever reported on elephant poaching before. I started with Syria: “If the regime immediately surrendered its stockpiles as was suggested by Secretary Kerry and the Russians, that would be an important step. But this cannot be another excuse for delay or obstruction, and Russia has to support the international community’s efforts sincerely or be held to account.” I also stressed that it was the President’s threat to use force that spurred the Russians to look for a way out.